Jennifer Myrick v. Richard Greenwood, et al
Filing
Filed opinion of the court PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge; Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge and Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. [6839227-1] [6839227] [16-3342]
Case: 16-3342
Document: 18
Filed: 05/05/2017
Pages: 5
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐3342
JENNIFER J. MYRICK,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
RICHARD G. GREENWOOD, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 16‐C‐460 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED APRIL 13, 2017* — DECIDED MAY 5, 2017
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and EASTERBROOK,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Dismayed that her former husband has been
awarded custody of their son, Jennifer Myrick brought this
suit seeking damages from the six state judges and court
* The appellees were not served with process in the district court and
have not participated in this appeal. We decide the appeal without oral
argument because it is frivolous. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(A).
Case: 16-3342
2
Document: 18
Filed: 05/05/2017
Pages: 5
No. 16‐3342
commissioners who presided over parts of the lengthy di‐
vorce and child‐custody proceedings. She maintains that, by
ruling against her, the judges manifested bias in favor of her
former husband, violating her right to due process of law in
that and other ways, and overlooked misconduct by her
former husband, her son’s guardians ad litem, and her own
attorney. She did not ask the federal court in this suit under
42 U.S.C. §1983 to change the award of custody but did re‐
quest damages.
The district court summarily dismissed the suit because
judges are absolutely immune from awards of damages for
acts taken in a judicial capacity, whether or not the judges
erred in conducting the litigation. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
Myrick’s brief does not try to explain why the defendants
are not entitled to immunity. It does not contend that the de‐
fendants acted other than in a judicial capacity. It is instead a
compendium of reasons Myrick believes that the state judges
should have ruled in her favor. Myrick contends that the
judges acted in bad faith, but “judicial immunity is not over‐
come by allegations of bad faith or malice”. Mireles, 502 U.S.
at 11. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, not the federal judi‐
ciary, is responsible for dealing with claims that state judges
erred. The judgment of the district court therefore is
AFFIRMED.
Case: 16-3342
No. 16‐3342
Document: 18
Filed: 05/05/2017
Pages: 5
3
POSNER, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the panel opinion
without reservations, but wish to note some wrinkles in the
case that merit the attention of our staff attorneys; of our
judges when they review orders, disposing of appeals, draft‐
ed by staff attorneys; of the district judges; and of litigants
and their lawyers, when the litigants have lawyers.
As noted in the panel opinion, the plaintiff filed this suit
in federal district court in Wisconsin against six Wisconsin
circuit court judges and family court commissioners, and the
opinion rightly notes that the defendants are immune from
liability for rulings made in the course of their judicial du‐
ties, as all the rulings that the plaintiff challenges were. But it
is worth noting that the “commissioner” defendants, though
not called judges, are judicial officers and therefore really do
partake of the same immunity as the state circuit court judg‐
es. See Milwaukee County Courts, Family Division, “What is
the Family Court Commissioner’s Office?,” http://county.
milwaukee.gov/Courts/Family.htm (visited May 5, 2017);
Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016).
Another wrinkle concerns a footnote that often appears
in our orders and opinions deciding appeals when we have
not heard oral argument: “We have agreed to decide this
case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral
argument would not significantly aid the court.” This lan‐
guage is derived from Rule 34(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which states: “Oral argument must be
allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who
have examined the briefs and record unanimously agrees
that oral argument is unnecessary for any of the following
reasons: (A) the appeal is frivolous; (B) the dispositive issue
Case: 16-3342
4
Document: 18
Filed: 05/05/2017
Pages: 5
No. 16‐3342
or issues have been authoritatively decided; or (C) the facts
and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs
and record, and the decisional process would not be signifi‐
cantly aided by oral argument.”
The commonly appearing footnote quoted above thus
tracks Rule 34(a)(2)(C), but is inapposite to the present case
and thus is properly omitted from the panel opinion. The
appellees were not served with process in the district court
and have not participated in the appeal, and the only brief
(not briefs) filed in the case was the plaintiff’s. The plaintiff
has no lawyer, has not requested that we try to find one to
represent her in this court, and has not asked for oral argu‐
ment. The appellate record circulated to the three judges
who constitute this appellate panel consisted solely of her
complaint, the district judge’s order dismissing the case, and
her brief—a brief that contains almost nothing that could be
regarded as a legal argument and in many places misappre‐
hends the function of a court of appeals, as when she asks us
“for a money judgment for no less than $3 million and no
more than $1 billion.”
It is true that additional material (available to the judges
on request) appears in a separate appendix lodged with the
clerk of our court, but none of that material is germane to the
issues on appeal. It recounts, for example, the appellant’s
custody battles with her former husband, including her state
court custody litigation, and it adds some medical records.
Finally there is the district court record, which has been filed
with us but which contains nothing of significance to the
plaintiff’s appeal: her consent to jurisdiction by a magistrate
judge; the chief district judge’s order dismissing the case and
Case: 16-3342
No. 16‐3342
Document: 18
Filed: 05/05/2017
Pages: 5
5
denying her motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis;
and her notice of appeal.
So there is a brief but not briefs, a scanty appellate record,
no request for oral argument—and no purpose would be
served by oral argument because, as the majority opinion
points out, the appeal is frivolous. It is therefore because of
Rule 34(a)(2)(A) (“the appeal is frivolous”) rather than
34(a)(2)(C) (“the facts and legal arguments are adequately
presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional pro‐
cess would not be significantly aided by oral argument”)
that we are authorized to decide the case without oral argu‐
ment.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?