Cornell Reynolds v. Randall Hepp

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Filed opinion of the court by Judge Hamilton. AFFIRMED. Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge, dissenting; David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge and Amy C. Barrett, Circuit Judge. [6948525-1] [6948525] [16-3430]

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Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30     In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________  No. 16‐3430  CORNELL D. REYNOLDS,  Petitioner‐Appellant,  v.  RANDALL HEPP,  Respondent‐Appellee.  ____________________  Appeal from the United States District Court for the  Eastern District of Wisconsin.  No. 16‐CV‐508 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.  ____________________  ARGUED JANUARY 4, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 30, 2018  ____________________  Before  WOOD,  Chief  Judge,  and  HAMILTON  and  BARRETT,  Circuit Judges.  HAMILTON,  Circuit  Judge.  Petitioner‐appellant  Cornell  Reynolds  seeks  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  under  28  U.S.C.  § 2254. In 2002, a Wisconsin jury convicted Reynolds in a fatal  carjacking. He seeks habeas relief based on two alleged viola‐ tions of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to coun‐ sel. First, he argues that Wisconsin violated his right to coun‐ sel when it stopped paying his state‐appointed lawyer during  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 2  Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  his direct appeal. In the alternative, he argues that he received  ineffective  assistance  from  his  counsel  during  his  direct  ap‐ peal and trial. The district court denied relief. We affirm.  I.  Factual & Procedural Background  In May 2001, two young men approached a group of teen‐ agers in a parking lot in Milwaukee. One of the men shot two  of the teenagers, killing one of them. The two men drove away  in the car the two teenage victims had been driving. Reynolds  was  arrested  two  days  later  after  he  was  identified  as  the  shooter.  Wisconsin  indicted  him  for  carjacking  resulting  in  death, carjacking resulting in bodily harm, and possessing a  firearm  as  a  felon.  A  jury  convicted  Reynolds  on  all  three  charges.  Reynolds  sought  relief  through  a  direct  appeal,  a  state  post‐conviction  proceeding,  and  a  state  habeas  corpus  petition. Finding no relief in the state courts, he filed his fed‐ eral habeas corpus petition. We start by summarizing the rel‐ evant facts at each stage of Reynolds’s case.  A.  Trial & Direct Appeal  Before trial, Reynolds raised an equal protection challenge  to  Wisconsin’s  felony  carjacking  statute.  The  trial  court  re‐ jected the challenge, and the case proceeded to trial. The main  issue  at  trial  was  identification.  The  prosecution  called  four  eyewitnesses,  including  the  surviving  gunshot  victim.  Each  identified  Reynolds  as  one  of  the  two  carjackers  and  as  the  shooter of at least one victim. Reynolds did not testify and did  not  call  any  witnesses.  The  jury  convicted  Reynolds  of  car‐ jacking  resulting  in  death,  carjacking  resulting  in  bodily  harm, and possession of a firearm by a felon.  The  Wisconsin  State  Public  Defender’s  Office  appointed  attorney  Terry  Williams  as  Reynolds’s  post‐conviction  and  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  3  appellate counsel. With his counsel’s help, Reynolds moved  for a new trial on the basis that his trial counsel provided in‐ effective assistance and should have raised an alibi defense.1  Reynolds  submitted  two  affidavits  describing  his  wherea‐ bouts on the night of the shooting. The trial court found that  the affidavits did not help Reynolds since they placed him just  a  few  minutes  from  the  crime  scene  around  the  time  of  the  shooting. The court denied Reynolds’s motion without an ev‐ identiary hearing, concluding that he had failed to raise facts  showing ineffective assistance or prejudice to his defense.  On direct appeal, Reynolds argued that he was entitled to  an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim and  added  an  argument  that  his  trial  counsel  failed  to  cross‐ examine  the  eyewitnesses  adequately.  The  Wisconsin  Court  of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to hold  what  Wisconsin  courts  call  a  Machner  hearing.  See  State  v.  Machner,  285  N.W.2d  905  (Wis. App.  1979).  On  remand,  the  trial  court  held  an  evidentiary  hearing,  considered  both  arguments, and denied Reynolds’s motion for a new trial.   Reynolds appealed again. At some point after the eviden‐ tiary hearing—and while Reynolds’s appeal was pending— staff at the Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office told at‐ torney Williams that he had spent too much time on his cases.  The  State  Public  Defender’s  Office  informed  Williams  that  they would not pay him for some of the work he had com‐ pleted on Reynolds’s appeal and that they would not pay him  for any more work on the case. They also told Williams that  they would no longer assign cases to him. Handling such a                                                    1  In  Wisconsin,  defendants  generally  begin  their  direct  appeals  by  moving for a new trial in the trial court. See Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h).  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 4  Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  management  issue  by  cutting  off  attorney  Williams  without  taking concrete steps to ensure that his clients would continue  to be represented would seem highly unusual and troubling.  The record before us simply does not show what efforts the  staff might have made to protect Reynolds’s interests.  Reynolds did not immediately learn that the State Public  Defenders  had  stopped  paying  his  attorney.  But  when  he  asked Williams to pursue in the second appeal the equal pro‐ tection challenge to the carjacking statute—which trial coun‐ sel had unsuccessfully raised before trial—Williams told him  that the State was not paying him anymore and that he could  not  afford  to  investigate  that  additional  question.  Reynolds  could not afford to pay for additional work, even assuming  that Williams could have accepted private payments on top of  the earlier public defender payments. The result was that Wil‐ liams did not investigate the equal protection challenge as a  possible  argument  on  appeal.  Nevertheless,  Williams  com‐ pleted briefing in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals on the inef‐ fective‐assistance claims and later filed a petition for review  with the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals af‐ firmed the denial of a new trial, and the Wisconsin Supreme  Court denied review.  B.  Collateral Post‐Conviction Relief  In  October  2010,  Reynolds  filed  a  pro  se  collateral  post‐ conviction motion in the trial court under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  As relevant here, Reynolds argued that he received ineffective  assistance  of  appellate  counsel  because  attorney  Williams  failed to argue that his trial counsel should have challenged  the  jury  instructions  on  carjacking.  The  formal  charging  in‐ strument had said that Reynolds took the vehicle “by use of”  a dangerous weapon, but the jury was instructed to convict  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 No. 16‐3430  Pages: 30 5  even if it found that he took the car by only “threat of the use  of  a  dangerous  weapon.”  Reynolds  argued  that  the  jury  should have been instructed using the language in the formal  charges and that Williams was ineffective for not raising this  argument on appeal.  The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and  the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court  first  found  that  Reynolds’s  claim  for  ineffective  appellate  counsel  was  conclusory  and,  therefore,  procedurally  barred  under State v. Escalona‐Naranjo, 517 N.W.2d 157 (Wis. 1994). In  the alternative, the court found that the jury instructions were  sufficient  to  support  a  conviction  under  Wisconsin  law  be‐ cause  the  carjacking  statute  establishes  a  single  offense  that  can be committed by using or threatening to use a weapon.  See Wis. Stat. § 943.23(1g) (defining carjacking as intentionally  taking “any vehicle without the consent of the owner” by “the  use  of,  or  the  threat  of  the  use  of,  force”  or  a  dangerous  weapon). The court also found that even if the jury instruc‐ tions  were  improper,  Reynolds  could  not  prove  prejudice.  The central issue at trial was identification, not the difference  between using a gun and threatening to use a gun—after all,  the carjacker shot two victims, and one died. The Wisconsin  Supreme Court again denied review.  C.  State Habeas Corpus Proceedings  Reynolds next filed a state habeas corpus petition  in the  Wisconsin Court of Appeals under State v. Knight, 484 N.W.2d  540 (Wis. 1992). In it, he alleged that Wisconsin violated his  Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel when the  State  Public  Defender’s  Office  stopped  paying  his  appellate  attorney. Reynolds claimed that the State interfered with his  representation, created a conflict of interest between him and  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 6  Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  his lawyer, and caused his lawyer to forgo investigating the  equal protection challenge. The Court of Appeals once again  denied relief. The court relied on two cases that applied the  conflict‐of‐interest standard in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335  (1980)—Freeman v. Chandler, 645 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2011),  and  State  v.  Love,  594  N.W.2d  806,  810–11  (Wis.  1999)—and  found that Reynolds had not shown that the alleged conflict  adversely  affected  his  lawyer’s  representation  of  him.  The  court  found  as  a  matter  of  state  law  that  Reynolds  had  for‐ feited the equal protection challenge by failing to raise it be‐ fore the Machner evidentiary hearing. That means the forfei‐ ture occurred before the State stopped paying his lawyer. Any  effort  to  bring  the  equal  protection  claim  after  that  point  would have been frivolous, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals  found, so the conflict of financial interest could not have ad‐ versely affected Williams’s representation of Reynolds.  D.  Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings  Reynolds then filed his federal habeas corpus petition un‐ der 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argued that the State deprived him of  counsel when it created a conflict of interest during his direct  appeal, and that his appellate counsel was constitutionally in‐ effective for failing to object to the jury instructions.2 The dis‐ trict court denied relief. The court found that there was suffi‐ cient  evidence  to  convict  Reynolds  of  either  using  force  or  threatening to use force, and thus any mistake in the jury in‐ structions  could  not  have  prejudiced  him.  The  court  also  found that Reynolds had not shown that a conflict adversely                                                    2  Reynolds  raised  several  additional  arguments  about  how  his  trial  and appellate attorneys were ineffective, but he does not pursue those ar‐ guments in this appeal.  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 No. 16‐3430  Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 7  affected  his  appellate  representation  because  Reynolds  ar‐ gued only that the conflict prevented his lawyer from pursu‐ ing a procedurally barred claim. The district court declined to  grant a certificate of appealability, but we granted a certificate  to  review Reynolds’s  claims surrounding  his representation  after  the  State  Public  Defender’s  Office  stopped  paying  his  lawyer.  II.  Denial of Effective Counsel  The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee crimi‐ nal defendants the effective assistance of counsel during their  first appeals as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393–94,  396–97  (1985);  Douglas  v.  California,  372  U.S.  353,  356–57  (1963). The two‐prong analysis in Strickland v. Washington, 466  U.S.  668  (1984),  governs  most  ineffective  assistance  claims.  Strickland requires a petitioner to show: (1) that the attorney  provided constitutionally deficient performance; and (2) that  the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687.  Prejudice  under  Strickland  means  “a  reasonable  probability  that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the  proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.  Although  Strickland  states  the  general  rule,  the  Supreme  Court has recognized some exceptions for situations in which  prejudice  is either  presumed or easier  to show. Bell  v.  Cone,  535  U.S.  685,  695–96  (2002)  (explaining  three  circumstances  when  prejudice  is  presumed).  Reynolds  argues  that  two  of  these exceptions apply here: a complete denial of counsel and  an actual conflict of interest.  A.  Complete Denial of Counsel  Reynolds  first  argues  that  the  State  caused  Williams  to  abandon his role as an advocate when it stopped paying him,  Case: 16-3430 8  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  causing  a  complete  denial  of  counsel  under  United  States  v.  Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Cronic recognized three “circum‐ stances that are so likely to prejudice the accused” that they  amount to a complete denial of counsel and prejudice is pre‐ sumed. The first is when a defendant is denied the presence  of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. The other two  involve performance along those lines: counsel “entirely” fail‐ ing “to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversar‐ ial testing,” and circumstances that are likely to prevent any  lawyer, “even a fully competent one,” from providing effec‐ tive assistance. Id. at 658–60; see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 695–97  (summarizing the three Cronic scenarios in which prejudice is  presumed  and  emphasizing  that  counsel’s  failure  “must  be  complete” to trigger presumption). Reynolds refers to the lat‐ ter two situations as “constructive” denial of counsel and ar‐ gues that one occurred here. He also likens his case to Penson  v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), in which the Court found a com‐ plete denial of counsel when appellate counsel withdrew after  submitting only a bare assertion that the appeal was meritless.  Id. at 88–89.  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not reach this denial‐ of‐counsel  question,  which  leads  Reynolds  to  argue  that  de  novo review applies. But the Wisconsin court failed to reach  this issue for a reason: Reynolds did not raise it in state court.  He procedurally defaulted this claim, and we cannot consider  it on the merits.  Before pursuing habeas relief in federal court, a state pris‐ oner  must  exhaust  available  state‐court  remedies.  28  U.S.C.  § 2254(b)(1).  In  addition,  the  federal  claims  “must  be  fairly  presented to the state courts” so that the state has a “fair op‐ portunity to consider” the issues “and to correct that asserted  Case: 16-3430 No. 16‐3430  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 9  constitutional defect.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–76  (1971).  Fair  presentation  generally  requires  the  petitioner  to  raise both the operative facts and controlling legal principles  in the state courts. Ellsworth v. Levenhagen, 248 F.3d 634, 639  (7th Cir. 2001). If the petitioner fails to present a claim to the  state courts, that claim is procedurally defaulted, and a fed‐ eral  habeas  court  cannot  review  it  absent  “cause  and preju‐ dice” or a miscarriage of justice (meaning conviction of an in‐ nocent person). E.g., Thomas v. Williams, 822 F.3d 378, 384, 386  (7th Cir. 2016), citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750  (1991).  Even liberally construed, Reynolds’s pro se petition to the  Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not fairly present this claim  for denial of counsel. He argued only that Wisconsin denied  him the “effective assistance of counsel” by creating “an ac‐ tual conflict of interest” between him and his counsel. The ar‐ gument that he was denied counsel altogether is a different  legal theory governed by a different legal rule—one that the  Wisconsin courts did not have the chance to apply. By refor‐ mulating  his claim in this  appeal, Reynolds seeks to benefit  from a less stringent standard for deciding prejudice: Cronic’s  presumption of prejudice rather than Sullivan’s adverse‐effect  standard.  This  tactic  does  not  work.  See  Boyko  v.  Parke,  259  F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2001) (reformulation “should not place  the claim in a significantly different legal posture by making  the claim stronger or more substantial”). A petitioner is not  bound to his state court presentation word‐for‐word, and he  may provide further support for his claim. But he still must  have presented the governing legal principles and “the sub‐ stance of a federal habeas corpus claim” to the state court. Pi‐ card, 404 U.S. at 278; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,  Case: 16-3430 10  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  366 (1995) (per curiam) (“mere similarity of claims is insuffi‐ cient to exhaust”).  Even  though  Reynolds  did  not  describe  the  issue  in  so  many words as a complete denial of counsel, he might have  fairly presented this claim if he had cited relevant cases and  alleged facts that were “well within the mainstream of consti‐ tutional  litigation”  of  that  right.  Ellsworth,  248  F.3d  at  639.  Reynolds did not do so. He did not rely on cases addressing  complete denials of counsel. Instead, he cited Strickland, Sulli‐ van, and Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985), a case  applying  the  Sullivan  conflict‐of‐interest  standard.  Reynolds  also cited Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Evitts  v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)—two cases that established the  right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. But a  single reference to these cases was insufficient, especially in  light of the facts Reynolds described. Nowhere did Reynolds  assert that his lawyer abandoned his case. Although he said  that his lawyer “had in essence been fired,” he also wrote that  “Williams  felt  that  it  was  his  professional  responsibility  to  complete the current briefing process” and that he petitioned  the  Wisconsin  Supreme  Court  for  further  review  as  well.  When  describing  his  lawyer’s  deficient  performance,  Rey‐ nolds argued only that his lawyer declined to investigate one  argument: the equal protection claim. Asserting that his law‐ yer failed to make that single argument did not fairly notify  the  state  court  that  Reynolds  claimed  a  complete  denial  of  counsel. See Penson, 488 U.S. at 88–89 (distinguishing between  failing “to press a particular argument” and being “entirely  without the assistance of counsel on appeal”).  The fair presentment rule is not so rigid that a pro se peti‐ tioner  needed  to  cite  Cronic  or  any  other  denial‐of‐counsel  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 No. 16‐3430  Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 11  case by name. For example, a petitioner could exhaust a de‐ nial of counsel claim by describing facts that amount to a com‐ plete  denial  of  counsel  and  citing  Strickland,  which  summa‐ rized: “Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of coun‐ sel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.” 466  U.S. at 692. Still, the petitioner must describe facts and legal  principles that fairly notify the court of what it should decide.  Because  Reynolds  (1)  did  not  rely  on  cases  addressing  the  complete denial of counsel, (2) framed the violation as a con‐ flict of interest under Sullivan, and (3) did not allege that he  lacked  an  attorney,  this  abandonment  claim  was  not  fairly  presented to the state courts. Moreover, even if the denial‐of‐ counsel claim were not procedurally barred or if we were in‐ clined to consider it as sufficiently related to the claims Rey‐ nolds did raise, the record makes clear that attorney Williams  simply did not abandon Reynolds. Even after being told by  the State Public Defender that he would not be paid any more  for working on Reynolds’s case, Williams continued to repre‐ sent Reynolds for free in the state court of appeals, completing  the briefing there, and then filing a petition for review with  the Wisconsin Supreme Court. That fact does not immunize  his work from scrutiny, but this was not an abandonment that  could lead to the presumption of prejudice.  B.  Conflict of Interest  In the alternative, Reynolds argues that he was denied the  effective  assistance  of  counsel  when  the  State  Public  De‐ fender’s Office created a conflict of interest by ceasing to pay  his lawyer for work on Reynolds’s case while also informing  him that he would no longer receive new case assignments.  Reynolds  properly  exhausted  this  claim,  and  the  Wisconsin  Court of Appeals decided it on the merits. We cannot issue a  Case: 16-3430 12  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  writ of habeas corpus on this basis unless the decision “was  contrary  to,  or  involved  an  unreasonable  application  of,  clearly  established  Federal  law,  as  determined  by  the  Su‐ preme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  The first question under § 2254(d)(1) is the scope of clearly  established  federal  law  on  a  defendant’s  Sixth Amendment  right  to  conflict‐free  counsel.  The  Supreme  Court  has  held  that concurrent multiple representation—for example, repre‐ senting  co‐defendants  in  a  single  trial—violates  the  Sixth  Amendment if it “gives rise to a conflict of interest.” Sullivan,  446 U.S. at 348, citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482  (1978).  Reynolds  argues  that  his  lawyer’s  financial  interest  kept  the lawyer from zealously representing him. We reject this ar‐ gument  for  two  independent  reasons.  First,  the  Supreme  Court has not yet extended its multiple‐representation deci‐ sions to financial conflicts of interest between attorney and cli‐ ent, let alone provided clear guidance as to whether or under  what circumstances a financial conflict of interest between at‐ torney and client violates a defendant’s right to counsel. That  silence  presents  a  nearly  insurmountable  obstacle  to  this  claim on a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Second,  the Supreme Court has not given lower courts much guidance  as to what counts as an “adverse effect” under Sullivan, as dis‐ tinct from a reasonable probability of a different outcome un‐ der  Strickland.  Without  clearer  guidance  from  the  Supreme  Court, the state court decision here was not contrary to or an  unreasonable  application  of  clearly  established  Supreme  Court law.  In cases where defense counsel represents multiple clients  with conflicting  interests,  the Supreme Court  holds that the  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 No. 16‐3430  Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 13  standard for reversal depends on whether anyone objected to  the conflict during the representation: “absent objection, a de‐ fendant must demonstrate that ‘a conflict of interest actually  affected the adequacy of his representation.’” Mickens v. Tay‐ lor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002), quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349.  If  no  party  raises  a  timely  objection  to  a  conflict  of  interest  arising from multiple representation, the accused must show  that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his law‐ yer’s performance.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348. If the defendant  shows  a  conflict  and  a  lapse  in  representation,  prejudice  is  presumed. Id. at 349–50. Reynolds argues that the logic of Sul‐ livan should apply to the financial pressure on his appellate  lawyer, which caused the lawyer to decline to investigate the  equal protection challenge and adversely affected his perfor‐ mance.  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals accepted Sullivan as stat‐ ing the controlling federal rule. That court found that even if  the State interfered with the lawyer’s representation, that po‐ tential  interference  came  after  the  lawyer  had  forfeited  the  equal protection claim. After the Machner evidentiary hearing,  the scope of the appeal was limited by the lawyer’s earlier fil‐ ings, and the equal protection claim was no longer available.3  The Wisconsin court then concluded that the financial conflict                                                    3 Reynolds argues that Wisconsin law did not actually limit the scope  of the appeal at this point. The state courts treated the failure to raise the  issue properly as a waiver. In habeas corpus litigation, federal courts or‐ dinarily  defer  to  state  courts’  applications  of  state  procedural  rules  and  doctrine to proceedings in state courts, at least as long as the relevant rules  or doctrines are firmly established and consistently followed. E.g., Mar‐ tinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2012). We see no reason to question the state  courts’ routine conclusion that Reynolds failed to raise the equal protec‐ tion claim in a timely way.   Case: 16-3430 14  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  had no adverse effect on Williams’s representation. See Sulli‐ van, 446 U.S. at 349–50. The state court reasoned that even if  attorney Williams had investigated the equal protection the‐ ory,  he  should  have  concluded  that  the  theory  could  not  properly be presented to the court of appeals. It had been for‐ feited  because  it  had not  been  raised  in  Reynolds’s  first  ap‐ peal. Sep. App. 71–72.  The Wisconsin court’s conclusion may or may not be cor‐ rect in the end, but it did not unreasonably apply Sullivan. The  Supreme Court itself simply has not extended Sullivan, or any  constitutional analysis of conflicts of interest, to financial con‐ flicts between attorney and client. Sullivan dealt with one team  of lawyers who represented three men who were accused of  the same murders but were tried in three separate trials. The  Court  vacated  habeas  relief  for  Sullivan,  the  one  client  who  had been convicted. The Court held that, in the absence of a  timely objection, the accused was required to show that the  potential conflict of interest (a) had ripened into an actual con‐ flict of interest that (b) adversely affected the adequacy of his  lawyers’ representation of him. 446 U.S. at 348.  The Supreme Court has not yet held that Sullivan extends  even  from  multiple,  conflicted  concurrent  representations  to  multiple,  conflicted  successive  representations,  Mickens,  535  U.S. at 174–76, let alone to financial conflicts of interest. Mick‐ ens affirmed the denial of habeas relief where the lawyer rep‐ resenting the accused in a murder case had been representing  the murder victim on unrelated, undisclosed (and confiden‐ tial) juvenile charges at the time he was murdered. The Mick‐ ens  opinion  noted  that  the  case  had  been  argued  on  the  as‐ sumption that the Sullivan would extend to conflicted succes‐ Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 No. 16‐3430  Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 15  sive representations, but that the Court was not actually en‐ dorsing that assumption. Id. at 175. Mickens expressly left that  successive representation question open. Id. at 176.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the scope of the Sullivan rule  is a critical issue here. Mickens acknowledged that the federal  courts of appeals had applied Sullivan to “all kinds of alleged  attorney  ethical  conflicts,”  including  financial  conflicts,  as  well as attorney’s interests in getting a job with the prosecutor  or romance with the prosecutor. 535 U.S. at 174. But Mickens  pointedly  did  not  endorse  those  extensions  of  Sullivan.  Id.  Cautioning the  lower  courts more broadly,  the  Court  wrote  that  “Not  all  attorney  conflicts  present  comparable  difficul‐ ties.” 535 U.S. at 175.4   This  circuit  has  said  that  the  “precise  scope  of  claims  to  which the  Cuyler [v. Sullivan] standard applies has not been  definitively stated by the Supreme Court.” Spreitzer v. Peters,  114 F.3d 1435, 1451 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997) (denying habeas relief).  Since before Mickens, we have at least assumed that Sullivan  extends to financial conflicts of interests. United States v. Mar‐ rera, 768 F.2d 201, 206–07 (7th Cir. 1985) (attorney and defend‐ ant  agreed  to share  movie rights to  story  of crime). Mickens  makes it very difficult, though, to take that step in a habeas  corpus  challenge  to  a  state  conviction  governed  by                                                    4 The cited financial conflict of interest case was United States v. Hearst,  638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980) (remanding for hearing on whether at‐ torney F. Lee Bailey’s book contract regarding the defense of Patty Hearst  adversely affected his representation of her). But Mickens also noted the  Fifth Circuit decision in Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1269–72 (5th Cir. 1995)  (en banc), which declined to extend Sullivan to a financial conflict of inter‐ est (also involving media contracts) and instead applied the Strickland v.  Washington standard to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Case: 16-3430 16  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  § 2254(d)(1). To prevail here, Reynolds needs to show that it  would be unreasonable for the state court to fail to extend Sul‐ livan to financial conflicts between attorney and client and that  the state court applied Sullivan unreasonably. That extension  would  be  a  significant  new  development,  with  effects  far  more sweeping than its extension from concurrent to succes‐ sive representations. Extension to financial conflicts of inter‐ ests would pose a range of challenging problems. It would not  be unreasonable within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) for lower  courts to refrain from making that extension themselves.  A wide range of fee arrangements can create at least some  tension between attorneys and clients. For example, it is not  unusual in criminal defense for a lawyer to insist on a sizable  up‐front retainer against which the lawyer can bill, often with  little hope of replenishing the retainer if the case takes more  work than the lawyer initially expected. Nor is it unusual for  clients  to  fall  behind  in  paying  their  lawyers.  In  those  and  many other circumstances, lawyers may face more or less se‐ rious financial conflicts of interest as the client and case may  call for additional work that will be essentially unpaid. View‐ ing the lawyer’s incentives through a narrow and short‐term  economic  lens,  these  situations  give  a  lawyer  a  financial  in‐ centive  to  minimize  non‐essential  work,  much  like  attorney  Williams’s  incentives  here.  Nor  is  it  unusual  for  underpaid  and overworked public defenders to have to allocate a finite  number of hours in a month or year among different clients.  If such routine incentives, combined with an admission by  a  lawyer  that  his  or  her  judgments  about  which  additional  work to carry out were affected at the margin by those incen‐ tives, were enough to find an actual conflict and “adverse ef‐ fect”  that  demonstrated  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel,  Case: 16-3430 No. 16‐3430  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 17  many convictions would become vulnerable to collateral at‐ tack.  Yet  we  know  that  lawyers  facing  such  incentives  and  choices are also motivated by their sense of professional duty  and pride, and an interest in their professional reputations, to  continue to do good work for a client even if no more money  will  be  paid  in  the  particular  case.  Those  realities  underlie  Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16. A client’s failure to pay as  agreed  can  provide  good  cause  for  a  lawyer  to  terminate  a  representation.  But  Rule  1.16  provides  that  a  lawyer  in  that  situation must continue the representation if ordered to do so  by a court. When that happens, there is a financial conflict of  interest not unlike what has happened here. We have not been  directed to any cases treating such conflicts as showing a de‐ nial  of  effective  counsel,  let  alone  to  a  controlling  Supreme  Court case holding as much.  These  considerations  help  to  show  that  how  to  apply  conflict‐of‐interest doctrine, which so far has developed in the  Supreme  Court  to  address  loyalties  to  multiple  clients,  to  financial  conflicts  raises  challenging  questions  that  the  Supreme Court simply has not addressed. Under § 2254(d)(1),  we  may  not  use  a  federal  habeas  proceeding  to  extend  Supreme  Court  precedents  into  new  fields  where  there  is  room  for  fair‐minded  disagreement,  as  there  is  here.  See  generally Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).  Still, Reynolds argues that a conflict of interest is a conflict  of interest. From his point of view, the fact that the attorney’s  loyalties or interests ran in his personal favor rather than in  favor of another client should not matter. After all, attorney  Williams acknowledged that it  was finances that led him to  refuse Reynolds’s request that he look into the equal protec‐ tion challenge to the carjacking statute, and perhaps also to a  Case: 16-3430 18  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  challenge to the jury instructions on carjacking. Reynolds re‐ lies on the language in Sullivan teaching, in the context of mul‐ tiple, concurrent representations, that an actual conflict of in‐ terest  that  adversely  affected  the  lawyer’s  performance  vio‐ lates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 446 U.S. at 348– 49.  Assuming that the Sullivan standard applies to this finan‐ cial conflict of interest, which would be consistent with both  the state appellate court’s approach here and our opinion in  Marrera, Reynolds has shown some effect on Williams’s repre‐ sentation: a failure to investigate at least the additional equal  protection claim. An adverse effect seems to be a lower stand‐ ard than the Strickland reasonable probability of a different re‐ sult. But what does it take to show an adverse effect? The Wis‐ consin court concluded there was no adverse effect from the  conflict  of  interest  because  any  new  claims  or  theories  that  Reynolds asked Williams to pursue, including the equal pro‐ tection claim, were already forfeited by the time the conflict  arose.  Yet  effective  lawyers  can sometimes overcome proce‐ dural hurdles in criminal appeals and habeas cases. And by  asking whether Williams could have raised the equal protec‐ tion claim after Reynolds asked him to, the Sullivan “adverse  effect” standard begins to slide toward the Strickland standard  of prejudice, gauged in terms of the outcome of the case. The  Sullivan analysis seems to focus more on the conflict’s effect  on the attorney’s actions than on the outcome of the case.  Yet Sullivan still requires not just an effect but an adverse  effect on attorney performance. 446 U.S. at 348. The Supreme  Court has not clarified what counts as an adverse effect. See  Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“The  Case: 16-3430 No. 16‐3430  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 19  precise nature of [Cuyler v. Sullivan’s] ‘actual conflict’ and ‘ad‐ verse effect’ elements is rather vague … .”). Nor has the Court  clarified where this standard lies between any effect on attor‐ ney  performance  and  an effect that  rises  to Strickland preju‐ dice.  We  have  written  broadly  that  a  defendant  shows  an  ad‐ verse effect “if, but for the attorney’s actual conflict of interest,  there is ‘a [reasonable] likelihood that counsel’s performance  somehow would have been different.’” Stoia v. United States,  22 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1994), quoting Frazer v. United States,  18  F.3d  778,  787  (9th  Cir.  1994)  (Beezer,  J.,  concurring).  We  used that language in a most unusual case, and one that did  not involve the forfeiture problem that the state court found  decisive here.  The lawyer  in  Stoia who had  directed  the de‐ fense strategy had entered his own plea agreement with the  federal  government.  The  lawyer  was  probably  violating  his  plea  agreement  by  directing  the  defense  strategy  in  Stoia’s  case, and at the same time the lawyer was under investigation  for soliciting perjury and obstructing justice in his represen‐ tation  of  one  of  Stoia’s  co‐defendants.  22  F.3d  at  771–72.  In  Stoia,  the  defendant’s  other  lawyers  identified  a  number  of  specific ways in which the strategist made decisions that hurt  Stoia’s defense. Id. at 773.   That situation in Stoia is not readily comparable to a cli‐ ent’s  (or  state  public  defender  agency’s)  more  quotidian  re‐ fusal or inability to pay. And in any event, the broad Stoia lan‐ guage is not binding on state courts. Under § 2254(d)(1), we  cannot grant habeas relief based on only our own precedent  when a state court has ruled on the merits of a claim.  Even  if  our  language  in  Stoia  were  binding  precedent  in  this case, state courts interpreting it would still need to decide  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 20  Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  what it means for counsel’s performance to be “different,” let  alone  “adverse.”  “Adverse”  can  be  read  fairly  to  require  a  showing of at least some sort of negative consequence for the  client. It would not be unreasonable for a state court consid‐ ering this question to peek at the merits of the claim that the  attorney did not investigate and raise. Why would failure to  raise  a  sure  loser  of  an  issue  necessarily  amount  to  an  “ad‐ verse effect” requiring a new trial?  The Wisconsin carjacking statute does not rely on any dis‐ tinctions that implicate suspect classes or fundamental rights.  An equal protection challenge would have to show the legis‐ lature drew a line that bore no rational relationship to a legit‐ imate governmental purpose, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianap‐ olis, 566 U.S. 673, 681 (2012), a standard that is very difficult to  satisfy. This is not the sort of argument that moves courts to  overlook  procedural  failures  to  free  wrongly  convicted  de‐ fendants.  The  state  court  did  not  unreasonably  apply  Su‐ preme Court precedent in holding that a missed opportunity  to raise such an argument in an already untimely fashion was  not an “adverse effect” within the meaning of Sullivan. Rey‐ nolds’s  claim  cannot  meet  the  stringent  standard  of  § 2254(d)(1).5                                                    5 Our dissenting colleague proposes as a remedy that Reynolds’s con‐ victions be set aside. That remedy would not fit the argued violation of his  right to counsel on appeal. If the financial conflict produced an “adverse  effect” within the meaning of Sullivan, that effect was counsel’s refusal to  investigate an already‐forfeited equal protection challenge to Wisconsin’s  carjacking  statute.  That  potential  challenge  still  has  not  been  shown  to  have any arguable merit. If there were a constitutional violation here in  the appellate representation, the remedy would seem to be a fresh appeal,  not a new trial based on the assumption that the equal protection theory  not only was not forfeited but would have produced a victory on appeal.  Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 No. 16‐3430  Pages: 30 21  III. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel  Finally, Reynolds claims that he received ineffective assis‐ tance  of  appellate  and  trial  counsel  because  both  attorneys  failed  to  challenge  the  jury  instructions  on  his  carjacking  counts. This issue is outside the scope of the certificate of ap‐ pealability. We certified Reynolds’s claim that the State vio‐ lated his right to the effective assistance of counsel “when the  state public defender’s office allegedly informed Reynolds’s  appointed counsel that he would not be paid for future work  on Reynolds’s case and when counsel, citing this reason, de‐ clined  to  conduct  additional  investigation  that  Reynolds  re‐ quested.” We did not certify any questions related to the jury  instructions, and Reynolds did not request permission to ar‐ gue any non‐certified claims. See Welch v. Hepp, 793 F.3d 734,  737 (7th Cir. 2015). Also, since we know (a) that the state stat‐ ute authorizes conviction for either use or threatened use of a  weapon,  see  Wis.  Stat.  § 943.23(1g),  and  (b)  that  a  deadly  weapon was certainly used in this case, we see no reason to  consider expanding the scope of our certificate of appealabil‐ ity. We therefore decline to review this issue. Welch, 793 F.3d  at 737–38.                                                     See, e.g., Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2013) (ordering new  appeal where appellate counsel had been ineffective); see generally Roe v.  Flores‐Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (where appellate counsel abandoned  defendant  by  failing  to  file  notice  of  appeal,  and  defendant  otherwise  would have taken appeal, defendant is entitled to new appeal); Penson v.  Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 87 (1988) (where state appellate court found several ar‐ guable issues in record, remedy for denial of counsel on appeal was new  appeal); Dodd v. Knight, 533 F. Supp. 2d 844, 854 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (ordering  new appeal where appellate counsel was ineffective).  Case: 16-3430 22  Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16‐3430  The  district  court’s  judgment  denying  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus is   AFFIRMED.  Case: 16-3430 No. 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 23 WOOD, Chief Judge, dissenting. Few would doubt that financial conflicts of interest can destroy the integrity of a relationship. That is why, in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), the Supreme Court found that due process was violated when a local judge’s salary depended on the fines that resulted from convictions in cases before him. See also Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (due process violated by local law providing that judge was compensated only when he issued search warrants, not when he denied them). It is why judges must give extra scrutiny to the performance of counsel in class actions, lest the lawyer sell out the class and walk away with an enormous fee. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 803–04 (9th ed. 2014); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 502–03 (1994). And it is why the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys in Wisconsin, which are based on the American Bar Association’s Model Rules with some additions not material here, state that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” SCR 20:1.7(a). One way in which a forbidden conflict can arise is if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by … a personal interest of the lawyer.” Id. at 20:1.7(a)(2). The lawyer is relieved of this responsibility only if, among other things, the “affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client.” Id. at 20:1.7(b)(4). In addition, lawyers may not limit the scope of their representation of a client unless “the client gives informed consent,” again in writing. Id. at 20:1.2(c). The obvious concern is that, faced with a conflict between one’s own financial interest and the interests of another person, the former will win out. If the lawyer puts his or her own Case: 16-3430 24 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16-3430 interest first, the client is the loser. This is precisely what Cornell Reynolds says happened to him in the course of the criminal prosecution the State of Wisconsin brought against him in the early 2000s. The key events in the case can be summarized quickly. In May 2001, Reynolds was charged with carjacking resulting in death. The primary issue at the trial was identification. A jury convicted him, and he was sentenced in early 2002. As Wisconsin law permits, Reynolds then filed a direct appeal and a post-conviction motion simultaneously. At that point, the Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office appointed attorney Terry Williams to serve as Reynolds’s post-conviction and appellate counsel. Williams filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that Reynolds’s trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise an alibi defense. The state trial court denied the post-conviction motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. Still with Williams’s help, Reynolds appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the ruling on the post-conviction motion so that the trial court could hold an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness point. The trial court obliged, but it again concluded that Reynolds was not entitled to a new trial. So far, so good. The problem now before us arose when Williams filed a new appeal on Reynolds’s behalf. While that appeal was pending, someone on the staff of the Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office told Williams that he had spent too much time on the case. The consequences were serious for Williams: (1) he would not be paid for some of the work he already had done; (2) he would not be paid for any more work on Reynolds’s case; and (3) he would no longer receive case Case: 16-3430 No. 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 25 assignments from the Public Defender. At that point, Williams halted all further work on the case. Reynolds asked him to pursue an equal protection challenge to the car-jacking statute, but Williams refused to do so. Importantly, his stated reason had nothing to do with the potential merit of such an argument. Williams frankly said that he was shutting down his work because the state was not paying him. He told Reynolds that he would do additional work if Reynolds paid him for it, but Reynolds was unable to do so. Williams simply filed the brief he already had prepared, and after the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, he later filed a petition for review on Reynolds’s behalf in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. After some additional state proceedings, Reynolds filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the federal court. He presented several arguments: first, that he was constructively denied counsel after the Public Defender’s Office cut off Williams’s pay, in violation of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); second, that Williams had an actual financial conflict of interest, which resulted in the denial of effective assistance of counsel under the standards of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); and third, that his appellate counsel was ineffective pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for failing to object to trial counsel’s own failure to object to certain jury instructions. While I am persuaded that the state courts’ decisions fell within the generous boundaries provided by section 2254 with respect to the first and third of these arguments, I conclude that the state courts, as well as the majority here, have failed to apply Cuyler properly and that Reynolds is entitled to issuance of the writ on this ground. Case: 16-3430 26 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16-3430 In Cuyler, the Supreme Court addressed the question “whether a state prisoner may obtain a federal writ of habeas corpus by showing that his retained defense counsel represented potentially conflicting interests.” 446 U.S. at 337. In the case before the Court, two lawyers had represented three codefendants in a murder prosecution. The Court accepted that this amounted to multiple representation. Id. at 342. But it clarified that “multiple representation does not violate the Sixth Amendment unless it gives rise to a conflict of interest.” Id. at 348. The burden on a defendant who seeks to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment in such cases, the Court held, is to “demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id. (emphasis added). Such a showing might rest on a failure to cross-examine a witness, or a failure to object to the introduction of certain evidence. Id. at 348–49. Critically, it is the lawyer’s performance that is the focus of the inquiry, not the ultimate outcome of the trial. The Court expressly declared that once unconstitutional multiple representation has been demonstrated—that is, once the defendant has shown an actual conflict and an adverse effect on the lawyer’s performance—there “is never harmless error.” Id. at 349 (emphasis added). Underscoring that fact, the Court continued as follows: Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. Id. at 349–50. Because the court of appeals had used a different standard, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Case: 16-3430 No. 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 27 As my colleagues note, some conflicts and ethical violations do not present difficulties akin to multiple representation. Ante at 17. But we must not lose sight of the fact that Cuyler created a standard to be applied not just when one attorney represents clients with competing interests, but “in situations where Strickland itself is evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002). The existence of an actual conflict of interest between attorney and client is one of those instances. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (finding structural error in the deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, rejecting harmless error, and holding that “no additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation ‘complete’”). Reynolds has established the two elements required by Cuyler: he has shown that there was an actual conflict of interest between him and his lawyer, and he has shown that the conflict had an adverse effect on his lawyer’s performance, insofar as the lawyer limited the scope of his representation to the matters he already had researched and flatly refused to look into anything else. The Supreme Court has not distinguished between an actual conflict of interest arising out of multiple representation, as was present in Cuyler, and a more direct conflict of interest between attorney and client based on financial considerations. (Indeed, the latter situation involves a form of multiple representation: Williams was trying to represent both himself and Reynolds.) Nor can there be any doubt that the conflict between Reynolds and Williams affected Williams’s performance. Without obtaining Reynolds’s permission, as contemplated by professional ethics norms and over Reynolds’s direct objection, Williams froze his work for Reynolds and did nothing but file what he already had Case: 16-3430 28 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16-3430 completed, following up on the same limited points with the state supreme court. At the state post-conviction stage, Reynolds presented this conflict-of-interest claim to the state courts. The Wisconsin court of appeals agreed that “a conflict of interest may also arise when an attorney and his client have divergent interests.” Sep. App. at 70 (quotation marks omitted). The court then correctly noted that the claimant had to show an actual conflict and an adverse effect on the lawyer’s performance. Id. It then discussed Williams’s performance for a bit, but it pivoted over to the ultimate result in the case, when it said that had Williams not had the conflict, he would have determined that the issue Reynolds wanted to raise was not properly before the court in any event. That is the language of harmless error, not a reference to Williams’s own performance. It says, in essence, that the conflict affected Williams’s performance insofar as he failed to raise the issues that Reynolds wanted to see explored, but that Williams’s failure could not have affected the outcome. That reasoning is contrary to the holding of Cuyler, which cannot have been more clear in rejecting a harmless-error approach. At the very least, it is an unreasonable application of Cuyler, since it shifts from a focus on Williams’s performance to one on the ultimate impact of Williams’s decisions in a manner that Cuyler forbids. See also Mickens, 535 U.S. at 170 (2002) (stressing that the conflict must affect counsel’s performance, rather than be merely a theoretical division of loyalties). Tempting as it may be to engage in harmless-error analysis in every case, the Supreme Court has decided that there are some situations in which it is off the table. Case: 16-3430 No. 16-3430 Document: 46 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 29 The only remaining question is what the appropriate remedy is in this case. A common remedy for a failure of counsel at the appellate stage would be, as my colleagues have noted, a fresh appeal with unconflicted counsel. See Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2013). But nothing in the statute restricts the district court’s options to only that remedy. To the contrary, the law provides that “[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243, ¶ 8. The Supreme Court has recognized that “a court has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987). The question here is thus what remedy would suffice to redress the serious miscarriage of justice suffered by Reynolds. In my view, this is a situation that demands more than a fresh appeal. The state courts have already decided—in the absence of a proper adversary presentation on Reynolds’s behalf—that any additional points that may have been raised on appeal were forfeited or meritless. I have no reason to believe that they would not simply reiterate that point, if we were to limit the remedy to a new appeal. (Principles of law-of-thecase might even require them to do so.) Because a new appeal would not redress the constitutional violation in Reynolds’s case, I would issue a conditional writ granting him a new trial (if the state chooses to take that step). This is well within the scope of the statute, as our sister circuits have recognized. See, e.g., Ramchair v. Conway, 601 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (petitioner deprived of effective appellate counsel entitled to new trial as remedy); Turner v. Bagley, 401 F.3d 718, 727 (6th Cir. 2005) (granting unconditional writ requiring new trial for deprivation of access to appellate process because of undue delay); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 943–44 (11th Cir. 2001) Case: 16-3430 Document: 46 30 Filed: 08/30/2018 Pages: 30 No. 16-3430 (appellate counsel’s failure to raise Batson claim remedied by grant of new trial). In this respect, I agree with the observations of the Tenth Circuit in Clayton v. Jones, 700 F.3d 435 (10th Cir. 2012), a case in which the defendant was denied his right to appeal because of ineffective assistance of counsel. As that opinion put it, “[c]ertainly a district court is not confined to only granting an appeal out of time when a petitioner has been denied his right to a direct appeal. It is not unprecedented for a district court to fashion a remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal that goes beyond an appeal out of time.” Id. at 443–44. The only problem in Clayton was that the district court had not sufficiently explained why a new appeal would not suffice. I have indicated why I believe this case is a proper candidate for a broader remedy. Reynolds has tried hard to navigate the habeas corpus process—no mean feat for even an experienced lawyer—and in my view he has shown that he should receive a new trial. I therefore respectfully dissent.

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