Estate of Ryan L. Clark v. Bruce Walker
Filing
Filed opinion of the court by Judge Hamilton. AFFIRMED. Joel M. Flaum, Circuit Judge; Michael S. Kanne, Circuit Judge and David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge. [6856729-1] [6856729] [16-3560, 16-3644]
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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 16‐3560 & 16‐3644
ESTATE OF RYAN L. CLARK,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
BRUCE WALKER and TINA KUEHN,
Defendants‐Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 14‐C‐1402 — Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Judge.
____________________
ARGUED MARCH 28, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2017
____________________
Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Ryan Clark committed suicide
five days after entering the custody of the Green Lake County
Jail in Wisconsin. The officers on duty at the time of his death
did not know that Clark had a high risk of committing sui‐
cide. When he entered the jail, however, he was assessed as
having a maximum risk of suicide. The intake staff who were
aware of that risk—Officer Bruce Walker and Nurse Tina Ku‐
ehn—had not initiated the jail’s suicide prevention protocol.
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Clark’s estate brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that Walker and Kuehn violated Clark’s Eighth Amendment
rights by acting with deliberate indifference toward his seri‐
ous risk of suicide.
Walker and Kuehn moved for summary judgment. They
argued there was insufficient evidence to allow a jury to find
deliberate indifference, and they invoked qualified immunity.
In a detailed order, the district court denied their motions. See
Estate of Clark v. County of Green Lake, No. 14‐C‐1402, 2016 WL
4769365 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 2016). The court found numerous
issues of material fact regarding Clark’s suicide risk, the de‐
fendants’ knowledge of that risk, and who was responsible for
initiating the suicide protocol (Walker or Kuehn). The court
also rejected defendants’ qualified immunity arguments. As a
preliminary matter, the court determined that Kuehn was un‐
able to invoke qualified immunity because she was a private
contractor, not a government employee. On the merits, the
court ruled that both defendants were not shielded by quali‐
fied immunity because it was clearly established in the Sev‐
enth Circuit that inmates have the right to be free from delib‐
erate indifference to a known risk of suicide. Both defendants
appealed.
Because this is an appeal from a denial of summary judg‐
ment, our jurisdiction is quite limited. We have jurisdiction to
review only the denial of qualified immunity and only to the
extent the denial turned on questions of law. This narrows our
consideration to two issues: whether Nurse Kuehn was enti‐
tled to qualified immunity as a private medical contractor,
and whether it was clearly established that Clark had a right
to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious risk of
suicide. We agree with the district court on both points, so we
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affirm its denial of summary judgment for these two defend‐
ants.1
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Clark’s History of Suicidal Behavior
Our review on appeal from denial of summary judgment
based on qualified immunity is limited to questions of law, so
1 The parties and the district court addressed Clark’s rights under the
Eighth Amendment. While the Eighth Amendment applies to convicted
prisoners, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees. See
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015) (“The
language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the claims often dif‐
fers. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prison‐
ers) cannot be punished at all, much less maliciously and sadistically.”)
(quotations omitted). Courts have expressed some uncertainty regarding
which amendment controls for hybrid forms of detention, such as here
where Clark’s extended‐supervision officer placed him on short “holds”
in the county jail. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Gilden, No. 15‐cv‐437‐jdp, 2017 WL
90389, slip op. at *3 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“When plaintiff turned him‐
self in after violating the terms of his extended supervised release from his
prior conviction, and was thus held in jail custody, it is not clear whether
the law considered him a ‘prisoner’ or a ‘pretrial detainee.’”). We need not
address this issue here, both because of the parties’ apparent agreement
and because summary judgment was properly denied under the Eighth
Amendment standard, which is at least as difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy
as the Fourteenth Amendment standard. See, e.g., Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321
F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003) (“as a pretrial detainee, [plaintiff] was entitled
to at least the same protection against deliberate indifference to his basic
needs as is available to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amend‐
ment ”); see also Jackson v. Illinois Medi–Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir.
2002) (“[W]hen considering a pretrial detainee’s claim of inadequate med‐
ical care, we frequently turn to the analogous standards of Eighth Amend‐
ment jurisprudence.”) (citations omitted).
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we recount the facts as stated by the district court in its assess‐
ment of the summary judgment record. See Locke v. Haessig,
788 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2015).
Ryan Clark struggled for years with alcoholism and de‐
pression. In 2009 he was released from Wisconsin state prison
after serving time for his fifth offense of operating a vehicle
under the influence of alcohol. His release was subject to ex‐
tended supervision. Over the next two years he was admitted
to the Green Lake County Jail approximately eight times.
Each time his extended‐supervision officer placed him on a
“hold” due to alleged violations of his supervision rules, and
each time he was intoxicated.
Jail records show that Clark received regular medical
treatment for depression while in custody. He was frequently
given medication for depression, such as sertraline and fluox‐
etine, and his jail record stated that he experienced “anxiety
attacks” when he did not receive his medication. The jail rec‐
ords also documented Clark’s serious risk of suicide. This in‐
cluded documentation of instances of self‐harm, including a
suicide attempt in 2011. At times in the past, the jail had put
Clark on “Special Watch Observation,” where he was ob‐
served every fifteen minutes to prevent suicide.
B. Intake, Confinement, and Suicide
On May 23, 2012, Clark was admitted once more to the
Green Lake County Jail because he violated supervision rules
by drinking alcohol. His breath test showed a blood alcohol
level of 0.27, more than three times the legal limit for driving.
Defendant Walker performed the intake process. Following
standard practice, Walker administered the Spillman Initial
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Inmate Assessment, which is a software program that in‐
cludes a suicide risk assessment. The program provides ques‐
tions for the intake officer to ask the inmate, and it uses the
inmate’s responses to estimate his suicide risk.
Based on Clark’s responses, the Spillman Assessment cal‐
culated that he was at a “maximum” suicide risk. According
to the jail administrator, the Spillman Assessment is not dis‐
positive, and officers have discretion to initiate the suicide
protocol based on other factors, such as when an inmate ex‐
pressly says that he is contemplating suicide. Walker testified
that he thought the Spillman Assessment automatically pro‐
duced a maximum suicide rating for all inmates intoxicated
at the time of the test. Officer testimony indicated that officers
made discretionary determinations about suicide risk without
psychological training on suicide prevention or an under‐
standing of how the Spillman Assessment functioned.
After completing the suicide assessment reflecting maxi‐
mum risk, Walker placed Clark in the holding cell to wait for
Nurse Kuehn’s routine medical intake. He left the Spillman
Assessment for her review. Walker did not, however, imple‐
ment the jail’s suicide prevention protocol, which requires
special precautions for inmates at risk of committing suicide.
For instance, officers are supposed to check jail records to de‐
termine if the inmate has a prior history of suicidal behavior.
Walker did not conduct this check, which would have shown
a prior suicide attempt while in jail. Nor did Walker place
Clark in a suicide prevention cell, initiate monitoring of Clark,
or refer him to a mental health provider. The district court also
found a factual dispute between Walker and Nurse Kuehn
over who was responsible for initiating the suicide protocol.
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Nurse Kuehn performed Clark’s medical intake. Kuehn
worked for Correctional Healthcare Companies, a company
contracted by the jail to provide medical services. During the
intake, Kuehn documented that Clark was taking antidepres‐
sant medication but could not remember the name of his med‐
icine while he was intoxicated. She never followed up to learn
Clark’s medication. She placed Clark’s Spillman Assessment
in his medical chart, but she also did not take steps pursuant
to the jail policy to mitigate Clark’s risk of suicide. She did not
refer Clark to a mental health counselor, which she had done
for Clark in the past. Nor did she inform jail staff of Clark’s
suicide risk. Instead of assigning Clark to the cell designed for
suicide prevention, she assigned him to a cell for alcohol de‐
toxification. Inmates in detoxification cells are alone 24 hours
a day. Kuehn later testified that she was aware that alcohol
detoxification increases the risk of suicide. She also testified
that she knew Clark would experience extreme isolation in
the detoxification cell. Kuehn followed up with Clark several
times after his initial intake.
Four nights later, Clark committed suicide, on May 28
shortly after midnight. The officers on duty at the time were
unaware that Clark posed a suicide risk. He was not in the
suicide prevention cell, and neither Walker nor Kuehn had
notified them of any risk. The officer monitoring the security
cameras did not observe Clark’s suicide. The video recording
shows that Clark’s preparation and suicide took approxi‐
mately thirty minutes. Clark fashioned a noose with pieces of
fabric and tied it to his bedroll. He used his bedroll as a coun‐
terweight by placing it over a little dividing wall in his cell,
and then hanged himself by letting his body sag on the other
side of the wall. An officer discovered Clark’s body approxi‐
mately one hour later, but it was too late to revive him.
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C. Procedural History
In November 2014 Clark’s estate brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to Clark’s risk of
suicide. The estate named as defendants Green Lake County
and Officers Walker, Schoenscheck, and Pflum (the “County
Defendants”). The estate also named Kuehn and Correctional
Healthcare Companies, Inc. (the “Medical Defendants”). The
County Defendants moved to dismiss or alternatively for
summary judgment. The Medical Defendants also moved for
summary judgment. The district court denied the County De‐
fendant’s motion to dismiss and then granted summary judg‐
ment on the Eighth Amendment claim for all defendants
other than Walker and Kuehn.2
The court found that genuine issues of material fact pre‐
cluded summary judgment for Walker and Kuehn. As an ini‐
tial matter, Walker and Kuehn both disputed who was re‐
sponsible for initiating the suicide protocol. The court also
concluded that the estate offered sufficient evidence to allow
a jury to find that Walker and Kuehn acted with deliberate
indifference to Clark’s risk. Finally, the court rejected defend‐
ants’ qualified immunity arguments. After reviewing our
precedent, the court held that the immunity defense should
not extend to Kuehn as a private contractor. Nonetheless, the
court went on to consider the merits of the qualified immun‐
2 Defendants also named Health Professionals Ltd. as a defendant, but
that company was taken over by Correctional Healthcare Companies, and
for purposes of this case it is undisputed that both organizations had com‐
mon corporate ownership. In addition, the estate amended its complaint
to add a Monell claim against Green Lake County, but that issue is not
before us on appeal.
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ity defense for both defendants and determined that the de‐
fense failed because it was clearly established in 2012 in the
Seventh Circuit that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s se‐
rious risk of suicide violates the Eighth Amendment. Walker
and Kuehn then appealed the denial of summary judgment.
II. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction over Denial of Summary Judgment
We have limited jurisdiction over these appeals. Ordinar‐
ily, a denial of summary judgment is not appealable because
it is not a final order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Ortiz v. Jordan, 562
U.S. 180, 188 (2011). The collateral order doctrine recognizes
certain exceptions, including when qualified immunity is de‐
nied for legal reasons. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985) (“[A] district court’s denial of a claim of qualified im‐
munity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an ap‐
pealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.”).
If qualified immunity is denied at summary judgment be‐
cause of a factual dispute, however, we do not have jurisdic‐
tion over that issue. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995)
(“[W]e hold that a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified
immunity defense, may not appeal a district court’s summary
judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or
not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for
trial.”); see also Locke, 788 F.3d at 665 (“Because this is an in‐
terlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity, we have appellate jurisdiction over only legal
questions.”). As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson, we
have appellate jurisdiction when a district court denies a pub‐
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lic official’s qualified immunity defense and “the issue ap‐
pealed concerned, not which facts the parties might be able to
prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed
a violation of ‘clearly established’ law.” 515 U.S. at 311 (cita‐
tions omitted).
Given these constraints, we cannot review all of the issues
briefed by Walker and Kuehn, including whether the district
court erred by denying their motions for summary judgment
on the merits of the deliberate indifference claim. That ruling
on the merits is not a final judgment, and it does not fall into
one of the exceptions provided by the collateral order doc‐
trine. See Ortiz, 562 U.S. at 188, citing Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976).
B. Denial of Qualified Immunity
We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. Levin v. Madigan, 692
F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2012). Qualified immunity “protects
government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009),
quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When we
review a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, we consider “(1) whether the facts, taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the de‐
fendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the
constitutional right was clearly established at [that] time.”
Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009), cit‐
ing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
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1. Private Contractors
Before addressing the two steps of qualified immunity, we
must determine whether Kuehn was entitled to invoke quali‐
fied immunity as a private healthcare contractor. Kuehn’s cen‐
tral argument is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Filarsky
v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012), requires us to extend qualified
immunity to private healthcare contractors, even though our
cases since Filarsky have held otherwise.
We have addressed this issue recently, holding that private
medical personnel in prisons are not entitled to the protection
of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722,
734 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“qualified immunity does not
apply to private medical personnel in prisons”), citing Shields
v. Illinois Depʹt of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 794 (7th Cir. 2014);
see also Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2017) (“This
Court has construed the Supreme Court’s holding that em‐
ployees of privately‐operated prisons may not assert a quali‐
fied‐immunity defense also to deny that defense to employees
of private corporations that contract with the state to provide
medical care for prisoners.”).
In Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997), the Su‐
preme Court held that privately employed prison guards can‐
not assert qualified immunity. More recently in Filarsky, the
Court considered whether a private lawyer who worked part
time for a municipality was eligible for qualified immunity on
federal claims arising from his public service. The Court de‐
termined that the lawyer was eligible, holding that “immun‐
ity under § 1983 should not vary depending on whether an in‐
dividual working for the government does so as a full‐time
employee, or on some other basis.” Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 389.
Filarsky did not overrule Richardson. Instead, “the Filarsky
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Court reaffirmed the holding of Richardson categorically re‐
jecting immunity for the private prison employees there.”
Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2013), citing
Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 392–94.
The Court in Filarsky reached its conclusion on the part‐
time lawyer through an historical inquiry, asking whether the
person asserting qualified immunity would have been im‐
mune from liability under the common law in 1871 when
Congress passed the law later codified as § 1983. See Filarsky,
566 U.S. at 384. In a detailed opinion, the Sixth Circuit applied
Filarsky’s historical method and held that a privately em‐
ployed doctor working for a state prison could not invoke
qualified immunity. McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696, 697 (6th
Cir. 2012). After examining numerous nineteenth‐century
sources, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “the absence of any
indicia that a paid physician (whether remunerated from the
public or private fisc) would have been immune from suit at
common law, convince[s] us that there was no common‐law
tradition of immunity for a private doctor working for a pub‐
lic institution at the time that Congress passed § 1983.” Id. at
704. We found the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning persuasive in Cur‐
rie, 728 F.3d at 632, and have held in other post‐Filarsky cases
that private medical personnel in prisons are not afforded
qualified immunity. See, e.g., Rasho, 856 F.3d at 479; Petties, 836
F.3d at 734. Because Kuehn was a privately employed nurse
working at the Green Lake County Jail, she is ineligible for
qualified immunity.
2. Step 1: Violation of a Constitutional Right
Because Kuehn is ineligible for qualified immunity, we
turn our focus to Walker’s appeal. The first qualified immun‐
ity step raises again the issue of deliberate indifference. We
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can review this question in the context of a denial of qualified
immunity at summary judgment to the extent that the denial
turns on a question of law. In this case, deliberate indifference
requires the estate to show that Clark had a serious medical
condition that posed a substantial risk and that Walker actu‐
ally knew about the risk and acted or failed to act in disregard
of that risk. See Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir.
2002), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994);
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Walker admits
that an elevated risk of suicide is a serious medical condition,
but he disputes whether Clark’s risk was sufficiently acute. He
also argues that there was insufficient evidence to raise a gen‐
uine issue about whether he “actually knew” of Clark’s risk
and disregarded it.
Both of these disputes are factual in nature. Johnson holds
that a defendant who is denied qualified immunity at sum‐
mary judgment cannot immediately appeal “whether or not
the evidence in the pretrial record was sufficient to show a
genuine issue of fact for trial.” 515 U.S. at 307. The district
court found here that “the facts, when taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, establish that Walker was aware that
Clark was a risk” but that he “told no one.” (The court also
found that the “record is replete with questions of fact that
preclude summary judgment with respect to Kuehn.”) Be‐
cause the district court’s ruling on the first qualified immunity
step turns on factual questions, we do not have jurisdiction to
review it.
3. Step 2: Clearly Established Law
We do have jurisdiction to review the second qualified im‐
munity step: whether Clark’s asserted rights were clearly es‐
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tablished at the time of his suicide. A right is clearly estab‐
lished when it is defined clearly enough to put officers on no‐
tice of their duties under the circumstances they confront. See
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (“For a constitutional
right to be clearly established, its contours must be suffi‐
ciently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.”) (quotation omitted).
This does not require a prior case “directly on point, but ex‐
isting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitu‐
tional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al‐Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011).
Clark’s right to be free from deliberate indifference to his
risk of suicide while he was in custody was clearly established
at the time of his death in 2012. See Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 623
(“[T]he right Mrs. Cavalieri asserts on behalf of Steven is the
right to be free from deliberate indifference to suicide. There
is no doubt that this right was clearly established prior to Ste‐
ven’s 1998 suicide attempt.”); Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 404–
05 (7th Cir. 1992) (“It was clearly established in 1986 that po‐
lice officers could not be deliberately indifferent to a detainee
who is in need of medical attention because of a mental illness
or who is a substantial suicide risk.”); see also id. at 406 n.6
(collecting cases from other circuits).
Walker responds to this substantial body of case law in
several ways. First, he argues that it is “doubtful” whether cir‐
cuit precedent can clearly establish law for purposes of quali‐
fied immunity. He cites two Supreme Court cases, but both
cases leave this question unanswered. See Taylor v. Barkes, 579
U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015); City & County of San
Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015).
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Other Supreme Court cases indicate circuit precedent is ade‐
quate for these purposes. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617 (1999) (“Petitioners have not brought to our attention
any cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the
time of the incident which clearly established the rule on
which they seek to rely.”). In addition, we have exercised this
authority for decades, including in this specific context of
prison and jail suicides. See Hall, 957 F.2d at 404–05; see also
Werner v. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2016). We see no rea‐
son to depart from these precedents.
Second, Walker argues that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Taylor v. Barkes shows that Clark’s rights were not clearly
established. 579 U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). Barkes had
committed suicide in prison, and his estate brought a § 1983
suit for deliberate indifference. The estate sued the commis‐
sioner of the Delaware Department of Correction and the war‐
den of the prison where Barkes committed suicide. Although
it was undisputed that the commissioner and the warden had
never interacted with Barkes and did not know about his sui‐
cide risk, the complaint alleged that these officials violated
Barkes’ rights by failing to supervise and monitor the imple‐
mentation of adequate suicide prevention protocols. Id. at
2043. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, holding
that the right at issue was not clearly established at the rele‐
vant time in the precedent of the Supreme Court or the Third
Circuit. Id. at 2045.
Taylor is readily distinguishable from this case. First,
Clark’s estate is not suing supervisory officials who did not
know about Clark’s risk. The estate contends that Walker and
Kuehn actually knew Clark’s risk and disregarded it. Second,
in Taylor the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit in part
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because the right at issue was not clearly established in the
Third Circuit. Here, the right at issue has long been clearly
established in this circuit, as explained above.
Finally, Walker argues that the clearly established prohibi‐
tion on deliberate indifference to prisoners’ and jail inmates’
risk of suicide is too general to be enforceable for purposes of
qualified immunity. Walker urges us to consider Clark’s rights
at a very high level of specificity: whether a jail inmate had a
right “to be placed immediately on a special watch in a suicide
cell despite no outward signs of suicidal ideation during an
initial intake assessment, when the intake officer knew that
trained medical personnel would conduct a follow‐up assess‐
ment and ultimately determine the inmate’s proper observa‐
tion and housing status.” This very specific right, Walker ar‐
gues, “has never been clearly established by the Supreme
Court.”
Courts may not define clearly established law at too high
a level of generality, see Sheehan, 575 U.S. at —, 135 S. Ct. at
1775–76, but there is no such problem here. The Supreme
Court has long held that prisoners have an Eighth Amend‐
ment right to treatment for their “serious medical needs.” Es‐
telle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). For purposes of quali‐
fied immunity, that legal duty need not be litigated and then
established disease by disease or injury by injury. Risk of sui‐
cide is a serious medical need, of course. See Sanville v.
McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2001) (“It goes without
saying that suicide is a serious harm.”) (quotation omitted).
Accepting the facts described by the district court, Clark’s es‐
tate has offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that
Walker actually knew about Clark’s serious risk of suicide.
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(Recall that Clark’s score on the suicide risk screening tool in‐
dicated a maximum risk of suicide.) Walker should have
taken action based on this knowledge, yet he chose to do noth‐
ing. Our precedent establishes that “particular conduct” such
as this violates clearly established law. See Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. —, —, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (empha‐
sis omitted), citing al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. To the extent
Walker argues that our prior cases are factually distinguisha‐
ble from this case, our limited jurisdiction precludes consid‐
ering that argument.
The district court’s denial of summary judgment for de‐
fendants Kuehn and Walker on the basis of qualified immun‐
ity is
AFFIRMED.
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