USA v. Mohamed Fadiga


Filed opinion of the court by Judge Easterbrook. AFFIRMED. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge; Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge and Diane S. Sykes, Circuit Judge. [6844936-1] [6844936] [16-3870]

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Case: 16-3870 Document: 23 Filed: 06/01/2017 Pages: 5 In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________   No.  16-­‐‑3870   UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,   Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellee,   v.   MOHAMED  FADIGA,   Defendant-­‐‑Appellant.   ____________________   Appeal  from  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the   Northern  District  of  Indiana,  Hammond  Division.   No.  2:15CR43-­‐‑001  —  Philip  P.  Simon,  Judge.   ____________________   ARGUED  MAY  18,  2017  —  DECIDED  JUNE  1,  2017   ____________________   Before  BAUER,  EASTERBROOK,  and  SYKES,  Circuit  Judges.   EASTERBROOK,   Circuit   Judge.   A   jury   found   Mohamed   Fadiga  guilty  of  possessing  more  than  15  unauthorized  “ac-­‐‑ cess   devices”—gift   cards   that   had   been   fraudulently   reen-­‐‑ coded—and  a  judge  sentenced  him  to  30  months’  imprison-­‐‑ ment.   See   18   U.S.C.   §1029(a)(3).   He   contends   that   police   learned  about  the  crime  by  violating  the  Fourth  Amendment   and  that  the  jury  pool  was  the  result  of  racial  discrimination.   Case: 16-3870 2   Document: 23 Filed: 06/01/2017 Pages: 5 No.  16-­‐‑3870   A  police  officer  stopped  a  car  that  had  an  expired  license   plate.   He   asked   Mamadu   Barry,   the   driver,   for   registration   papers,   which   he   did   not   have;   Barry   also   professed   not   to   know  who  owned  the  car  or  where  he  was  driving  to.  So  the   officer  asked  Fadiga,  who  was  in  the  passenger’s  seat.  Fadi-­‐‑ ga  replied  that  “a  friend”  owned  the  car  and  produced,  not  a   registration  document,  but  a  rental  agreement.  The  car’s  re-­‐‑ turn  was  past  due  under  that  agreement,  which  did  not  au-­‐‑ thorize  either  Barry  or  Fadiga  to  drive  the  car.  When  Fadiga   opened   his   wallet   to   extract   his   driver’s   license,   the   officer   saw   oodles   of   plastic   cards   in   lieu   of   money.   Now   suspi-­‐‑ cious,   he   asked   Barry   and   Fadiga   for   permission   to   search   the   car;   both   consented.   The   search   turned   up   a   bag   full   of   gift  cards,  and  the  officer  asked  his  dispatcher  to  send  some-­‐‑ one  with  a  card  reader  to  determine  whether  the  cards  were   legitimate.   About   half   an   hour   later   the   card   reader   arrived   and  detected  that  the  cards  had  been  tampered  with.   Fadiga’s  motion  to  suppress  the  evidence  rests  on  the  de-­‐‑ lay   between   the   officer’s   call   and   the   card   reader’s   arrival.   Rodriguez   v.   United   States,   135   S.   Ct.   1609   (2015),   holds   that   police  violate  the  Fourth  Amendment  by  extending  a  traffic   stop  to  allow  time  for  a  drug-­‐‑detection  dog  to  arrive,  unless   reasonable  suspicion  justifies  an  investigation.  District  Judge   Lozano   concluded   that   the   unless   clause   of   Rodriguez   has   been  satisfied:  the  police  reasonably  suspected  that  the  car’s   occupants   possessed   doctored   gift   cards.   2015   U.S.   Dist.   LEXIS   91006   (N.D.   Ind.   July   14,   2015).   Later   the   case   was   transferred  to  Judge  Simon,  who  agreed  with  Judge  Lozano   and   denied   a   motion   for   reconsideration.   2016   U.S.   Dist.   LEXIS  65316  (N.D.  Ind.  May  18,  2016).   Case: 16-3870 No.  16-­‐‑3870   Document: 23 Filed: 06/01/2017 Pages: 5 3   We   agree   with   both   district   judges.   The   car’s   occupants   consented   to   a   search,   which   turned   up   far   more   gift   cards   than   the   most   avid   shopper   carries.   That   plus   other   suspi-­‐‑ cious  details—Barry’s  professed  ignorance  of  the  car’s  own-­‐‑ ership   and   destination;   Fadiga’s   assertion   that   an   unnamed   friend  owned  the  car,  coupled  with  a  rental  contract  that  did   not   permit   either   Barry   or   Fadiga   to   operate   the   car— justified  detention  to  learn  more.  Rodriguez  tells  us  that  rea-­‐‑ sonable  suspicion  permits  a  delay  for  the  arrival  of  investiga-­‐‑ tive  resources.  135  S.  Ct.  at  1615–16.  And  that’s  not  all.  Rodri-­‐‑ guez   dealt   with   a   situation   in   which   the   car’s   occupants   could  drive  away  lawfully,  if  not  detained  by  the  police.  But   Fadiga  and  Barry  did  not  appear  to  have  any  right  to  use  the   car.   The   return   date   on   the   rental   contract   had   passed,   and   neither   Fadiga   nor   Barry   had   been   authorized   to   drive   the   car.  Whether  or  not  they  waited  for  a  card  reader,  the  police   were  entitled  to  detain  Fadiga  and  Barry  until  their  authority   to   use   the   car   had   been   determined.   Extending   the   traffic   stop  therefore  did  not  violate  the  Constitution.   Now   for   the   argument   about   discrimination.   The   venire   from   which   the   jury   was   to   be   selected   comprised   48   per-­‐‑ sons,   none   of   them   black.   Fadiga   asserted   that   this   must   have  been  the  result  of  racial  discrimination.  Asked  for  sup-­‐‑ porting   evidence,   Fadiga’s   lawyer   offered   none.   The   judge   ruled  that  a  person  who  protests  the  composition  of  the  pool   from   which   a   jury   is   drawn   must   show   that   some   discrimi-­‐‑ natory   practice   produced   the   racial   imbalance.   2016   U.S.   Dist.  LEXIS  71102  (N.D.  Ind.  June  1,  2016),  citing,  e.g.,  United   States   v.   Phillips,   239   F.3d   829,   842   (7th   Cir.   2001)   (“[T]he   makeup   of   any   given   venire   is   not   significant,   provided   all   rules  for  selection  have  been  observed.”).   Case: 16-3870 4   Document: 23 Filed: 06/01/2017 Pages: 5 No.  16-­‐‑3870   Fadiga’s  appellate  brief  tries  to  supply  some  of  what  was   missing   in   the   district   court.   His   lawyer   observes   that   the   population  of  the  two  counties  (Lake  and  Porter)  from  which   the  jury  pool  came  is  approximately  20%  black,  and  he  asks   us  to  infer  that  a  discriminatory  practice  must  have  existed.   Zero  for  48  from  such  a  population  is  exceptional,  but  Fadiga   has   not   attempted   to   estimate   the   probability   that   it   could   occur  by  chance—nor  has  he  provided  data  about  voter  reg-­‐‑ istration   or   the   age   distribution   of   the   counties’   population   (people   under   18   are   ineligible   to   serve   on   juries).   The   plan   at  the  time  of  Fadiga’s  trial  drew  from  lists  of  registered  vot-­‐‑ ers;  since  then,  the  Northern  District  of  Indiana  has  amended   its   plan   to   include   as   potential   jurors   everyone   with   gov-­‐‑ ernment-­‐‑issued  identification  such  as  a  driver’s  license,  plus   all  resident  taxpayers,  whether  or  not  registered  to  vote.   For  a  challenge  to  the  composition  of  a  jury  pool  to  suc-­‐‑ ceed,   counsel   must   show   how   the   venire   was   selected.   The   Jury   Selection   and   Service   Act,   28   U.S.C.   §§  1861–78,   pro-­‐‑ vides   a   means   to   do   that,   and   §1867(d)   entitles   litigants   to   hearings  before  jury  selection  begins  if  they  can  show  what   seems   to   be   a   substantial   departure   from   expectations.   Liti-­‐‑ gants   who   invoke   this   statute   are   entitled   to   discovery.   See   §§  1867(f),   1868.   The   statute   adds   that   the   “procedures   pre-­‐‑ scribed  by  this  section  shall  be  the  exclusive  means  by  which   a   person   accused   of   a   Federal   crime   …   may   challenge   any   jury   on   the   ground   that   such   jury   was   not   selected   in   con-­‐‑ formity  with  the  provisions  of  this  title”  (§1867(e)).   The   record   does   not   offer   any   reason   to   think   that   the   rules   of   the   Northern   District’s   former   plan   were   either   bi-­‐‑ ased   or   bypassed.   The   plan   is   race-­‐‑blind   and   before   its   amendment  should  have  produced  venires  that  in  aggregate   Case: 16-3870 No.  16-­‐‑3870   Document: 23 Filed: 06/01/2017 Pages: 5 5   tracked   the   population   of   registered   voters—at   least   if   all   groups  respond  to  jury  summonses  at  the  same  rate,  another   question  on  which  the  record  is  silent.  It  is  possible  to  imag-­‐‑ ine  things  going  wrong,  such  as  a  batch  of  jury  summonses   being  sent  to  a  single  town  or  precinct  that  is  predominantly   white,  but  there’s  no  evidence  that  this,  or  anything  else,  did   go  wrong.  As  no  one  is  entitled  to  racial  balance  on  any  par-­‐‑ ticular   jury,   see   Holland   v.   Illinois,   493   U.S.   474,   480   (1990);   United   States   v.   Ashley,   54   F.3d   311,   315   (7th   Cir.   1995),   the   district  court  properly  rejected  Fadiga’s  complaint  about  this   pool.   AFFIRMED  

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