USA v. Jason Kiedrowski
Filed Nonprecedential Disposition PER CURIAM. We GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal. Michael S. Kanne, Circuit Judge; Diane S. Sykes, Circuit Judge and David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge. [6888685-1]  [16-4117]
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 6, 2017
Decided December 7, 2017
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JASON A. KIEDROWSKI,
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
William C. Griesbach,
O R D E R
Jason Kiedrowski robbed multiple credit unions and banks throughout
Wisconsin while on state probation for a burglary he committed in 2013. Police
apprehended him after his sixth robbery and he confessed to the spree. He pleaded
guilty to an information charging one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and
was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. Kiedrowski
appeals, and now his appointed attorney moves to withdraw under Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967). Kiedrowski has not responded to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b).
Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of
this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be
thorough, we limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey,
748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir.
Kiedrowski has told his counsel that he does not wish to withdraw his guilty
plea. Thus counsel appropriately passes over possible arguments about the adequacy of
the plea colloquy and voluntariness of the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d
348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel first considers whether Kiedrowski could contest the guidelines
calculation and the reasonableness of the sentence. Counsel correctly identifies no
mistake in the offense level calculation and an immaterial—but favorable—mistake in
the criminal history calculation, namely, the omission of one criminal‐history point.
Regardless, Kiedrowski had far more than the 13 criminal history points necessary for a
criminal history category of VI, and thus we agree that arguing for reversal based on
this miscalculation would be frivolous. Further, the sentence imposed is within the
guideline range of 100 to 125 months and we agree with counsel that there is no basis to
disturb the presumption that the sentence is reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 347 (2007); United States v. Gries, 872 F.3d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 2017).
Counsel notes that Kiedrowski wishes to challenge the district judge’s decision to
impose his federal sentence consecutive to his state sentence for burglary, which he
received when his probation was revoked because of the bank robberies. The district
judge had broad discretion to impose the sentence concurrently or consecutively.
18 U.S.C. § 3584; United States v. Moore, 784 F.3d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 2015). And although
the judge did not rely on this point, the Sentencing Commission recommends a
consecutive sentence when the defendant’s probation was revoked for the same
conduct underlying the federal offense. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 cmt. n.4(C); United States
v. Jackson, 546 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2008). In deciding to impose a consecutive
sentence, the judge adequately considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
including the unrelated burglary and bank robbery that the state and federal sentences
punish, Kiedrowski’s character and long criminal history, and the need to protect the
public from his continued crimes.
Finally counsel considers the district judge’s imposition, over Kiedrowski’s
objection, of a condition of supervised release allowing warrantless searches and
correctly concludes a challenge would be frivolous. The condition permits searches that
are reasonable in time and manner and based on reasonable suspicion; we have allowed
the imposition of a condition authorizing searches if limited in this way. See United
States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 860–62 (7th Cir. 2015). The district judge specifically
considered the condition appropriate for Kiedrowski, given his long criminal history
and extensive drug use, believing the condition “provides added incentive for Mr.
Kiedrowski upon release to make sure he doesn’t return to the life of crime.” Cf. id.
Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?