United States v. Monard Mosley

Filing

OPINION FILED - THE COURT: KERMIT E. BYE, C. ARLEN BEAM and STEVEN M. COLLOTON. Steven M. Colloton, Authoring Judge (PUBLISHED) [3673382] [09-1648]

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-1648
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United States of America,
Appellee,
v.
Monard D. Mosley,
Appellant.

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*
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* Appeal from the United States
* District Court for the
* Western District of Missouri.
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Submitted: December 14, 2009
Filed: June 11, 2010
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Before BYE, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Monard Mosley appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as
a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). After
a trial at which Mosley was represented by counsel, a jury found Mosley guilty as
charged, and the district court1 sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. Mosley
appeals his conviction on the ground that the district court erroneously denied his
request to represent himself. We affirm.

1

The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri.

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I.
On October 3, 2006, a security officer at the Research Medical Center notified
police that an individual, later identified as Mosley, had removed a handgun from his
clothing and left the gun in the center console of his vehicle in the parking lot. The
security officer detained Mosley, and when police arrived, they discovered that
Mosley had active warrants for his arrest. Police arrested Mosley and searched his
vehicle, where they found a firearm in the center console. A grand jury later charged
Mosley with unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon.
At a hearing before a magistrate judge on September 27, 2007, Mosley
expressed his desire to proceed without a lawyer. The magistrate judge granted
Mosley’s motion to allow his lawyer to withdraw, and provided Mosley with time to
consider whether there was a different lawyer whom Mosley would want to represent
him. At a pretrial conference before the magistrate judge on October 11, 2007,
Mosley again asserted his desire to proceed pro se. The magistrate judge engaged in
a colloquy with Mosley to ensure that the decision to proceed pro se was knowing and
voluntary, and then decided that Mosley could represent himself.
Mosley subsequently filed two pro se pleadings, including a “Motion to
Dismiss Case for Mistaken Identity & Jurisdictional Issues Over a Sovereign,” which
the magistrate judge was “hard pressed to decipher and discern.” R. Doc. 40, at 2.
Following Mosley’s motions, the government filed a motion for a mental examination
to determine Mosley’s competency to stand trial. The magistrate judge granted the
motion for a competency examination and also determined that Mosley should no
longer be permitted to proceed pro se. The court appointed counsel for Mosley in
December 2007.
At a competency hearing on May 27, 2008, Mosley was disruptive and
unresponsive. When the hearing began, Mosley stated that he was present for the
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matter, spelled his name, and asserted that “I am a live and living, flesh and blood
breathing man, who is a secured party who is sovereign. I am not a corporation.” R.
Doc. 122, Tr. 2. During the hearing, the magistrate judge asked whether Mosley had
read a competency evaluation prepared by the Federal Medical Center. Mosley
refused to answer repeated inquiries, and then exclaimed: “Do you know anybody
here in this courtroom who has a claim against me? I don’t understand, sir. Why am
I being detained if no one has a claim against me?” Id. at 3. Mosley also reserved his
right “not to be compelled to perform any adhesion contract or commercial
agreement.” Id. at 4.
Following these statements, the magistrate judge explained that his earlier order
had appointed counsel to represent Mosley, and that Mosley should not proceed pro
se because he “either [does] not understand these proceedings or [is] not willing to
participate in them.” Id. At the close of the hearing, the magistrate judge reiterated
that Mosley would be represented by appointed counsel for all pretrial matters and for
trial, because he refused to participate in the proceedings. The district court
eventually determined that Mosley was competent to stand trial.
Mosley continued his pattern of unresponsiveness at a pretrial conference on
July 10, 2008. Mosley again refused to answer the magistrate judge’s questions
directly and reiterated that he was a “secured party.” The magistrate judge also gave
Mosley the opportunity to address the court, at which time Mosley read from a
prepared statement making claims that were unrelated to his case.
Before trial, Mosley filed several more pro se motions to dismiss counsel and
to represent himself. At a pretrial conference on October 22, 2008, the magistrate
judge stated that he was denying Mosley’s motions to represent himself, and that
Mosley could appeal the decision to the trial judge when his trial occurred. In a
subsequent written order denying Mosley’s motions to proceed pro se, the magistrate
judge again explained that “[e]ach time the Court has attempted to engage the
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defendant in a discussion of his ability to represent himself, the defendant has been
completely unresponsive to the Court.” R. Doc. 70. In November 2008, Mosley
sought review in this court of the denial of his motions to proceed pro se, but we
dismissed the premature appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
At his trial, Mosley asserted his right to proceed pro se, saying he was
appealing the decision of the magistrate judge. Although the district court did not
state expressly on the record that Mosley’s motion was denied, the court never
discharged appointed counsel, and Mosley was represented by counsel throughout the
trial.
Mosley continued his disruptive behavior at trial. During voir dire, Mosley
interrupted the discussion between the attorneys and the judge on several occasions.
At trial, Mosley explained to the judge that the name on the indictment was not his,
but was that of a corporation. Later, Mosley interrupted the proceedings and declared
that his lawyer was being forced on his case.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court sentenced Mosley to a term
of 180 months’ imprisonment. Mosley appeals.
II.
Mosley argues that the district court erred in denying his right to selfrepresentation, asserting that because he “was determined to be competent for trial,
he should have been allowed to represent himself.” He also contends that the district
court failed to explain the basis for its denial of his request to proceed pro se. We
review the district court’s decision de novo. See United States v. Mahasin, 442 F.3d
687, 691 (8th Cir. 2006).

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The Sixth Amendment grants an accused the right to counsel, as well as the
related right to waive counsel and proceed pro se. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 807 (1975). A defendant’s right to self-representation, however, is not absolute,
and self-representation can be disallowed or terminated when the defendant “engages
in serious obstructionist misconduct.” United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 681 (8th
Cir. 2007); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (“The right of self-representation
is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.”). A defendant is not entitled
to use the right of self-representation “as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for
distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial process.” United States v.
Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 808-09 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he
government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times
outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.” Martinez v. Court of
Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000). That a defendant is competent to stand trial
does not mean that he is automatically entitled to represent himself. The inquiries are
distinct. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1993).
Mosley argues that there is nothing in the record that explains why the court
denied him the right to represent himself. Although the district court did not expressly
articulate its reasons for denying Mosley’s appeal of the magistrate’s ruling, we are
satisfied that the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s reasoning. During trial,
the district judge explained to Mosley that he had reviewed the proceedings before the
magistrate judge, and stated that Mosley “wanted to talk . . . about everything but this
case.” R. Doc. 127, Tr. 7. The court warned Mosley that the court would “try this
case,” and that “we’re not going to try the United States Constitution or all of that
stuff.” Id. We take the district court’s statements as an adoption of the magistrate
judge’s conclusion that Mosley could not proceed pro se because he was unwilling to
participate in the proceedings.
The reasoning of the magistrate judge, as adopted, was sufficient to support the
court’s decision on self-representation. In the order appointing counsel for Mosley,
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the magistrate judge noted that good cause existed for a competency examination and
stated: “Under this circumstance, the serious penalties defendant Mosley faces if
convicted and his complete lack of any legal training or experience, the Court has
concluded that it is not in the interests of justice nor in the interests of defendant
Mosley to allow him to proceed pro se.” R. Doc. 37. Later, at a competency hearing,
the magistrate judge explained that it was not appropriate for Mosley to proceed pro
se because either he did not understand the proceedings or he was not willing to
participate in them. At that same hearing, the magistrate judge clarified that his
decision was based on the fact that Mosley refused to respond to his questions and
participate in the proceedings. The magistrate judge reiterated this rationale in an
order denying Mosley’s pro se motions to represent himself.
Mosley’s obstreperous conduct provided sufficient grounds for the district court
to terminate and disallow Mosley’s self-representation. Mosley’s behavior interfered
with pretrial proceedings and delayed the trial. There was good cause to believe that
Mosley would continue to disrupt the proceedings if the court permitted him to resume
self-representation. The district court thus did not err by concluding that Mosley
essentially forfeited his right to represent himself by engaging in conduct that
obstructed the proceedings against him. See Myers, 503 F.3d at 681.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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