W3i Mobile, LLC v. Westchester Fire Insurance

Filing

OPINION FILED - THE COURT: WILLIAM JAY RILEY, MICHAEL J. MELLOY and RAYMOND W. GRUENDER. William Jay Riley, Authoring Judge (PUBLISHED) [3755832] [09-3701]

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________
No. 09-3701
___________
W3i Mobile, LLC,

*
*
Appellant,
*
* Appeal from the United States
v.
* District Court for the
* District of Minnesota.
Westchester Fire Insurance Company, *
*
Appellee.
*
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Submitted: October 21, 2010
Filed: February 15, 2011
___________
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MELLOY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
___________
RILEY, Chief Judge.
W3i Mobile, LLC (W3i) sued Westchester Fire Insurance Company
(Westchester), claiming breach of contract and seeking a declaration that an insurance
policy required Westchester to defend and indemnify W3i for expenses associated
with two class action lawsuits brought against W3i. The district court1 granted
summary judgment in favor of Westchester, finding a products exclusion precluded
coverage under the policy. We affirm.

1

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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I.

BACKGROUND
A.
Parties
W3i is a wholly owned subsidiary of W3i Holdings, LLC, a Minnesota limited
liability company with its principal place of business in Minnesota and members in
Minnesota and California. W3i provides mobile content to cellular telephone users.
According to W3i, “mobile content” refers to products and services marketed and sold
by W3i “such as ringtones, quizzes, horoscopes, and weather alerts.”
Westchester, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in
New York, is an indirect subsidiary of ACE Limited. Westchester issued a Business
and Management Indemnity Policy (Policy) to W3i, effective January 1, 2008 to
January 1, 2009.

B.
Insurance Policy
The Policy contains three coverage sections, including a Directors, Officers and
Company (D&O) section. Insuring Clause A.3 of the D&O section obligates
Westchester “to pay the Loss of [W3i] which [W3i] becomes legally obligated to pay
by reason of a Claim first made against [W3i] . . . for any Wrongful Act.” (emphasis
omitted). As relevant, the D&O section defines “Claim” to include “a civil
proceeding against [W3i] seeking monetary damages . . . , commenced by the service
of a complaint or similar pleading.”
The D&O section includes various exclusions,2 including an exclusion
applicable only to Clause A.3, providing Westchester “shall not be liable for Loss on
account of any Claim . . . alleging, based upon, arising out of, attributable to, directly
2

The D&O section also includes a breach of contract exclusion, which
Westchester argues also precludes coverage. Because we conclude the products
exclusion precludes coverage, we need not decide whether the policy’s breach of
contract exclusion does so as well.
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or indirectly resulting from, in consequence of, or in any way involving . . . any goods
or products manufactured, produced, processed, packaged, sold, marketed, distributed,
advertised or developed by [W3i]” (emphasis omitted) (products exclusion).
C.
Underlying Lawsuits
In September 2008, users of W3i’s mobile content filed two class action
complaints (underlying claims) against W3i in California and Minnesota state courts.3
The underlying claims alleged W3i billed cellular telephone users for unauthorized
mobile content in violation of various state consumer protection statutes,4 and
constituted tortious interference with a contract and unjust enrichment.
According to the underlying claims, the delivery of mobile content involves
(1) mobile content providers, (2) wireless carriers, and (3) aggregators. Content
providers such as W3i “create the mobile content and deliver their products by means
of cell phone technology.” Wireless carriers such as AT&T, Verizon Wireless, and
Sprint provide the cellular telephone devices and wireless service to their customers
pursuant to contracts with those customers. Aggregators serve as the “middle-men”
between the content providers and the wireless carriers, negotiating agreements, as
well as “manag[ing] the complex [wireless] carrier relationships, distribution, billing,
and customer service.”
The three types of businesses often share the revenue generated when customers
purchase mobile content. When a customer purchases mobile content, the content
provider gives the customer’s cellular telephone number and the amount to be charged

3

Both underlying claims were later removed to federal court.

4

The Minnesota lawsuit alleged W3i engaged in deceptive trade practices in
violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.44, 325F.67. The California lawsuit alleged
violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770, and
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.
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to the aggregator, who in turn passes this information to the wireless carrier. The
wireless carrier then includes the charge on the customer’s cellular telephone bill.
Once the customer pays for the mobile content, the wireless carrier retains its “revenue
share” and remits the balance to the aggregator, who in turn retains its “revenue share”
and remits the remainder to the mobile content provider.
The underlying claims allege this system lacks “checks or safeguards to prevent
erroneous and unauthorized charges.” The likelihood of unauthorized or false charges
is increased by “[r]ecycled numbers, misleading ‘consent’ procedures present when
customers sign-up for premium mobile content, [and] the absence of [] signature
requirements, age confirmations, or personal code numbers.”
D.
Prior Proceedings
In November 2008, after W3i notified Westchester of the underlying claims and
requested coverage, Westchester advised W3i that coverage was not available. W3i
filed a breach of contract and declaratory judgment action in federal district court, and
Westchester moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Westchester’s
motion, finding “Westchester ha[d] no duty to defend or indemnify W3i for expenses
associated with the [u]nderlying [c]laims.” The district court concluded the products
exclusion precluded recovery because the underlying claims involved W3i’s product
and that the illusory coverage doctrine did not apply in these circumstances under
Minnesota law.5 W3i appeals.

5

W3i does not appeal the district court’s conclusion that the illusory coverage
doctrine does not apply because, as W3i’s counsel stated at oral argument, W3i
“could not meet the high standard Minnesota [law] requires.”
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II.

DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its interpretation
of state law de novo. Babinski v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 569 F.3d 349, 351 (8th Cir.
2009). We may affirm a grant of summary judgment “on any grounds supported by
the record.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009). “Summary
judgment is proper when the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (amended
effective Dec. 1, 2010).
Minnesota law governs our interpretation of the insurance policy in this
diversity action. See Babinski, 569 F.3d at 351-52. Under Minnesota law, “[g]eneral
principles of contract interpretation apply to insurance policies.” Carlson v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Lobeck v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 582 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 1998)). We must interpret clear and
unambiguous policy language “according to plain, ordinary sense so as to effectuate
the intentions of the parties.” Id. (quoting Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch,
Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Language in a policy is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations.” Id. While we construe ambiguity in favor of the insured, we “may
not . . . read an ambiguity into the plain language of an insurance contract.” Hubred
v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989).
We agree with the district court that the products exclusion’s plain language
precludes coverage under the D&O section. The exclusion operates against claims
“arising out of, . . . directly or indirectly resulting from, . . . or in any way involving
. . . products . . . produced, . . . sold, marketed, distributed, . . . or developed by
[W3i].” (emphasis added). The two underlying claims allege customers were billed
for mobile content, which indisputably is W3i’s “product” regardless of whether the
bills were erroneous or unauthorized. In other words, the underlying claims charge
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W3i with either erroneously billing for products the customer never received or billing
for products without proper authorization from the customer. These claims arguably
arise out of, or directly or indirectly result from, W3i’s developed and marketed
product, its mobile content. At the very least, the claims “involve” W3i’s mobile
content.
We reject W3i’s characterization of the underlying claims as billing disputes
unaffected by the policy’s products exclusion. Accepting this characterization would
require us to ignore both the exclusion’s plain and unambiguous language and the
underlying claims’ factual allegations. Nothing in the language of the products
exclusion limits its operation to claims which have W3i’s products at the core of the
claims. Interpreting the exclusion so narrowly would require us to ignore the
exclusion’s “in any way involving” clause, contrary to Minnesota’s rule of contract
interpretation. See Hammer v. Investors Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 511 N.W.2d 6, 8
(Minn. 1994) (explaining “the court is bound to attribute the usual and accepted
meaning to [a] phrase [and] . . . is not free to construe the phrase in such a way as to
afford coverage”); Gorr v. Consol. Foods Corp., 91 N.W.2d 772, 782 (Minn. 1958)
(noting courts cannot disregard clear and unambiguous language in the interest of the
insured).
The underlying claims do not exclusively concern W3i’s billing practices in
isolation of the mobile content, as W3i suggests. The nature of mobile content allows
customers to order and receive the product directly to their cellular telephones. The
underlying claims allege “the absence of [] signature requirements, age confirmations,
or personal code numbers exacerbate the likelihood of unauthorized and false
charges.” This implies customers are receiving and using mobile content, but are
doing so without fully understanding or authorizing the charges associated with the
mobile content. Therefore, the underlying claims involve the use of W3i’s product.

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W3i argues the word “involving” is ambiguous because it has many different
definitions, including “[t]o have as a necessary feature or consequence; entail.” See
American Heritage College Dictionary 730 (4th ed. 2007). W3i also points to AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995), where the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the word “involving” broadly, and concluded it was
“the functional equivalent of ‘affecting.’” “Because policy exclusions are strictly
construed against the insurer,” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply
Co., 718 N.W.2d 888, 895 (Minn. 2006), W3i contends we must interpret “involving”
narrowly and require a cause-and-effect relationship between the mobile content and
the underlying claims in order to implicate the products exclusion. Because the
district court found no causal connection between W3i’s mobile content and the
underlying claims existed, W3i argues the products exclusion, interpreted narrowly,
is not applicable.
We disagree with W3i because its argument fails to account for our duty to
interpret “involving” within the context of its use. “Because a word has more than
one meaning does not mean it is ambiguous. The sense of a word depends on how it
is being used; only if more than one meaning applies within that context does
ambiguity arise.” Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517
N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994). In the Westchester products exclusion, “in any way”
modifies “involving.” As we have recently determined, “[t]he word ‘any’ when
‘[r]ead naturally . . . has an expansive meaning.’” Leonard v. Exec. Risk Indem. (In
re SRC Holding Corp), 545 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)). We find the “in any way” language incorporates all
reasonable definitions of the word “involving,” including those not requiring a causal
connection, such as “to have within or as part of itself.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1191 (1993).
Relying on cases such as Waseca Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N.W.2d 917
(Minn. 1983), W3i suggests that Minnesota’s “independent cause doctrine” compels
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coverage because “when two concurrent causes contribute to a loss, one covered by
insurance and one not, an insurer may not deny coverage due to the presence of the
non-covered loss.” We doubt application of this doctrine is appropriate here, but need
not address this issue because W3i raised the argument for the first time in its reply
brief. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 590, 592 (8th Cir. 1999)
(repeating our general practice against addressing issues and arguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief).
Finally, W3i asserts the policy should cover the underlying claims through
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. W3i claims the district court’s
interpretation “was contrary to the reasonable expectations of the insured because it
effectively nullified [Clause A.3].”
“The doctrine of ‘reasonable expectations’ protects the ‘objectively reasonable
expectations’ of insureds ‘even though painstaking study of the policy provisions
would have negated those expectations.’” Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527
N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Atwater Creamery v. Western Nat’l
Mut. Ins., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1985)). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
recently discussed at length its limited application of the doctrine, refusing to expand
it beyond “use as a tool for resolving ambiguity and for correcting extreme situations
. . . where a party’s coverage is significantly different from what the party reasonably
believes it has paid for and where the only notice the party has of that difference is in
an obscure and unexpected provision.” Carlson, 749 N.W.2d at 47-49; see Royal Ins.,
517 N.W.2d at 891 (refusing to apply the doctrine to the policy’s “plainly designated”
pollution exclusion). The reasonable expectations doctrine “is not a license to ignore
. . . [an] exclusion . . . nor to rewrite the exclusion solely to conform to a result that the
insured might prefer.” Royal Ins., 517 N.W.2d at 891.
This case involves a commercial insurance policy purchased by experienced
business people. See Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323,
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327 (Minn. 1993) (holding it inappropriate to apply the reasonable expectations
doctrine where “the purchasers of the insurance were experienced business people”);
Atwater Creamery Co., 366 N.W.2d at 277 (advising us the doctrine “is closely related
to the doctrine of contracts of adhesion” and particularly applicable “[w]here there is
unequal bargaining between the parties”). The Westchester products exclusion used
clear and unambiguous language and was plainly labeled under the exclusion section.
Were we to apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations here, we would expand the
doctrine beyond its current scope under Minnesota law. We decline to do so.
III.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
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