Viasystems v. EBM-Papst

Filing

OPINION FILED - THE COURT: LAVENSKI R. SMITH, RAYMOND W. GRUENDER and DUANE BENTON. Raymond W. Gruender, Authoring Judge (PUBLISHED) [3809700] [10-2460]

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________
No. 10-2460
___________
Viasystems, Inc.,

*
*
*
* Appeal from the United States
* District Court for the
* Eastern District of Missouri.
*
*
*
*
___________

Appellant,
v.
EBM-Papst St. Georgen
GmbH & Co., KG,
Appellee.

Submitted: February 16, 2011
Filed: July 21, 2011
___________
Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
___________
GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
Viasystems, Inc., a Missouri-based corporation, filed suit against EBM-Papst
St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG (“St. Georgen”), a German corporation, alleging
several claims in contract and tort. The district court1 concluded that it had neither
specific nor general personal jurisdiction over St. Georgen and granted its motion to
dismiss. Viasystems appeals, and, for the following reasons, we affirm.

1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri.

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I.

BACKGROUND

Viasystems, a Delaware corporation based principally in Saint Louis, Missouri,
is a manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. In 2007, Viasystems contracted
to manufacture base units for Ericsson A.B., a Swedish company. Part of each base
unit consisted of a cooling fan, and, at Ericsson’s prompting, Viasystems purchased
cooling fans that were manufactured by St. Georgen. The fans were manufactured in
St. Georgen’s Herbolzheim, Germany plant and shipped to Shanghai, China, where
they were sold to ebm-papst Shanghai, a Chinese corporation, which resold them to
Viasystems’ Chinese subsidiary. After the fans were installed, the completed base
units were sold to Ericsson for use in mobile phone facilities in Japan. At no point
did the fans or base units enter the United States.
Ericsson subsequently informed St. Georgen that the cooling fans in some of
the base units were failing, a malfunction that St. Georgen traced to a manufacturing
defect. Ericsson replaced the fans at a cost of over $5,000,000 and demanded
reimbursement from Viasystems. Viasystems partially reimbursed Ericsson and, in
turn, made demand on St. Georgen to assume responsibility for the replacement costs.
After several months of negotiations, resulting in a partial payment by St. Georgen
and its insurer to Viasystems of $1,494,941, St. Georgen declined to pay anything
further. Viasystems filed suit in federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction.
Viasystems’ amended complaint included counts for breach of implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, negligence,
noncontractual indemnity, and tortious interference, and requested damages and
declaratory judgment. St. Georgen filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. In response, Viasystems argued that both specific and general personal
jurisdiction existed and that, in the alternative, the court at least should allow it to
conduct jurisdictional discovery before dismissing the case. The district court
granted St. Georgen’s motion to dismiss and denied Viasystems’ motion for
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jurisdictional discovery, concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over St.
Georgen and that the basic facts supporting this conclusion were undisputed, making
further discovery unwarranted. Viasystems appeals, contending that the district court
erred in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction and abused its discretion in
refusing to allow further jurisdictional discovery.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Personal Jurisdiction

We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of in personam jurisdiction de
novo. Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2010). We require the party
asserting jurisdiction to make only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction and will
view the evidence in the light most favorable to that party. See Romak USA, Inc. v.
Rich, 384 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, “[t]he party seeking to
establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction carries the burden of proof, and the
burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.” Epps v. Stewart Info.
Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2003).
Personal jurisdiction over a defendant represents the power of a court to enter
“a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff.”
Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). Personal jurisdiction can
be specific or general. “‘Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of
action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the forum state,’ while
‘[g]eneral jurisdiction . . . refers to the power of a state to adjudicate any cause of
action involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the cause of action
arose.’” Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co., 528 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 2008)
(alterations in original) (quoting Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816,
819 (8th Cir. 1994)). Viasystems asserts that St. Georgen is subject to both specific

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and general personal jurisdiction, either of which would allow the case to proceed.
We address each in turn.
1.

Specific Jurisdiction

Specific personal jurisdiction can be exercised by a federal court in a diversity
suit only if authorized by the forum state’s long-arm statute and permitted by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Romak, 384 F.3d at 984.2 In
Missouri, specific personal jurisdiction is authorized only to the extent that “the
[cause of] action arose out of an activity covered by [Missouri’s] long-arm statute.”
Conway v. Royalite Plastics, Ltd., 12 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Mo. banc 2000). Missouri’s
long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants who, inter alia,
transact business, make a contract, or commit a tort within the state. Mo. Rev. Stat.
section 506.500.1. These individual categories are construed broadly, such that if a
defendant commits one of the acts specified in the long-arm statute, the statute will
be interpreted “to provide for jurisdiction, within the specific categories enumerated
2

Although cases from our circuit collapse these two inquiries out of a belief
that “the Missouri long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over
non-residents to the extent permissible under the due process clause,” Romak, 384
F.3d at 984 (quoting Porter v. Berall, 293 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2002)), the more
recent decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court—which the Rules of Decision Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1652, binds us to apply in this diversity case, see Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 856
(8th Cir. 2010)—analyze the two questions separately. See Bryant v. Smith Interior
Design Grp., 310 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. banc 2010) (“First, the court inquires
whether the defendant’s conduct satisfies Missouri’s long-arm statute. If so, the court
next evaluates whether . . . asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant
comports with due process.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Angoff v. Marion
A. Allen, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 483, 486 (Mo. banc 2001); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Elyria
Foundry Co., 955 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. banc 1997). Accordingly, we follow the
Missouri Supreme Court’s analysis. However, the result of this appeal does not turn
on this choice, since it is the due process inquiry that ultimately is dispositive.
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in the statute[], to the full extent permitted by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” State
ex rel. Metal Serv. Ctr. of Ga, Inc. v. Gaertner, 677 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. banc
1984).
On appeal, Viasystems contends that St. Georgen is subject to specific personal
jurisdiction because, in the months before Viasystems initiated the instant lawsuit, St.
Georgen sent several e-mails, made phone calls, and made a partial payment to
Viasystems in Missouri before refusing to pay anything further. Viasystems alleges
that St. Georgen’s eventual refusal to pay Ericsson’s replacement costs in full
constitutes tortious interference with Viasystems’ contract with Ericsson, a tort that
negatively affected Viasystems in Missouri. Viasystems concludes that St. Georgen
thus falls within the “tortious act” category of the long-arm statute pursuant to the
“effects test.” See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (“California
is the focal point both of the [out-of-state conduct] and of the harm suffered.
Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’
of their [out-of-state] conduct in California.”). We need not decide whether these
actions by St. Georgen suffice to place it within the bounds of Missouri’s long-arm
statute, because it is clear that the cited activities are not sufficient to surmount the
due-process threshold.
Even if personal jurisdiction over a defendant is authorized by the forum state’s
long-arm statute, jurisdiction can be asserted only if it comports with the strictures of
the Due Process Clause. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
291 (1980). The touchstone of the due-process analysis remains whether the
defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The fundamental inquiry is
whether the defendant has “purposefully availed” itself of the “benefits and
protections” of the forum state, see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
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482 (1985), to such a degree that it “should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297.
St. Georgen’s incidental contacts with Missouri—scattered e-mails, phone
calls, and a wire-transfer of money to Viasystems in Missouri—do not constitute a
“deliberate” and “substantial connection” with the state such that St. Georgen could
“reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” See Burger King Corp., 471
U.S. at 474-75 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297). Indeed,
these isolated connections are just the sort of random, fortuitous, and attenuated
contacts that cannot justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 475; see
also Burlington Indus. v. Maples Indus., 97 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that 100 telephone calls by defendant to plaintiff were “insufficient, alone, to confer
personal jurisdiction”); Institutional Food Mktg. Assocs., Ltd. v. Golden State
Strawberries, Inc., 747 F.2d 448, 456 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant’s
“phone conversations and written correspondence” with plaintiffs were “not
sufficient, under the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause, to justify an exercise of personal
jurisdiction”).
Nor can jurisdiction be based on the effects on Viasystems in Missouri of St.
Georgen’s refusal to pay Ericsson’s replacement costs in full. Due process allows a
state to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the in-state effects of
defendants’ extraterritorial tortious acts only if those acts “(1) were intentional, (2)
were uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt
of which was suffered—and which the defendant knew was likely to be suffered—[in
the forum state].” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796 (alteration in original) (quoting Lindgren
v. GDT, LLC, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (S.D. Iowa 2004)). Even assuming
Viasystems could satisfy factors (1) and (3), St. Georgen’s refusal to pay the
replacement costs in full simply was not “uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum
state,” id. (quoting Lindgren, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1132), or “performed for the very
purpose of having [its] consequences felt in the forum state,” Dakota Indus. v.
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Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Brainerd v.
Governors of Univ. of Alta., 873 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1989)), in such a way that
St. Georgen should “ha[ve] clear notice that it is subject to suit there,” World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297. Accordingly, Viasystems has not carried its
burden of establishing a prima facie case that specific personal jurisdiction can be
asserted over St. Georgen.
2.

General Jurisdiction

If a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant it can “adjudicate any cause
of action involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the cause of action
arose.” Miller, 528 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Bell Paper Box, 22 F.3d at 819). Like
specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction can only be asserted insofar as it is
authorized by state law and permitted by the Due Process Clause. Sondergard v.
Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993). The Missouri Supreme Court has
held that general jurisdiction is properly asserted over an out-of-state corporation,
under Missouri Law, when that corporation is “present and conducting substantial
business in Missouri.” State ex rel. K-Mart Corp. v. Holliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Mo. banc 1999); see also Wineteer v. Viet. Helicopter Pilots Ass’n, 121 S.W.3d 277,
282 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). We need not decide whether Missouri law authorizes
general jurisdiction over St. Georgen, however, because we conclude that subjecting
St. Georgen to general jurisdiction in Missouri also is not permitted by the Due
Process Clause.
Because it extends to causes of action unrelated to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum state, general jurisdiction over a defendant is subject to a higher dueprocess threshold. A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign corporations
only if they have developed “continuous and systematic general business contacts,”
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984), with the
forum state, “[so] as to render them essentially at home in the forum State,” Goodyear
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Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. ---, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796, 803 (U.S.
June 27, 2011). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place,
one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Id. at 806; see also
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). On appeal, Viasystems
proffers two theories in support of extending general personal jurisdiction over St.
Georgen, both based on the activities of St. Georgen’s regional distributors.3
First, Viasystems contends that St. Georgen is subject to general personal
jurisdiction because the company that distributes its products in the United States,
ebm papst, Inc. (“EPI”), acts as its agent, making EPI’s Missouri contacts attributable
to St. Georgen. “[A] party who relies upon the authority of an agent has the burden
of proof regarding both the fact of the agency relationship and the scope of the
agent’s authority.” Romak USA, Inc., 384 F.3d at 985 (quoting Karr-Bick Kitchens
& Bath, Inc. v. Gemini Coatings, Inc., 932 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
Though it makes a half-hearted effort in this direction, Viasystems has not carried its
burden of showing the existence of an actual agency relationship between St.
Georgen and EPI. Viasystems’ only argument is based on scattered statements on the
website www.ebm-papst.com to the effect that EPI is St. Georgen’s “at-home
partner[],” and “represent[ative],” statements which Viasystems characterizes as
“admissions.” Even if these scattered marketing statements could support an
inference that the two companies have a legally recognized agency relationship, St.
Georgen cannot be held responsible for the statements on www.ebm-papst.com for
the simple reason that this website is owned and operated not by St. Georgen, but by
its corporate parent, ebm-papst Mulfingen GmbH & Co. KG (“Mulfingen”).
3

The district court also addressed whether general jurisdiction could be based
on the website owned and run by St. Georgen’s German parent corporation, pursuant
to the test first laid out in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119
(W.D. Pa. 1997). On appeal, Viasystems disclaims any intent to found jurisdiction
on the existence of this website, so we do not address the argument.
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Viasystems’ more vigorous argument is that an agency relationship should be
implied between EPI and St. Georgen because EPI “performs services that are
‘sufficiently important to [St. Georgen] that if it did not have a representative to
perform them, [St. Georgen’s] own officials would undertake to perform substantially
similar services.’” In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1063,
1072-73 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir.
2001)). We are not free to adopt this “agency theory” of jurisdiction because it is
inconsistent with our precedent. Our cases consistently have insisted that “personal
jurisdiction can be based on the activities of [a] nonresident corporation’s in-state
subsidiary . . . only if the parent so controlled and dominated the affairs of the
subsidiary that the latter’s corporate existence was disregarded so as to cause the
residential corporation to act as the nonresidential corporate defendant’s alter ego.”
Epps, 327 F.3d at 648-49; see also Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey
Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1975).
To be sure, we have emphasized that determining whether personal jurisdiction
exists in a given case “involves applying principles of fairness and reasonableness to
a distinct set of facts, and the determination is not readily amenable to rigid rules that
can be applied across the entire spectrum of cases.” Anderson v. Dassault Aviation,
361 F.3d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 2004). Moreover, in Anderson we recognized that even
if the in-state subsidiary of a foreign corporation is not its corporate parent’s alter
ego, a lesser relationship between the two corporations remains a relevant factor in
determining whether the foreign corporation “‘purposefully directed its products to
the United States,’ and specifically to [the forum state], . . . ‘through the distribution
system it set up in this country,’” id. at 454—a basis for jurisdiction that we address
below. However, this inquiry—whether a foreign corporation has established
minimum contacts with the forum state through “pour[ing] its products into regional
distributors,” Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610,
615 (8th Cir. 1994)—should be kept conceptually separate from the question whether
a subsidiary’s contacts with the forum state should be attributed to a foreign parent
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corporation through an agency theory. In answering this latter question, we have
always required a degree of control and domination by the parent corporation that is
absent here. See Epps, 327 F.3d at 648-49.
St. Georgen’s lack of control and domination over EPI can be seen most clearly
by considering the overarching corporate structure that links St. Georgen to EPI. St.
Georgen itself is a wholly-owned-subsidiary of Mulfingen, a German corporation.
Mulfingen and St. Georgen own 72 percent and 28 percent, respectively, of ebm
Beteiligungs-GmbH, which is the sole owner of ebm-Industries Management Group,
Inc., which, in turn, is the sole owner of EPI. St. Georgen’s ownership of EPI is thus
confined to a two-steps-removed 28-percent interest. St. Georgen did not create EPI,
has no control or authority over EPI, and has no directors or officers in common with
EPI. The relationship between these two companies is too attenuated to support the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over St. Georgen based on the activities of EPI.
Viasystems next contends that St Georgen is subject to general personal
jurisdiction in Missouri because it “heads a distribution network, thus ‘realizing the
much greater economic benefit of multiple sales in distant forums.’” Barone, 25 F.3d
at 613 (quoting Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir.
1986)). While our circuit has held that the mere “placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more, does not constitute an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State,” Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel
Works, 906 F.2d 369, 376 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Guinness Imp. Co. v. Mark VII
Distribs., 153 F.3d 607, 615 (8th Cir. 1998), we have been willing to recognize a
variant of “stream-of-commerce” jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer that “‘pours
its products’ into a regional distributor with the expectation that the distributor will
penetrate a discrete, multi-State trade area,” Vandelune v. 4B Elevator Components
Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Barone, 25 F.3d at 615).
Because Viasystems’ causes of action do not arise out of the distribution of St.
Georgen’s products in Missouri, there is no dispute that Viasystems must use this
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“stream of commerce” theory to support general, rather than specific, jurisdiction.
However, when our circuit’s decision in Barone established the variant of “stream-ofcommerce” jurisdiction on which Viasystems now seeks to rely, we were careful to
note that “stream of commerce” jurisdiction is “a type of specific jurisdiction (as
opposed to general jurisdiction).” Barone, 25 F.3d at 612. Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently clarified that placing products in “the stream of commerce” is “[a]
connection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation [that it] is an
inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 180 L. Ed. 2d
at 803. The Court rejected “the sprawling view of general jurisdiction” that would
make “any substantial manufacturer or seller of goods . . . amenable to suit, on any
claim for relief, wherever its products are distributed.” Id. at 809.
Our precedent and the Supreme Court’s decision in Goodyear make clear that
even if a foreign corporation “‘pours its products’ into a regional distributor with the
expectation that the distributor will penetrate a discrete, multi-State trade area,”
Vandelune, 148 F.3d at 948 (quoting Barone, 25 F.3d at 615), this connection alone
is “so limited” that it “is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”
See Goodyear, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 803.4 Accordingly, we conclude that Viasystems has
not made a prima facie case for the existence of general personal jurisdiction over St.
Georgen.
B.

Jurisdictional Discovery

Finally, Viasystems argues that even if it has not established a prima facie case
for the existence of personal jurisdiction, it is entitled to conduct jurisdictional

4

Any suggestion in Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580 (8th Cir. 2008), that a
seller might have formed contacts “so continuous and systematic as to warrant general
personal jurisdiction,” id. at 589, simply by “deliver[ing] its products to a regional
distributor with an expectation that the distributor would penetrate the forum state,”
id. at 587-88, does not survive Goodyear.
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discovery “so that [it can] further support its assertion of jurisdiction.” We review
the district court’s denial of Viasystems’ motion for jurisdictional discovery for abuse
of discretion. Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 589 (8th Cir. 2008).
The district court concluded that jurisdictional discovery was unwarranted
because “[t]his is not a case in which certain facts necessary to resolving the
jurisdictional inquiry are either unknown or disputed.” Viasystems, Inc. v. ebm-papst
St. Georgen GmbH & Co. KG, No. 09-cv-02076, 2010 WL 2402834, at *9 (E.D. Mo.
June 11, 2010). We agree. Viasystems does not dispute the facts central to our
conclusion, such as St. Georgen’s lack of ownership and control of its United States
distributor, EPI. Moreover, even if Viasystems’ factual allegations—that St. Georgen
had phone and e-mail contacts with Missouri; refused to pay Ericsson’s replacement
costs in full, causing damage in Missouri; and “poured its products” into Missouri
through its local distributor, see Barone, 25 F.3d at 615, which acted as its agent by
performing services that were critical to its operation, see Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at
928-29—are taken as true, for reasons already mentioned these allegations are
insufficient to establish either specific or general personal jurisdiction.
Viasystems suggests that further discovery “would likely show” that St.
Georgen “likely knew of the independent distributors and their locations in
Missouri, . . . knew of, and possibly paid for, advertising and marketing efforts for its
products in Missouri,” that “tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of [St. Georgen’s]
product is being sold in Missouri,” and that “[St. Georgen’s] employees traveled to
Missouri for trade shows, training, marketing, or to provide technical support.” Many
of these allegations concern the relationship between St. Georgen and its distributor
and therefore, even if proven, would be insufficient to support general jurisdiction,
as discussed above. Moreover, Viasystems’ assertion that jurisdictional discovery
“would likely” reveal these facts is entirely speculative, and “[w]hen a plaintiff offers
only speculation or conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum state, a court
is within its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery.” Dever v. Hentzen
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Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1074 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Carefirst of Md, Inc.
v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003)). Accordingly,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Viasystems’ motion for
jurisdictional discovery.
III.

CONCLUSION

Because St. Georgen does not have sufficient “minimum contacts” with
Missouri, the maintenance of this suit would offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S.
at 463). We therefore affirm the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction,
and we likewise affirm the denial of Viasystems’ motion for jurisdictional discovery.
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