David L. Laase v. County of Isanti, et al

Filing

OPINION FILED - THE COURT: ROGER L. WOLLMAN, DIANA E. MURPHY and RAYMOND W. GRUENDER. Raymond W. Gruender, Authoring Judge (PUBLISHED) [3779051] [10-2896]

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________
No. 10-2896
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David L. Laase,

*
*
Appellant,
*
*
v.
*
* Appeal from the United States
County of Isanti; Jeffrey R. Edblad,
* District Court for the
Isanti County Attorney, in his official * District of Minnesota.
capacity; City of Cambridge,
*
Minnesota; David Pajnic, Chief of
*
Police, Cambridge, Minnesota, in his
*
official capacity,
*
*
Appellees.
*
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Submitted: March 16, 2011
Filed: April 20, 2011
___________
Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
After David Laase’s Minnesota state-court challenge to the forfeiture of his
vehicle failed, he brought a lawsuit in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming that the forfeiture of his vehicle violated the United States and

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Minnesota Constitutions. The district court1 concluded that, as a matter of Minnesota
law, Laase’s suit was res judicata and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
Under Minnesota’s statutory forfeiture scheme, a vehicle is subject to forfeiture
“if it was used in the commission of a designated offense,” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.63(6)(a), and “[a]ll right, title, and interest in a vehicle subject to
forfeiture . . . vests in the appropriate agency upon commission of the conduct
resulting in the designated offense,” § 169A.63(3). However, upon seizure, the state
agency must “serve the driver or operator of the vehicle with a notice of the seizure
and intent to forfeit the vehicle,” § 169A.63(8)(b), and the vehicle’s owner may “file
a demand for a judicial determination of the forfeiture,” § 169A.63(8)(d). The state
agency is permitted to file an answer to this demand, “including an affirmative
counterclaim for forfeiture,” § 169A.63(9)(c), but whether or not it does so, “[t]here
is a presumption that a vehicle seized . . . is subject to forfeiture if the prosecuting
authority establishes that the vehicle was used in the commission of a designated
offense,” § 169A.63(9)(e). The owner may raise a number of affirmative defenses to
forfeiture, but she “bears the burden of proving any affirmative defense raised.” Id.
In 2006, David Laase’s wife was convicted of second-degree driving while
impaired, see Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20(2), 169A.25(1)(b), a designated offense under
section 169A.63(1)(e). The County of Isanti, Minnesota, seized the Laases’ 2007
Chevrolet Tahoe, and David Laase filed a demand for judicial determination, raising
multiple affirmative defenses, including the “innocent owner” defense and a claim
that the forfeiture statute is unconstitutional because “it violates the double jeopardy
provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Laase also asserted the
unspecified affirmative defense that “the forfeiture statute . . . is unconstitutional,

1

The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.
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both on its face and applied.”2 The Minnesota district court ruled for Laase based on
the innocent owner defense, concluding that Laase “did not actually or constructively
know that his wife was going to use the vehicle in a manner contrary to the law.”
Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, No. CV-06-383, slip op. at 1 (10th Jud. Dist. Minn.
June 19, 2007); see § 169A.63(7)(d). The court did not address his constitutional
claims.
The County appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that “Minn. Stat. § 169A.63 does not authorize forfeiture of a vehicle used by one of
its joint owners to commit a designated offense when the other joint owner has
proved by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know the vehicle would be
used in a manner contrary to law.” Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 755 N.W.2d 23,
26 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). The court of appeals did not address any claim that the
forfeiture statute was unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The Minnesota
Supreme Court granted the County’s petition for review and reversed, holding that
“[b]ecause Ms. Laase is both an owner and the offender, . . . the ‘innocent owner’
defense does not apply, and . . . the vehicle was properly forfeitable.” Laase v. 2007
Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 439-40 (Minn. 2009). The court reversed without
remanding or addressing any of the other affirmative defenses raised by Laase before
the Minnesota district court, including his constitutional claims, specifically noting
that “Laase did not argue that his constitutional rights would be violated in the
absence of operation of the innocent owner defense.” Id. at 440 n.11.

2

We are unable to discern whether Laase intended this claim to be distinct
from his double-jeopardy claim and, if so, what other constitutional basis he sought
to assert.
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Laase then brought suit in federal court, claiming that the forfeiture of his
vehicle violated the takings clauses of both the Fifth Amendment3 and Article I,
section 13 of the Minnesota Constitution,4 and the excessive fines clauses of the
Eighth Amendment5 and Article I, section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution.6 The
County moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, based on the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim, based on state principles of res
judicata. The federal district court concluded that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the
suit but that the doctrine of res judicata did, and consequently the court granted the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Laase appeals this dismissal.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim based on res judicata. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 533 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008). In conducting this review, we
accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. M.M. Silta, Inc. v. Cleveland Cliffs,
Inc., 616 F.3d 872, 876. (8th Cir. 2010). By enacting the Full Faith and Credit
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, “Congress has specifically required all federal courts to
give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from
which the judgments emerged would do so.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96
(1980). “The law of the forum that rendered the first judgment controls the res
judicata analysis.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 539
F.3d 809, 821 (8th Cir. 2008).
3

“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
4

“Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use
without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 13.
5

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
6

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
or unusual punishments inflicted.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 5.
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Under Minnesota law, the disposition of an earlier claim constitutes a res
judicata bar against the litigation of a subsequent claim where “(1) the earlier claim
involved the same set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the
same parties or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; [and] (4)
the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter.” Hauschildt
v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004). “Res judicata applies equally to
claims actually litigated and to claims that could have been litigated in the earlier
action.” Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 220 (Minn.
2007). Where a plaintiff’s claims come to a final judgment, that judgment
“constitutes an absolute bar to a second suit for the same cause of action, and is
conclusive between parties and privi[]es, not only as to every matter which was
actually litigated, but also as to every matter which might have been litigated,
therein.” Beutz v. A. O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 431 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Minn.
1988) (quoting Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 124 N.W.2d 328, 340 (Minn.
1963)). The parties in this lawsuit and in the former state proceedings are plainly the
same, and Laase does not contend otherwise on appeal. He does challenge, however,
each of the other three elements.
Laase urges that the first element is not met because his federal claims arise
from different factual circumstances than the claims adjudicated in state court. The
underlying facts—the arrest and conviction of Ms. Laase and the seizure of the
vehicle—are the same. However, Laase suggests that although in state court he
challenged the seizure and forfeitability of the vehicle, he now challenges its actual
forfeiture. The state-court determination that his vehicle is forfeitable, he claims,
constitutes a crucial additional fact. Indeed, Laase opines that his constitutional
claims could not have been brought until the state judicial proceedings concluded,
resulting in the determination of forfeitability, and until the County takes the
additional step of procuring a judgment of forfeiture. Alternatively, because the
County has pointed to no such judgment of forfeiture, Laase claims that the third
element also is not met because there was no final judgment on the merits. Moreover,
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because he could not have litigated his constitutional challenge to forfeiture until the
state litigation determined forfeitability, he argues that he had no full and fair
opportunity to litigate his constitutional claims in the state lawsuit and that the fourth
res judicata element therefore also is not satisfied.
Laase’s challenge to these three elements of the res judicata doctrine
misapprehends the nature of Minnesota’s statutory forfeiture scheme. Under Minn.
Stat. section 169A.63(8), (10), if the owner of a seized vehicle fails to file a demand
for judicial determination within 30 days after receipt of the state agency’s notice of
intent to seek forfeiture, the vehicle is automatically forfeited.
Under
section 169A.63(9), (10), if the owner does file a demand for judicial determination
and the court determines that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture, the state agency is
immediately authorized to “sell the vehicle and distribute the proceeds” or “keep the
vehicle for official use.” § 169A.63(10)(a). Accordingly, even if a demand for
judicial determination is filed, forfeiture is automatic upon a determination that the
owner committed a designated offense and has failed to prove an affirmative defense.
Because of this automatic nature of forfeiture under the statute, the fact that
state litigation over forfeitability has concluded adds nothing to the “group of
operative facts” that gives rise to Laase’s state and federal excessive fines and takings
claims. See Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840 (quoting Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of
Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2002)). Laase’s newly asserted constitutional
claims are based on the same set of facts as the affirmative defenses to forfeiture that
Laase asserted in state court—the arrest and conviction of Ms. Laase, the seizure of
their vehicle, and the County’s notice of intent to forfeit. Because both sets of claims
are based on the same facts, they are supported by the same evidence. See id. at 84041 (“The ‘common test for determining whether a former judgment is a bar to a
subsequent action is to inquire whether the same evidence will sustain both actions.’”
(quoting McMenomy v. Ryden, 148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Minn. 1967))). Accordingly,

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Laase’s earlier state-law and double-jeopardy claims and the constitutional claims he
now asserts “involve[] the same set of factual circumstances.” See id. at 840.
Moreover, because section 169A.63(9), (10) makes forfeiture automatic upon
a judicial determination that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture, no separate judgment
subsequent to a determination of forfeitability is necessary to effect the forfeiture of
a vehicle. Once the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the innocent owner defense
was not available to Laase, the forfeiture of his vehicle was complete. To be sure, the
court’s opinion says “the vehicle was properly forfeitable.” Laase, 776 N.W.2d at
439-40. However, since the court did not remand for any additional proceedings after
reversing the application of the innocent owner defense, it is evident that no further
judicial steps were necessary to effect the forfeiture. Therefore, the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s determination that the innocent owner defense did not apply
properly serves as a final judgment for res judicata purposes.
Our conclusion that no additional steps were necessary to effect the forfeiture
of the vehicle also is fatal to Laase’s suggestion that he had no full and fair
opportunity to litigate his constitutional claims in the state-court proceedings. To the
extent Laase argues that his constitutional challenges to forfeiture were not ripe until
state-court litigation over seizure and forfeitability concluded, his argument fails
because forfeiture is automatic upon the determination of forfeitability. As a result,
Laase’s constitutional claims were ripe and could have been asserted in the
underlying state litigation. Minnesota courts routinely hear constitutional challenges
in forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., Miller v. One 2001 Pontiac Aztek, 669 N.W.2d
893 (Minn. 2003); Borgquist v. 2002 Ford F350, No. A10-733, 2010 WL 3463713
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2010) (unpublished); City of New Brighton v. 2000 Ford
Excursion, 622 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). Indeed, in the state district court,
Laase asserted the affirmative defense that the seizure of his vehicle violated the
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause. Nothing prevented him from raising his
federal and state excessive fines and takings claims at that time. In fact, Minnesota
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principles of res judicata required him to do so. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at
220 (“Res judicata applies equally to claims actually litigated and to claims that could
have been litigated in the earlier action.”).7
We also reject Laase’s argument that res judicata does not apply because a
state agency’s claim for forfeiture is a permissive counterclaim under Minn. Stat.
section 169A.63(9)(c) and “[t]here is no res judicata sanction for not raising a
permissive counterclaim.” G.A.W. v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999). The County’s assertion of res judicata is based on Laase’s failure to raise his
constitutional claims as an affirmative defense, not on any failure by the County to
raise a counterclaim for forfeiture. While the assertion of a counterclaim for
forfeiture may be permissive, the assertion of an affirmative defense against forfeiture
is not. Once a state agency serves a notice of intent to forfeit, the owner must either
make a demand for judicial determination within 30 days or be subject to automatic
forfeiture. See § 169A.63(8), (10). If the owner makes a demand for judicial
determination, “[t]here is a presumption that a vehicle seized under this section is
subject to forfeiture if the prosecuting authority establishes that the vehicle was used
in the commission of a designated offense,” and unless the owner carries his burden
of proving an affirmative defense, the vehicle will be forfeited. § 169A.63(9)(e).
This is true regardless of whether the state agency brings a separate counterclaim for
forfeiture. Laase was required to raise and prove any affirmative defense upon which

7

Lasse’s suggestion that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
constitutional claims he now asserts because the constitutional claims he advanced
in state court were mooted by the district court’s decision in his favor on other
grounds misses the mark. The takings and excessive fines claims Laase attempts to
bring now are distinct from the double-jeopardy affirmative defense raised in state
court. Further, we do not read the unspecified constitutional challenge Laase
advanced in state court, to the extent it differs from the double-jeopardy claim, as
encompassing the two constitutional claims he now raises. Accordingly, these earlier
constitutional challenges are relevant only insofar as they show that Laase at that time
also could have brought the additional constitutional claims he now asserts.
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he hoped to be granted relief, and under Minnesota law there is no reason not to
attach a res judicata sanction to his failure to do so.
Finally, Laase notes that res judicata is a flexible doctrine that “should not be
rigidly applied without an analysis of whether the application of the doctrine would
work an injustice on the party against whom it is urged.” Rucker v. Schmidt, 768
N.W.2d 408, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 794 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 2011).
Because the district court made no explicit determination that application of res
judicata would be just and equitable in this case, Laase contends that we must remand
for such an analysis. This argument fails to persuade for two reasons. First, the
district court’s discussion of the elements of res judicata indicates that the court was
aware that the application of the doctrine implicated questions of justice and equity
and that the court was not applying the doctrine in a rigid, inflexible manner. Second,
we are convinced that applying the doctrine of res judicata results in no injustice in
this case. The doctrine promotes important interests in finality and the avoidance of
piecemeal litigation, see Roach v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 595 F.2d 446, 449
(8th Cir. 1979), and equity is not disserved by precluding the further litigation of
claims that Laase had a full and fair opportunity to assert in state court. In these
circumstances, we conclude that any failure by the district court to declare expressly
that res judicata was justly applied was, at most, a harmless error.8
8

Laase suggests that Minnesota employs a per se rule requiring a court to
balance the equities before applying res judicata and that any failure to do so requires
reversal, even if harmless. In support of this proposition, he cites the Minnesota
appellate decision in Rucker, 768 N.W.2d at 417-18, which he interprets as adopting
such a rule. We can find no decisions by the Minnesota Supreme Court to this effect.
Indeed, in reviewing the decision in Rucker, the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly
refused to reach the question whether such a per se rule was appropriate. Rucker v.
Schmidt, 794 N.W.2d 114, 121 n.8 (Minn. 2011). We decline Laase’s invitation to
apply such a per se requirement because we conclude that Rucker is not persuasive
evidence that the Minnesota Supreme Court would require such formalism. See
Cotton v. Commodore Express, Inc., 459 F.3d 862, 864 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Decisions
from intermediate state courts are evidence of how the state supreme court might rule,
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“Once there is an adjudication of a dispute between parties, res judicata
prevents either party from relitigating claims arising from the original circumstances,
even under new legal theories.” Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837. We conclude, based
on Minnesota’s principles of res judicata, that the claims Laase asserts in this
litigation are barred by the earlier state-court judgment, precluding him from raising
them in this later proceeding. See Beutz, 431 N.W.2d at 531.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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but they are not binding.”).
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