Justin Shekleton v. Ryan Eichenberger

Filing

OPINION FILED - THE COURT: WILLIAM JAY RILEY, MICHAEL J. MELLOY and BOBBY E. SHEPHERD. Bobby E. Shepherd, Authoring Judge (PUBLISHED) [3907738] [11-2108]

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No.11-2108
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Justin Shekleton,

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Plaintiff-Appellee,
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Appeal from the United States
v.
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District Court for the
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Northern District of Iowa.
Ryan Eichenberger, Individually and
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in his Official Capacity as a Law
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Enforcement Officer for Chickasaw
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County Sheriff’s Department,
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Defendant-Appellant
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Chickasaw County, Iowa,
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Defendant.
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Submitted: January 11, 2012
Filed: May 3, 2012
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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MELLOY and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Justin Shekleton brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ryan
Eichenberger, individually and in his capacity as a Chickasaw County, Iowa Sheriff’s
Department Deputy alleging Deputy Eichenberger violated Shekleton’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from excessive force by unnecessarily tasering Shekleton.

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Deputy Eichenberger appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion for summary
judgment as to the section 1983 individual capacity claim, asserting that Shekleton’s
claim is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.2 We affirm.
I.
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on September 6, 2008, Shekleton left McShanny’s
Bar in New Hampton, Iowa. Upon leaving the bar, Shekleton observed Joy and
Randy Brummond, John Schoenfeld, and Pamela Rausch smoking cigarettes outside
the bar. Shekleton engaged Rausch, who was a bartender at McShanny’s, in a short
conversation. Simultaneously, Deputy Eichenberger drove past McShanny’s while
on patrol with his window rolled down and observed Shekleton and Rausch
conversing. Although Deputy Eichenberger believed Shekleton and Rausch were
arguing and that their voices were loud, Shekleton, Schoenfeld, and both Brummonds
stated under oath that the conversation between Shekleton and Rausch was a friendly
one.
After observing Rausch and Shekleton, Deputy Eichenberger communicated
to the dispatch station that he had observed two people arguing outside McShanny’s,
that he believed one of the two was a bartender at McShanny’s, and that he was going
to investigate. Deputy Eichenberger then turned around and drove back in the
direction of McShanny’s, parked, and walked to the bar.
1

The Honorable Jon Stuart Scoles, United States Magistrate Judge for the
Northern District of Iowa, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by
consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
2

In his complaint, Shekleton also asserted a section 1983 claim against the
County for failure to adequately train its officers as well as state law claims against
Deputy Eichenberger and the County for assault and battery. The failure to train and
“official capacity” claims were dismissed by the district court, and the state claims
remain pending. These claims are not part of this interlocutory appeal.
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When Deputy Eichenberger arrived on foot at McShanny’s, Shekleton was
walking away from the bar and Rausch had already gone inside. Deputy
Eichenberger approached Shekleton and asked him why he had been arguing with
Rausch. Shekleton explained to Deputy Eichenberger that the two had not been
arguing. Deputy Eichenberger asked the same question again, Shekleton again
responded that there had been no argument and suggested that Deputy Eichenberger
go into McShanny’s and ask Rausch if the two had been arguing. At this point, two
other officers—responding to Deputy Eichenberger’s radio transmission—arrived on
the scene. Deputy Eichenberger directed the two officers to go in the bar and ask
Rausch what had occurred outside with Shekleton.
Deputy Eichenberger believed Shekleton was intoxicated and asked him to
move away from the street corner. In response, Shekleton moved back towards the
buildings along the street and leaned against the wall of a store adjacent to
McShanny’s. Deputy Eichenberger then asked Shekleton for a third time to explain
why he had been arguing with Rausch. According to Deputy Eichenberger,
Shekleton then became agitated, told Deputy Eichenberger he had not been arguing
with Rausch, and demanded that Deputy Eichenberger “fucking apologize” to him.
Shekleton agrees he asked for an apology, but denies using an obscenity. The three
affiant witnesses support Shekleton’s version of events.3
After Shekleton demanded an apology from Deputy Eichenberger, Shekleton
stopped leaning against the wall, unfolded his arms, and turned toward Deputy
Eichenberger. Deputy Eichenberger believed this behavior was threatening; however,
Shekleton stated under oath that he did not behave aggressively towards Deputy
3

In his affidavit, Schoenfeld stated if Deputy Eichenberger and Shekleton were
in a heated argument, he did not notice it and did not hear Shekleton use an obscenity
toward the officers. Randy Brummond stated in his affidavit that Shekleton did not
“yell[] [or] scream[]” at the officer. In her affidavit, Joy Brummond stated that she
did not remember Shekleton swearing or acting “belligerent” towards the officer.
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Eichenberger.4 After Shekleton moved away from the wall, Deputy Eichenberger
twice instructed Shekleton to place his hands behind his back. Shekleton told Deputy
Eichenberger both times that he was unable to place his arms behind his back. In
1998, Shekleton suffered a head injury as a result of a hunting accident and has since
suffered from left-side dystonia, a condition that causes his left arm to shake beyond
his control. Deputy Eichenberger responded “I know” after Shekleton told him he
could not control his arm. (J. Brummond Aff. ¶ 13).5 Additionally, Shekleton has
lived in New Hampton since 1997 and is a well-known businessman in the
community of approximately 3700 people; likewise, many in the small community
know of his disability.
When Shekleton did not place his arms behind his back, Deputy Eichenberger
attempted to handcuff him. According to Shekleton, Deputy Eichenberger lost his
grip on Shekleton as the two accidentally fell in Deputy Eichenberger’s attempt to
handcuff him. According to Eichenberger, Shekleton broke away from him in an
attempt to resist arrest. At this point, the other two officers exited McShanny’s and

4

We note that Deputy Eichenberger devotes much of his brief to his argument
that the district court improperly considered certain facts as material. In particular,
Deputy Eichenberger argues that because Shekleton admitted that Deputy
Eichenberger believed Shekleton and Rausch were arguing and believed that
Shekleton was behaving aggressively towards him, the testimony disputing those
facts is immaterial. However, because an officer’s actions in an excessive force case
are evaluated under an objective standard, Deputy Eichenberger’s belief as to what
was happening is irrelevant. See Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir.
2011). Instead, what is relevant is whether a reasonable officer would have believed
the facts to be as Deputy Eichenberger believed them to be and whether a reasonable
officer would have determined the use of a taser was necessary under those facts.
5

Additionally, Schoenfeld’s affidavit states that he heard Shekleton tell Deputy
Eichenberger that he could not put his arm behind his back, and Joy Brummond’s
affidavit states that she believed Deputy Eichenberger observed Shekleton’s arm
tremoring. (Schoenfeld Aff. ¶ 14); (J. Brummond Aff. ¶ 13).
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heard Deputy Eichenberger tell Shekleton to stop resisting. One of the two officers
then attempted to help restrain Shekleton by grabbing his arm but was unable to do
so.6 At that point, Deputy Eichenberger yelled “taser, taser, taser” and discharged his
taser at Shekleton with the probes striking Shekleton’s upper chest and rib cage. The
electric charge from the probes caused Shekleton to fall face-first to the ground, and
as a result Shekleton suffered minor head injuries.
While Shekleton was on the ground, he was double-handcuffed, a process that
allows for extra space between the arms. He was arrested for public intoxication and
interference with official acts, but was taken to the hospital for treatment of his
injuries before booking. The charges were later dropped.
We must now determine whether the district court was correct in finding that
Shekleton’s section 1983 action against Deputy Eichenberger is not barred by the
doctrine of qualified immunity.
II.
Qualified immunity protects officers from liability in a section 1983 case
“unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory
right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden
Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009). “We review de novo a district court’s
denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. We view the facts
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true the facts that the district
court found were adequately supported, as well as the facts the district court likely
assumed.” Id. at 495-96 (citation omitted).

6

That officer stated in his deposition that Shekleton forcefully attempted to
resist him and break free from his grip.
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Evaluating a claim of qualified immunity requires a “two-step inquiry: (1)
whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or
statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at 496.
We begin our inquiry by determining whether Shekleton has established that
a violation of a constitutional or statutory right occurred. Shekleton claims Deputy
Eichenberger violated his rights by using excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because he deployed his taser. “‘To establish a constitutional violation
under the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from excessive force, the test is
whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable under the particular
circumstances.’” Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819, 824 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Brown, 574 F.3d at 496). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . .” Id. at 826
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “In determining
reasonableness, a court considers the totality of the circumstances and ‘the severity
of the crime at issue, the immediate threat the suspect poses to the safety of the officer
or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.’” Smith v. Kan. City, Mo. Police Dept’, 586 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). Force is “‘least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants who
do not flee or actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of the
officers or the public.’” Johnson, 658 F.3d at 827-28 (quoting Brown, 574 F.3d at
499).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Shekleton, a reasonable officer
would not have concluded that an argument occurred between Shekleton and Rausch.
When Deputy Eichenberger arrived at the scene, Rausch was inside the bar, and
Shekleton was leaving the area. Shekleton told Deputy Eichenberger repeatedly that
he had not been arguing with Rausch. Shekleton complied with the officer’s orders
to step away from the street and did not behave aggressively towards Deputy
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Eichenberger, nor did Shekleton direct obscenities towards Eichenberger or yell at
him. When Deputy Eichenberger told Shekleton to place his arms behind his back,
Shekleton told Deputy Eichenberger repeatedly that he could not physically do so.
Shekleton’s disability was well known in the community of New Hampton, and
Eichenberger verbally acknowledged he was aware that Shekleton could not
physically place his arms behind his back. Although Deputy Eichenberger and
Shekleton fell apart from each other when Deputy Eichenberger attempted to
handcuff Shekleton, Shekleton did not resist and did not intentionally cause the two
to break apart.
Under these facts, Shekleton was an unarmed suspected misdemeanant, who
did not resist arrest, did not threaten the officer, did not attempt to run from him, and
did not behave aggressively towards him. Shekleton has established that a violation
of a constitutional right occurred in that a reasonable officer would not have deployed
his taser under the circumstances as presented by Shekleton. See Johnson, 658 F.3d
at 827-28.
Having determined that Shekleton has established that a violation of a
constitutional right occurred, we move to our next inquiry: determining whether
Deputy Eichenberger’s use of the taser against Shekleton constituted a clearly
established constitutional violation. Deputy Eichenberger contends in his brief that
at the time of the incident it was not a clearly established violation of law to use his
taser under the circumstances and contends that our taser jurisprudence is in a state
of flux.
When determining whether an action was a clearly established constitutional
violation, we look to the state of the law at the time of the incident. Norman v.
Schuetzle, 585 F.3d 1097, 1109 (8th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds by
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
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reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). “[A] general constitutional rule already
identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct
in question, ‘even though the very action in question has [not] previously been held
unlawful.’” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (quoting United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
Deputy Eichenberger is correct that at the time of the incident, we had not yet
had an opportunity to determine whether an officer’s use of a taser on a nonviolent,
nonfleeing misdemeanant was an excessive use of force. However, the right to be
free from excessive force dates back to the adoption of the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution, as it is “‘a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person . . . .’” McGruder v.
Heagwood, 197 F.3d 918, 919 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d
747, 750 (8th Cir. 1998)). That the level of force used must be justified in light of
“the severity of the crime at issue,” the suspect’s flight risk, and the immediacy of the
risk posed by the suspect to the safety of officers and others was the clearly
established law on the night of the incident. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989).
In Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d at 491, decided after the incident
between Shekleton and Deputy Eichenberger, we were presented with an officer’s use
of a taser in facts similar to this case. There, we determined that the general law
prohibiting excessive force in place at the time of the incident was sufficient to
inform an officer that use of his taser on a nonfleeing, nonviolent suspected
misdemeanant was unreasonable, even though we did not have a case specifically
addressing officer taser use prior to the incident. Id. at 499-500.
As in Brown, we agree that the general constitutional principles against
excessive force that were clearly established at the time of the incident between
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Deputy Eichenberger and Shekleton were such as to put a reasonable officer on notice
that tasering Shekleton under the circumstances as presented by Shekleton was
excessive force in violation of the clearly established law.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the opinion of the district court denying
Deputy Eichenberger’s motion for summary judgment.
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