Robert Styre v. Derral Adam

Filing

FILED OPINION (ALEX KOZINSKI, J. CLIFFORD WALLACE and BARRY G. SILVERMAN) REVERSED. Judge: AK , Judge: JCW Authoring, Judge: BGS . FILED AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. [7774599]

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT E. STYRE,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
DERRAL G. ADAMS,
Respondent-Appellant.

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No. 09-15782
D.C. No.
1:07-cv-01436WWS
OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William W Schwarzer, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 11, 2011*
San Francisco, California
Filed June 6, 2011
Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, J. Clifford Wallace and
Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Wallace

*The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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STYRE v. ADAMS

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COUNSEL
Krista L. Pollard, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for the appellant.
Marc Elliot Grossman, Esq., Upland, California, for the
appellee.

OPINION
WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:
Warden Derral G. Adams appeals from the district court’s
writ of habeas corpus to Petitioner Robert E. Styre. We have
jurisdiction over Adams’ appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, and we reverse.
I.
Styre was convicted of first-degree murder in January 1982
and sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-seven years to life
with the possibility of parole. At a 2005 parole hearing, the
California Board of Prison Terms (Board) found Styre eligible
for parole and calculated a tentative release date. Four months
later, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reversed the Board’s
decision, concluding that the gravity of Styre’s offense and
his violent criminal history made him unsuitable for parole.
See Cal. Const. art. 5, § 8(b) (authorizing the Governor to “affirm, modify, or reverse” parole decisions).
Following a series of unsuccessful petitions for collateral
relief in state court, Styre filed a federal petition for a writ of

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STYRE v. ADAMS

habeas corpus. According to Styre, he was denied parole in
violation of his due process rights because the Governor’s
adverse parole decision was not supported by “some evidence” of current dangerousness.
II.
[1] Styre’s habeas claims are foreclosed by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859,
863 (2011) (holding that “the responsibility for assuring that
the constitutionally adequate procedures governing California’s parole system are properly applied rests with California
courts, and is no part of the Ninth Circuit’s business”). In
light of Cooke, we recently explained that “there is no substantive due process right created by California’s parole
scheme.” Roberts v. Hartley, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL
1365811, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2011). Rather, “[d]ue process is satisfied as long as the state provides an inmate seeking parole with ‘an opportunity to be heard and . . . a
statement of the reasons why parole was denied.’ ” Id., quoting Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862 (omission in original).
[2] Styre does not dispute that he received these procedural
protections. Instead, he contends that this case is distinguishable from Cooke and Roberts because the Governor, rather
than the Board, denied his request for parole. Although we
declined to reach a similar argument in Pearson v. Muntz, ___
F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1238007, at *5 n.5 (9th Cir. Apr. 5,
2011), we now hold that the Due Process Clause does not
require that the Governor hold a second suitability hearing
before reversing a parole decision. On this issue, Cooke
implicitly rejects the distinction that Styre proposes. Like
Styre, one of the inmates in Cooke had been found unsuitable
for parole by the Governor, rather than the Board. 131 S. Ct.
at 861. Even though the Governor did not conduct a separate
hearing before reversing the Board’s favorable parole decision, the Court held that the inmate’s due process rights had
been satisfied because he was “allowed to speak at [his]

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parole hearing and to contest the evidence against [him],
[was] afforded access to [his] records in advance, and [was]
notified as to the reasons why parole was denied.” Id. at 862.
Inasmuch as Styre does not dispute that he received each of
these procedural safeguards—including an opportunity to
speak at his hearing before the Board—“that is the end of the
matter for purposes of the Due Process Clause.” Roberts,
2011 WL 1365811, at *3.
[3] A second and separate reason why reversal is required
is that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) precludes Styre from obtaining a writ of
habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. AEDPA states that federal
courts may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state’s
adjudication of a federal claim “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. § 2254(d)(1).
Because there is no Supreme Court precedent holding that a
state governor must conduct a second parole hearing before
reversing a parole board’s favorable decision, Styre’s habeas
corpus claims necessarily fail. See Harrington v. Richter, 131
S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011) (“As a condition for obtaining
habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show
that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”). In light
of both Cooke and AEDPA, we must reverse the district
court’s order directing habeas corpus relief.
REVERSED.