Powell's Books, Inc., et al v. John Kroeger, et al

Filing 70

Filed (ECF) Appellees Steve Atchison, Elizabeth Ballard, Jack Banta, Bernice Barnett, Walter M. Beglau, Brad Berry, Edwin I. Caleb, Stephen D. Campbell, Jason Carlile, Tim Colahan, Thomas W. Cutsforth, Peter L. Deuel, Everett Dial, Michael Dugan, John Fisher, John Foote, Paul Frasier, Dean Gushwa, Douglass Harcleroad, John Haroldson, Robert Hermann, Mark Huddleston, Ryan Joslin, John Kroger, Joshua Marquis, Wade M. McLeod, Eric J. Nisley, Dan Norris, Daniel Ousley, William Bryan Porter, Michael D. Schrunk, David A. Schutt, John Sewell, Matt Shirtcliff, Tim Thompson, Marion Weatherford and Gary Williams in 09-35153, Appellees Steve Atchison, Elizabeth Ballard, Jack Banta, Bernice Barnett, Walter M. Beglau, Brad Berry, Edwin I. Caleb, Stephen D. Campbell, Jason Carlile, Tim Colahan, Thomas W. Cutsforth, Peter L. Deuel, Everett Dial, Michael Dugan, John Fisher, John Foote, Paul Frasier, Dean Gushwa, Douglass Harcleroad, John Haroldson, Robert Hermann, Mark Huddleston, Ryan Joslin, John R. Kroger, Joshua Marquis, Wade M. McLeod, Eric J. Nisley, Dan Norris, Daniel Ousley, William Bryan Porter, Michael D. Schrunk, David A. Schutt, John Sewell, Matt Shirtcliff, Tim Thompson, Marion Weatherford and Gary Williams in 09-35154 petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc (from 09/20/2010 opinion). Date of service: 11/08/2010. [7539074] [09-35153, 09-35154] (AJ)

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Powell's Books, Inc., et al v. John Kroeger, et al Doc. 70 Att. 1 ( ( C a s e : 0 9 - 3 5 1 5 3 09/20/2010 Page: 1 o f 27 10: 747913'6. b'kIEn~ 61-1 I]L/3(;0{/6 WllJc' I Ei"GL v F O R PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F O R THE N I N T H C I R C U I T POWELL'S BOOKS, INC.; O L D MULTNOMAH B O O K S T O R E , L T D . , D B A A n n i e B l o o m ' s B o o k s ; DARK H O R S E COMICS, INC.; C O L E T T E ' S : G O O D F O O D + HUNGRY M I N D S , L L C ; BLUEJAY, I N C . , D B A P a u l i n a Springs Books; ST. JOHN'S BOOKSELLERS, L L C ; AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS FOUNDATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION; ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, I N C . ; FREEDOM TO R E A D FOUNDATION, I N C . ; COMIC B O O K L E G A L DEFENSE FUND, Plaintiffi-Appellants, and AMERICAN C I V I L LIBERTIES U N I O N OF O R E G O N ; CANDACE M O R G A N ; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE COLUMBIAIWILLAMETTE, I N C . ; CASCADE A I D S P R O J E C T , PlaintifJ~, V. qlE,ce\E.~V[~ n li1 21 DIVISION SALEM, OR 97301 '~J 14447 Dockets.Justia.com ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 2 o f 27 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 14448 POWELL'S BOOKS V. KROGER JOHN R. KROGER, in his official capacity as Attol11ey General o f the State o f Oregon; M A n SHIRTCLlFF, Baker County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOHN HAROLDSON, Benton County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOHN FOOTE, Clackamas County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOSHUA MARQUIS, Clatsop County District Attol11ey, in his official capacity; STEVE ATCHISON, Columbia County District Attorney, in his official capacity; PAUL FRASIER, Coos County District Attorney, in his official capacity; GARY WILLIAMS, Crook County District Attol11ey, in his official capacity; EVERETT DIAL, Curry County District Attorney, in his official capacity; MICHAEL DUGAN, Deschutes County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JACK BANTA, Douglas County District Attorney, in his official capacity; MARION WEATHERFORD, Gilliam County District Attorney, in his official capacity; RYAN JOSLIN, Grant County District Attorney, in his official capacity; ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 3 of 27 ( ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER 14449 TIM CaLAHAN, Harney County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOHN SEWELL, Hood River County District Attorney, in his official capacity; MARK HUDDLESTON, Jackson County District Attorney, in his official capacity; PETER L. DEUEL, Jefferson County District Attorney, in his official capacity; STEPHEN D. CAMPBELL, Josephine County District Attorney, in his official capacity; EDWIN 1. CALEB, Klamath County District Attorney, in his official capacity; DAVID A. SCHUTT, Lake County District Attomey, in his official capacity; DOUGLASS HARCLEROAD, Lane County District Attorney, in his official capacity; BERNICE BARNETT, Lincoln County District Attorney, in her official capacity; JASON CARLILE, Linn County District Attomey, in his official capacity; DAN NORRIS, Malheur County District Attorney, in his official capacity; WALTER M. BEGLAU, Marion County District Attorney, in his official capacity; ELIZABETH BALLARD, Morrow County District Attorney, in her official capacity; ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 4 o f 27 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 14450 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER MICHAEL D. SCHRUNK, Multnomah County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOHN FISHER, Polk County District Attorney, in his official capacity; WADE M. McLEOD, Sherman County District Attorney, in his official capacity; WILLIAM BRYAN PORTER, Tillamook County District Attorney, in his official capacity; DEAN GUSHWA, Umatilla County District Attorney, in his official capacity; TIM THOMPSON, Union County District Attomey, in his official capacity; DANIEL OUSLEY, Wallowa County District Attorney, in his official capacity; ERIC J. NISLEY, Wasco County District Attorney, in his official capacity; ROBERT HERMANN, Washington County District Attorney, in his official capacity; THOMAS W. CUTSFORTH, Wheeler County District Attorney, in his official capacity; BRAD BERRY, Yamhill County District Attorney, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees. No. 09-35153 D.C. No. 3:08-cv-0050 I - M O ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 5 o f 27 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 POWELL'S BOOKS V. KROGER 14451 AMERICAN C I V I L LIBERTIES U N I O N OF O R E G O N ; CANDACE M O R G A N ; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE COLUMBIAIWILLAMElTE, INC.; CASCADE A I D S PROJECT, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and POWELL'S BOOKS, INC.; OLD MULTNOMAH B O O K STORE, L T D . , DBA Annie GOOD FOOD Bloom's Books; DARK MINDS, HORSE COMICS, INC.; COLETTE'S: + HUNGRY L L C ; BLUEJAY, INC., D B A P a u l i n a Springs Books; ST. JOHN'S BOOKSELLERS, L L C ; AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS FOUNDATION FOR F R E E EXPRESSION; ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, I N C . ; FREEDOM FUND, To R E A D FOUNDATION, I N C . ; C O M I C B O O K LEGAL DEFENSE Plaintiffs. v. ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 6 of 27 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 14452 POWELL'S BOOKS V. KROGER JOHN R. KROGER, in his official capacity as Attorney General o f the State o f Oregon; MATT SHIRTeLlFF, Baker County District Attomey, in his official capacity; JOHN HAROLDSON, Benton County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOHN FOOTE, Clackamas County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOSHUA MARQUIS, Clatsop County District Attorney, in his official capacity; STEVE ATCHISON, Columbia County District Attorney, in his official capacity; PAUL FRASIER, Coos County District Attorney, in his official capacity; GARY WILLIAMS, Crook County District Attorney, in his official capacity; EVERETT DIAL, Curry County District Attorney, in his official capacity; MICHAEL DUGAN, Deschutes County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JACK BANTA, Douglas County District Attorney, in his official capacity; MARION WEATHERFORD, Gilliam County District Attorney, in his official capacity; RYAN JOSLIN, Grant County District Attorney, in his official capacity; ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 7 of 27 10: 7479136 OklEnlry: 61-1 POWELL'S BOOKS V. KROGER 14453 TIM COLAHAN, Harney County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOHN SEWELL, Hood River County District Attorney, in his official capacity; MARK HUDDLESTON, Jackson County District Attorney, in his official capacity; PETER L. DEUEL, Jefferson County District Attorney, in his official capacity; STEPHEN D. CAMPBELL, Josephine County District Attorney, in his official capacity; EDWIN 1. CALEB, Klamath County District Attorney, in his official capacity; DAVID A. SCHUTT, Lake County District Attorney, in his official capacity; DOUGLASS HARCLEROAD, Lane County District Attorney, in his official capacity; BERNICE BARNETT, Lincoln County District Attorney, in her official capacity; JASON CARLILE, Linn County District Attorney, in his official capacity; DAN NORRIS, Malheur County District Attorney, in his official capacity; WALTER M. BEGLAU, Marion County District Attorney, in his official capacity; ELIZABETH BALLARD, M o n o w County District . Attorney, in her official capacity; I Case:09-35153 0 9 / 2 0 / 2 0 1 0 P a g e : 8 o f 2 7 I D : 7 4 7 9 1 3 6 DktEntry:61-1 14454 POWELL'S BOOKS V. KROGER MICHAEL D. SCHRUNK, Multnomah County District Attorney, in his official capacity; JOHN FISHER, Polk County District Attorney, in his official capacity; WADE M. McLEOD, Sherman County District Attorney, in his official capacity; WILLIAM BRYAN PORTER, Tillamook County District Attorney, in his official capacity; DEAN GUSHWA, Umatilla County District Attorney, in his official capacity; TIM THOMPSON, Union County District Attorney, in his official capacity; DANIEL OUSLEY, Wallowa County District Attorney, in his official capacity; ERIC 1. NISLEY, Wasco County District Attorney, in his official capacity; ROBERT HERMANN, Washington County District Attorney, in his official capacity; THOMAS W. CUTSFORTH, Wheeler County District Attorney, in his official capacity; BRAD BERRY, Yamhill County District Attorney, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees. No. 09-35154 D.C. No. 3:08-cv-0050l-MO OPINION Appeal from the United States District Court for the District o f Oregon Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 8, 2 0 l 0 - P o r t l a n d , Oregon Filed September 20, 2010 ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 9 of 27 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER 14455 Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, M. Margaret McKeown, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges. Opinion b y J u d g e M c K e o w n ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 10 o f 27 I D : 7 4 7 9 1 3 6 DktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S BOOKS V. KROGER 14457 COUNSEL Michael A. Bamberger, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, New York, New York; P.K. Runkles-Pearson, Stoel Rives ( , ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 11 o f 27 10: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 14458 P O I V E L L ' S B O O K S V. K R O G E R LLP, Portland, Oregon; Chin See Ming, ACLU Foundation o f Oregon, Inc., Portland, Oregon, for the plaintiffs-appellants. Michael A. Casper, Oregon Department o f Justice, Salem, Oregon, for the defendants-appellees. J. Joshua Wheeler, The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection o f Free Expression, Charlottesville, Virginia, for . . amicus c u n a e . OPINION McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: W e consider here the constitutionality o f a pair o f Oregon statutes intended to stop child sexual abuse in its early stages. The statutes broadly take aim at practices o f "luring" and "grooming" that expose minors to sexually explicit materials in the hopes o f lowering their inhibitions against engaging in s e x u a l c o n d u c t . T h e " f u r n i s h i n g " statute, O r e g o n R e v i s e d S t a t u t e s § 167.054 ( " s e c t i o n 0 5 4 " ) , c r i m i n a l i z e s p r o v i d i n g children under the age o f thirteen with sexually explicit material. The "luring" statute, § 167.057 ("section 057"), criminali z e s p r o v i d i n g minors under the age o f eighteen with visual, verbal, or narrative descriptions o f sexual conduct for the purpose o f sexually arousing the minor or the furnisher, or inducing the minor to engage in sexual conduct. A p p e l l a n t s , a b r o a d c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f booksellers; n o n - p r o f i t literary, legal, and health organizations; and a concemed grandmother (together, " P o w e l l ' s Books"), argue that these statutes violate the First Amendment. In particular, Powell's Books claims, among other things, that the statutes are facially overbroad and criminalize a substantial amount o f constitutionally protected speech. W e agree. ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 12 o f 27 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER 14459 Although the state argues that the statutes may be construed to narrowly focus on the sharing o f hardcore pornography or material that is obscene to minors alone, its position is contradicted by the statutory text. Repeated reliance on the legislat u r e ' s efforts to combat hardcore pornography cannot change the text o f the statute. The legislative goal does not match the text o f the statutes; the statutes' undoing is their overbreadth. I n their current form, the statutes sweep up a host o f material entitled to constitutional protection, ranging from standard sexual education materials to novels for children and young adults by Judy Blume. Despite the legislature's laudable goals, we cannot rewrite the statute to conform to constitut i o n a l limitations. 1 BACKGROUND We begin with a review o f the statutory scheme. The statutes follow a series o f related anti-child abuse laws that the Oregon courts invalidated under the state constitution's speech clause in 2000. See State v. Maynard, 5 P.3d 1142, 1149-51 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing previous cases). In 2007, the legislature went back to the drawing board and enacted the current statutes in an effort to address the perceived gap in O r e g o n ' s child abuse prevention scheme. Section 054, the "furnishing" statute, criminalizes the act o f "intentionally furnish[ing] a child [under the age o f thirteen], or intentionally permit[ting] a child to view, sexually explicit material" where the person "knows that the material is sexually explicit material." OR. REV. STAT. § 167.054(1).' Furnishing is a Class A misdemeanor. This section includes several 1Because the statutes are unconstitutionally overbroad, we do not address the challenge to the provisions as void for vagueness or the challenges to the statutes as applied to particular works. ' T h e Oregon statutes define "child" as " a 'person under 13 years o f age." OR, R E V . S T A T . § 167.051(1). " ' F u r n i s h e s ' means to sell, give, rent, loan o r otherwise provide." Id. § 167.051(2). ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 13 o f 27 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 14460 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER e x e m p t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g i m m u n i t y for acts o f f u r n i s h i n g material w h o s e " s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t p o r t i o n s . , . f o r m m e r e l y a n i n c i dental part o f a n otherwise n o n o f f e n d i n g w h o l e and serve s o m e p u r p o s e o t h e r t h a n titillation." [d. § 1 6 7 . 0 5 4 ( 2 ) ( b ) : Sect i o n 0 5 4 a l s o i n c l u d e s a n u m b e r o f a f f i t m a t i v e defenses,4 S e c t i o n 057 c r i m i n a l i z e s " l u r i n g , " which is defined as " [ f J u r n i s h [ i n g ] to, o r u s [ i n g ] w i t h , a m i n o r " a " v i s u a l r e p r e sentation o r e x p l i c i t verbal description o r narrative account o f s e x u a l c o n d u c t " f o r the p u r p o s e o f " [ a ] r o u s i n g o r s a t i s f y i n g the s e x u a l d e s i r e s o f the p e r s o n or the m i n o r " o r " [ i ] n d u c i n g t h e m i n o r to e n g a g e in sexual c o n d u c t . " [d. § 167.057(1 ).5 L u r i n g is a Class C felony. L i k e section 054, section 0 5 7 e x e m p t s the f u r n i s h i n g o r u s e o f " a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , description o r a c c o u n t o f s e x u a l c o n d u c t t h a t forms merely a n incidental p a r t o f an o t h e r w i s e n o n o f f e n d i n g w h o l e a n d s e r v e s s o m e p u r p o s e o t h e r than titillation," [d. § 167.057(2), T h e section also includes s i m i l a r affirmative defenses. 6 3Employees o f museums, schools, law enforcement agencies, medical treatment providers, and public libraries acting within the scope o f regular employment are also exempt from prosecution, OR. R E V . S T A T , § 167.054(2)(a) 4In particular, it is an affirmative defense that the material was furnished (or that viewing was permitted) "solely for the purpose o f sex education, a1t education or psychological treatment" by a parent o r legal guardian, an education or treatment provider, o r their agent. OR, R E V , S T A T . § 167,054(3)(a), I t is also an affirmative defense to have "reasonable cause to believe" that the person who received o r viewed the material was not a child, o r that the defendant was less than three years older than the child, Id. § 167,054(3)(b)-(c). 5Plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality o f the inducing prong, and we do not address it here, S e e OR. R E V . S T A T , § 174.040 (noting that " i f any part o f a statute is held unconstitutional, the remaining Palts shall remain in force unless" an enumerated exception applies), 6In particular, it is an affirmative defense to furnish or use the material for psychological o r medical trcatmcnt by a treatmcnt provider or her agent, but it is not a defense to provide the matcrial for sex or a1t education by permission o f a parent or legal guardian, OR, R E V , S T A T . § 167,057(3)(a), It is also an affirmative defense to have "reasonable cause to believe" the recipient o f the material or person with whom the material was used was not a minor, id. § 167.057(3)(b), o r that the defendant was less than three years older than the minor. [d. § 167.057(3)(c). ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 14 o f 2 7 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER 14461 Powell's Books brought suit seeking a declaration o f the unconstitutionality of, and injunction against enforcement of, sections 054 and 057 under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district c o u r t d e n i e d P o w e l l ' s B o o k s ' motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions, finding the statutes neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor void for vagueness. Powell's Books, Inc. v. Myers, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1243-44, 1246-47, 1249-50 (D. Or. 2008). The district court also rejected Powell's Books' pre-enforcement, asapplied challenges on grounds that the plaintiffs were too diverse and that the works that allegedly fell within the reach o f the statutes were too dissimilar. Id. at 1235-36. ANALYSIS We address Powell's Books' overbreadth challenge alone as it suffices to dispose o f this case. 7 In examining an overbreadth challenge, we follow a familiar sequential analysis. First, we construe the reach o f the statutory provisions. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). Second, we inquire whether the statute criminalizes a "substantial amount" o f expressive activity. Id. at 297. Finally, we consider whether the statute is "readily susceptible" to a limiting construction that would render it constitutional. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass 'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statutes cannot survive this inquiry. Contrary to the s t a t e ' s position, the statutes reach the distribution o f far more material than hardcore pornography or material that is obscene to minors, and they implicate a substantial amount o f 7We review de novo the denial o f declaratory relief. Wagner v. Pro!'1 E n g ' r s in Cal. Gov't, 354 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2004). We review denial o f a permanent injunction for an abuse o f discretion, but review the underlying determination o f the statutes' constitutionality de novo and the underlying findings o f fact for clear error. 1Ľng v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 15 of 27 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 14462 P O W E L L ' S BOOKS V. KROGER constitutionally protected speech. In addition, the statutes are n o t s u b j e c t to a l i m i t i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t w o u l d m a k e them constitutional. F o r this reason, we conclude that Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 167.054 and 167.057 (except the "inducing" prong, w h i c h is not at issue here) are unconstitutionally o v e r b r o a d and m u s t b e invalidated. I. T H E S C O P E OF S E C T I O N S 054 AND 057 W e begin with the scope o f the statutes. In construing the reach o f sections 054 and 057, o u r role is to " i n t e r p r e t the law as w o u l d the [Oregon] S u p r e m e Court." P l a n n e d Parenthood o f Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). T h i s process is a different undertaking than construing a fede r a l s t a t u t e . U n d e r O r e g o n r u l e s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n , w e first c o n s i d e r text and context together. State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050-51 (Or. 2009). W e may also consider legislative history proffered by a party to the extent that it is useful. [d. I f the scope o f the statute remains ambiguous at that point in the analysis, we may then turn to "general m a x i m s o f statutory construction" to resolve o u r uncertainty. Id. T h e Oregon approach contrasts with the standard federal statutory construction, which looks first to the text and then, in the case o f ambiguity, employs the canons o f constlUction and, in light o f the debate over its significance, m a y o r may n o t involve a reference to legislative history. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 3 7 1 , 3 8 5 (2005); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). [1] O n their face, the liability provisions o f sections 054 a n d 057 c o v e r a r a n g e o f m a t e r i a l . S e c t i o n 0 5 4 ( I ) c r i m i n a l i z e s furnishing " s e x u a l l y explicit material" to children. T h e definit i o n s p r o v i s i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e , § 1 6 7 . 0 5 1 , s p e c i f i c a l l y defines " s e x u a l l y explicit material" as "material containing visual i m a g e s " of: (a) Human masturbation o r sexual intercourse; Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 16 o f 2 7 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER 14463 (b) G e n i t a l - g e n i t a l , o r a l - g e n i t a l , a n a l - g e n i t a l o r o r a l anal c o n t a c t , w h e t h e r b e t w e e n p e r s o n s o f t h e s a m e o r o p p o s i t e s e x or b e t w e e n h u m a n s a n d animals; o r (c) P e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e v a g i n a o r r e c t u m b y a n y o b j e c t o t h e r t h a n as p a r t o f a p e r s o n a l h y g i e n e p r a c t i c e . Id. § 167.051(5). [2] Section 057(1) c r i m i n a l i z e s fUl11ishing a m i n o r o r " u s [ i n g ] " a " v i s u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n or e x p l i c i t v e r b a l d e s c r i p t i o n o r n a r r a t i v e a c c o u n t o f s e x u a l c o n d u c t " with a minor. s " S e x u a l c o n d u c t " is defined as the s a m e acts depicted in " s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t m a t e r i a l , " e x c e p t it adds the " [ t ] o u c h i n g o f the g e n i tals, p u b i c a r e a s o r b u t t o c k s o f t h e h u m a n m a l e o r f e m a l e o r o f the breasts o f the h u m a n female." Id. § 167.051(4). T h e definition o f " s e x u a l c o n d u c t " is also n a r r o w e r in t h a t i t e x c l u d e s " [ p ] e n e t r a t i o n o f the vagina o r r e c t u m b y a n y o b j e c t " w h e r e " p a r t o f a m e d i c a l diagnosis or as p a r t o f a p e r sonal h y g i e n e p r a c t i c e , " w h e r e a s the definition o f " s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t m a t e r i a l " only e x c l u d e s s u c h p e n e t r a t i o n w h e n p a r t o f a " p e r s o n a l h y g i e n e p r a c t i c e . " Compare OR. R E V . STAT. § 167.051(4)(c) with OR. REv. STAT. § 167.051(5)(c). T h e state chiefly seeks to l i m i t the b r e a d t h o f sections 0 5 4 a n d 0 5 7 b a s e d o n the e x e m p t i o n f r o m l i a b i l i t y t h a t a p p e a r s i n b o t h p r o v i s i o n s - t h a t is, t h e e x e m p t i o n f o r m a t e r i a l s w h o s e s e x u a l c o n t e n t " f o r m [s] m e r e l y a n incidental part o f an o t h e r wise nonoffending whole a n d serves s o m e p u r p o s e o t h e r t h a n titillation." See OR. REv. STAT. § 167.054(2)(b); s e e also id. § 167.057(2). I n t h e s t a t e ' s v i e w , this e x e m p t i o n n a r r o w s t h e SBeeause the statute does not define "explicit" as it is used in section 057, we refer to its ordinary, dictionary m e a n i n g - t h a t is, as "fully revealed or expressed without vagueness, implication, or ambiguity" and "open in the depiction o f nudity or sexuality." Merriam-Webster Online DictionalJ' (2010), http://www.merriam-webster.eom/dietionary/explieit; see Doe v. Medford Sch. Disl. 549C, 221 P J d 787, 792 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 17 of 27 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 14464 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER statutes to bar the dissemination only o f "hardcore pornography" to children and minors. [3] This argument is unavailing. T h e text and context show that the statutes cover far more than what might qualify as hardcore pornography. T h e statutory text makes no mention o f "hardcore pornography," b u t rather refers to "sexually explicit material" and a "visual representation or explicit verbal description or narrative account o f sexual conduct." OR. R E V . STAT. §§ 167.054(1), 167.057(1)(a). As the materials in the record show, whatever the precise boundaries o f hardcore pornography may be, the statutes clearly extend beyond them. P o w e l l ' s Books submitted a wide alTay o f books to illustrate its argument. Consider, for example, the well-known drawings o f sex acts in The Joy o f Sex; the cartoon depictions o f sexual intercourse in the c h i l d r e n ' s book, Mommy L a i d an Egg, or Where Do Babies Come From? by Babette Cole; or the fantastical sex scene between Charlotte and Lord Griffin in Kentaro M i u r a ' s manga, Berserk. All are visual depictions o f "sexual intercourse" under section 054, yet they hardly count as hardcore pornography. [4) Similarly, the references to the "visual representation" and " e x p l i c i t " v e r b a l d e p i c t i o n s o f " s e x u a l c o n d u c t " i n s e c t i o n 057 are not synonymous with hardcore pornography. Section 057 reaches representations o f activity, including the touching o f breasts or buttocks, that are commonly seen or read outside o f p o r n o g r a p h i c materials, h a r d c o r e o r otherwise. E x a m p l e s i n c l u d e the b o o k s l i s t e d a b o v e , a l o n g w i t h t h e s c e n e s o f " s e x ual conduct" that appear in a work like Margaret A t w o o d ' s classic and frequently-taught novel, The Handmaid's Tale. To be sure, the exemption constrains the statutes' reach to a certain extent. I t does not, however, limit their application to materials that fall outside constitutional protection. Again the text and context make this clear. As a preliminary matter, we note that the requirement o f a non-"titillating" purpose r e f e r s t o t h e e x p l i c i t p o r t i o n o f the m a t e r i a l s , a n d n o t the w o r k ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 18 o f 27 10: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. K R O G E R 14465 as a whole. In section 054, the word "serve" agrees grammatically with "sexually explicit portions," not with the "nonoffending whole." See OR. R E V . STAT. § 167.054(2)(b) (referring to "material the sexually explicit portions o f which form merely an incidental part o f an otherwise nonoffending whole and serve some purpose other than titillation"). Similarly, in section 057, the word "serves" agrees with "representation, description or account o f sexual conduct." S e e id. § 167.057(2) (referring to " a representation, description or account o f sexual conduct that forms merely an incidental part o f an otherwise nonoffending whole and serves some purpose other than titillation"). Thus, the exemption considers whether the explicit portion o f the material, and not the work as such or as a whole, serves some purpose other than arousal. The state bases its "hardcore pornography" argument on a disjunctive reading o f the exemption. In the state's view, a work may provide the basis for prosecution unless its explicit portions form "merely an incidental part o f an otherwise nonoffending whole" or "serve some purpose other than titillation." To put this the other way around, the exemption ostensibly protects a work from giving rise to liability unless its sexually explicit portions form more than an incidental portion o f the work as a whole and solely intend to titillate. Thus, the state argues, the statutes only cover hardcore pornography.9 The problem, however, is that the statute does not say " o r " - i t says "and." The two conditions for exemption from prosecution are plainly written in the conjunctive: a defendant must satisfy both conditions in order to avoid prosecution. Thus, a work might still give rise to liability i f its sexually explicit portions solely intend to titillate but are only an inci9Secausc we reject this line o f analysis, we do not address whether the s t a t e' s definition o f hardcore pornography is a viable one. Indeed, our decision rests on the text o f the statute as written, not on an undefined premise that it targets hardcore pornography. ( ( ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 19 of 27 14466 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. K R O G E R dental p a r t o f the w o r k as a w h o l e (e.g., arguably, some o f the sex s c e n e s in Berserk). L i k e w i s e , a w o r k might g i v e rise to l i a b i l i t y i f its s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t p o r t i o n s are m o r e t h a n a n i n c i dental p a r t o f the work, b u t d o n o t s o l e l y intend to titillate (e.g., The Handmaid's Tale). N e i t h e r work, o n the s t a t e ' s defi n i t i o n , c o n s t i t u t e s h a r d c o r e p o r n o g r a p h y , y e t t h e y still p o t e n tially r u n afoul o f the statutes. 10 T h e state m a k e s two r e l a t e d a r g u m e n t s that w e decline to embrace. First, the state relies heavily on State v. Maynard, a decision b y the Oregon C o u r t o f Appeals construing the pred e c e s s o r p r o v i s i o n to t h e exemption. In Maynard, the court a d d r e s s e d a statute that c r i m i n a l i z e d furnishing m i n o r s any visual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f " a p e r s o n o r portion o f the h u m a n b o d y t h a t d e p i c t s nudity, s a d o m a s o c h i s t i c abuse, s e x u a l c o n duct o r sexual e x c i t e m e n t . " OR. R E V . STAT. § l 6 7 . 0 6 5 ( l ) ( a ) ( r e p e a l e d 2 0 0 7 ) . T h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e d an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e that is essentially identical to the e x e m p t i o n in sections 0 5 4 and 057: n a m e l y , a d e f e n s e f o r s o - c a l l e d " c o n t r a b a n d " t h a t was " m e r e l y an i n c i d e n t a l p a r t o f an o t h e r w i s e n o n o f f e n d i n g w h o l e , a n d s e r v i n g s o m e p u r p o s e t h e r e i n o t h e r t h a n titillation[ .] " OR. R E V . S T A T . § 167.085 ( a m e n d e d 2007).11 R e a d i n g t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s t o g e t h e r , t h e c o u r t in M a y n a r d c o n s t r u e d t h e statute as "seek[ing] to p r e v e n t h a r m to children b y prohibiting a t t e m p t s to titillate t h e m b y m e a n s o f sexually e x p l i c i t 10 Although the state cites several cases construing "and" to mean "or," they are all inapposite. See Siodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 246-47 (1978) (same, where alternative reading would undermine the statute's purpose); United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro, 331 F J d 1047, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2003) (reading "and" disjunctively to avoid surplusage); Ollilo v. Clatskanie People's Uti!. Dist., 132 P.2d 416, 419 (Or. 1942) (construing the term "and/or"); Pendleton Sch. Dist. 16R v, State, 185 P.3d 471, 479 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (reading "and" disjunctively to avoid internal contradiction), a f f ' d in part and r e v ' d in part on other grounds, 200 P .3d 133 (Or. 2009). 11As the court explained, "titillate" in this context meant "to [sexually] excite pleasurably o r agreeably" or to "arouse by stimulation." Maynard, 5 P J d at 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 20 o f 27 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S BOOKS V. KROGER 14467 m a t e r i a l s " and to " p r o t e c t [ ] children f r o m the harmful effects o f v i e w i n g h a r d c o r e p o r n o g r a p h y . " M a y n a r d , 5 P . 3 d at 1 1 4 7 , 1148 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) . T h e c o u r t e s p e c i a l l y b a s e d its interpretation on the defense i n former § 167.085, w h i c h " p l a i n l y . . . applie[ d] to t h o s e materials n o t primarily i n t e n d e d to titillate the victim." Id. a t 1147. T h e state argues that M a y n a r d r e q u i r e s c o n s t r u i n g sections 054 and 057 as l i m i t e d to hardcore materials. Maynard, however, is o f l i m i t e d relevance and does n o t authorize reading the e x e m p t i o n in t h e s t a t e ' s e x p a n s i v e manner. In holding that the s t a t u t e was a i m e d a t the effects o f e x p o s u r e to hardcore p o r n o g r a p h y , M a y n a r d did n o t c o n s t r u e the s c o p e o f the statute, b u t r a t h e r a d d r e s s e d t h e t h r e s h o l d i s s u e , u n d e r O r e g o n free s p e e c h d o c t r i n e , o f w h e t h e r t h e s t a t u t e " s u f f i c i e n t l y identified the harmful effects it s o u g h t to p r e v e n t . " Id. a t 1146. 12 I n d e e d , u p o n turning to the scope o f the material covered, the c o u r t w e n t o n to strike d o w n the s t a t u t e as overbroad. See id. a t 1150_51. 13 Thus, e v e n assuming that, u n d e r Maynard, sect i o n s 0 5 4 a n d 0 5 7 s i m i l a r l y a i m a t e f f e c t s the l e g i s l a t u r e d e e m e d harmful, t h a t d o e s n o t d e t e n n i n e w h a t materials a c t u ally fall within t h e i r reach. [5] A s a s e c o n d line o f defense, the state cites legislative h i s t o r y t h a t l i k e w i s e r e f l e c t s the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s c o n c e m s a b o u t m i n o r s ' e x p o s u r e t o h a r d c o r e p o r n o g r a p h y . In t h e s t a t e ' s 12Under the Oregon framework, cOUlis examine first whether the restriction aims at the content o f speech or the harmful effeets o f speech. I f the law targets content, it is unconstitutional unless the restraint is confined within some historical exception. I f the law targets effects, courts scrutinize it for overbreadth. Siale v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 576-77 (Or. 1982). 13Significantly, in Maynard the eOUli specifically held the statute to be overbroad because the defense did not apply to all acts o f "furnishing," but rather only to the acts o f "display," "showing," and "exhibition." Maynard, 5 P.3d at 1150-51. Contrary to the state's argument, Maynard did not reach the issue o f whether the defense was suftlcient to save the statute from overbreadth with respect to the expressive activity it did cover. ( ( 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 21 of 27 14468 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER view, the legislature was highly cognizant o f state court decisions striking down previous laws on sharing explicit materials with minors as overbroad and endeavored to draft a statute focused narrowly on hardcore pornography.14 However, "[ w ]hen the text o f a statute is truly capable o f having only one meaning, no weight can be given to legislative history t h a t s u g g e s t s - o r e v e n c o n f i r m s - t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s intended something different." Gaines, 206 P.3d at 1051. Regardless o f any contrmy suggestions in the legislative history, the statutory text is plainly not limited to offending pornographic materials that the state hoped to target. In short, good intentions c a n n o t t t u m p t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e . II. T H E C R I M I N A L l Z A T l O N O F A S U B S T A N T I A L A M O U N T OF EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY [6] Having delimited the reach o f the statutes, we consider w h e t h e r they c r i m i n a l i z e a s u b s t a n t i a l a m o u n t o f e x p r e s s i v e activity.15 States may restrict the access o f minors to obscene 14See. e.g., Maynard, 5 P.3d at 1150 (invalidating statute that criminalized visual images o f sexual conduct and sexual excitement "regardless o f the significance o f such depictions in the context o f the materials taken as a whole"); State v. Woodcock, 706 P.2d 1012, 1013 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (deeming overbroad a statute that "essentially prohibits furnishing minors with any printed matter containing ' d i t t y words' no matter how incidental the objectionable language is in the context o f the work as a whole"); State v. Frink, 653 P.2d 553, 555 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (invalidating a ban on furnishing a minor with materials that depict nudity regardless o f erotic content). 15The state argues that section 057 is dirccted at the conduct o f "luring minors using pomography" and not speech, and thus falls outside First Amendment protections. However, the statute plainly applies to materials covered by the First Amendment. The statute does not proscribe speech that is integral or limited to criminal c o n d u c t - t h a t is, speech that is "the vehicle" for a crime. United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 2004). Section 057 curbs speech used to induce prospective victims to engage in sexual activity but also criminalizes providing materials to arouse o r satisfy sexual dcsires. OR. R E V . STAT. § 167.057(l)(b). Whereas inducing a minor to engage in sexual activity is independently criminal, arousing oneself 01' a minor is not. ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 22 o f 27 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S BOOKS V. KROGER 14469 material so long as the legislature has a rational basis "to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968). A state may impose such restrictions even i f the material at issue is not obscene to adults. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F J d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2003). However, "[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them." Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975). In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a New York statute that criminalized the sale o f "girlie magazines" to persons under the age o f seventeen. 390 U.S. at 631-33. This statute incorporated the obscenity test previously articulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, namely, that a work is obscene i f (a) the dominant theme o f the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation o f sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. 383 U.S. 4 1 3 , 4 1 8 (1966). Five years after Ginsberg, the Court revisited the question o f the appropriate obscenity standard for adults in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court explicitly rejected the lack o f "redeeming social value" prong set forth in Memoirs, holding that a state could criminalize the distribution o f only those materials that "taken as a whole, do not have serious literaty, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24. 16 16The Court left the other two prongs substantially unchanged, holding that material was obscene i f "the average persou, applying contemporary ( ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 23 o f 27 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 14470 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t has n e v e r e x p l i c i t l y e x t e n d e d the " s e r i ous v a l u e " standard to o b s c e n i t y for minors. See Entm 't Software A s s ' n v. Blagojevich, 4 6 9 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2006) ( c i t i n g c a s e s ) . T h e p a r t i e s , h o w e v e r , a r g u e t h a t Miller's a m e n d m e n t with respect to adults also applies to minors. A n u m b e r o f o u r s i s t e r c i r c u i t s h a v e a p p r o v e d o f the a d a p t a t i o n o f Miller to minors as well. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1503 & n.18 ( l i t h Cir. 1990); Am. Booksellers A s s ' n v. Virginia, 8 8 2 F.2d 125, 127 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1989); U s . News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1286-87 ( l O t h Cir. 1983). [7] Ultimately, w e need n o t d e c i d e this issue as the statutes are o v e r b r o a d u n d e r b o t h frameworks. Sections 0 5 4 and 057 s w e e p up material that, w h e n t a k e n as a whole, has serious lite r a t y , artistic, political, o r s c i e n t i f i c value for minors and thus also has at least some " r e d e e m i n g social value." B e c a u s e the s t a t u t e s s w e e p b e y o n d Miller's m o r e l e n i e n t d e f i n i t i o n o f obscenity, they necessarily e x t e n d beyond the Ginsburg form u l a t i o n as well. I n addition, sections 054 and 057 do not limit themselves to material t h a t predominantly appeals to m i n o r s ' p r u r i e n t i n t e r e s t . A s a r e s u l t , the s t a t u t e s r e a c h a s u b s t a n t i a l a m o u n t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected speech. B e c a u s e the statutes fail to s a t i s f y the first two prongs o f Miller/Ginsberg, w e n e e d n o t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e y a l s o c r i m i n a l i z e the f u r n i s h i n g o f a s i g n i f i c a n t a m o u n t o f m a t e r i a l that is n o t p a t e n t l y o f f e n s i v e . A. SERIOUS V A L U E [8] N o t h i n g in the l a n g u a g e o f the statutes, including the exemptions, takes the " s e r i o u s v a l u e " o f the w o r k as a whole community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the p11lrient interest" and " t h e work depicts o r describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law." Mittel', 413 U.S. at 24 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 24 o f 2 7 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. K R O G E R 14471 into account, or, for that matter, whether the work possesses any "redeeming social value." A pair o f examples from the record highlight the statutes' overbreadth in this regard. I t ' s Pelfect!y Norma! is a sexual education book containing simple line drawings that include non-obscene but unmistakable images o f sexual intercourse and masturbation. As its subtitle indicates, the book provides frank information about "changing bodies, growing up, sex & sexual health," and thus does not lack serious scientific value even for children under the age o f thirteen. The images o f sexual intercourse and masturbation are "sexually explicit material" and, pursuant to section 054, they may not be furnished to children under the age o f thirteen. OR. R E V . STAT. §§ 167.054(1); 167.05l(5)(a). While their primaty purpose is education rather than titillation, the images o f sexual intercourse and masturbation are not an "incidental" portion o f the work as a whole, as they cannot be considered subordinate or nonessential in a sexual education manual. Thus, the exemption fails to shelter sexual education materials like I t ' s Pelfect!y Norma! from liability. [9] Similarly, section 057 sweeps up works like Forever, a coming-of-age novel written by Judy Blume. Forever includes explicit narrative accounts o f masturbation, sexual intercourse, and genital-genital contact, which are all depictions o f sexual conduct that may not be shared with minors, i f the fumisher intends to arouse the minor or the furnisher. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 167.057(a)-(b); l67.051(4)(a)-(b). But Forever certainly contains serious artistic or literary value as to minors as a whole, and the explicit narrative accounts in Forever are not incidental to the coming o f age StOlY. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coa!., 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002) (explaining that inclusion o f obscene portions that are part o f the narrative o f a non-obscene work do not cause "the work itself . . . [to] become obscene"). These examples are hardly exotic. They demonstrate that the statutes reach a substantial number o f works that are not obscene to children or minors because they fail to take into account the value o f the work as a whole. ( ( 1 0 : 7 4 7 9 1 3 6 OktEntry:61-1 C a s e : 0 9 - 3 5 1 5 3 09/20/2010 P a g e : 2 5 0 f 2 7 14472 B. P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER PRURIENT INTEREST [10) The statutes also do n o t limit themselves to material that predominantly appeals to p m r i e n t interest. Such material is understood to trigger responses " o v e r and beyond" normal sexual arousal. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1985). Section 054 defines sexually explicit material to consist o f visual images o f sexual intercourse as well as more specific subcategories. This definition is broad enough to reach a substantial amount o f material that does not appeal to the pmrient interest o f a child under thirteen, but merely appeals to regular sexual interest. [11) Section 057 reaches even farther than section 054, criminalizing the fumishing o f written and visual depictions o f sexual intercourse, along with depictions o f the "[t]ouching o f the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks o f the human male or female or o f the breasts o f the human female," to minors as old as seventeen. OR. R E V . STAT. §§ l67.05l(4)(d); l67.057(1)(a). As the district court found, section 057 thus criminalizes fiction no more tawdry than a romance novel, "written or created to arouse the reader [or] viewer." Powell's Books, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1246. In this respect, section 057 also reaches a substantial amount o f expressive activity that does not appeal to the pmrient interests o f minors. The exemption does not cure this overbreadth as i t focuses on titillation, and not pmrient interest. Titillation and arousal are not synonymous with an abnOlmal or prurient sexual response as described in Brockett. To criminalize furnishing material solely intended to titillate the reader will certainly sweep up some material that appeals to the pmrient interest o f children and minors, but it will also criminalize a broad swath o f material that does not appeal to prurient interests. [12) By restricting the dissemination and use o f nonobscene material, the statutes trench on the First Amendment rights o f minors and adults alike. On the one hand, the statutes ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 26 o f 2 7 10: 7479136 OktEntry: 61-1 P O W E L L ' S BOOKS V. KROGER 14473 limit minors' access to expressive material that the state may not legitimately proscribe. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14. On the other, the statutes also restrict adults from providing minors with materials that are entirely anodyne for First Amendment purposes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the state may not prevent adults from circulating non-obscene materials amongst themselves. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252. Although we apply a "variable standard" for obscenity to minors, it is equally true that the state may n o t restrict adults from sharing material with minors that is not obscene for minors. The statutes' overbreadth impinges on the rights o f all individuals to legitimately share and access non-obscene materials without the interference o f the state. III. LIMITING CONSTRUCTION [13] I n light o f the statutes' facial overbreadth, the only question remaining is whether the statutes are susceptible to a reasonable limiting construction. In addressing this issue, we consider the limiting constlUctions proffered by the state, but do not "insert missing terms into the statute or adopt an interpretation precluded by the plain language o f the ordinance." Foti v. City o f Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Frink, 653 P.2d at 557-58. We may not "rewrite a state law to confOlID it to constitutional requirements." Am. Bookse//ers, 484 U.S. at 397. [14] The statutes sweep in the many works that include portions solely intended to titillate and arouse the reader but have serious value when taken as a whole. The statutes also e x e m p t m a t e r i a l s b a s e d o n a n o n - t i t i l l a t i n g purpose, r a t h e r than a plUrient one. To satisfy the Miller/Ginsberg requirements, we would have to insert language where we are not permitted to do so. See OR. R E V . STAT. § 174.010 (providing that "[i]n the constlUction o f a statute, the office o f the j u d g e is . . . not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has ( Case: 09-35153 09/20/2010 Page: 27 o f 27 ID: 7479136 DktEntry: 61-1 14474 P O W E L L ' S B O O K S V. KROGER been inserted."); see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). Finally, although we appreciate the s t a t e ' s argument that it has not, and will not, bring prosecutions against individuals or businesses like P o w e l l ' s Books, this stand down approach cannot overcome the flaws in the statute. "The First Amendment protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy o f noblesse oblige." [d. at 1591. We may not uphold the statutes merely because the state promises to treat them as properly limited. [15] In sum, we conclude that because sections 054 and 057 on their face reach a significant amount o f material that is not obscene as to minors, the statutes are unconstitutionally overbroad. REVERSED.

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