Cecil Ingram, et al v. Armine Oroudjian, et al
Filing
FILED PER CURIAM OPINION (DOROTHY W. NELSON, SANDRA S. IKUTA and LAWRENCE L. PIERSOL) AFFIRMED. FILED AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. [7833935]
Case: 09-57022 07/27/2011 Page: 1 of 6
ID: 7833935 DktEntry: 22-1
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CECIL INGRAM and THE FAIR
HOUSING COUNCIL OF THE SAN
FERNANDO VALLEY, a California
Non-Profit Corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ARMINE OROUDJIAN, an individual
and ANTONY ABELYAN,
an individual,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 09-57022
D.C. No.
2:08-cv-03917GAF (VBK)
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 7, 2011*
Pasadena, California
Filed July 27, 2011
Before: D. W. Nelson and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges,
and Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior District Judge.**
Per Curiam Opinion
*The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior District Judge for the
District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
9641
Case: 09-57022 07/27/2011 Page: 2 of 6
ID: 7833935 DktEntry: 22-1
INGRAM v. OROUDJIAN
9643
COUNSEL
Odion L. Okojie, Law Offices of Odion L. Okojie, Los Angeles, California; Jerome Zamos, Law Offices of Jerome Zamos,
Woodland Hills, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Joseph C. Owens, William John Rea, Jr., Robert Anderson
Wooten, Jr., Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Gary Alan Starre, Starr & Cohn, Encino,
California, for the defendants-appellees.
Case: 09-57022 07/27/2011 Page: 3 of 6
9644
ID: 7833935 DktEntry: 22-1
INGRAM v. OROUDJIAN
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Cecil Ingram and The Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (“Appellants”) appeal the district court’s order
awarding them attorney fees following settlement of their
claims against Armine Oroudjian and Antony Abelyan
(“Appellees”) brought under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619, and California law.
Ingram, disabled and confined to a wheelchair, lives in an
apartment owned by Oroudjian and managed by Abelyan. In
May of 2008, Ingram’s bank did not honor his rent check and
the landlord initiated an unlawful detainer action against
Ingram in state court. While the state action was pending,
Appellants filed this federal lawsuit alleging, among other
things, discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act and
violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.
Ingram eventually prevailed in the unlawful detainer action
and maintained possession of his apartment.
After learning Ingram succeeded in the unlawful detainer
action, the district court strongly encouraged the parties to settle this case. Instead, according to the district court, counsel
for Appellants took unreasonable settlement positions and
prolonged the litigation, forcing Appellees to pursue litigation
alternatives, including a motion for summary judgment. With
an opening demand of $425,000, the case later settled for payments of $30,000 to Ingram and $2,000 to the Fair Housing
Council, an offer which had been rejected by Appellants one
month before settling for that amount. Following settlement,
Appellants moved for an award of attorney fees in the amount
of $88,857.50. The district court awarded $30,485.00. Appellants argue the district court erred by deducting some of the
hours billed and lowering the hourly rates requested by
Appellants.
Case: 09-57022 07/27/2011 Page: 4 of 6
ID: 7833935 DktEntry: 22-1
INGRAM v. OROUDJIAN
9645
We review the district court’s decision awarding attorney
fees for an abuse of discretion. See Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.
2010).
Appellants raise four arguments in support of their claim
that the district court abused its discretion: 1) the district court
improperly considered settlement proceedings; 2) the district
court should have awarded fees for responding to the summary judgment motion; 3) the district court erred by disallowing fees for briefing the abstention doctrine under Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); and 4) the hourly rate set by the
district court is too low.
[1] First, Appellants allege that the district court should not
have considered settlement discussions. This Court has not
addressed the issue, but other circuits have held that settlement negotiations may be considered by the district court as
a factor in determining a fee award. See, e.g., Lohman v.
Duryea Borough, 574 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2009); Parke v.
First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1012 (8th
Cir. 2004); Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 967 (7th Cir.
2000). In Lohman, the defendants made three settlement
offers after the trial began, including one for $75,000. See
Lohman, 574 F.3d at 165. The plaintiff rejected the offers and
was awarded $12,205 by the jury. See id. When considering
the plaintiff ’s motion for attorney fees, the district court
reduced the lodestar from $62,986.75 to $30,000 based on the
plaintiff ’s limited success. See id. at 166. The court noted that
the plaintiff would “have achieved a much greater level of
success if [he] had settled the case.” Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred by using evidence from
settlement negotiations to reduce the award. See id. at 167.
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding it is permissible for a district court to consider settlement negotiations in measuring the
litigant’s success for purposes of awarding attorney fees, see
id. at 167-168, and rejection of a settlement offer that was six
times the jury award was probative of the plaintiff ’s lack of
Case: 09-57022 07/27/2011 Page: 5 of 6
9646
ID: 7833935 DktEntry: 22-1
INGRAM v. OROUDJIAN
success, see id. at 169. We agree with the reasoning of the
Third Circuit and therefore hold that the district court did not
err by considering settlement negotiations for the purpose of
deciding a reasonable attorney fee award in this case.
[2] Second, Appellants argue that the district court erred
by disallowing attorney fees for 40 hours Appellants’ lawyers
spent opposing Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
The district court reasoned that Appellants should have
aggressively pursued settlement at the early stages of the case
and that counsel for Appellants unduly extended the duration
of the litigation. Because the district court is more familiar
with the course of the litigation before it, including Appellants’ role in extending the litigation, we defer to the district
court’s decision not to award fees for responding to the
motion for summary judgment. See Chalmers v. City of Los
Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on
other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The district
court is in the best position to determine in the first instance
the number of hours reasonably expended in furtherance of
the successful aspects of a litigation and the amount which
would reasonably compensate the attorney.”).
[3] Third, Appellants assert that the district court should
have awarded fees for briefing the Younger abstention doctrine. Appellants attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction
to halt the pending state court unlawful detainer proceedings
when it was clear to the district court that the Younger abstention doctrine prevented the district court from exercising jurisdiction. The district court then ordered Appellants to show
cause why the federal action should not be dismissed because
of the pending state action. Subsequently, the state court
action ended and the abstention issue became moot. Despite
that, Appellants submitted a response regarding the Younger
abstention doctrine. The district court deducted the hours
spent on the abstention issue from the attorney fee award,
explaining that it was not reasonable for experienced counsel
to spend so much time researching the law on Younger
Case: 09-57022 07/27/2011 Page: 6 of 6
ID: 7833935 DktEntry: 22-1
INGRAM v. OROUDJIAN
9647
abstention. The district court is in the best position to discern
what work was unnecessary, and we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deducting the hours
spent on the preliminary injunction and the Younger abstention doctrine.
Fourth, Appellants argue that the district court erred in
determining a reasonable hourly rate of $350 for their lawyers. We have held that “[i]n determining a reasonable hourly
rate, the district court should be guided by the rate prevailing
in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of
comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id. at 1210-11.
The district court noted that Appellants failed to submit affidavits from local attorneys or from a fee expert to show that
the requested rates of $475 for Mr. Zamos and $375 for Mr.
Okojie match the prevailing market rates. Appellees submitted a declaration supporting a market rate of $350 to $400 for
lawyers with experience similar to Appellants’ lawyers, and
the district court said its own familiarity with the Los Angeles
legal market supported an hourly fee of $325 to $375 per
hour.
[4] This court has never addressed whether it is proper for
a district court to rely on its own familiarity with the legal
market. Other circuit courts have held that judges are justified
in relying on their own knowledge of customary rates and
their experience concerning reasonable and proper fees. See,
e.g., Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d
1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (courts are experts as to the reasonableness of attorney fees and award may be based on
court’s own experience); In re U.S. Golf Corp., 639 F.2d
1197, 1207 (5th Cir. 1981) (same). We agree. We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion either by
relying, in part, on its own knowledge and experience, or by
setting an hourly rate of $350 for Appellants’ lawyers.
AFFIRMED.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?