USA v. State of Arizona, et al

Filing 197

Filed (ECF) Appellants Janice K. Brewer and State of Arizona citation of supplemental authorities. Date of service: 03/01/2011. [7664236] (JB)

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USA v. State of Arizona, et al Doc. 197 Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. LAW OFFICES DENVER LAS VEGA S LOS ANGELES LOS CABOS ORANGE COUNT Y PHOENIX S A LT L A K E C I T Y TUCSON One Arizona Center 400 East Van Buren Street Suite 1900 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-2202 602.382.6000 602.382.6070 (Fax) JOHN J. BOUMA 602.382.6216 March 1, 2011 VIA CM/ECF Molly C. Dwyer Clerk of the Court United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 95 7th Street San Francisco, CA 94103-1526 Re: United States v. Arizona, Case No. 10-16645 (Judges Bea, Paez, and Noonan) Rule 28(j) Statement of Supplemental Authority Regarding the U.S. Supreme Court's Opinion in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., No. 08-1314 Dear Ms. Dwyer: Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 28(j), Appellants the State of Arizona and Governor Janice K. Brewer submit this statement to notify the panel of the U.S. Supreme Court's February 23, 2011 opinion in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., No. 08-1314. In Williamson, the Supreme Court addressed whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which permits automobile manufacturers to install on rear, inner car seats either lap belts or lap-and-shoulder belts, preempts state tort liability based on a manufacturer's failure to install lap belts. The Williamson Court found no conflict preemption--even though Standard 208 provides manufacturers a choice that the state tort suit would prohibit--because Standard 208's "seatbelt choice is not a significant objective of the federal regulation." Slip Op. at 1. Williamson is pertinent to the appeal in United States v. Arizona in two respects. First, it clarifies the standard for conflict preemption, which is the primary basis upon which the district court enjoined Sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 of S.B. 1070. The injunction cannot be affirmed, therefore, absent a showing that these provisions conflict with a "significant objective" of some federal statute or regulation. Second, Williamson prevents National Center for Immigrants' Rights v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1370 (9th Cir. 1990) ("NCIR") from controlling the constitutionality of Section 5(C). In NCIR, this Court found that Congress did not intend to sanction employees when it enacted IRCA. Although NCIR confirms that Congress chose not to sanction employees (as the DOT Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. March 1, 2011 Page 2 chose not to require lap-and-shoulder belts), nothing in NCIR suggests that imposing such sanctions would interfere with any "significant" congressional objective. To the contrary, in reversing NCIR, the Supreme Court found that the challenged no-work bond conditions (an employee sanction) were consistent with Congress' objectives in enacting both INA and IRCA. See INS v. Nat'l Center for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 194 & n.8 (1991). For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the Court consider Williamson and its application to the issues on appeal before issuing its decision. Sincerely, SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. s/John J. Bouma John J. Bouma Robert A. Henry Joseph G. Adams Attorneys for Appellants, Janice K. Brewer and the State of Arizona cc (by CM/ECF): All Counsel of Record 12634156

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