Susan Latta, et al v. C. Otter, et al

Filing

FILED OPINION (STEPHEN R. REINHARDT, RONALD M. GOULD and MARSHA S. BERZON) AFFIRMED; REVERSED; REMANDED. Judge: SR Authoring, Judge: RMG , Judge: MSB Concurring, Judge: SR Concurring. FILED AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. [9268466] [14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668]

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FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OCT 07 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

SUSAN LATTA; TRACI EHLERS; LORI
WATSEN; SHARENE WATSEN;
SHELIA ROBERTSON; ANDREA
ALTMAYER; AMBER BEIERLE;
RACHAEL ROBERTSON,

No. 14-35420
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD

OPINION
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
C. L. OTTER, “Butch”; Governor of the
State of Idaho, in his official capacity,
Defendant - Appellant,
And
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Recorder of Ada
County, Idaho, in his official capacity,
Defendant,
STATE OF IDAHO,
Intervenor-Defendant.

1

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SUSAN LATTA; TRACI EHLERS; LORI
WATSEN; SHARENE WATSEN;
SHELIA ROBERTSON; ANDREA
ALTMAYER; AMBER BEIERLE;
RACHAEL ROBERTSON,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
C. L. OTTER, “Butch”; Governor of the
State of Idaho, in his official capacity,
Defendant,
And
CHRISTOPHER RICH, Recorder of Ada
County, Idaho, in his official capacity,
Defendant - Appellant,
STATE OF IDAHO,
Intervenor-Defendant Appellant.

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No. 14-35421
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Candy W. Dale, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
BEVERLY SEVCIK; MARY
BARANOVICH; ANTIOCO CARRILLO;
THEODORE SMALL; KAREN GOODY;
KAREN VIBE; FLETCHER
WHITWELL; GREG FLAMER;
MIKYLA MILLER; KATRINA MILLER;
ADELE TERRANOVA; TARA
NEWBERRY; CAREN CAFFERATAJENKINS; FARRELL CAFFERATAJENKINS; MEGAN LANZ; SARA
GEIGER,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
BRIAN SANDOVAL, in his official
capacity as Governor of the State of
Nevada; DIANA ALBA, in her official
capacity as the County Clerk and
Commissioner of Civil Marriages for
Clark County, Nevada; AMY HARVEY,
in her official capacity as the County Clerk
and Commissioner of Civil Marriages for
Washoe County, Nevada; ALAN
GLOVER, in his official capacity as the
Clerk Recorder for Carson City, Nevada,
Defendants - Appellees,
And
COALITION FOR THE PROTECTION
3

No. 12-17668
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00578-RCJ-PAL

OPINION

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OF MARRIAGE,
Intervenor-Defendant Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 8, 20141
San Francisco, California
Before: REINHARDT, GOULD, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Reinhardt:
Both Idaho and Nevada have passed statutes and enacted constitutional
amendments preventing same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to recognize
same-sex marriages validly performed elsewhere.2 Plaintiffs, same-sex couples
1

A disposition in Jackson v. Abercrombie, Nos. 12-16995 & 12-16998, is
forthcoming separately.
2

Idaho Const. Art. III, § 28 (“A marriage between a man and a woman is the
only domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this state.”); Idaho
Code §§ 32-201 (“Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract
between a man and a woman . . . .”), 32-202 (identifying as qualified to marry
“[a]ny unmarried male . . . and unmarried female” of a certain age and “not
otherwise disqualified.”); 32-209 (“All marriages contracted without this state,
which would be valid by the laws of the state or country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in this state, unless they violate the public policy of this state.
Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but are not limited to,
same-sex marriage, and marriages entered into under the laws of another state or
(continued...)
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who live in Idaho and Nevada and wish either to marry there or to have marriages
entered into elsewhere recognized in their home states, have sued for declaratory
relief and to enjoin the enforcement of these laws. They argue that the laws are
subject to heightened scrutiny because they deprive plaintiffs of the fundamental
due process right to marriage, and because they deny them equal protection of the
law by discriminating against them on the bases of their sexual orientation and
their sex. In response, Governor Otter, Recorder Rich, and the State of Idaho, along
with the Nevada intervenors, the Coalition for the Protection of Marriage (“the
Coalition”), argue that their laws survive heightened scrutiny, primarily because
the states have a compelling interest in sending a message of support for the
institution of opposite-sex marriage. They argue that permitting same-sex marriage
will seriously undermine this message, and contend that the institution of oppositesex marriage is important because it encourages people who procreate to be
responsible parents, and because opposite-sex parents are better for children than
same-sex parents.

2

(...continued)
country with the intent to evade the prohibitions of the marriage laws of this
state.”); Nev. Const. Art. 1, § 21 (“Only a marriage between a male and female
person shall be recognized and given effect in this state.”); Nev. Rev. Stat. §
122.020(1) (“[A] male and female person . . . may be joined in marriage.”).
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Without the benefit of our decision in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
2014), the Sevcik district court applied rational basis review and upheld Nevada’s
laws. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012). After we decided
SmithKline, the Latta district court concluded that heightened scrutiny applied to
Idaho’s laws because they discriminated based on sexual orientation, and
invalidated them.3 Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-CV-00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999, at
*14–18 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014). We hold that the Idaho and Nevada laws at issue
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they
deny lesbians and gays4 who wish to marry persons of the same sex a right they
afford to individuals who wish to marry persons of the opposite sex, and do not
satisfy the heightened scrutiny standard we adopted in SmithKline.
I.

3

The Latta court also found a due process violation because, it concluded,
the laws curtailed plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry. Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13CV-00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999, at *9–13 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014).
4

We have recognized that “[s]exual orientation and sexual identity are
immutable; they are so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be
required to abandon them.” Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th
Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177,
1187 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006).
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Before we reach the merits, we must address two preliminary matters: first,
whether an Article III case or controversy still exists in Sevcik, since Nevada’s
government officials have ceased to defend their laws’ constitutionality; and
second, whether the Supreme Court’s summary dismissal in Baker v. Nelson, 409
U.S. 810 (1972), is controlling precedent that precludes us from considering
plaintiffs’ claims.
A.
Governor Sandoval and Clerk-Recorder Glover initially defended Nevada’s
laws in the district court. However, they have since withdrawn their answering
briefs from consideration by this Court, in light of our decision in SmithKline, 740
F.3d at 480-81 (holding heightened scrutiny applicable). Governor Sandoval now
asserts that United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), “signifies that
discrimination against same-sex couples is unconstitutional,” and that “[a]ny
uncertainty regarding the interpretation of Windsor was . . . dispelled” by
SmithKline. As a result, we have not considered those briefs, and the Governor and
Clerk-Recorder were not heard at oral argument, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 31(c).
The Nevada Governor and Clerk Recorder remain parties, however, and
continue to enforce the laws at issue on the basis of a judgment in their favor
below. As a result, we are still presented with a live case or controversy in need of
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resolution. Despite the fact that Nevada “largely agree[s] with the opposing party
on the merits of the controversy, there is sufficient adverseness and an adequate
basis for jurisdiction in the fact the [state] intend[s] to enforce the challenged law
against that party.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Although the state defendants withdrew their briefs, we are required to
ascertain and rule on the merits arguments in the case, rather than ruling
automatically in favor of plaintiffs-appellants. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 887 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[Defendant’s] failure to file a
brief does not compel a ruling in [plaintiff’s] favor, given that the only sanction for
failure to file an answering brief is forfeiture of oral argument.”).
There remains a question of identifying the appropriate parties to the case
before us—specifically, whether we should consider the arguments put forward by
the Nevada intervenor, the Coalition for the Protection of Marriage. As plaintiffs
consented to their intervention in the district court—at a point in the litigation
before Governor Sandoval and Clerk-Recorder Glover indicated that they would no
longer argue in support of the laws—and continue to so consent, the propriety of
the intervenor’s participation has never been adjudicated.
Because the state defendants have withdrawn their merits briefs, we face a
situation akin to that in Windsor. There, a case or controversy remained between
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Windsor and the United States, which agreed with her that the Defense of Marriage
Act was unconstitutional but nonetheless refused to refund the estate tax she had
paid. Here as there, the state defendants’ “agreement with [plaintiffs’] legal
argument raises the risk that instead of a real, earnest and vital controversy, the
Court faces a friendly, non-adversary proceeding . . . .” 133 S. Ct. at 2687
(citations and quotation marks omitted). Hearing from the Coalition helps us “to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). As a result, we consider the
briefs and oral argument offered by the Coalition, which, Governor Sandoval
believes, “canvass the arguments against the Appellants’ position and the related
policy considerations.”5
B.
Defendants argue that we are precluded from hearing this case by Baker, 409
U.S. 810. In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court had rejected due process and
equal protection challenges to a state law limiting marriage to a man and a woman.

5

For the sake of convenience, we refer throughout this opinion to arguments
advanced generally by “defendants”; by this we mean the parties that continue
actively to argue in defense of the laws—the Idaho defendants and the Nevada
intervenor—and not Governor Sandoval and Clerk-Recorder Glover.
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191 N.W.2d 185, 186–87 (Minn. 1971). The United States Supreme Court
summarily dismissed an appeal from that decision “for want of a substantial
federal question.” Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. Such summary dismissals “prevent
lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented
and necessarily decided by those actions,” Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176
(1977) (per curiam), until “doctrinal developments indicate otherwise,” Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343–44 (1975) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants contend that this decades-old case is still good law, and therefore bars
us from concluding that same-sex couples have a due process or equal protection
right to marriage.
However, “subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court” not only “suggest”
but make clear that the claims before us present substantial federal questions.6
Wright v. Lane Cnty. Dist. Ct., 647 F.2d 940, 941 (9th Cir. 1981); see Windsor,

6

To be sure, the Court made explicit in Windsor and Lawrence that it was not
deciding whether states were required to allow same-sex couples to marry.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“This opinion and its holding are confined to those
lawful marriages [recognized by states].”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003) (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
The Court did not reach the question we decide here because it was not presented
to it. Although these cases did not tell us the answers to the federal questions
before us, Windsor and Lawrence make clear that these are substantial federal
questions we, as federal judges, must hear and decide.
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133 S. Ct. at 2694–96 (holding unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment a
federal law recognizing opposite-sex-sex but not same-sex marriages because its
“principal purpose [was] to impose inequality, not for other reasons like
governmental efficiency”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003)
(recognizing a due process right to engage in intimate conduct, including with a
partner of the same sex); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–34 (1996)
(invalidating as an irrational denial of equal protection a state law barring
protection of lesbians and gays under state or local anti-discrimination legislation
or administrative policies). Three other circuits have issued opinions striking down
laws like those at issue here since Windsor, and all agree that Baker no longer
precludes review. Accord Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386, 2014 WL 4359059, at *7
(7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373–75 (4th Cir. 2014);
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1204–08 (10th Cir. 2014). As any observer of
the Supreme Court cannot help but realize, this case and others like it present not
only substantial but pressing federal questions.
II.
Plaintiffs are ordinary Idahoans and Nevadans. One teaches deaf children.
Another is a warehouse manager. A third is an historian. Most are parents. Like all
human beings, their lives are given greater meaning by their intimate, loving,
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committed relationships with their partners and children. “The common
vocabulary of family life and belonging that other[s] [] may take for granted” is, as
the Idaho plaintiffs put it, denied to them—as are all of the concrete legal rights,
responsibilities, and financial benefits afforded opposite-sex married couples by
state and federal law7—merely because of their sexual orientation.

7

Nevada, unlike Idaho, has enacted a domestic partnership regime. Since
2009, both same-sex and opposite-sex couples have been allowed to register as
domestic partners. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 122A.100, 122A.010 et seq. Domestic
partners are generally treated like married couples for purposes of rights and
responsibilities—including with respect to children—under state law. However,
domestic partners are denied nearly all of the benefits afforded married couples
under federal law—including, since Windsor, same-sex couples married under
state law.
The fact that Nevada has seen fit to give same-sex couples the opportunity to
enjoy the benefits afforded married couples by state law makes its case for the
constitutionality of its regime even weaker than Idaho’s. With the concrete
differences in treatment gone, all that is left is a message of disfavor. The Supreme
Court has “repeatedly emphasized [that] discrimination itself, by perpetuating
‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored
group as ‘innately inferior’ and therefore as less worthy participants,” can cause
serious “injuries to those who are denied equal treatment solely because of their
membership in a disfavored group.” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40
(1984) (citation omitted).
If Nevada were concerned, as the Coalition purports it to be, that state
recognition of same-sex unions would make the institution of marriage
“genderless” and thereby undermine opposite-sex spouses’ commitments to each
other and their children, it would be ill-advised to permit opposite-sex couples to
participate in the alternative domestic partnership regime it has established.
However, Nevada does just that.
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Defendants argue that their same-sex marriage bans do not discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation, but rather on the basis of procreative capacity.
Effectively if not explicitly, they assert that while these laws may disadvantage
same-sex couples and their children, heightened scrutiny is not appropriate because
differential treatment by sexual orientation is an incidental effect of, but not the
reason for, those laws. However, the laws at issue distinguish on their face between
opposite-sex couples, who are permitted to marry and whose out-of-state marriages
are recognized, and same-sex couples, who are not permitted to marry and whose
marriages are not recognized. Whether facial discrimination exists “does not
depend on why” a policy discriminates, “but rather on the explicit terms of the
discrimination.” Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers
of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991). Hence, while
the procreative capacity distinction that defendants seek to draw could in theory
represent a justification for the discrimination worked by the laws, it cannot
overcome the inescapable conclusion that Idaho and Nevada do discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation.
In SmithKline, we held that classifications on the basis of sexual orientation
are subject to heightened scrutiny. 740 F.3d at 474. We explained:

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In its words and its deed, Windsor established a level of scrutiny for
classifications based on sexual orientation that is unquestionably higher
than rational basis review. In other words, Windsor requires that
heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving
sexual orientation.
Id. at 481.
Windsor, we reasoned, applied heightened scrutiny in considering not the
Defense of Marriage Act’s hypothetical rationales but its actual, motivating
purposes.8 SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 481. We also noted that Windsor declined to
adopt the strong presumption in favor of constitutionality and the heavy deference
to legislative judgments characteristic of rational basis review. Id. at 483. We
concluded:
Windsor requires that when state action discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation, we must examine its actual purposes and carefully
consider the resulting inequality to ensure that our most fundamental
institutions neither send nor reinforce messages of stigma or secondclass status.
Id.

8

Although as discussed in the text, SmithKline instructs us to consider the
states’ actual reasons, and not post-hoc justifications, for enacting the laws at issue,
these actual reasons are hard to ascertain in this case. Some of the statutory and
constitutional provisions before us were enacted by state legislatures and some
were enacted by voters, and we have been informed by all parties that the
legislative histories are sparse. We shall assume, therefore, that the justifications
offered in defendants’ briefs were in fact the actual motivations for the laws.
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We proceed by applying the law of our circuit regarding the applicable level of
scrutiny. Because Idaho and Nevada’s laws discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, that level is heightened scrutiny.
III.
Defendants argue that their marriage laws survive heightened scrutiny
because they promote child welfare by encouraging optimal parenting. Governor
Otter argues that same-sex marriage “teaches everyone—married and unmarried,
gay and straight, men and women, and all the children—that a child knowing and
being reared by her mother and father is neither socially preferred nor officially
encouraged.” Governor Otter seeks to have the state send the opposite message to
all Idahoans: that a child reared by its biological parents is socially preferred and
officially encouraged.
This argument takes two related forms: First, defendants make a
“procreative channeling” argument: that the norms of opposite-sex marriage ensure
that as many children as possible are raised by their married biological mothers and
fathers. They claim that same-sex marriage will undermine those existing norms,
which encourage people in opposite-sex relationships to place their children’s
interests above their own and preserve intact family units, instead of pursuing their
own emotional and sexual needs elsewhere. In short, they argue that allowing
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same-sex marriages will adversely affect opposite-sex marriage by reducing its
appeal to heterosexuals, and will reduce the chance that accidental pregnancy will
lead to marriage. Second, Governor Otter and the Coalition (but not the state of
Idaho) argue that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples promotes child welfare
because children are most likely to thrive if raised by two parents of opposite
sexes, since, they assert, mothers and fathers have “complementary” approaches to
parenting.9 Thus, they contend, children raised by opposite-sex couples receive a
better upbringing.
A.
We pause briefly before considering the substance of defendants’ arguments
to address the contention that their conclusions about the future effects of same-sex
marriage on parenting are legislative facts entitled to deference. Defendants have
not demonstrated that the Idaho and Nevada legislatures actually found the facts
asserted in their briefs; even if they had, deference would not be warranted.

9

These arguments are not novel. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(BLAG) relied in part on similar contentions about procreative channeling and
gender complementarity in its attempt to justify the federal Defense of Marriage
Act, but the Court did not credit them. Brief on the Merits for Respondent BLAG
at 44-49, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
280 at *74–82.
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Unsupported legislative conclusions as to whether particular policies will
have societal effects of the sort at issue in this case—determinations which often,
as here, implicate constitutional rights—have not been afforded deference by the
Court. To the contrary, we “retain[] an independent constitutional duty to review
factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake. . . . Uncritical deference to
[legislatures’] factual findings in these cases is inappropriate.” Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417, 450–55 (1990).
B.
Marriage, the Coalition argues, is an “institution directed to certain great
social tasks, with many of those involving a man and a woman united in the
begetting, rearing, and education of children”; it is being “torn away,” they claim,
“from its ancient social purposes and transformed into a government-endorsed
celebration of the private desires of two adults (regardless of gender) to unite their
lives sexually, emotionally, and socially for as long as those personal desires last.”
Defendants struggle, however, to identify any means by which same-sex marriages
will undermine these social purposes. They argue vehemently that same-sex
marriage will harm existing and especially future opposite-sex couples and their

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children because the message communicated by the social institution of marriage
will be lost.
As one of the Nevada plaintiffs’ experts testified, there is no empirical
support for the idea that legalizing same-sex marriage would harm—or indeed,
affect—opposite-sex marriages or relationships. That expert presented data from
Massachusetts, a state which has permitted same-sex marriage since 2004, showing
no decrease in marriage rates or increase in divorce rates in the past decade.10 See
Amicus Brief of Massachusetts et al. 23–27; see also Amicus Brief of American
Psychological Association et al. 8–13. It would seem that allowing couples who
want to marry so badly that they have endured years of litigation to win the right to
do so would reaffirm the state’s endorsement, without reservation, of spousal and
parental commitment. From which aspect of same-sex marriages, then, will
opposite-sex couples intuit the destructive message defendants fear? Defendants
offer only unpersuasive suggestions.

10

The Coalition takes issue with this conclusion, arguing that the effects of
same-sex marriage might not manifest themselves for decades, because “something
as massive and pervasive in our society and humanity as the man-woman marriage
institution, like a massive ocean-going ship, does not stop or turn in a short space
or a short time.” Given that the discriminatory impact on individuals because of
their sexual orientation is so harmful to them and their families, such unsupported
speculation cannot justify the indefinite continuation of that discrimination.
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First, they argue that since same-sex families will not include both a father
and a mother, a man who has a child with a woman will conclude that his
involvement in that child’s life is not essential. They appear to contend that such a
father will see a child being raised by two women and deduce that because the state
has said it is unnecessary for that child—who has two parents—to have a father, it
is also unnecessary for his child to have a father. This proposition reflects a crass
and callous view of parental love and the parental bond that is not worthy of
response. We reject it out of hand. Accord Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1223 (concluding
that it was “wholly illogical” to think that same-sex marriage would affect
opposite-sex couples’ choices); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d
Cir. 2012); Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 998 (N.D. Cal.
2012); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Defendants also propose another possible means by which endorsing samesex marriage could discourage opposite-sex marriage, albeit less explicitly:
opposite-sex couples who disapprove of same-sex marriage will opt less frequently
or enthusiastically to participate in an institution that allows same-sex couples to
participate. However, the fear that an established institution will be undermined
due to private opposition to its inclusive shift is not a legitimate basis for retaining
the status quo. In United States v. Virginia, the Court explained:
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The notion that admission of women would downgrade VMI’s stature,
destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is a
judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other “selffulfilling prophec[ies],” see Mississippi Univ. for Women [v. Hogan],
458 U.S. [718,] 730 [(1982)], once routinely used to deny rights or
opportunities.
...
A like fear, according to a 1925 report, accounted for Columbia Law
School’s resistance to women’s admission, although “[t]he faculty . . .
never maintained that women could not master legal learning.11 . . . No,
its argument has been . . . more practical. If women were admitted to the
Columbia Law School, [the faculty] said, then the choicer, more manly
and red-blooded graduates of our great universities would go to the
Harvard Law School!” The Nation, Feb. 18, 1925, p. 173.
518 U.S. 515, 542–44 (1996); see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)
(“The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.”). The Sevcik district court thus erred in crediting the
argument that “a meaningful percentage of heterosexual persons would cease to
value the civil institution as highly as they previously had and hence enter it less
frequently . . . because they no longer wish to be associated with the civil
institution as redefined,” both because defendants failed to produce any support for

11

Likewise, Governor Otter assures us that Idaho’s laws were not motivated
by judgments about the relative emotional commitments of same-sex and oppositesex couples; his argument is about an “ethos,” he claims, and so is not weakened
by the fact that same-sex couples may, as he admits, be just as child-oriented.
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that prediction, and because private disapproval is a categorically inadequate
justification for public injustice. Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
Same-sex marriage, Governor Otter asserts, is part of a shift towards a
consent-based, personal relationship model of marriage, which is more adultcentric and less child-centric.12 The Latta district court was correct in concluding,
however, that “marriage in Idaho is and has long been a designedly consent-based
institution. . . . Idaho law is wholly indifferent to whether a heterosexual couple
wants to marry because they share this vision” of conjugal marriage. Latta, 2014
WL 1909999, at *23.
Idaho focuses on another aspect of the procreative channeling claim.
Because opposite-sex couples can accidentally conceive (and women may choose
not to terminate unplanned pregnancies), so the argument goes, marriage is
important because it serves to bind such couples together and to their children.
This makes some sense. Defendants’ argument runs off the rails, however, when
they suggest that marriage’s stabilizing and unifying force is unnecessary for same-

12

He also states, in conclusory fashion, that allowing same-sex marriage will
lead opposite-sex couples to abuse alcohol and drugs, engage in extramarital
affairs, take on demanding work schedules, and participate in time-consuming
hobbies. We seriously doubt that allowing committed same-sex couples to settle
down in legally recognized marriages will drive opposite-sex couples to sex, drugs,
and rock-and-roll.
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sex couples, because they always choose to conceive or adopt a child.13 As they
themselves acknowledge, marriage not only brings a couple together at the initial
moment of union; it helps to keep them together, “from [that] day forward, for
better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health.” Raising children
is hard; marriage supports same-sex couples in parenting their children, just as it
does opposite-sex couples.
Moreover, marriage is not simply about procreation, but as much about
expressions of emotional support and public commitment . . . . [M]any
religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; . . .
therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious
faith as well as an expression of personal dedication . . . . [M]arital status
often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e. g., Social
Security benefits), property rights (e. g., tenancy by the entirety,
13

As Judge Richard Posner put it, bluntly:

[These states] think[] that straight couples tend to be sexually
irresponsible, producing unwanted children by the carload, and so must
be pressured . . . to marry, but that gay couples, unable as they are to
produce children wanted or unwanted, are model parents—model
citizens really—so have no need for marriage. Heterosexuals get drunk
and pregnant, producing unwanted children; their reward is to be allowed
to marry. Homosexual couples do not produce unwanted children; their
reward is to be denied the right to marry. Go figure.
Baskin, 2014 WL 4359059, at *10 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
Idaho and Nevada’s laws are both over- and under-inclusive with respect to
parental fitness. A man and a woman who have been convicted of abusing their
children are allowed to marry; same-sex partners who have been adjudicated to be
fit parents in an adoption proceeding are not.
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inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e. g., legitimation
of children born out of wedlock).
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987) (recognizing that prisoners, too,
enjoyed the right to marry, even though they were not allowed to have sex, and
even if they did not already have children).
Although many married couples have children, marriage is at its essence an
“association that promotes . . . a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing that
married couples have a privacy right to use contraception in order to prevent
procreation). Just as “it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage
is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse,” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, it
demeans married couples—especially those who are childless—to say that
marriage is simply about the capacity to procreate.
Additionally, as plaintiffs argue persuasively, Idaho and Nevada’s laws are
grossly over- and under-inclusive with respect to procreative capacity. Both states
give marriage licenses to many opposite-sex couples who cannot or will not
reproduce—as Justice Scalia put it, in dissent, “the sterile and the elderly are

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allowed to marry,” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05—but not to same-sex couples
who already have children or are in the process of having or adopting them.14
A few of Idaho and Nevada’s other laws, if altered, would directly increase
the number of children raised by their married biological parents. We mention
them to illustrate, by contrast, just how tenuous any potential connection between a
ban on same-sex marriage and defendants’ asserted aims is. For that reason alone,
laws so poorly tailored as those before us cannot survive heightened scrutiny.
If defendants really wished to ensure that as many children as possible had
married parents, they would do well to rescind the right to no-fault divorce, or to
divorce altogether. Neither has done so. Such reforms might face constitutional
difficulties of their own, but they would at least further the states’ asserted interest
in solidifying marriage. Likewise, if Idaho and Nevada want to increase the
percentage of children being raised by their two biological parents, they might do
better to ban assisted reproduction using donor sperm or eggs, gestational
surrogacy, and adoption, by both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, as well as by

14

Defendants acknowledge this, but argue that it would be unconstitutionally
intrusive to determine procreative capacity or intent for opposite-sex couples, and
that the states must therefore paint with a broad brush to ensure that any couple
that could possibly procreate can marry. However, Idaho and Nevada grant the
right to marry even to those whose inability to procreate is obvious, such as the
elderly.
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single people. Neither state does. See Idaho Code §§ 39-5401 et seq.; Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§ 122A.200(1)(d), 126.051(1)(a), 126.510 et seq., 127.040; see also Carla
Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 Am. J. Comp.
L. 97, 102 & n.15 (2010); Idaho is a destination for surrogacy, KTVB.com (Dec.
5, 2013).
In extending the benefits of marriage only to people who have the capacity
to procreate, while denying those same benefits to people who already have
children, Idaho and Nevada materially harm and demean same-sex couples and
their children.15 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. Denying children resources and
stigmatizing their families on this basis is “illogical and unjust.” Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (citation omitted). It is counterproductive, and it is
unconstitutional.
C.

15

Idaho attempts to rebut testimony by the Idaho plaintiffs’ expert that
children of unmarried same-sex couples do just as well as those of married
opposite-sex couples; the state mistakenly argues that this evidence shows that the
children of same-sex couples are not harmed when the state withholds from their
parents the right to marry. A more likely explanation for this expert’s findings is
that when same-sex couples raise children, whether adopted or conceived through
the use of assisted reproductive technology, they have necessarily chosen to
assume the financial, temporal, and emotional obligations of parenthood. This does
not lead, however, to the conclusion that these children, too, would not benefit
from their parents’ marriage, just as children with opposite-sex parents do.
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Governor Otter and the Coalition, but not the state of Idaho, also argue that
children should be raised by both a male parent and a female parent. They assert
that their marriage laws have “recognized, valorized and made normative the roles
of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ and their uniting, complementary roles in raising their
offspring,” and insist that allowing same-sex couples to marry would send the
message that “men and women are interchangeable [and that a] child does not need
a mother and a father.”
However, as we explained in SmithKline, Windsor “forbid[s] state action
from ‘denoting the inferiority’” of same-sex couples. 740 F.3d at 482 (citing
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)).
It is the identification of such a class by the law for a separate and
lesser public status that “make[s] them unequal.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
at 2694. DOMA was “practically a brand upon them, affixed by the
law, an assertion of their inferiority.” Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 308 (1879). Windsor requires that classifications based on
sexual orientation that impose inequality on gays and lesbians and
send a message of second-class status be justified by some legitimate
purpose.
SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 482. Windsor makes clear that the defendants’ explicit
desire to express a preference for opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples is a
categorically inadequate justification for discrimination. Expressing such a
preference is precisely what they may not do.

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Defendants’ argument is, fundamentally, non-responsive to plaintiffs’ claims
to marriage rights; instead, it is about the suitability of same-sex couples, married
or not, as parents, adoptive or otherwise. That it is simply an ill-reasoned excuse
for unconstitutional discrimination is evident from the fact that Idaho and Nevada
already allow adoption by lesbians and gays. The Idaho Supreme Court has
determined that “sexual orientation [is] wholly irrelevant” to a person’s fitness or
ability to adopt children. In re Adoption of Doe, 326 P.3d 347, 353 (Idaho 2014).
“In a state where the privilege of becoming a child’s adoptive parent does not
hinge on a person’s sexual orientation, it is impossible to fathom how hypothetical
concerns about the same person’s parental fitness could possibly relate to civil
marriage.” Latta, 2014 WL 1909999, at *23. By enacting a domestic partnership
law, Nevada, too, has already acknowledged that no harm will come of treating
same-sex couples the same as opposite-sex couples with regard to parenting. Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 122A.200(1)(d) affords same-sex domestic partners parenting rights
identical to those of married couples, including those related to adoption, custody
and visitation, and child support. See also St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027, 1033
(Nev. 2013) (en banc) (“Both the Legislature and this court have acknowledged
that, generally, a child’s best interest is served by maintaining two actively
involved parents. To that end, the Legislature has recognized that the children of
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same-sex domestic partners bear no lesser rights to the enjoyment and support of
two parents than children born to married heterosexual parents.”).
To allow same-sex couples to adopt children and then to label their families
as second-class because the adoptive parents are of the same sex is cruel as well as
unconstitutional. Classifying some families, and especially their children, as of
lesser value should be repugnant to all those in this nation who profess to believe
in “family values.” In any event, Idaho and Nevada’s asserted preference for
opposite-sex parents does not, under heightened scrutiny, come close to justifying
unequal treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.
Thus, we need not address the constitutional restraints the Supreme Court
has long imposed on sex-role stereotyping, which may provide another potentially
persuasive answer to defendants’ theory. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (explaining
that justifications which “rely on overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females” are inadequate to survive
heightened scrutiny); see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979)
(rejecting the claim that “any universal difference between maternal and paternal
relations at every phase of a child’s development” justified sex-based distinctions
in adoption laws). We note, in addition, that defendants have offered no probative
evidence in support of their “complementarity” argument.
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IV.
Both the Idaho defendants and the Coalition advance a few additional
justifications, though all are unpersuasive.16 First, they argue that the population of
each state is entitled to exercise its democratic will in regulating marriage as it sees
fit. Each state “has an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic
relations reflect the widely held values of its people.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). True enough. But a primary purpose of
the Constitution is to protect minorities from oppression by majorities. As Windsor
itself made clear, “state laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must
respect the constitutional rights of persons.” 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (citing Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). Thus, considerations of federalism cannot carry the
day for defendants. They must instead rely on the substantive arguments that we
find lacking herein.
Second, defendants argue that allowing same-sex couples to marry would
threaten the religious liberty of institutions and people in Idaho and Nevada.

16

None of the arguments advanced by other states in defense of their bans is
any more persuasive. In particular, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that states
may not “go slow” in extending to same-sex couples the right to marry; “it is
sufficiently implausible that allowing same-sex marriage would cause palpable
harm to family, society, or civilization to require the state to tender evidence
justifying [if not proving] its fears; it has provided none.” Baskin, 2014 WL
4359059, at *16–17.
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Whether a Catholic hospital must provide the same health care benefits to its
employees’ same-sex spouses as it does their opposite-sex spouses, and whether a
baker is civilly liable for refusing to make a cake for a same-sex wedding, turn on
state public accommodations law, federal anti-discrimination law, and the
protections of the First Amendment.17 These questions are not before us. We
merely note that avoiding the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws that “serv[e]
compelling state interests of the highest order” cannot justify perpetuation of an
otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory marriage regime. Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (citation omitted).
Third, the Coalition argues that Nevada’s ban is justified by the state’s
interest in protecting “the traditional institution of marriage.”18 Modern marriage

17

See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. 2012)
(holding that a wedding photographer was liable for discrimination against a samesex couple under state public accommodations law, and that this law did not violate
the First Amendment), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). Nevada law currently
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in public accommodations,
while Idaho law does not. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 651.050(3), 651.070; Dan Popkey,
Idaho doesn’t protect gays from discrimination, but Otter says that does not make
the state anti-gay, Idaho Statesman (Feb. 23, 2014).
We note also that an increasing number of religious denominations do
sanctify same-sex marriages. Amicus Brief of Bishops of the Episcopal Church in
Idaho et al. 8–9. Some religious organizations prohibit or discourage interfaith and
interracial marriage, but it would obviously not be constitutional for a state to do
so. Amicus Brief of the Anti-Defamation League et al. 23–25.
18

This argument was not advanced to this Court by the Idaho defendants.
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regimes, however, have evolved considerably; within the past century, married
women had no right to own property, enter into contracts, retain wages, make
decisions about children, or pursue rape allegations against their husbands. See
generally Claudia Zaher, When A Woman's Marital Status Determined Her Legal
Status: A Reserach Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 Law
Libr. J. 459, 460–61 (2002) (“Under coverture, a wife simply had no legal
existence. She became . . . ‘civilly dead.’”). Women lost their citizenship when
they married foreign men. See Kristin Collins, When Father’s Rights Are Mothers’
Duties, 109 Yale L.J. 1669, 1686–89 (2000). (In fact, women, married or not, were
not allowed to serve on juries or even to vote. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 131–35 (1994).). Before no-fault divorce laws were enacted,
separated spouses had to fabricate adulterous affairs in order to end their
marriages. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 577–78 (2005). As
plaintiffs note, Nevada has been a veritable pioneer in changing these practices,
enacting (and benefitting economically from) laws that made it among the easiest
places in the country to get married and un-married. Both Idaho and Nevada’s
marriage regimes, as they exist today, bear little resemblance to those in place a
century ago. As a result, defendants cannot credibly argue that their laws protect a

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“traditional institution”; at most, they preserve the status quo with respect to one
aspect of marriage—exclusion of same-sex couples.
Certainly, the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is longstanding.
However, “it is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that marriage must
remain a heterosexual institution because that is what it historically has been.”
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 961 n.23 (Mass. 2003). The
anti-miscegenation laws struck down in Loving were longstanding. Here as there,
however, “neither history nor tradition [can] save [the laws] from constitutional
attack.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
V.
Idaho and Nevada’s marriage laws, by preventing same-sex couples from
marrying and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere,19
impose profound legal, financial, social and psychic harms on numerous citizens of
those states. These harms are not inflicted on opposite-sex couples, who may, if

19

Because we hold that Idaho and Nevada may not discriminate against
same-sex couples in administering their own marriage laws, it follows that they
may not discriminate with respect to marriages entered into elsewhere. Neither
state advances, nor can we imagine, any different—much less more
persuasive—justification for refusing to recognize same-sex marriages performed
in other states or countries.
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they wish, enjoy the rights and assume the responsibilities of marriage. Laws that
treat people differently based on sexual orientation are unconstitutional unless a
“legitimate purpose . . . overcome[s]” the injury inflicted by the law on lesbians
and gays and their families. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 481–82.
Defendants’ essential contention is that bans on same-sex marriage promote
the welfare of children, by encouraging good parenting in stable opposite-sex
families. Heightened scrutiny, however, demands more than speculation and
conclusory assertions, especially when the assertions are of such little merit.
Defendants have presented no evidence of any such effect. Indeed, they cannot
even explain the manner in which, as they predict, children of opposite-sex couples
will be harmed. Their other contentions are equally without merit. Because
defendants have failed to demonstrate that these laws further any legitimate
purpose, they unjustifiably discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and are
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The official message of support that Governor Otter and the Coalition wish
to send in favor of opposite-sex marriage is equally unconstitutional, in that it
necessarily serves to convey a message of disfavor towards same-sex couples and
their families. This is a message that Idaho and Nevada simply may not send.

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The lessons of our constitutional history are clear: inclusion strengthens,
rather than weakens, our most important institutions. When we integrated our
schools, education improved. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,
492–95 (1954). When we opened our juries to women, our democracy became
more vital. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535–37 (1975). When we
allowed lesbian and gay soldiers to serve openly in uniform, it enhanced unit
cohesion. See Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 n.11 (9th Cir. 2008).
When same-sex couples are married, just as when opposite-sex couples are
married, they serve as models of loving commitment to all.
The judgment of the district court in Latta v. Otter is AFFIRMED. The
judgment of the district court in Sevcik v. Sandoval is REVERSED, and the case is
REMANDED to the district court for the prompt issuance of an injunction
permanently enjoining the state, its political subdivisions, and its officers,
employees, and agents, from enforcing any constitutional provision, statute,
regulation or policy preventing otherwise qualified same-sex couples from
marrying, or denying recognition to marriages celebrated in other jurisdictions
which, if the spouses were not of the same sex, would be valid under the laws of
the state.
AFFIRMED REVERSED and REMANDED.
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Counsel
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Steven L. Olsen, Chief of Civil Litigation
Division, W. Scott Zanzig, Deputy Attorney General, and Clay R. Smith, Deputy
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Boise, Idaho, for DefendantAppellant Christopher Rich and Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant State of Idaho
Monte Neil Stewart (argued) and Daniel W. Bower, Stewart Taylor & Morris
PLLC, Boise, Idaho; Thomas C. Perry and Cally A. Younger, Office of the
Governor, Boise, Idaho, for Defendant-Appellant Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter
Deborah A. Ferguson (argued), The Law Office of Deborah A. Ferguson, PLLC,
Boise, Idaho; Craig Harrison Durham, Durham Law Office, PLLC, Boise, Idaho;
Shannon P. Minter and Christopher F. Stoll, National Center for Lesbian Rights,
San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Susan Latta, Traci Ehlers, Lori
Watsen, Sharene Watsen, Shelia Robertson, Andrea Altmeyer, Amber Beierle, and
Rachael Robertson
Tara L. Borelli (argued), Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Atlanta,
Georgia; Jon W. Davidson, Peter C. Renn, and Shelbi D. Day, Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Los Angeles, California; Carla Christofferson,
Dawn Sestito, Dimitri Portnoi, Melanie Cristol, and Rahi Azizi, O’Melveny &
Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California; Kelly H. Dove and Marek P. Bute, Snell &
Wilmer LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Beverly Sevcik, Mary
Baranovich, Antioco Carrillo, Theodore Small, Karen Goody, Karen Vibe, Fletcher
Whitwell, Greg Flamer, Mikyla Miller, Katrina Miller, Adele Terranova, Tara
Newberry, Caren Cafferata-Jenkins, Farrell Cafferata-Jenkins, Megan Lanz, Sara
Geiger
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, C. Wayne Howle, Solicitor General,
Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellee
Governor Brian Sandoval
Neil A. Rombardo, District Attorney, Randal R. Munn, Chief Deputy District
Attorney, Joseph L. Ward, Jr., Senior Deputy District Attorney, Carson City
District Attorney’s Office, Carson City, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellee Alan
Glover
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Monte Neil Stewart (argued), Craig G. Taylor, and Daniel W. Bower, Stewart
Taylor & Morris PLLC, Boise, Idaho, for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee Coalition
for the Protection of Marriage
Counsel for Amici
Shannon P. Minter, Christopher F. Stoll, and Samantha Ames, National Center for
Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae 13 Public Interest and
Legal Service Organizations
Michael L. Whitlock, Susan Baker Manning, Jared A. Craft, Sara Carian, John A.
Polito, and Erik Wilson, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici
Curiae 27 Employers and Organizations Representing Employers
Byron J. Babione, David Austin R. Nimocks, and James A. Campbell, Alliance
Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Amicus Curiae Alliance Defending
Freedom
Dean Robert Broyles, Western Center for Law & Policy, Escondido, California, for
Amicus Curiae Helen M. Alvare
Staci J. Pratt and Allen Lichtenstein, ACLU of Nevada Foundation, Las Vegas,
Nevada; Daniel M. Gluck and Lois K. Perrin, ACLU of Hawai’i Foundation,
Honolulu, Hawai’i, for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
of Nevada and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Hawai’i
Nathalie F.P. Gilfoyle, American Psychological Association, Washington D.C.;
Paul M. Smith, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae
American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and
National Association of Social Workers
Nathalie F.P. Gilfoyle, American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C.;
Paul M. Smith, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae
American Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers,
American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, American Psychoanalytic
Association, and Hawaii Psychological Association

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Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Jr., Mark A. Lightner, Andra Troy, and Andrew P. Meiser,
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae
American Sociological Association
Rocky C. Tsai, Samuel P. Bickett, and Rebecca Harlow, Ropes & Gray LLP, San
Francisco, California; Steven M. Freeman, Seth M. Marnin, and Michelle
Deutchman, Anti-Defamation League, New York, New York, for Amici Curiae
Anti-Defamation League, Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State, Bend the Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice, Central Conference of
American Rabbis, Global Justice Institute, Hadassah, the Women’s Zionist
Organization of America, Hindu American Foundation, Interfaith Alliance
Foundation, Japanese American Citizens League, Jewish Social Policy Action
Network, Keshet, Metropolitan Community Churches, More Light Presbyterians,
National Council of Jewish Women, Nehirim, People for the American Way
Foundation, Presbyterian Welcome, Reconcilingworks: Lutherans for Full
Participation, Reconstructionist Rabbinical College and Jewish Reconstructionist
Communities, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Society for
Humanistic Judaism, T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights, Women of
Reform Judaism, and Women’s League for Conservative Judaism
Rocky C. Tsai, Samuel P. Bickett, Rebecca Harlow, and Idin Kashefipour, Ropes
& Gray LLP, San Francisco, California; Steven M. Freeman, Seth M. Marnin, and
Michelle Deutchman, Anti-Defamation League, New York, New York; Eric Alan
Isaacson, Anti-Defamation League, San Diego, California, for Amici Curiae AntiDefamation League, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Bend
the Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice, Board of Trustees of the Pacific Central
District/Unitarian Universalist Association, Hadassah, the Women’s Zionist
Organization of America, Hindu American Foundation, Interfaith Alliance
Foundation, Interfaith Alliance Hawai’i, Japanese American Citizens League,
Keshet, National Council of Jewish Women, Metropolitan Community Churches,
More Light Presbyterians, Nehirim, Pacific Central District/Unitarian Universalist
Association, Pacific Southwest District/Unitarian Universalist Association, People
for the American Way Foundation, Reconcilingworks: Lutherans for Full
Participation, Religious Institute, Inc., Sikh American Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Society for Humanistic Judaism, South Asian Americans Leading
Together, Southern California Nevada Conference of the United Church of Christ,
T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights, Union for Reform Judaism, Central
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Conference of American Rabbis, Women of Reform Judaism, Unitarian
Universalist Association, Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community
Churches, and Women’s League for Conservative Judaism
Jyotin Hamid and Joseph Rome, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New
York, for Amicus Curiae Professor Carlos A. Ball
Daniel McNeel Lane, Jr., Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, San Antonio,
Texas; Jessica M. Weisel, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles,
California, for Amici Curiae Historians of Marriage Peter W. Bardaglio, Norma
Basch, Stephanie Coontz, Nancy F. Cott, Toby L. Ditz, Laura F. Edwards, Michael
Grossberg, Hendrik Hartog, Ellen Herman, Martha Hodes, Linda K. Kerber, Alice
Kessler-Harris, Elaine Tyler May, Serena Mayeri, Steve Mintz, Elizabeth Pleck,
Carole Shammas, Mary L. Shanley, Amy Dru Stanley, and Barbara Welke
Jerome C. Roth and Amelia L. B. Sargent, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, San
Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom,
et al.
Jeffrey S. Trachtman, Norman C. Simon, Jason M. Moff, Kurt M. Denk, and
Jessica N. Witte, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, New York, New York, for
Amici Curiae Bishops of the Episcopal Church in Idaho, General Synod of the
United Church of Christ, Mormons for Equality, Reconstructionist Rabbinical
Association, Reconstructionist Rabbinical College and Jewish Reconstructionist
Communities, Union for Reform Judaism, Unitarian Universalist Association,
Affirmation, Covenant Network of Presbyterians, Methodist Federation for Social
Action, More Light Presbyterians, Presbyterian Welcome, Reconciling Ministries
Network, Reconcilingworks: Lutherans for Full Participation, Religious Institute,
Inc., and 38 Faith Leaders in the State of Idaho
John C. Eastman, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Chapman University,
Orange, California; D. John Sauer, Clark & Sauer, LLC, for Amici Curiae Center
for Constitutional Jurisprudence and 27 Scholars of Federalism and Judicial
Restraint
Lynn D. Wardle, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Provo, Utah; Stephen Kent Ehat,
Lindon, Utah, for Amici Curiae Center for Urban Renewal and Education,
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Coalition of African-American Pastors USA, and Frederick Douglass Foundation,
Inc.
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Columbia Law School Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic,
New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae Columbia Law School Sexuality and
Gender Law Clinic
Holly Carmichael, San Jose, California, for Amicus Curiae Concerned Women for
America
Lawrence J. Joseph, Law Office of Lawrence J. Joseph, Washington, D.C., for
Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund
Katherine Keating and Robert Esposito, Bryan Cave LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Amicus Curiae Family Equality Council and Colage
K. Lee Marshall, Katherine Keating, Tracy Talbot, and Robert Esposito, Bryan
Cave LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae Family Equality Council,
Equality Hawaii Foundation, We Are Family, and Colage
Joanna L. Grossman, Hofstra Law School, Hempstead, New York; Marjory A.
Gentry, Arnold & Porter LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae Family
Law and Conflict of Laws Professors
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley, California; Courtney
Joslin, UC Davis School of Law, Davis, California; Laura W. Brill and Meaghan
L. Field, Kendall Brill & Klieger LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae
Family Law Professors
Elizabeth L. Deeley, Sarah E. Piepmeier, and Raghay Krishnapriyan, Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, for Amicus Curiae Gary J. Gates
Brad W. Seiling and Benjamin G. Shatz, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Los
Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae Gary J. Gates
Mary L. Bonauto, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Boston, Massachusetts,
for Amicus Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders
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Charles S. Limandri, Freedom of Conscience Defense Fund, Rancho Santa Fe,
California, for Amici Curiae Robert P. George, Sherif Girgis, and Ryan T.
Anderson
Nicholas M. O’Donnell, Sullivan & Worcester LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, for
Amicus Curiae GLMA - Health Professionals Advancing LGBT Equality
Lynn D. Wardle, Brigham Young University Law School, Provo, Utah, for Amici
Curiae Professors Alan J. Hawkins and Jason S. Carroll
Rita F. Lin and Sara Bartel, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, California,
for Amici Curiae Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Courtney Joslin, and 63 Other Family
Law Professors
Catherine E. Stetson, Erica Knievel-Songer, Mary Helen Wimberly, Madeline H.
Gitomer, Jenna N. Jacobson, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington D.C., for
Amicus Curiae Historians of Antigay Discrimination
Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Howard University School of Law Civil Rights
Clinic, Washington, D.C.; Brad W. Seiling and Benjamin G. Shatz, Manatt, Phelps
& Phillips, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae Howard University
School of Law Civil Rights Clinic
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General, and Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General,
Office of the Attorney General of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana; Luther Strange,
Attorney General, State of Alabama; Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, State
of Alaska; Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, State of Arizona; John Suthers,
Attorney General, State of Colorado; Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General,
State of Idaho; Timothy C. Fox, Attorney General, State of Montana; Jon Bruning,
Attorney General, State of Nebraska; E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General, State of
Oklahoma; Alan Wilson, Attorney General, State of South Carolina; Sean Reyes,
Attorney General, State of Utah, for Amici Curiae States of Indiana, Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina
and Utah
Robert H. Tyler and Jennifer L. Bursch, Advocates for Faith and Freedom,
Murrieta, California, for Amicus Curiae Institute for Marriage and Public Policy
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G. David Carter, Joseph P. Bowser, and Hunter T. Carter, Arent Fox LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Law Enforcement Officers, First Responders,
and Organizations
Stephen M. Crampton, Mary E. McAlister, and Mandi D. Campbell, Liberty
Counsel, Lynchburg, Virginia; Mathew D. Staver and Anita L. Staver, Liberty
Counsel, Orlando, Florida, for Amici Curiae Liberty Counsel
William C. Duncan, Marriage Law Foundation, Lehi, Utah, for Amicus Curiae
Marriage Law Foundation
Martha Coakley, Attorney General, Genevieve C. Nadeau, Assistant Attorney
General, and Jonathan B. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, Massachusetts; Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General of California, Sacramento, California; George Jepsen,
Attorney General of Connecticut, Hartford, Connecticut; Joseph R. Biden, III,
Attorney General of Delaware, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware;
Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington,
District of Columbia; Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois;
Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa; Janet T. Mills, Attorney
General of Maine, Augusta, Maine; Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of
Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland; Joseph A. Foster, Attorney General of New
Hampshire, Concord, New Hampshire; Gary K. King, Attorney General of New
Mexico, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New
York, New York, New York; Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General of Oregon,
Salem, Oregon; William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, Montpelier,
Vermont; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Washington, Olympia,
Washington, for Amici Curiae Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington
Gerard V. Bradley, Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana, for Amicus
Curiae Dr. Paul McHugh
Sherrilyn Ifill, Christina A. Swarns, Natasha M. Korgaonkar, and Ria Tabacco
Mar, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., New York, New York, for
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Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.
Bruce A. Wessel, Moez M. Kaba, C. Mitchell Hendy, and Brian Eggleston, Irell &
Manella LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae National and Western
States Women’s Rights Organizations
Marcia D. Greenberger and Emily J. Martin, National Women’s Law Center,
Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center, Gender
Justice, Legal Momentum, Legal Voice, National Association of Women Lawyers,
National Partnership for Women & Families, Southwest Women’s Law Center,
Women Lawyers Association of Michigan, Women’s Law Project, and Professors
of Law Associated with the Williams Institute
Marcia D. Greenberger, Emily J. Martin, and Cortelyou C. Kenney, National
Women’s Law Center, Washington, D.C.; David C. Codell, Williams Institute,
UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae National
Women’s Law Center, Williams Institute Scholars of Sexual Orientation and
Gender Law, and Women’s Legal Groups
Abbe David Lowell and Christopher D. Man, Chadbourne & Parke LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Outserve - SLDN and American Military
Partner Association
Kevin T. Snider, Pacific Justice Institute, Sacramento, California, for Amicus
Curiae Pacific Justice Institute
Jiyun Cameron Lee and Andrew J. Davis, Folger Levin LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Amicus Curiae Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays,
Inc.
Mark W. Mosier and Jennifer Schwartz, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Amici Curiae Political Science Professors
Abram J. Pafford, Pafford Lawrence & Childress PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
Amici Curiae Professors of Social Science
David Alan Robinson, North Haven, Connecticut, for Amicus Curiae David Alan
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Robinson
Alexander Dushku, R. Shawn Gunnarson, and Justin W. Starr, Kifton &
McConkie, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Amici Curiae United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops, National Association of Evangelicals, Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist
Convention, and Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod

9