State of Washington, et al v. Donald J. Trump, et al

Filing 149

Submitted (ECF) Amicus brief for review (by government or with consent per FRAP 29(a)). Submitted by Freedom Watch, Inc.. Date of service: 02/15/2017. [10320156] [17-35105] (Klayman, Larry) [Entered: 02/15/2017 09:18 AM]

CASE NO. 17-35105
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
Appellants
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT, et al.,
Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON,
CASE NO. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE FREEDOM WATCH, INC., IN
SUPPORT OF EN BANC REVIEW OF APPELLANTS-DEFENDANTS
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Larry Klayman, Esq.
FREEDOM WATCH, INC.
2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 345
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
February 15, 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

FRAP RULE 26.1 AND FRAP 29(a)(4)(E) DISCLOSURE STATEMENT v
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

vi

I.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

II.

ARGUMENT
A.
Appellee States Will Not Prevail on the Merits
B.
Standing
C.
President's Power To Regulate Entry Into The United States
is Clear And Almost Unlimited
D.
Courts May Not Look "Behind" The Clear Text
at Campaign Statements
E.
Straw-Man Argument Of Religious Discrimination
F.
Court Usurping Presidential Role: Executive Order Targets
"Failed states" Plus Terrorist Sponsor, Hostile Iran, Not Islam
G.
Non-Justiciable Political Question
H.
Severability of the Executive Order
I.
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) Did Not Repeal 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)
J.
Appellees Reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1152(A)(1)(A) Misplaced
K.
Irreparable Harm Supports The Executive Order,
Not The Appellees
L.
Court Should Consolidate Multi-District Litigation: Forum
Non Conveniens And Judge Shopping

5
5
6

III.

CONCLUSION

8
9
10
12
14
16
17
19
19
22
22

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 687-686 (9th Cir., 2006) ................... 18
Alaska Airlines, Inc v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-685, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987).. 17
Alexander v. Americans United Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 761-762, 94 S.Ct. 2053, 40 L.Ed.2d 518
(1974) ........................................................................................................................................ 20
Beacon Theaters, Inc v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) ....... 20
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago., 441 U.S. 677, 696-97, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ...... 18
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 887, 91 S.Ct. 128, 27 L.Ed.2d 140
(1970) .......................................................................................................................................... 6
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952) ................................................................... 9
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)........................................................................... 9
L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982) ............................... 7
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) ................................................................. 7
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012) .................................. 19
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) ........................................................ 10
Powell v. Cormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-519, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) ................... 15
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 537, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) ............................. 20
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) .................... 18
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953) .... 7
Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001) ........... 5
Texas v. United States of America, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. November 9, 2015)
(Appeal No. 15-40238) ..................................................................................................... 7
U.S. v. Alvarez-Hernandez, 478 F.3d 1060, 1065-1066 (9th Cir. 2007). ..................................... 18
United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1991) ........................................................... 18
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365,
172 L.Ed.2d 249, 555 U.S. 7, 77 USLW 4001 (2008)................................................. 5, 6
Zadvydas v. Davis Et Al., 533 U.S. 678 (2001) .............................................................................. 7
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84 (2015) ............................................. 8
Statutes
28 U.S. Code § 1391 ..................................................................................................................... 23
8 U.S. Code § 1182(f) ............................................................................................................... 9, 19
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) .............................................................................................. ii, 18, 19, 20

iii

8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) ................................................................................................................... 18, 20
8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) .................................................................................................................. 12
Article II ........................................................................................................................................ 23
Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ............................................................. 9
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)................................................................................................................... 6
FRAP Rule 29(a)(4)(E) ................................................................................................................... v
FRAP Rule 26.1 .............................................................................................................................. v

iv

FRAP RULE 26.1 AND FRAP 29(a)(4)(E)) DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Freedom Watch, Inc. is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization, with no
parent corporation and no publicly traded stock.
In compliance with Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") Rule
29(a)(4)(E), Freedom Watch, Inc. further states that this brief was authored by
counsel for Freedom Watch, without the involvement of counsel for any party in
this matter. No party or counsel for such party contributed money that was
intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. No person other than the
Amicus or its counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or
submitting this brief.

Dated: February 15, 2017

/s/ Larry Klayman
Larry Klayman
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
FREEDOM WATCH, INC.

v

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus Curiae Freedom Watch, Inc. hereby respectfully submits this brief to
assist the Court and the ends of justice pursuant to the FRAP Rule 29. 1 Counsel
for the Appellants and Appellees have graciously offered their consent to this filing
and therefore pursuant to FRAP Rule 29 and Circuit Rule 29, on the direction of
said rules, a separate motion for leave to file this brief is not required.
Freedom Watch is a public interest group dedicated to preserving freedom,
pursuing individual rights and civil liberties, preserving the rule of law and public
confidence in the courts, and fighting for ethics in government and the judicial
system, as well as investigating and prosecuting government corruption and abuse.
As part of its goal to remain constant to the principles of the Founding Fathers,
Freedom Watch is dedicated to ensuring the rights of all citizens through action,
frequently with legal cases and other means.
Previously, Freedom Watch filed an Amicus Curiae brief before the U.S.
Supreme Court in a related case, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. __, 132 S.Ct.
2492 (2012) which addressed some of the legal issues and considerations
implicated here. Similarly, Freedom Watch filed Amicus Curiae briefs before the
U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas

The brief was amended and shortened somewhat on the Clerk's direction as
to format and a new Section D has been added ahead of approval being granted.
1

vi

in Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), and brought a parallel
case Arpaio v. Obama , in a petition before the U.S. Supreme Court as Case No.
15-643, including a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court

concerning somewhat similar issues regarding President Barack Obama's authority
to disregard federal law on immigration by Executive Order.
With the majority of the country's citizens demanding the integrity of the
rule of law, enforcement of our nation's immigration laws, protection of the
country's borders, and defense of their families, communities, and nation against
terrorist threats, Freedom Watch is required to speak on behalf of those unable to
do so. As such, consistent with its mission, Freedom Watch seeks to provide the
means and mechanism to protect American citizens’ rights in this matter of great
public interest and to uphold our constitutional system of separation of powers and
the rule of law.

vii

I.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
"[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of
individual rights, it is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160, 83 S.Ct. 554, 563,
9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). The Constitution's due process
guarantees call for no more than what has been accorded
here: a statement of reasons and an opportunity for a
prompt postrevocation hearing.

Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 310, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)
(emphases added); Accord, Kennedy v. Rusk v. Cort, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9
L.Ed.2d 644 (1963).
This Court and the nation have been dragged into a constitutional crisis at
break-neck speed, while leaving the nation unprotected from infiltration by
terrorists. On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an Executive
Order "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States," ("Executive Order"), 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, attached as Exhibit A.
"We want to ensure that we are not
admitting into our country the very threats
our soldiers are fighting overseas."
-- Verbal statement by the President Trump, upon signing the Executive Order
officially announcing its purpose.2
Amicus Curiae Freedom Watch respectfully offers its analysis for the benefit

2

Ken Thomas, "Trump Orders Strict New Refugee Screening, Citing
Terrorists," Associated Press, January 27, 2017, accessible at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/889887c9c328423b955920f4d7465e54/trumpexpected-sign-directive-halting-refugee-flows-us

of this Court pursuant to FRAP Rule 29.
Now before the Court is Appellants' motion for a stay of the Temporary
Restraining Order ("TRO") from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Washington ("District Court.") Appellants seek a stay of a stay. But defects in the
TRO demonstrate that the TRO should be stayed, being deficient on the merits.
En Banc review is warranted of the Per Curiam Order on February 9, 2017,
of a three-judge panel ("Panel") of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
("Ninth Circuit"). The Panel has restrained the core, constitutionally-established
role of the President of the United States as head of the nation's foreign policy,
international relations, national security, national defense, commander-in-chief,
and head of the executive branch.
First, the Appellees do not have standing under parens patriae. Despite
claiming that public universities are agencies of their States, the universities are
actually claiming temporary inconvenience by others, not themselves. Further, as
the Panel admits, the Executive Order provides for a waiver. Anyone affected who
is not a threat to the country may receive a waiver. According to news reports,
everyone detained in transit has already received such a waiver.
Also, in this constitutional crisis, unfolding at astonishing and dangerous
speed, the courts have substituted their own national security judgments and
factual analyses in place of the President's and the Congress' unique authority

2

under the Constitution. Specifically, to balance the harms for the TRO, the
Honorable James L. Robart and the Panel decided for themselves that seven failed
states -- hot beds of terrorism and lacking trustworthy records -- do not represent
any real danger to U.S. families and communities. Such military, foreign policy,
and national security analysis is not within the capabilities of the courts. The
President is briefed by an extensive system of intelligence agencies.3 This Court
does not have regular access to those intelligence resources.
Moreover, the District Court and Panel were in error: Judge Robart
inaccurately argued in the hearing that no terrorist attack had -- so far -- resulted
from aliens entering from the seven failed states and Iran.4 First, this demonstrates
the lack of expertise of the courts. Aliens from the world's seven most dangerous
countries may recruit for, train, incite, finance, organize, support, plan, and help
implement terrorist attacks regardless of whether they personally deliver the bomb.
The Panel erroneously assumed that terrorist threats are presented only by those
who push the button. 5

3

Justin Fishel and John Santucci, "Trump Receives 1st Presidential Daily
Brief," ABC News, November 15, 2016, accessible at:
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-receives-presidentialdaily/story?id=43554271
4
Regrettably, Appellants' counsel stated he was unprepared to address the
question on short notice. A slower, more-circumspect examination of these issues
is necessary.
5
Jessica Vaughn, "Study Reveals 72 Terrorists Came From Countries
Covered by Trump Vetting Order," Center for Immigration Studies, February 11,
3

Second, the claim is false:
Since 9/11, 72 individuals from the seven mostly Muslim countries
covered by President Trump's "extreme vetting" executive order
have been convicted of terrorism, bolstering the administration's
immigration ban. According to a report out Saturday, at least 17
claimed to be refugees from those nations, three came in as
"students," and 25 eventually became U.S. citizens.6
Thus, the balance of the equities and harms cannot sustain a TRO.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit en banc should dismiss the case by the
Appellees as a non-justiciable "political question." The District Court lacks Article
III jurisdiction, and dismissal is mandatory. The question is textually committed to
the President and the Congress, and there are no legally-cognizable standards
available for a court to apply in substituting a court's judgment on national security
threats in place of the Commander-in-Chief's judgment.
Moreover, neither the Appellees nor the foreign college students they
complain for will suffer irreparable harm. Financial loss is, by definition,
recoverable. However, loss of life from a terrorist attack is the very essence of
irreparable harm. The Panel ignored the irreparable harm from terrorist attacks and
erroneously found irreparable harm that is compensable by money damages.

2017, accessible at: http://cis.org/vaughan/study-reveals-72-terrorists-camecountries-covered-trump-vetting-order
6
Paul Bedard, "Report: 72 convicted of terrorism from 'Trump 7' mostly
Muslim countries," The Washington Examiner, February 11, 2017, accessible at:
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/report-72-terrorists-came-from-7-muslimcountries-trump-targeted/article/2614582
4

II.

ARGUMENT
A. APPELLEE STATES WILL NOT PREVAIL ON THE MERITS
Appellants seek a stay of a stay (TRO). Appellants' request for a stay of the

TRO must meet the requirements for an injunction, stay, or TRO. Appellants must
show that they have a substantial likelihood of success in vacating the TRO.
But where the February 3, 2017, TRO is fatally flawed, which it is, the
Appellants are likely to prevail in vacating it, because of its flaws. Flaws in the
TRO establish that the Appellants are entitled to a stay of the deficient TRO.
The TRO is fatally flawed because it does not even attempt to show that the
Plaintiff States have any chance of succeeding in their lawsuit in the end. To
obtain a TRO, the Appellees must have established (1) a likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) that irreparable harm is likely in the absence of preliminary relief;
(3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant's favor; and 4) that an injunction
is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129
S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); Stuhlbarg Int’l
Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as
of right. Munaf, 553 U.S., at 689-690, 128 S.Ct., at 2218–2219. In
each case, courts “must balance the competing claims of injury and
must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding
of the requested relief.” Amoco Production Co., 480 U.S., at 542, 107
S.Ct. 1396. “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity
should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing
the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S.,
5

at 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798; see also Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. at 24.
B. STANDING
As the Panel stated in its Per Curiam Order page 8:
We have an independent obligation to ascertain our jurisdiction,
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), and we consider
the Government’s argument de novo, see, e.g., Hajro v. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir.
2016). We conclude that the States have made a sufficient showing to
support standing, at least at this preliminary stage of the proceedings.
First, even though the Appellees argue that public universities are agencies
of the Plaintiff States, nevertheless they are still claiming the interests of others
inconvenienced in traveling to the universities.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed.
1078, the Court held a State lacked standing to challenge, as parens
patriae, a federal grant-in-aid program under which the Federal
Government was allegedly usurping powers reserved to the States. It
was said in Mellon:
'[T]he citizens of Massachusetts are also citizens of the United
States. It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may
institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States
from the operation of the statutes thereof. While the State, under some
circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its
citizens (Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241, 21 S.Ct. 331, 45
L.Ed. 497), it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in
respect of their relations with the Federal Government.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 887, 91 S.Ct. 128, 27
L.Ed.2d 140 (1970) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).

6

A “State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against
the Federal Government” on behalf of its citizens. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v.
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982) (emphasis added);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). Also, Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), involved allegations that Massachusetts was losing land
along its coastline to rising oceans. 549 U.S. at 522. The Court deemed it “of
critical importance” that Congress had authorized the exact type of challenge the
State brought. Id. at 516.
Those affected are the United States' citizens as well as the States'. Even a
noted case on amnesty for illegal aliens, Texas v. United States, agrees:
The court also considered but ultimately did not accept the
notions that Texas could sue as parens patriae on behalf of
citizens facing economic competition from DAPA
beneficiaries and that the state had standing based on the
losses it suffers generally from illegal immigration.
Texas v. United States of America, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. November 9, 2015)
(Appeal No. 15-40238).
Second, aliens cannot have standing in U.S. courts for the denial of rights
they do not have. Since no one has a right to enter the United States who is not a
U.S. citizen, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct.
625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953); Zadvydas v. Davis Et Al., 533 U.S. 678 (2001), aliens
kept out have suffered no legal damages because they have no right of entry.
Third, any alien who is not a terrorist threat is eligible for a waiver. As the
7

Per Curiam Order admits on page 4:
Sections 3(g) and 5(e) of the Executive Order allow the Secretaries of
State and Homeland Security to make case-by-case exceptions to
these provisions “when in the national interest.” 82 Fed. Reg. 8,97880. Section 5(e) states that situations that would be in the national
interest include “when the person is a religious minority in his country
of nationality facing religious persecution.” 82 Fed. Reg. 8,979. The
Executive Order requires the Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security and the Director of National Intelligence to evaluate the
United States’ visa, admission, and refugee programs during the
periods in which entry is suspended. 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977-80.
Anyone who is not a threat is not harmed because they can receive a waiver.
Note that the waiver provides due process: notice and a hearing.
C. PRESIDENT'S POWER TO REGULATE ENTRY INTO THE
UNITED STATES IS CLEAR AND ALMOST UNLIMITED
As is now well-known, we start with the congressional legislation that
confirms the President’s authority in 8 U.S. Code § 1182(f), Section 212(f) of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act:
(f) Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or
of any class of aliens into the United States would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by
proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary,
suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as
immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens
any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.
And, of course, even without the benefit of legislation, the President has
inherent constitutional authority over foreign policy. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84 (2015). Of course that power is at its

8

zenith when Congress by statute has agreed by legislation, as is true here.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). see also, e.g.,
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952) (recognizing that control
over immigration is an integral part of Article II authorities “in regard to the
conduct of foreign relations [and] the war power”).
Yet the Panel completely ignored the statute that gives the President the
clear and unfettered authority to issue the Executive Order under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(f). In fact, the Panel was effectively trying to enjoin the statute, not the
Executive Order.
D. COURTS MAY NOT LOOK "BEHIND" THE CLEAR TEXT AT
CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS
The Appellees claims are foreclosed by Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 762 (1972), which is logically identical. Like the universities here, plaintiffs
invited an avowed communist so that they could hear his lectures:
We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on
the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will
neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by
balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of
those who seek personal communication with the applicant.
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769-770 (emphasis added). And furthermore:
The case, therefore, comes down to the narrow issue whether the First
Amendment confers upon the appellee professors, because they wish
to hear, speak, and debate with Mandel in person, the ability to
determine that Mandel should be permitted to enter the country or, in

9

other words, to compel the Attorney General to allow Mandel's
admission.
Id.
It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unadmitted and nonresident
alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country as a
nonimmigrant or otherwise. United States ex rel. Turner v.
Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292, 24 S.Ct. 719, 723, 48 L.Ed. 979
(1904); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
542, 70 S.Ct. 309, 312, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 530—532, 74 S.Ct. 737, 742—743, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954);
see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592, 72 S.Ct. 512,
520, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952).”
408 U.S. at 762. Moreover:
“It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that
foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any
domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been
admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to
enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the
legislative and executive branches of the national government. As
to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative
officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are
due process of law.”12 (emphasis added).
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (emphasis in original).
Thus, although the Appellees have ripped President Trump's campaign
statements out of context, only the clear text of the Executive Order may be
considered. The President has presented "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason" within his core authority of national security. That is conclusive.
E. STRAW-MAN ARGUMENT OF RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Appellees would have us believe that the Trump Administration seeks to
10

discriminate against Muslims -- but only for 90 days -- and then only from the
world's seven most dangerous countries in terms of terrorism. Of the world's 49
Muslim-majority countries,7 the Executive Order leaves 42 unaffected. 8
The Muslim nation of Kuwait has also banned entry into Kuwait from five
(5) of the same seven (7) countries.9 The issue is the risk of terrorism, not religion.
Most Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East have accepted zero -none -- of these affected refugees.10 Even fabulously-wealthy Muslim-majority
nations like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates refuse to trust these
Muslim refugees into their own countries,11 where they share common languages,

"Muslim-Majority Countries Comprising the Islamic World," Center for the
Education of Women, University of Michigan, accessible at:
http://www.cew.umich.edu/muslim_majority ; The Pew Research Center identifies
49 countries: "The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Muslim-Majority
Countries," Pew Research Center, January 27, 2011, accessible at:
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-populationmuslim-majority/
8
Counts vary as 49 to 51 or 52 Muslim-majority nations by various reports.
9
"After Trump, Now Kuwait Bans 5 Muslim-Majority Countries, Including
Pakistan," NDTV, February 2, 2017, accessible at: http://www.ndtv.com/worldnews/kuwait-bans-5-muslim-majority-countries-including-pakistan-1655311
10
Richard Pollock, "Persian Gulf Muslim States Have Accepted No Syrian
Refugees," Daily Caller, November 24, 2015, accessible at:
http://dailycaller.com/2015/11/24/persian-gulf-muslim-states-have-accepted-nosyrian-refugees/
11
Ishaan Tharoor, "The Arab World’s Wealthiest Nations Are Doing Next to
Nothing for Syria’s Refugees," The Washington Post, September 4, 2015,
accessible at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/04/the-arabworlds-wealthiest-nations-are-doing-next-to-nothing-for-syriasrefugees/?utm_term=.b13685bd30b6
7

11

cultures, social structures, familiar social support institutions, food, methods, and
religions, because of the risk of letting terrorists into their countries.
As now-President Trump stated on the campaign trail, as reported by CNN:
"I LOVE THE MUSLIMS. I THINK THEY'RE GREAT PEOPLE," 12
proclaimed candidate Donald Trump. Further: "They [townhall attendees] asked
whether the billionaire businessman would consider putting a Muslim in his
Cabinet or on his ticket. 'Oh, absolutely, no problem with that.' Trump
responded. 'Would I consider putting a Muslim-American in my Cabinet?
Absolutely no problem with that.'"13
Appellees ripped Trump's campaign statements out of context. Clearly,
Trump was referring, if very loosely, to Syrian refugees, which was the topic.
F. COURT USURPING PRESIDENTIAL ROLE: EXECUTIVE
ORDER TARGETS "FAILED STATES" PLUS TERRORIST
SPONSOR, HOSTILE IRAN, NOT ISLAM
The Executive Order suspended entry into the country of aliens from Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Of course, terrorist ISIS stands
for "the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria." Thus, 2 of the 7 are nations in which the
United States is actively in a hot war with ISIS right now. As the Panel admits at

12

MJ Lee and Noah Gray, "Trump to CNN: 'I love the Muslims,'" CNN,
September 20, 2015, accessible at:
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/19/politics/donald-trump-muslimscontroversy/index.html
13
Id.
12

pages 3-4 of its Per Curiam Order:
It asserts, “Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war,
strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists
will use any means possible to enter the United States. The United
States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that
those approved for admission do not intend to harm Americans and
that they have no ties to terrorism.” Id.
The Executive Order covers only those countries identified, during the
Obama Administration, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12). Trump ordered
(emphasis added):
I hereby proclaim that the immigrant and nonimmigrant
entry into the United States of aliens from countries
referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
1187(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the United
States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons
for 90 days from the date of this order (excluding those
foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, C-2 visas for travel to
the United Nations, and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 visas).
The Appellees misrepresent this case as being about religion, and even if it
were this is irrelevant, as there is not right for foreign aliens of any race, religion,
ethnicity, national origin or sexual preference to enter the United States, if he or
she is not a citizen or permanent resident.
The seven countries are selected not because they are Muslim, but because
those "failed states" are in chaos (and Iran is implacably hostile and a state sponsor
of terrorism), such that documents and records related to a person seeking entry

13

into the United States cannot be trusted. Records about potential entrants
necessary to investigate and screen entrants for national security purposes are
either non-existent or incomplete or worse commonly forged or falsified due to
rampant corruption of officials, poverty-stricken bureaucrats, threats of violence or
intimidation against bureaucrats, or terrorist infiltration of governments. 14
Governmental records, police reports, identity papers, etc., from the seven
nations are easily forged or official governmental records falsified.15 Even the
starting point of a refugee's actual identity is unreliable.16

Testimony of Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly, Homeland
Security Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, April 7, 2017, accessible on
C-SPAN at: https://www.c-span.org/video/?423321-1/homeland-securitysecretary-john-kelly-testifies-us-border-security&live
15
Chuck Ross, " FBI Director Admits US Can’t Vet All Syrian Refugees For
Terror Ties [VIDEO]," The Daily Caller, accessible at:
http://dailycaller.com/2015/10/21/fbi-director-admits-us-cant-vet-all-syrianrefugees-for-terror-ties-video/; Jerry Markon, "Senior Obama officials have
warned of challenges in screening refugees from Syria," The Washington Post,
November 17, 2015, accessible at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federaleye/wp/2015/11/17/senior-obama-officials-have-warned-of-challenges-inscreening-refugees-from-syria/?utm_term=.bc0746040762
16
Id.; Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation James Comey stated:
“We can query our databases until the cows come home, but nothing will show up
because we have no record of that person…You can only query what you have
collected.” And: FBI Assistant Director Michael Steinbach said that “the concern
in Syria is that we don’t have the systems in places on the ground to collect the
information… All of the data sets, the police, the intel services that normally you
would go and seek that information [from], don’t exist.” Kelly Riddell, "FBI
director warns of coming “terrorist diaspora,” as Democrats push for more Syrian
refugees," The Washington Times, September 28, 2016, accessible at:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/28/james-comey-warns-comingterrorist-diaspora-democr/
14

14

G. NONJUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTION
Several ingredients necessary to the TRO analysis are political questions
which are non-justiciable: Whether there is irreparable harm, the balance of
equities (harm), the supposed motivation, and whether the threats of terrorism
justify inconvenience to aliens depend upon whether the courts should usurp the
authority of the President and the Congress over international relations, foreign
policy, national security, and the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.
It is well established that the federal courts will not adjudicate
political questions. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59
S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918). In Baker v. Carr, supra,
we noted that political questions are not justiciable primarily because
of the separation of powers within the Federal Government. After
reviewing our decisions in this area, we concluded that on the surface
of any case held to involve a political question was at least one of the
following formulations:
'a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a co-ordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.' 369 U.S., at 217, 82 S.Ct., at 710.
Powell v. Cormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-519, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969)

15

Under the political question doctrine, the District Court lacks Article III
jurisdiction, and dismissal is mandatory. The question is textually committed under
our nation's Constitution to the President and the Congress, and there are no
legally-cognizable standards available for a court to apply in substituting a court's
judgment on national security threats in place of the Commander-in-Chief's
judgment. The courts are not a forum in which competing litigants can present
their preferred excerpts from classified intelligence briefings and the court can
render a decision on whether a threat of terrorism does or does not rise to the level
of constituting irreparable harm by entrants from this or that country.
The TRO directly cripples the President's core constitutional roles in areas
and in ways that courts are not qualified to second guess by courtroom debates
over classified intelligence reports.
H. SEVERABILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
The Panel was concerned about the role of the Judiciary in rewriting
the Executive Order.
Arguably, as the Appellants contend, the Executive Order does not
apply on its terms to so-called green card owners or lawful permanent
residents. Since it is doubtful that the Executive Order was ever intended to
apply to those persons at all, it is possible to sever consideration of those
persons from the rest of the Executive Order.

16

Similarly, can holders of existing visas be severed from the remainder?
By way of analogy to statutes, where there are few precedents on executive
orders, this Executive Order is severable when:
"[A] court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than
is necessary. . . . '[W]henever an act of Congress contains
unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be
unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and to
maintain the act in so far as it is valid.' " Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 652, 104 S.Ct. 3262 3268, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (plurality
opinion), quoting El Paso & Northeastern R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215
U.S. 87, 96, 30 S.Ct. 21, 24, 54 L.Ed. 106 (1909). The standard for
determining the severability of an unconstitutional provision is well
established: " 'Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of
that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is
fully operative as a law.' " Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108, 96 S.Ct.
612, 677, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam ), quoting Champlin
Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210,
234, 52 S.Ct. 559, 564, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932). Accord: Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U.S., at 653, 104 S.Ct., at 3269; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S., at
931-932, 103 S.Ct., at 2773-2774; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 585, 88 S.Ct. 1209 1218, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968).
Alaska Airlines, Inc v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-685, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d
661 (1987).
I. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) DID NOT REPEAL 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)
The Appellees hang their case on seeking to undercut 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) by

setting up a conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), as tying the President's
hands.17 Whereas 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) explicitly names the President as having

Amicus Curiae has not found appellate precedents interpreting 18 U.S.C. §
1182(f) -- only unrelated cases involving § 1182(a).
17

17

authority, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) does not address the President's authority.
However, a repeal or partial repeal should not be lightly assumed.
It is well settled, however, that repeals by implication are
not favored, see, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189, 98
S.Ct. 2279 2299, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978), and will not be
found unless an intent to repeal is " 'clear and manifest.' "
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198, 60 S.Ct.
182, 188, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939) (quoting Red Rock v. Henry,
106 U.S. 596, 602, 1 S.Ct. 434, 439, 27 L.Ed. 251 (1883)).
Nothing in the language of these two provisions suggests
the existence of the " ' "irreconcilable conflict," ' " Kremer
v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468, 102
S.Ct. 1883 1890, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (citations omitted),
from which an intent to repeal may be inferred.
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987)
Moreover, the federal courts recognize well-established rules harmonizing
interpretation of amendments or subsequent enactments.
[W]e presume that Congress is aware of the legal context in which
it is legislating. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago., 441 U.S. 677,
696-97, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ("It is always
appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other
citizens, know the law. . . ."); United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d
398, 403 (9th Cir.1991) ("Congress is, of course, presumed to
know existing law pertinent to any new legislation it enacts.").
Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 687-686 (9th Cir., 2006)
"We also 'presume that when Congress amends a statute, it is
knowledgeable about judicial decisions interpreting the prior
legislation,' Porter v. Bd. of Trs. of Manhattan Beach Unified
Sch. Dist., 307 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002) ....
U.S. v. Alvarez-Hernandez, 478 F.3d 1060, 1065-1066 (9th Cir. 2007).
18

Therefore, we must interpret the later-enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) as

consistent with the President's authority under 8 U.S. Code § 1182(f). Congress
did not intend to retract any authority from the President to conduct foreign policy.
At least we must presume so under rules of statutory construction.
J. APPELLEES' RELIANCE ON 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) MISPLACED

Or perhaps, as was the case in Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417, 429, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998),
the statutory context makes that intention clear, because any
other reading of “individual” would lead to an “ ‘absurd’ ”
result Congress could not plausibly have intended.
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012)
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) places both national origin and religion on the
same footing. It would lead to an absurd result -- which must be avoided -- to
interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) as prohibiting the President from basing his
actions under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) on national origin (like religion). So, it would
produce an "absurd result" to interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) as limiting the
President's 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) authority.
Moreover, subparagraph § 1152(a)(1)(A) concerns the allocation of
immigration among various countries, not the power of the President.
K. IRREPARABLE HARM SUPPORTS THE EXECUTIVE
ORDER, NOT THE APPELLEES
The Appellees cannot show irreparable harm or even any legally-cognizable
19

harm, including because the Executive Order and surrounding law allows each
potential visitor, entrant, or immigrant to obtain an individual, case-by-case waiver
(quoted in Section B, supra). Apparently 100% of all affected travelers have in fact
received waivers.18
As the Panel admits on Page 10 of the Per Curiam Order: "The University
of Washington has already incurred the costs of visa applications for those interns
and will lose its investment if they are not admitted." The loss of an "investment"
or "costs" are not irreparable harm. Therefore, the TRO must fail.
The definition of irreparable harm is that there is no adequate remedy at law.
See, generally, Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed
("Irreparable Damage"); Alexander v. Americans United Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 761762, 94 S.Ct. 2053, 40 L.Ed.2d 518 (1974); Beacon Theaters, Inc v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500, 507, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,
537, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) (rendered obsolete on a different issue
not relevant here). Irreparable harm must be an injury that cannot be compensated
by money damages.
On the other side of the balance of harm, there is irreparable harm to the
national security of the United States. The presidential finding in the Executive
"Travelers Detained Due To Trump Travel Ban Released, Attorneys Say,"
January 28, 2017, CBS News Chicago Channel 2, accessible at:
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2017/01/28/travelers-detained-due-to-trump-travelban-released-attorneys-say/
18

20

Order is that the recent status quo of lax foreign policy, lax enforcement and a
careless lack of concern for the safety of the American people has increasingly
spawned death, violence, and destruction on U.S. soil in recent years. Actual
recent terrorist attacks in San Bernadino, California,19 Boston, Massachusetts,20
Orlando, Florida, and Garland, Texas, 21 and Ft. Lauderdale International Airport22
in addition to earlier incidents such as the first and second terrorist attacks at the
World Trade Center on February 26, 1993 and September, 11, 2001.
Thus, the danger to the national security clearly outweighs temporary delays
in travel by persons from the world's seven most dangerous countries in terms of
terrorist activity directed against the United States.

Michael S. Schmidt and Richard Perez-Pena, "F.B.I. Treating San
Bernardino Attack as Terrorism Case," New York Times, December 4, 2015,
accessible at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamicstate.html
20
"Russia warned U.S. about Boston Marathon bomb suspect Tsarnaev:
report," Reuters, March 25, 2014, accessible at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-explosions-boston-congress-idUSBREA2P02Q20140326
21
Jim Sciutto, Pamela Brown, Paul Cruic, "ISIS claims responsibility for
Texas shooting but offers no proof," CNN, May 5, 2015, accessible at:
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/us/garland-texas-prophet-mohammed-contestshooting/; Jim Sciutto, Pamela Brown, Paul Cruic, CNN, May 5, 2015, accessible
at: http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/politics/texas-attack-terror-tweets/index.html
22
Greg Pallone, "FBI: Airport gunman traveled to Florida for massacre,"
Fox News Channel 13 of Orlando, Florida, January 7, 2017, accessible at:
http://www.mynews13.com/content/news/cfnews13/news/article.html/content/new
s/articles/cfn/2017/1/7/fort_lauderdale_airp.html
19

21

L. COURT SHOULD CONSOLIDATE MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION:
FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND JUDGE SHOPPING
According to news reports, lawsuits have been filed on this exact same topic
in many federal circuits. 23 Under the doctrines of forum non conveniens and
venue under 28 U.S. Code § 1391, the Appellees' case should be dismissed and
transferred to the District of Columbia. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981). The Defendants are all in the District of Columbia, along with most of the
evidence and witnesses. All of the events at issue occurred or are occurring in the
District of Columbia. All cases should be consolidated under 28 U.S. Code § 1407.
III.

CONCLUSION
The Appellees, Plaintiff States, have set up a constitutional crisis, crippling

the President of the United States as Commander in Chief and head of international
relations, from carrying out his Constitutional duties under Article II. The U.S.
Constitution was developed and ratified largely due to our Founders' realization
that in international relations and national defense a single national leader must be
free to act for the nation. This is obviously true for the presidency.
Emergency treatment and prompt action on these matters is appropriate.
Increasingly-frequent terrorist attacks have been occurring on U.S. soil in response
to the spread of radical Islamic terrorism and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq
Matt Pearce, "Trump has been sued more than 60 times since becoming
president: A partial survey," The New York Times, February 11, 2017, accessible
at: http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-trump-lawsuits-20170210-story.html
23

22

and Syria (ISIS) styling itself as the re-establishment of an Islamic Caliphate
dedicated, in the minds of ISIS, to conquer the entire Earth without exception.
The people who live and work in this circuit, no less than any other large
U.S. city as an inviting "soft target," primarily Jews and Christians, are in
imminent danger of sworn enemies of the United States of America, enemies who
believe in their own minds -- however much we might view things differently
ourselves -- that their eternal destiny is contingent upon their murder of Americans
to further their religious beliefs. In the case of Islam, this, according to the Quran,
is the elimination of “infidels” in the name of Allah.
The U.S. Government, of course, cares not why people want to kill us, only
that they do. The question is not religion but threats to the nation.
Even if the government focused on areas of high-risk concentrated in Islamic
affiliation based upon actual facts on the ground, this would obviously be
constitutional and legal. Some decades ago, Catholic versus Protestant violence
and actual terrorism in Northern Ireland presented a genuine danger.24 Many
would rightly say that the violence and terrorism did not represent either Catholic
or Protestant religious traditions, yet the violence was real all the same.
Now, wishing away the actual, fact-based high concentration of violence and

Bryan Coll, "Terror Returns to Northern Ireland," TIME Magazine, March
8, 2009, accessible at:
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1883723,00.html?iid=sr-link1
24

23

terrorism directed against the United States, Christians, and Jews does not
transform defending our families and our country against attacks into religious
discrimination. Discriminating between visitors who represent threats of violence
from those who are benign is one of the core duties of the President and the entire
U.S. Government. Terrorists attacking Americans keep insisting that they are
doing so in the name of Islam, and our hapless officials keep pretending otherwise.
Addressing threats where they are actually found is not religious discrimination.
Terrorist supporters and agents from the seven dangerous countries may not
be the gunmen or bombers who end up in the news. They may also be the ones
who train, recruit, equip, and finance others. Agent provocateurs who radicalize
home-grown terrorists are flooding into our country. All need to be thoroughly
vetted before they are permitted entry into the United States. The President’s
Executive Order merely places a temporary 90 day moratorium on immigration as
the new administration develops a truly functional means of this required vetting,
in the interests of national security.
Dated: February 15, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Larry Klayman, Esq.
Larry Klayman, Esq.
FREEDOM WATCH, INC.
2020 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.,
Suite 345
Washington, D.C. 20006
Telephone: [phone]
[e-mail]
24

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that service of the foregoing motion and proposed brief will
be delivered electronically on February 15, 2017, to counsel for Plaintiffs and
Defendants through the District’s Electronic Case Filing system.
/s/ Larry Klayman, Esq.
Larry Klayman, Esq.
FREEDOM WATCH, INC.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this brief is in Times New Roman in 14 point font size,
and totals 6,478 words, including the Statement of Interest of Amicus Curiae, in
keeping with FRAP 29 and Circuit Rules.
Pursuant to the Court's Supplemental Briefing Order of February 10, 2017,
the briefing on en banc review was set at 14,000 words, higher than the normal
4,200 words permitted by the rules typically. Following the rules' direction that an
Amicus Curiae brief be one-half of the number of words of a principal brief, the
Amicus Curiae understands that 7,000 words are available for its brief.
/s/ Larry Klayman, Esq.
Larry Klayman, Esq.
FREEDOM WATCH, INC.
CERTIFICATE OF FILING BY CONSENT
I hereby certify that counsel for the Appellees and Appellants have given
their consent in writing (by email) to the filing of this Amicus Curiae brief.
/s/ Larry Klayman, Esq.
Larry Klayman, Esq.
FREEDOM WATCH, INC.

26

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