Natl Assoc. of Independ. Labor v. FLRA
OPINION filed  (Pages: 3) for the Court by Judge Kavanaugh [11-1299]
USCA Case #11-1299
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Submitted April 18, 2012
Decided June 1, 2012
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT LABOR,
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,
On Petition for Review of an Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority
Neil C. Bonney was on the brief for petitioner.
Rosa M. Koppel, Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations
Authority, and David M. Shewchuk, Deputy Solicitor, were on
the brief for respondent.
Before: HENDERSON, TATEL, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: A Navy Supervisor of
Shipbuilding negotiated an agreement with two unions
regarding the allocation of parking spaces at a shipyard in
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USCA Case #11-1299
The agreement governed the parking
privileges not only of the employees represented by those two
unions, but also of employees represented by a third union
that was not a party to the agreement. Under the agreement,
employees represented by the two unions that were parties to
the agreement received priority in parking over employees
represented by the third union.
After the Supervisor
discovered that employees represented by the third union
would be left without any on-site parking, the Supervisor
decided not to implement the agreement. The two unions that
had negotiated the original agreement objected and filed
unfair labor practice charges with the Federal Labor Relations
Authority. The FLRA upheld the Supervisor’s decision. The
case is now before us on petition for review of the FLRA’s
decision. We deny the petition for review.
Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute, an agency generally may not repudiate an agreement
negotiated with a union representing agency employees. See
5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1), (5); see also American Federation of
Gov’t Employees, Local 2924 v. FLRA, 470 F.3d 375, 376-78
(D.C. Cir. 2006). But the FLRA “will not find an unlawful
repudiation where the agreement allegedly repudiated is
contrary to law.” National Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n, 60
F.L.R.A. 985, 986 (2005).
The question here, therefore, is whether the original
agreement was contrary to law.
Under the relevant
precedents, the original agreement was indeed contrary to law
because it governed the working conditions of employees in
another bargaining unit. See American Federation of Gov’t
Employees, Local 32 v. FLRA (AFGE), 110 F.3d 810, 815-16
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Dep’t of the Navy, Naval Aviation Depot,
Cherry Point, North Carolina v. FLRA (Cherry Point), 952
F.2d 1434, 1441-43 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also 5 U.S.C.
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USCA Case #11-1299
§ 7114(a)(1). In Cherry Point, which is the precedent most
on point, we specifically held that it “would be counter to
basic principles of labor law” for a labor agreement to
“define parking privileges not just for members of the
union’s bargaining unit, but also for members of other
bargaining units.” AFGE, 110 F.3d at 815 (summarizing
Cherry Point, 952 F.2d 1434). Here, too, the original
agreement between the two unions and the Supervisor defined
the parking privileges of members of another bargaining unit.
The agreement was thus contrary to law. Therefore, the
Supervisor properly refused to implement it, and the FLRA
properly upheld the Supervisor’s decision.
We deny the petition for review.
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