Weeks et al v. Wyeth, Inc. et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that Defendants Teva and Actavis's 191 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 8/3/2015. (kh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
DANNY WEEKS and
WYETH, INC., et al.,
CASE NO. 1:10-CV-602-WKW
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action is one in a long line of lawsuits alleging inadequate and illegal
conduct on the part of the various pharmaceutical companies that “innovated,
made, promoted, and sold” the prescription drug Reglan® or its generic
counterpart, Metoclopramide (“MCP”). (Doc. # 142, at 1.) Plaintiffs Danny and
Vicki Weeks contend that Mr. Weeks ingested MCP in accordance with a
prescription from his treating physician and developed a severe and incurable
neurological disorder as a result. The Weeks allege that his diagnosis is the
proximate result of Defendants Wyeth, Inc. (“Wyeth”),1 Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”),
As noted in the Weeks’s Amended Complaint, Pfizer acquired Wyeth in a cash and
stock merger on October 15, 2009. As a result of the merger, Pfizer acquired all of Wyeth’s
assets and assumed the full extent of Wyeth’s liabilities. Pfizer is named in the Amended
Complaint solely as the successor to Wyeth’s liability.
Schwarz Pharma, Inc. (“Schwarz”),2 Actavis Elizabeth, LLC, (“Actavis”), and
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA’s (“Teva”) dissemination of “inaccurate, misleading,
materially incomplete, false and/or otherwise inadequate information” concerning
the potential effects of exposure to Reglan/MCP. (Doc. # 142, at 8.) They bring
the following claims against each Defendant: strict liability (Count I); negligence
(Count II); breach of implied warranty (Count III); breach of express warranty
(Count IV); fraud by misrepresentation (Count V); fraud by concealment,
suppression, or omission of material facts (Count VI); failure to adequately warn
(Count VII); and loss of consortium (Count VIII).
Presently before the court is Defendants Teva and Actavis’s (“Generic
Defendants”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, in which they argue that the
Weeks’s claims against them are preempted by federal law. (Doc. # 191.) The
motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 191, 194, 197.) Upon consideration of the
parties’ arguments, the record, and the relevant case law, the court finds that the
Generic Defendants’ motion is due to be granted.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The
parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
Schwarz entered an Asset Purchase Agreement with Wyeth on December 27, 2001,
whereby Schwarz purchased the rights and liabilities associated with Reglan subject to an
The FDA approved Reglan® in 1980 as a short-term therapy3 for adults
suffering from gastroesophageal reflux who did not respond to conventional
therapy and to relieve the symptoms associated with acute and recurrent diabetic
gastric stasis. Simply put, Reglan® was designed to increase the speed at which
food travels through the digestive system. In 1985, pharmaceutical manufacturers
began producing MCP – a generic version of Reglan®. MCP is equivalent to
Reglan® in all therapeutically relevant aspects, including dosage, strength, and
Mr. Weeks’s physician prescribed him MCP in 2007, and he took the drug
for approximately two years. In 2009, Mr. Weeks was diagnosed with tardive
TD is a neurological disorder that commonly causes
“involuntary, repetitive movements of the extremities, or lip smacking, grimacing,
tongue protrusion, teeth grinding, rapid eye movements or blinking, puckering and
pursing of the lips, and/or impaired and involuntary movement of the fingers.”
(Doc. # 142, at 12.) Mr. Weeks suffers from one or more of these symptoms. At
present, there is no known cure for TD, and its effects rarely are reversible.
Reglan® was never approved for use longer than twelve weeks.
The Weeks allege that Mr. Weeks’s prolonged ingestion of MCP caused him
to develop TD. The active ingredient in MCP works to block the transfer of
dopamine within the brain, which in turn causes the brain to produce additional
dopamine receptors. Ultimately, prolonged MCP ingestion may lead the areas
within the brain that control movement to become hypersensitive to dopamine,
potentially resulting in the development of a neurological movement disorder.
“Studies have shown that up to 29% of patients who take [MCP] for several years
develop [TD].” PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011).
In the Amended Complaint, the Weeks allege that Defendants had actual
knowledge that the risk of developing TD or another neurological side effect from
long-term use of Reglan® or MCP was “approximately 100 times greater” than the
risk that Defendants disclosed to medical professionals. (Doc. # 142, at 13.) The
Weeks contend that Defendants failed to warn doctors and patients of the risks
associated with long-term use and even “encouraged long term use of the drug,”
concealing the drug’s “true risks and the true prevalence of side effects.” (Doc. #
142, at 13.) The Weeks assert that, had Mr. Weeks’s treating physician been
warned of the true risks of MCP, he would have adjusted the prescription to avoid
the risks associated with long-term use or not prescribed the drug at all.
This case has a lengthy and complex procedural history. The Weeks initially
brought suit in July 2010. The Brand-Name Defendants4 responded with a motion
to dismiss. In the motion, they argued that Mr. Weeks only ingested the generic
MCP, and accordingly, the Weeks could not maintain products-liability claims
against them as the manufacturers and sellers of Reglan®. On March 31, 2011, the
Brand-Name Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part.
The court held that to the extent the Weeks were seeking “to argue that the BrandName Defendants owed Mr. Weeks a duty to disclose information either about
Reglan or generic MCP, the Weeks’s claims must fail.”
(Doc. # 86, at 6.)
However, it was determined that the Brand-Name Defendants had not carried their
burden of persuading the court that the Brand-Name Defendants did not owe a duty
to disclose information about Reglan® to Mr. Weeks’s prescribing physician.
Shortly after it was determined that the Weeks’s claims would withstand the
motion to dismiss, the Brand-Name Defendants moved to stay the action to allow
the Eleventh Circuit to issue its opinion in Simpson v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 11-11197
(11th Cir.). The Brand-Name Defendants argued that Simpson presented the same
issue existing in this case – “namely, whether brand-name drug manufacturers can
be held liable for harm caused by a generic product manufactured and distributed
The Brand-Name Defendants are Wyeth, Pfizer, and Schwarz.
by an unrelated generic manufacturer. (Doc. # 87, at 1.) The Weeks opposed the
stay and moved to amend their complaint. On April 14, 2011, the motion to stay
In response to the denial, the Brand-Name Defendants moved the court to
certify the unresolved question to the Alabama Supreme Court. On August 25,
2011, the court granted the motion and certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Alabama: “Under Alabama law, may a drug company be held
liable for fraud or misrepresentation (by misstatement or omission), based on
statements it made in connection with the manufacture or distribution of a brandname drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury from a generic drug
manufactured and distributed by a different company?” (Doc. # 117.)
Before the Alabama Supreme Court responded to the certification request,
the Generic Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a response in opposition to
the Weeks’s motion to amend their complaint.
They argued that the recent
Supreme Court decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011),
established that federal law preempted state-tort law claims against generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers and that the Weeks’s motion to amend was an
unsuccessful attempt to plead around the Mensing holding. After a period of
briefing and the filing of supplemental authority, the Weeks were given leave to
amend their complaint and the Generic Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
newly amended complaint. On June 6, 2012, however, the court chose to stay the
entirety of the action until the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the certified
question. In light of the stay, the court also denied the pending motion to dismiss
with leave to refile upon the conclusion of the certification process.
On January 11, 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court issued its opinion on the
certified question. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that liability could
misrepresentations made in connection with the manufacture and sale of a brandname drug, by a plaintiff who was injured by the generic drug manufactured and
distributed by a different company. The Brand-Name Defendants, however, timely
moved for a rehearing, which the Alabama Supreme Court granted.
On August 15, 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court withdrew its January 11,
2013 opinion and issued a new opinion. Despite the issuance of a new opinion, the
Alabama Supreme Court’s legal determination largely was unchanged.
second time, it concluded that liability could extend to brand-name manufacturers
and developers for fraud or misrepresentations made in connection with the
manufacture and sale of a brand-name drug, by a plaintiff who was injured by the
generic drug manufactured and distributed by a different company. The BrandName Defendants again applied for a rehearing, but the Alabama Supreme Court
denied their application, and on September 3, 2014, a certificate of judgment was
issued, making the determination as to the certified question final.
Upon the conclusion of the certification process, the stay was lifted, and a
new scheduling order was entered. The Generic Defendants then responded with
the now pending motion for judgment on the pleadings.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generic Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The Generic Defendants filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings on
December 10, 2014, approximately one week after the order was entered lifting the
stay over the action.
The Generic Defendants filed the motion without first
answering the Weeks’s Amended Complaint.
In fact, to date the Generic
Defendants have not answered the Weeks’s Amended Complaint.
Because the Generic Defendants have not filed answers, the Weeks argue
that the Generic Defendants are precluded from receiving a judgment on the
pleadings. For support, they highlight Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that, “after the pleadings are closed—but early enough
not to delay trial—a party may more for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(c). The Weeks also highlight Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., in which the
Eleventh Circuit explained that, “[w]hen a defendant fails to answer, Rule 12(c)
precludes a judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings have not yet closed,
and competing pleadings do not exist.” 774 F.3d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2014).
The Weeks are correct that, because the Generic Defendants have yet to file
an answer to the Amended Complaint, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
not an appropriate avenue for seeking dismissal of the Weeks’s claims. Id. at
1336–37. A review of case law, however, demonstrates the power of the court to
avoid judicial inefficiency by considering the motion for judgment on the
pleadings as a timely motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). In Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123 (2d
Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit evaluated an analogously situated case. The Patel
plaintiff had appealed a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim on grounds that the defendant had filed his motion to dismiss after
first answering the complaint. Id. at 125. Accordingly, the plaintiff contended that
the district court should not have considered the motion to dismiss because a Rule
12(b)(6) motion is only timely if filed prior to an answer. Id. The Second Circuit,
however, in addition to determining that the defendant had in fact not filed a valid
answer, also concluded that, when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is filed after
the close of pleadings, the “appropriate response is to treat such an untimely
motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).”
Id. at 126.
The Second Circuit ultimately provided two persuasive reasons for
construing the motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. First, it
explained that each of the sister circuits that had recently addressed the question
had arrived at the same answer. Id. (listing decisions from the Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits). Second, it noted that construing the
motion under the 12(c) standard made “eminently good sense” because
[t]he standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings is identical to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to
state a claim. In both postures, the district court must accept all
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. The court will not dismiss the case unless it is
satisfied that the complaint cannot state any set of facts that would
entitle him to relief.
Id. (omitting internal citations and quotation marks).
More recently, the district court for the District of Columbia directly
addressed an argument that a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
defendants who had not answered should be denied as premature. Jung v. Ass’n of
Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2004). While recognizing the
temporally limiting language of Rule 12(c), the court concluded that the class’s
argument must fail because, “if a party files a Rule 12(c) motion before its answer,
the Court may treat it as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited numerous other district
courts that had arrived at a similar determination and also explained that “[n]o
prejudice to any party results from treating a Rule 12(c) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion because the standard of review for motions for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is essentially the same as
that for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at 35–36.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review
In light of the foregoing authorities, the Generic Defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) will be construed as a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). When
evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take the
facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2012).
Rule 12(b)(6) review also includes consideration of any exhibits attached to the
complaint. Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352
(11th Cir. 2006). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The evaluation of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is “limited primarily to the face of
the complaint and attachments thereto.” Starship Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta
Ctny., Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, n.13 (11th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the court has not
considered the exhibits attached to either parties’ briefing, and conversion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) is not necessary. Harper v. Lawrence Cnty.,
Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A judge need not convert a motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment as long as he or she does not consider
matters outside the pleadings.”).
The Generic Defendants’ motion to dismiss is grounded singularly upon
their assertion that the Weeks’s state-law tort claims are preempted by federal law.
They specifically contend that the federal-labeling requirements imposed on
generic-pharmaceutical manufacturers directly conflict with state-tort liabilities
and that these conflicting obligations mandate the dismissal of the Weeks’s claims
against them on the basis of preemption. The Generic Defendants assert that two
recent Supreme Court cases and a 2013 Eleventh Circuit decision unequivocally
establish the aforementioned principles and control the present case. Mut. Pharm.
Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567
(2011); Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2013).
In response, the Weeks argue that the defense of federal preemption rests
upon a determination that federal law and state law are in direct conflict and that it
is the burden of the Generic Defendants to show that a conflict sufficient to trigger
federal preemption exists. The Weeks contend that the Generic Defendants have
not carried this burden. The specifically contend that the Generic Defendants have
not produced evidence necessary to show that the Generic Defendants could not
communicate a warning to Mr. Weeks’s prescribing physician under federal law.
Federal Pharmaceutical Regulations
The labeling of pharmaceuticals is heavily regulated by federal law. Before
a pharmaceutical manufacturer may market any new drug to the public, it must
first acquire federal approval.
To acquire federal approval, the 1962 Drug
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act require that a
manufacturer prove that the new drug “is safe and effective and that the proposed
label is accurate and adequate.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.; Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at
For a period of time, all manufacturers had to complete the same approval
process, whether the manufacturer was seeking to market an entirely new
pharmaceutical or merely a new, generic version of an existing drug. Mensing,
131 S. Ct. at 2574.
Because successfully completing the approval process
inherently required “costly and lengthy clinical testing” ill-suited to the
development of a thriving generic-pharmaceutical industry, in 1984 Congress
enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly
known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which drastically altered the approval
process for new generic pharmaceuticals. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j); Mensing, 131 S. Ct.
Pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, manufacturers of brand-name
drugs and manufacturers of generic drugs face two different sets of obligations
when seeking federal approval of new pharmaceuticals.
manufacturers must prove that the proposed label is “accurate and adequate.” 21
U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (d); Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. The manufacturers of
generic drugs, on the other hand, are not independently required to demonstrate the
accuracy or adequacy of their labels.
Rather, generic-drug manufacturers are
obligated to ensure that their proposed warning label is identical to the label of the
corresponding brand-name drug.
A defense of federal preemption is grounded upon the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause states that “the Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const.,
art. VI, cl. 2. This constitutional mandate has been interpreted to require any state
law, including those creating state-tort duties, to give way when it is determined
that the law is in direct conflict with a federal law. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577.
(“Where state and federal law ‘directly conflict,’ state law must give way.”
(quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009))). The Supreme Court has
explained that state and federal law directly conflict for preemption purposes when
it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements.” Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995).
To be sure, this is not the first case in which a court has been tasked with
determining whether state-tort laws directly conflict with the federal laws
In fact, the Supreme Court addressed a similar
preemption defense brought on behalf of the generic manufacturers of MCP in
2011. In Mensing, plaintiffs similarly situated to the Weeks alleged that the longterm use of MCP had caused them to develop TD and that the generic
manufacturers of MCP were liable under state-tort laws “for failing to provide
adequate warning labels.” 131 S. Ct. at 2573. Specifically, they contended that,
“despite mounting evidence that long term [MCP] use carries a risk of [TD] far
greater than that indicated on the label, none of the [m]anufacturers had changed
their labels to adequately warn of that danger.” Id. (internal quotation marks
The Mensing defendants countered the plaintiffs’ claims with a theory of
Like the Generic Defendants in the present action, the
Mensing defendants explained that “federal statutes and FDA regulations required
them to use the same safety and efficacy labeling as their brand-name
counterparts,” and, accordingly, it was impossible for them “to simultaneously
comply with both federal law and any state tort-law duty that required them to use
a different label.”
With these contentions in place, the Supreme Court
examined whether the Mensing defendants had an avenue by which they could
comply with both federal drug regulations and state-tort laws.
Relying heavily on the FDA’s interpretations of the federal requirements
imposed upon generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Supreme Court
determined that the Mensing defendants were without a viable means of complying
with both state and federal law. Specifically, the Supreme Court determined that
federal law prohibited the generic manufacturers from unilaterally changing their
labels via the “changes-being effected” process or providing heightened warnings
directly to physicians via “Dear Doctor” letters. Id. at 2575. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court concluded that federal law preempted the Mensing plaintiffs’
failure-to-warn state-tort claims.
Two years later, the Supreme Court extended its holding in Mensing,
concluding that federal pharmaceutical regulations also preempted state-tort claims
against generic manufacturers based upon design-defect theories. See Mut. Pharm.
Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). The Supreme Court rejected the First
Circuit’s rationale that Mensing was distinguishable because the generic
manufacturer could have complied with state design-defect laws and federal
regulations simultaneously by choosing to not make the drug at all. It determined
that a “stop-selling” rationale was “incompatible with . . . pre-emption
jurisprudence.” Id. at 2477. The Court ultimately concluded that state-tort laws
that require generic manufacturers to “render a drug safer by either altering its
composition or altering its labeling are in conflict with federal laws” and
preempted accordingly. Id. at 2479.
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Mensing and Bartlett. In Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2013),
a plaintiff appealed from a district court’s dismissal of her claims in favor of a
generic manufacturer of MCP. The district court had explicitly relied upon the
Supreme Court’s decision in Mensing, and on appeal, the plaintiff argued that
Mensing was distinguishable because her negligence claim was based upon a
“failure to communicate” theory. Id. at 1247–48. Addressing the plaintiff’s artful
attempt to overcome federal preemption, the Eleventh Circuit spoke to the scope of
Mensing, explaining that any state law cause of action grounded upon a generic
manufacturer’s taking unilateral action is preempted because the federal law “duty
of sameness” makes generic manufacturers dependent upon brand-name
manufacturers. Id. at 1249.
The Generic Defendants argue that Mensing, Bartlett, and Guarino control
the entirety of the Weeks’s action against them. The Weeks do not contest the
federal preemption principles asserted by the Generic Defendants. Rather, they
argue that the Generic Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied because the
Generic Defendants have yet to “adduce[ ] evidence necessary to warrant”
dismissal under Guarino or the other applicable cases.
Relying on Guarino and Morris v. PLIVA, Inc., 713 F.3d 774 (5th Cir. 2013)
– a Fifth Circuit decision favorably cited in Guarino – the Weeks contend that for
the Generic Defendants to prove federal preemption, they have to produce
evidence establishing that the Brand Name Defendants did not communicate the
approved warning to Mr. Weeks’s prescribing physician.
If the Brand-Name
Defendants communicated an updated warning, then the Generic Defendants also
would have been free to communicate such a warning under the applicable federal
regulations, thereby avoiding any preemption issues.
To be clear, the Weeks are not arguing that the Brand-Name Defendants did
communicate an updated warning.
In fact, they confirm that their Amended
Complaint includes an allegation that not one Defendant, whether Brand Name or
Generic, “communicated information of any kind about the drug to Mr. Weeks’[s]
prescriber after 2002.” (Doc. # 194, at 7.) The Weeks merely argue that the
Generic Defendants are the party attempting to rely upon federal preemption, and,
accordingly, they are the party that is required to demonstrate the existence of a
When considering the legal standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss, it is
clear that the Weeks’s argument is without merit. Addressing a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a court is required to accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true
and then determine whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”). Accordingly, because
the Weeks expressly allege in their Amended Complaint that the Brand-Name
Defendants failed to communicate any updated information to Mr. Weeks’s
prescribing physician, this court joins the several other district courts that have
determined a consumer’s state-law tort claims to be preempted by federal law in
accordance with Supreme Court and circuit precedent. Cooper v. Wyeth, Inc., No.
09-929-SDD-SCR, 2013 WL 6502554, at *4 (M.D. La. Dec. 11, 2013); Del Valle
v. Qualitest Pharm. Inc., No. B-11-113, 2012 WL 2899406, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June
22, 2012); Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236, 2011 WL 6153608, at *6
(E.D. Ark. Dec. 12, 2011); Metz v. Wyeth, LLC, No. 8:10-CV-2658-T-27AEP,
2011 WL 5024448, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2011); Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc., No.
08-3616, 2011 WL 5505399, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 2011).
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that Defendants Teva and
Actavis’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 191) is GRANTED.
DONE this 3rd day of August, 2015.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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