Daughtry v. Army Fleet Support LLC et al

Filing 186

OPINION AND ORDER that the 158 & 166 Motions for Attorney's Fees and Expenses, filed by dft Army Fleet Support, LLC, are denied. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/5/2014. (wcl, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

RORY M. DAUGHTRY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
ARMY FLEET SUPPORT, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:11cv153-MHT
(WO)

OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Army Fleet Support, LLC filed motions for
attorney’s fees and expenses after this court entered
summary judgment in its favor.
Daughtry’s

case

was

not

Because plaintiff Rory M.

frivolous,

unreasonable,

or

without foundation, the motions will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND
Daughtry brought this action against a number of
defendants,

including

military contractor.

his

employer,

Army

Fleet,

a

He alleged, among other things,

that Army Fleet violated the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA), as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117), by
failing to provide him with a reasonable accommodation
following a shoulder injury.

In particular, Daughtry,

who was employed as an aircraft mechanic, was for a time
assigned to a special mechanic duty known as “parts-turnin,” which in essence consisted of receiving and shelving
various items.

The accommodation he sought was continued

assignment to that duty, even after a change in military
policy resulted in parts-turn-in positions being filled
by only mechanics who had greater seniority than Daughtry
had.
This court granted summary judgment to the defendants
on all of Daughtry’s claims.
Support,

LLC,

(Thompson, J.).

925

F.Supp.2d

Daughtry v. Army Fleet
1277

(M.D.

Ala.

2013)

In its opinion, the court found that

defendant Army Fleet had satisfied its obligations under
the ADA and that, in order to place Daughtry in the
“parts-turn-in” position he desired, Army Fleet would
have needed either to create a new position for him or to

2

violate its agreement with Daughtry’s union regarding
hiring by seniority.

The ADA, this court concluded, did

not require Army Fleet to take either action.

Because

the existence of a reasonable accommodation is an element
of an ADA plaintiff’s prima facie case, Daughtry failed
to carry his initial burden.
The court then considered, and rejected, various
evidence and arguments offered by Daughtry.

Among other

things, the court acknowledged the persuasive potential
in Daughtry’s argument that another individual had been
accommodated in a parts-turn-in position far longer than
Daughtry had; however, the court ultimately rejected the
argument

because

individual’s

it

greater

failed

to

seniority.

account
The

for

that

court

also

considered and rejected a number of arguments because
Daughtry’s

counsel

appeared

to

have

significantly

mischaracterized the evidence presented in support of
them.

3

Army Fleet subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s
fees and expenses pursuant to the fee-shifting provision
of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205.

Motion for Attorney’s

Fees (Doc. No. 158).

Army Fleet later amended its motion

to correct an error.

Amended Motion for Attorney’s Fees

(Doc. No. 166).

It seeks a total of $ 218,337.50 in

attorney’s fees and expenses, exclusive of expenses it
seeks through a bill of costs separately filed with the
clerk

of

court.

Daughtry

opposes

the

original

and

amended motions.

II. ANALYSIS
42 U.S.C. § 12205 provides that, in an action under
the ADA, “the court ... in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing

party

...

a

reasonable

attorney's

including litigation expenses, and costs.”
keeping

with

Christiansburg

the

Supreme

Garment

Co.

Court’s
v.

fee,

However, in
guidance

Equal

in

Employment

Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (interpreting

4

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to
2000e–17), the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted § 12205
to

apply

differently

to

prevailing defendants.

prevailing

plaintiffs

and

Bruce v. City of Gainesville,

Ga., 177 F.3d 949, 951 (11th Cir. 1999).
Under Bruce, a prevailing defendant is not entitled
to fees as a matter of course.

Rather, as is generally

the case with civil-rights statutes, a court should grant
fees to a prevailing defendant in an ADA case only if the
plaintiff’s

claim

without foundation.”

was
Id.

“frivolous,

unreasonable,

or

The Bruce court noted that in

Christianberg the Supreme Court emphasized that “it is
not enough that the plaintiff had ultimately lost his
case.”

Id.

The Supreme Court cautioned courts to

“‘resist the understandable temptation to engage in post
hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did
not

ultimately

prevail,

his

action

must

have

been

unreasonable or without foundation’” because “‘[t]his

5

kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most
airtight claims.’”
at 421-2).

Id. (quoting Christianberg, 434 U.S.

As the Supreme Court noted, “‘seldom can a

prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success,’” and
“‘the course of litigation is rarely predictable.’”

Id.

(quoting Christianberg, 434 U.S. at 422).
In

determining

whether

the

plaintiff’s

case

was

frivolous, the court looks in part to three factors:
“‘(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie
case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and
(3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to
trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.’” Id.
(quoting Sullivan v. School Board of Pinellas County, 773
F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)).

However, these are

only factors; the determination of frivolity must be made
on a case-by-case basis.

Id. at 952.

In this case, the court notes that Daughtry did not
establish a prima-facie case and that the court entered
summary judgment without a trial.

6

However, Daughtry’s

failure to carry his initial burden was not a result of
a

claim

that

was

fanciful

from

the

beginning

or

contentions that were “absolutely incredible, and pure
fabrication”
contrary,

Id. (internal quotation omitted).

Daughtry

somewhat

different

is

clearly

disabled,

circumstances

or

On the

and,

with

under

somewhat

different evidence, his request to be kept in a partsturn-in

position

might

have

accommodation under the ADA.
evidence

reasonable

Indeed, Daughtry offered
been

accommodated in just the manner that he requested.

While

court

another

a

had

the

that

been

rejected

the

disabled

analogy

worked

for

failure

to

take

account of the other employee’s greater seniority, it
also acknowledged the argument’s persuasive potential.
Thus, the fact that in the end Daughtry and his attorneys
could not marshal sufficient evidence to defeat summary
judgment does not mean that his case was frivolous from
the start.

His case clearly was not “airtight,” and he

obviously could not have been “sure of ultimate success”

7

at the outset.

Christianberg, 434 U.S. at 421-2.

But

neither was this a hopeless claim.
The facts of Bruce are instructive.

There, the

plaintiff brought an ADA claim that he had been fired
because he was disabled after his hand had been crushed.
As it turned out, he apparently had not been fired at
all, and shortly thereafter he was assigned to a new job.
Thus Bruce, like Daughtry, could not establish a primafacie case of discrimination to survive summary judgment.
Bruce, 177 F.3d at 953 (Magill, J., dissenting) (“Bruce
failed to establish fundamental elements required to make
out a prima facie case on each” of his ADA claims).
Nevertheless, the court found that his suit was not “so
factually

or

legally

groundless

as

frivolous lawsuit from the outset.”

to

constitute

Id. at 952.

a

Here,

the contention which Daughtry in the end could not prove,
that there was an available reasonable accommodation, was
far more debatable than the determination of whether or
not Bruce had been terminated.

8

If the claim in Bruce was

not frivolous, it is clear to this court that Daughtry’s
was not either.
This court also sees no other basis on which to find
this litigation frivolous.
whether

the

defendant

As to the second factor,

offered

to

settle,

Army

Fleet

stated in its motion for fees only that there had been
unsuccessful mediation in this matter.
indication

that

Army

Fleet

offered

There is no
any

particular

settlement which might suggest its liability; but neither
is there any indication that plaintiff rejected a fair
settlement

offer

and

thereby

unreasonably

increased

litigation costs.
Finally, the court acknowledges that this litigation
was frustrating for the defendants and their attorneys,
as

it

was

at

times

for

the

court.

But

the

incomprehensibility of many of Daughtry’s filings, and
the disturbing pattern of their mischaracteriation of
evidence,

is

most

appropriately

attributable

Daughtry’s attorneys rather than Daughtry himself.

9

to
When

filings are improper, the appropriate remedy is generally
Rule 11 sanctions, not attorney’s fees for frivolous
litigation.
The guidance of the Supreme Court and the Eleventh
Circuit on this issue is clear.
“assessing

attorney’s

fees

In civil-rights cases,

against

plaintiffs

simply

because they do not finally prevail would ... undercut
the

efforts

of

Congress

to

enforcement” of those laws.
422.

promote

the

vigorous

Christianberg, 434 U.S. at

Like the court in Bruce, this court cannot say that

Daughtry’s case was “so lacking in merit that the filing
and maintaining of the lawsuit deserved an award of
attorney's fees for the defendant.”

177 F.3d at 952.

***
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motions for
attorney’s fees and expenses (doc. nos. 158 and 166),
filed by defendant Army Fleet Support, LLC, are denied.
DONE, this the 5th day of February, 2014.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE