McBride v. Houston County Health Care Authority et al

Filing 375

OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that the court still has jurisdiction over the state-law claim against defendant Dinesh Karumanchi. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/8/2015.(kh, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

COURTNEY McBRIDE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
DINESH KARUMANCHI,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:12cv1047-MHT
(WO)

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Courtney McBride developed a rare skin
disease after receiving treatment at a county hospital
followed by her subsequent discharge to a local jail.
She

originally

following

brought

defendants:

Authority;
Paladugu;

Dr.
Dr.

this
Houston

Dinesh

Rita

lawsuit
County

Karumanchi;

Fairclough;

against

the

Health
Dr.

City

the
Care

Rajendra
of

Dothan;

Board of Commissioners of the City of Dothan; Mamie
McCory;

Stephanie

Johnson;

Robinson; and Greg Benton.
the

Health

Care

Authority

Williams

Banks;

Belinda

She asserted claims that
and

the

doctors

committed

medical

malpractice

in

violation

of

Alabama

law

and

that the City of Dothan and its correctional officers
were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs in
violation of the United States Constitution and were
negligent in violation of Alabama law.
that

the

court

jurisdiction

had

(28

both

U.S.C.

She asserted

diversity-of-citizenship
§

1332)

as

well

as

federal-question (28 U.S.C. § 1331) and supplemental
jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367).
After
opinion,

the
all

court

issued

defendants

its

except

summary-judgment
the

Health

Care

Authority, Dr. Karumanchi, Correctional Officers McCory
and Johnson, and the City of Dothan either had been
dismissed
favor.
2015

or

had

summary

judgment

entered

in

their

See McBride v. Houston Cnty. Health Care Auth.,
WL

3892715

However,
correctional
dismissal.

on

(M.D.

Ala.

2015)

officers
In

appealed

response,

the

the

J.).

grounds,

qualified-immunity

(Thompson,

the

denial

court

of

stayed

their
the

litigation as to those two defendants as well as to the

2

City of Dothan.

The Health Care Authority has also

since been dismissed.

The question remains whether the

court should stay this litigation as to the remaining
state-law claim against Dr. Karumanchi.
As part of this issue, Karumanchi raised concerns
that this court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
try

the

court

claim

has

“a

subject-matter

against

him

continuing

separately.

obligation

jurisdiction

and

to

...

Because
assess
may

the

[its]

consider

subject matter jurisdiction claims at any time during
litigation,” Belleri v. United States, 712 F.3d 543,
547 (11th Cir. 2013), the court asked for briefing on
whether it had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332 or supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367 to try the remaining state-law claim.
After considering the parties’ briefing, and conducting
a hearing on the question of diversity jurisdiction,
the court holds it has jurisdiction.

3

I. DIVERSITY-OF-CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION
A. Legal Standard
“There
regarding

are

a

number

of

basic

diversity-of-citizenship

legal

principles

jurisdiction:

that

§ 1332 grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases
between ‘citizens of different states’; that the party
seeking

diversity

establishing
evidence;

jurisdiction

jurisdiction

...

that

by

a

diversity

is

has

the

burden

preponderance
determined

of

of

the

when

the

suit is instituted, not when the cause of action arose;
... that, for diversity jurisdiction to exist, there
must be ‘complete diversity,’ that is, each defendant
must be a citizen of a state different from that of
each plaintiff,” and that “the terms ‘citizenship’ and
‘domicile’ are synonymous.”

McDonald v. Equitable Life

Ins. Co. of Iowa, 13 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1280 & n. 1 (M.D.
Ala.

1998)

(Thompson,

J.)

(citing

Owen

Equip.

&

Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978); Smith
v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957)); Yeldell v.
Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 1990); Blakemore v.

4

Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 789 F.2d 616, 618 (8th Cir.
1986)).
“The law is also well-established that a person is
not

necessarily

a

citizen

of,

or

domiciled

in,

the

state in which she resides at any given moment. ...
Instead, ‘citizenship,’ or ‘domicile,’ is determined by
two elements: (1) physical presence within a State; and
(2)

the

mental

indefinitely.”

intent

McDonald,

to
13

make

a

F.Supp.2d

home
at

there

1280-1281

(citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S.
at 48; Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939);
Scoggins v. Pollock, 727 F.2d 1025, 1026 (11th Cir.
1984); Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 563 (5th
Cir.

June

1981)).1

“Intention

permanently is not necessary.

...

to

remain

there

It is enough to

have a ‘floating intention’ to stay indefinitely and

1. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of
the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

5

also have the general desire to return to one’s former
domicile at some undetermined point of time.” McDonald,
13 F.Supp.2d at 1280 (citing Yeldell, 913 F.2d at 537
(8th Cir. 1990); Crowley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678
(10th Cir. 1983)).
In determining domicile, a court should consider
both positive evidence and presumptions.

Mitchell v.

United States, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 350, 352 (1874).

One

such presumption is that the State in which a person
resides

at

any

domicile.

given

time

is

also

that

person’s

District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S.

441, 455 (1941); Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th
Cir.

1954);

see

generally

13B

Charles

Alan

Wright,

Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3612.

But because changes in residence

are so common in this country, courts also refer to
another presumption: once an individual has established
a

domicile,

satisfies

she

the

remains

mental

a

and

citizen
physical

domicile in a new State.

there

until

requirements

she
of

Yeldell, 913 F.2d at 537;

6

McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1483 (11th Cir.
1986).
“However, these presumptions are merely aids for
the court; they cannot override the actual facts of the
case.
entire

The objective facts bearing on an individual’s
course

of

conduct’

diversity-jurisdiction

determine

domicile
McDonald,

purposes.”

for
13

F.Supp.2d at 1281 (citing Wasson v. Northrup Worldwide
Aircraft Services, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 400, 404 (W.D.
Tex. 1978) (Suttle, J.)).
account

include

but

“Facts frequently taken into

are

not

limited

to:

current

residence; residence of family and dependents; place of
employment and name of business; voting registration
and

voting

practices;

property;

location

membership

in

organizations;
registration;

of

location

brokerage

church,

personal
and

clubs,

driver’s
and

of

license

payment

of

taxes.”

and

real

bank

accounts;

and

business

and

automobile
McDonald,

13

F.Supp.2d at 1281 (citing Garcia v. American Heritage
Life Ins. Co., 773 F. Supp. 516, 520 (D.P.R. 1991)

7

(Pieras,

J.);

13B

Miller,

Edward

Charles

H.

Procedure § 3612.)
instead,

a

Cooper,

Wright,

Federal

Arthur

Practice

R.
and

“No single factor is conclusive;

‘totality

necessary.”

Alan

McDonald,

of
13

evidence’

approach

F.Supp.2d

at

is

1280-1281

(citing National Artists Management Co. v. Weaving, 769
F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Conboy, J.)).
An

individual’s

considered
subjective

in

statements

determining

expressions

of

of

intent

domicile.
intent

also

However,
conflict

established facts, courts accord them less weight.

are
when
with
Lew

v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986); Hendry v.
Masonite Corp., 455 F.2d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1972). “But
when

subjective

expressions

of

intent

accord

with

objective facts, the subjective testimony bolsters the
objective evidence.”

McDonald, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1281.

B. Relevant Facts
All

parties

agree

that

defendants

were

citizens of Alabama when this case was filed.

The

8

all

the

issue is whether McBride was a citizen of Florida, in
which case the court has diversity jurisdiction, or, of
Alabama,

in

which

case

the

court

does

not.

The

relevant timeline is as follows:
 2001: McBride graduated from high school in Dothan,
Alabama.
 2001-2004: McBride served in the military in Florida.
While there, she opened several bank accounts and
obtained a credit card in Florida.
 2004-2007:
McBride
attended
and
graduated
from
Florida A&M University. She paid in-state tuition.
 2007: At some point in 2007, she renewed her Alabama
license.
 2007-2010: McBride appeared to have lived in Florida
in a series of apartments, but there is also evidence
she traveled back to Alabama frequently. She went to
the doctor in Alabama in 2008, 2009, and 2010.
The
doctor’s office also always listed her Alabama
number, although she said that the doctor relied on
her driver’s license, which had her mother’s address.
 Summer of 2010 or 2011 (right before her law school):
McBride spent a summer at Troy State in Dothan taking
classes.
She was charged in-state tuition, but all
she remembered is not having to pay any tuition.
 2011: Although not entirely clear from testimony,
McBride appeared to spend either a year or, at least,
a semester at law school in Florida.

9

 December 2011: McBride left law school and ended her
lease at her Florida apartment.
 December 2011-June 2011: McBride went back and forth
between Florida, where she stayed with friends, and
Dothan, Alabama.
 Late June 2012 - Late July 2012: The incidents at
issue in this lawsuit took place. McBride was jailed
and hospitalized.
 August 2012 - around September 2012:
McBride was
taken care of by her mother for some time after being
released from the hospital. It is unclear how long.
 Around September 2012 - November 2012: McBride
visited from friends in Florida after recovering but
returned to Dothan, Alabama.
 November 29, 2012: This lawsuit was filed.
In addition to these events, McBride also appears
to have registered to vote in Alabama although it is
unclear when.

The court, though, credits her testimony

that she has never voted.

Finally, McBride repeatedly

stated that she was a citizen of Florida and that it
was her intent to return there.

10

C. Analysis
Considering

jurisdiction

because

McBride

was

a

citizen McBride’s entire course of conduct, the court
finds it has diversity of Florida when the case was
filed.
First,

after

examining

the

totality

of

the

evidence, the court finds that McBride established her
domicile in Florida by December 2011.

Except for a

brief summer in Alabama to take classes, McBride lived
in

Florida

for

graduation.

a

decade

following

her

high-school

She started in the Navy, where she spent

three years.

During that time she opened multiple bank

accounts and had a credit card in Florida.

Following

her time in the Navy, she spent four years in college
in Florida where she paid in-state tuition, after which
she

remained

in

Florida

for

another

three

years.

Finally, after a summer taking classes in Alabama, she
started

law

December
period

of

school

in

2011.

These

time

McBride

Florida

before

leaving

factors--especially
spent

11

in

Florida

the

in
long

outside

of

school--reflect

that

she

established

domicile

there.

Put differently, McBride left Alabama after high school
and spent ten years in another State, where she worked,
went to school, and made a life.
Admittedly,

there

are

several

factors

that

cut

against McBride’s domicile in Florida by December 2011.
First, McBride originally went to Florida as a student,
and residing in a State merely as a university student
raises legitimate questions about a person’s intent to
remain in the State.

Mitchell v. Mackey, 915 F. Supp.

388, 391 (M.D. Ga. 1996) (Owens, J.).

However, that

concern is not controlling in this case.

As noted

above, McBride worked in the Navy in Florida before
attending

school

there

undergraduate studies.
who

merely

go

to

a

and

did

not

leave

after

her

Unlike other college students
State

to

attend

school,

she

demonstrated an intent to remain there.
Second,

McBride

received

Alabama as well as Florida.

in-state

tuition

in

Neither side presented

evidence on how a student can pay in-state tuition in

12

either State, but it appears that for a student to pay
in-state
intent

tuition

to

each

remain.

State

See

generally

Fla.

Stat.

requires

Ann.

an

§ 1009.21

(referencing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.17, which includes
an intent to remain requirement, in order to establish
residency

for

§ 16-64-3

(noting

in-state

in-state

tuition

tuition);
residency

that
require

1975

requirements

an

address

in

Ala.

Code
for

Alabama,

an

intent to remain, and possession of more substantial
contacts to Alabama than other States); but see 1975
Ala.

Code

§ 16-64-2(1)d

have

discretion

also

to

retired

or

active

duty

within

90

miles

of

§ 1009.21(10)(b)
exception).

Of

(establishing
allow

in-state

military

course,

Fla.

establishing
a

school’s

colleges

tuition

personnel

campus);

(also

that

who

Stat.
a

for
live
Ann.

military

determination

of

domicile for tuition purposes, while relevant, does not
bind

a

court’s

jurisdiction,
domicile

determination

because

could

the

differ

factors
and

13

of
used

because

domicile

for

to

determine

the

school’s

investigation may not be as thorough as a court’s.

Cf.

Alicea-Rivera v. SIMED, 12 F. Supp. 2d 243, 246 (D.P.R.
1998)

(Fuste,

J.)

(noting

that,

although

plaintiff

qualified to pay in-state tuition in Ohio and could
vote

there,

this

was

not

determinative

of

domicile

because he did not rent property there, pay utilities
bills

there,

or

abrogated

on

Santaella,

364

(stating

have

other

that

F.3d
the

post-graduate

grounds
348,

by

352

n.2

Alicea-Rivera

plans

Garcia
(1st

there),

Perez
Cir.

court

v.

2004)

incorrectly

required the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by clear
and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance
of the evidence).
Indeed, the court is not convinced that McBride had
domicile in Alabama when she likely certified as such
when

taking

assuming

summer

McBride

classes

claimed

there.

domicile

At
in

the

least,

Alabama

for

tuition purposes (and did not fall under a military
exception),

that

one--undermines

claim--whether
her

argument

14

or
that

not

a

paying

legitimate
in-state

tuition in Florida established her domicile there and
weighs against her general claim that she was a citizen
of

Florida

as

of

December

2011.

Nevertheless,

considering that the summer classes in Alabama occurred
after

around

a

decade

in

Florida,

and

that

McBride

returned to Florida after this summer, her one summer
of paying in-state tuition in Alabama during a ten-year
period does not indicate she was an Alabama rather than
a Florida citizen.
Last, McBride renewed her Alabama license, went to
the

doctor

Alabama.

in

Alabama,

and

visited

her

mother

in

These factors weigh against McBride’s claim

of Florida domicile.
However,

despite

McBride’s

Florida

totality

of

the

the

above

citizenship
evidence

in

shows

weighing
December
the

against

2011,

McBride

the
was

domiciled in Florida by December 2011, mainly because
of her long residency in Florida over nearly ten years,
including time in the Navy, renting several apartments,
and attending two schools.

15

This established domicile

gives McBride the presumption that Florida remained her
domicile:

“[O]nce

an

individual

has

established

a

domicile, he remains a citizen there until he satisfies
the mental and physical requirements of domicile in a
new state.”

McDonald, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1280-81.

The more difficult question is whether McBride’s
activity

between

December

2011

and

November

changed her citizenship from Florida to Alabama.
are

conflicting

signals.

Between

December

2012
There

2011

and

June 2011, McBride went back and forth between Florida,
where she stayed with friends, and Alabama, where she
stayed with her mother.

Nothing in that time, however,

indicates that she changed her intent to wanting to
live in Alabama.
intended

to

return

Indeed, McBride testified that she
to

Florida,

and,

given

that

she

spent the vast majority of her adult life in Florida,
the

court

McBride’s

has
time

no

reason
spent

to
in

doubt

that

Alabama

testimony.

during

her

hospitalization and the several months afterward also
do not change the presumption.

16

Of course, when McBride

was hospitalized and recovering during the summer of
2012, she had no choice on where to live.

In the fall

of 2012, the few months following her hospitalization,
she spent time in both Florida and Alabama.
In sum, on November 29, 2012, when this case was
filed, McBride continued to be a citizen of Florida.2
The

court

therefore

has

diversity-of-citizenship

jurisdiction.3

II. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Even

if

jurisdiction

the
in

court
this

did

case,

not
it

have

still

diversity
would

have

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim.

2.
Karumanchi presents a number of additional
facts from 2014 indicating McBride’s citizenship in
Alabama, including her application for housing, doctor
appointments, and car registration in Alabama from that
time.
These facts from 2014, over a year after the
case was filed, does not convince the court that
McBride was a citizen of Alabama when the case was
filed in 2012.
3. Karumanchi does not contest that this case also
meets the $ 75,000 threshold.
17

“Section

1367(a)[,

jurisdiction,]

gives

which

federal

governs
courts

supplemental
the

power

to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that
arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact with a
substantial

federal

claim.”

Upper

Chattahoochee

Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 701 F.3d
669,

678

(11th

Cir.

2012)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
All parties agree that these two requirements are
met.

First,

the

court

has

jurisdiction

over

the

federal § 1983 claim against the correctional officers,
and, second, the injuries alleged in the federal- and
state-law
diagnosis

claims
of

all

derive

Stevens-Johnson

Epidermal Necrolysis.

from

McBride’s

Syndrome

alleged

and

Toxic

Moreover, as all parties agree,

an appeal of the denial of qualified immunity does not
divest
claim,

the

court

because

of
the

jurisdiction
federal

dismissed.

18

over

claim

the
has

state-law
not

been

Therefore, even if the court did not have diversity
jurisdiction, it would have supplemental jurisdiction
over the state-law claim against Karumanchi.
***
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the court still has
jurisdiction over the state-law claim against defendant
Dinesh Karumanchi.
DONE, this the 8th day of July, 2015.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE