Kleinschnitz v. Phares, et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing as follows: (1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 9 ) Kleinschnitz's § 1983 unlawful arrest claim (Count 1), state law false arrest/false imprisonment claim (Count 5), and state law assault an d battery claim (Count 6) is DENIED; (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 9 ) Kleinschnitz's claims for § 1983 false imprisonment (Count 2), § 1983 malicious prosecution (Count 3), negligence (Count 8), state law municipal li ability (Count 9), and state law malicious prosecution as to Benton (Count 10) is GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED without prejudice; (3) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 9 ) Kleinschnitz's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 7) is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Honorable Judge Mark E. Fuller on 10/28/13. (scn, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JACOB KLEINSCHNITZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM PHARES, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:13-cv-0209-MEF
(WO – Do Not Publish)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jacob Kleinschnitz (“Kleinschnitz”) brings suit against Defendants Officer
William Phares (“Phares”), Police Chief Gregory Benton (“Benton”), and the City of Dothan
(collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and for various state law claims.1 The suit arises out of Phares’s arrest of Kleinschnitz for
obstructing governmental operations after Kleinschnitz failed to stop his vehicle promptly
when ordered by Phares. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss portions of Kleinschnitz’s
complaint on the grounds that Kleinschnitz fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, as well as on the grounds of qualified immunity and state law immunity (Doc. #9).
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is due to be GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.

1

All claims are brought against Phares and Benton in their individual capacities. (Doc. #1.)
1

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1343(a), and 1367. Additionally, Defendants have not argued that the Court does not
have personal jurisdiction over them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is appropriate
in this district.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff’s
allegations as true and reads them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Duke v.
Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Further, a district court must
favor the plaintiff with “all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint.”
Stephens v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint states
a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. A complaint does not state a facially plausible claim for relief if it shows only “a sheer
possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[a] pleading that offers labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). Absent the necessary factual allegations,
2

“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Id.
Courts are also not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since this case is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts the
following allegations in Kleinschnitz’s complaint as true:
Kleinschnitz is a twenty-year-old resident of Houston County, Alabama, and a
student at Wallace Community College. Kleinschnitz also works full time at the Publix
supermarket in Dothan. At around 11:20 p.m. on May 9, 2012, Kleinschnitz ended his shift
at Publix and met a co-worker at a nearby McDonald’s for a meal. Kleinschnitz then left
McDonald’s and began to take his normal route home while driving at or below the posted
speed limit.
After exiting the roundabout on Watley Drive, a vehicle with extremely bright
headlights approached from behind. Kleinschnitz did not realize the other vehicle was a
police cruiser. The police cruiser was driven by Phares. After following Kleinschnitz
closely for a period of time, Phares activated his beacons and siren without any basis for
doing so. Since Kleinschnitz considered the part of town he was in to be unsafe, he activated
his emergency flashers, lowered his window, and waved his hand at Phares in an attempt to
indicate that he was looking for a safe place to stop his vehicle.
Driving at an extremely slow rate of speed, Kleinschnitz approached the playground
at Westgate park. When he saw no one else present at the playground, he continued on
3

Watley Drive to find what he believed to be a safe place to stop. Kleinschnitz also saw no
one at the Westgate Tennis Center as he passed, so he continued driving. At this point,
Kleinschnitz heard a verbal demand by Phares that he “pull over.” Kleinschnitz continued
to drive at an extremely slow rate of speed and called his mother on his cell phone to ask her
what he should do. Kleinschnitz’s mother told him to pull over in an area with adequate light
and other people present. As he approached the intersection of Watley Drive and Westgate
Parkway, Kleinschnitz took a left onto Westgate Parkway. Kleinschnitz believed it was not
safe to pull over due to other traffic, and he ended his call with his mother so he could pull
into an upcoming Chevron service station.
Kleinschnitz then called 911 to confirm that it was a police officer following him and
to explain to the dispatch operator that he was attempting to find a safe place to stop. When
Kleinschnitz connected with a 911 operator, he told her that someone was attempting to pull
him over and that he was going to the Chevron station since it would have adequate lighting
and people present. Kleinschnitz heard the operator tell Phares at least two times that “he’s
trying to pull over.” The operator told Kleinschnitz to pull into the Chevron station and
stated that police officers had been placed on alert because of a robbery in the area.
Kleinschnitz parked in the Chevron parking lot, and the operator told him to place his
hands on the steering wheel so Phares could see them. The operator then told him to exit his
vehicle. After exiting his vehicle, Phares and several other officers were waiting with their
guns drawn on Kleinschnitz. Phares ordered Kleinschnitz to walk backwards to the rear of
his truck, squat on his knees, and lie face down on the parking lot. Phares then handcuffed
4

Kleinschnitz and yelled “why didn’t you pull over?” Kleinschnitz responded that he was
searching for a safe, lighted area, to which Phares responded, “you don’t feel safe and you
are a grown boy?” After Kleinschnitz was placed in a police cruiser, Phares again stated “so
you’re telling me a big ole 19 year old boy like you didn’t feel safe?” Kleinschnitz was then
arrested for obstructing governmental operations. He was booked and then released on bail.
Kleinschnitz eventually obtained a judgment of acquittal on the charge.
Kleinschnitz also alleges that Dothan police officers have procedural orders that
citizens may drive at or below the speed limit to find a safe place to pull over when they are
driving at night and are not sure that the car attempting to pull them over is a police vehicle.
At some time around May 2010, Benton, Chief of Police for the City of Dothan, stated this
policy in a video press release. In response to the question, “So if someone is out late at
night, and you see a blue light in your rear view mirror, and you think it may or may not be
a police car, then your advice is to proceed at a safe speed, the posted speed limit or maybe
even a little slower, to a well-lit area, before you stop?,” Benton responded, “Correct.”
Benton also stated that Dothan police officers have procedural orders that these situations can
occur and that they should be “wary” of such situations.
IV. DISCUSSION
Kleinschnitz brings claims against Phares for § 1983 unlawful arrest (Count 1), § 1983
false imprisonment (Count 2), state law false arrest and false imprisonment (Count 5), assault
and battery (Count 6), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 7). He also
brings claims against Phares and Benton for § 1983 malicious prosecution (Count 3),
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negligence (Count 8), and state law malicious prosecution (Count 10). Finally, he brings a
§ 1983 “deliberate indifference” claim against Benton and the City of Dothan (Count 4)2,
and a claim of neglectfulness, unskillfulness, and carelessness against the City of Dothan
(Count 9). Kleinschnitz concedes that he has failed to adequately allege claims for § 1983
malicious prosecution (Count 3) against Phares and Benton and state law malicious
prosecution against Benton (Count 10),3 and requests the Court to dismiss these claims
without prejudice. Accordingly, Count 10 as to Benton only and Count 3 are DISMISSED
without prejudice. Kleinschnitz also concedes that he has failed to adequately state a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 7).

Count 7 is accordingly

DISMISSED with prejudice.4 The Court will consider the remaining claims Defendants have
moved to dismiss.
I.

Federal Claims
A.

§ 1983 Unlawful Arrest and Qualified Immunity (Count 1)

Count 1 of Kleinschnitz’s complaint alleges Phares arrested Kleinschnitz without a

2

The pleadings make clear that this is a cause of action for municipal liability based on
Benton’s alleged role as a final policymaker for the City of Dothan. See Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). Defendants do not move to dismiss this claim.
3

Defendants do not move to dismiss the state law malicious prosecution claim (Count 10)
as to Phares. (Doc. #10, at 17–18.)
4

The Court dismisses this count with prejudice because Kleinschnitz’s complaint fails to
raise a plausible claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and the Court is
confident that discovery in this case would not lead to any set of facts that could support such a
claim under Alabama law. See Thomas v. BSE Indus. Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1040, 1044
(stating that under Alabama IIED is a “very limited cause of action that is available only in the most
egregious circumstances”).
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warrant or probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizure.5 Defendants move to dismiss Count 1 on the basis of
qualified immunity and argue that Phares had arguable probable cause to believe
Kleinschnitz violated either Ala. Code § 13A-10-2 (Obstructing Governmental Operations)
or Ala. Code § 32-5A-4 (Failure to Comply with Lawful Order of Police Officer Regulating
Traffic).6 Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that Phares is not entitled
to qualified immunity for the arrest of Kleinschnitz.
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that may be asserted on a pretrial motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d
1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002). Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government
officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation

5

Kleinschnitz styles Count 1 as a § 1983 claim for “Excessive Force/Unlawful Arrest and
Seizure.” (Doc. #1.) However, Kleinschnitz concedes that he does not state a separate Fourth
Amendment violation for excessive force. (Doc. #18, at 7.) In the Eleventh Circuit, “where an
excessive force claim is predicated solely on allegations the arresting officer lacked the power to
make the arrest, the excessive force claim is entirely derivative of, and is subsumed within, the
unlawful arrest claim.” Bashir v. Rock Cnty., 445 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2006). This is exactly
what Kleinschnitz alleges in Count 1, and he concedes he does not state a separate claim for
excessive force. (Doc. #18, at 7.) Therefore, the Court construes Count 1 as asserting only an illegal
seizure/arrest claim against Phares under § 1983.
6

Although Kleinschnitz was never charged with violating Ala. Code § 32-5A-4, Phares is
entitled to qualified immunity if there was arguable probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz for any
offense, regardless of whether Kleinschnitz was actually charged for that offense. See Devenpeck
v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996)).
7

omitted). Courts apply a two-part test for determining whether qualified immunity applies.
The Court must (1) determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a
constitutional violation; and (2) if the facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
establish a constitutional violation, determine whether the right violated was “clearly
established.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted).
An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause violates the Fourth
Amendment and can underpin a § 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time
of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest. See Brown,
603 F.3d at 734. Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement officials have facts
and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the
suspect had committed or was committing a crime. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130,
1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted). To receive qualified immunity, an
officer need not have actual probable cause but only “arguable” probable cause. Holmes v.
Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003). Arguable probable cause exists where
reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the
defendant could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff. Brown, 608
F.3d at 734 (citation and quotation omitted). Whether arguable probable cause exists
depends on the elements of the crime and the particular facts. Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394
F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004).
1.

Obstructing Governmental Operations
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A person commits the crime of obstructing governmental operations if “by means of
intimidation, physical force or interference or by any other independently unlawful act, he:
(1) [i]ntentionally obstructs, impairs or hinders the administration of law or other
governmental functions; or (2) [i]ntentionally prevents a public servant from performing a
governmental function.” Ala. Code § 13A-10-2 (1975). The public servant must be legally
authorized to undertake the action in question in order for interference to constitute
obstruction. In other words, this statute “would not apply to illegal action by a public servant
in performing an unauthorized function.” Commentary, Ala. Code § 13A-10-2; see also
A.A.G. v. State, 668 So. 2d 122, 126 n. 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (citing this statement from
the Commentary to Alabama’s criminal code and holding that police had probable cause to
enter defendant’s home before finding her guilty of obstruction of the officers’ search of her
home); Strange v. City of Tuscaloosa, 652 So. 2d 773, 775 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (reversing
conviction for obstruction under similarly-worded city ordinance because, although
defendant physically resisted police, they entered her home in violation of the Fourth
Amendment). In addition, a defendant must intend to interfere with or to prevent a public
servant’s performance of an official duty to be guilty of obstruction. See Commentary, Ala.
Code § 13A-10-2 (stating the statute “imposes a uniform mens rea requirement that the
accused act with intent to obstruct the . . . governmental function, or that he intentionally
prevents a public servant from performing a governmental function”). The Court finds that
Phares lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz for obstruction because Phares’s
initial attempt to stop Kleinschnitz was illegal and because Phares had information
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conclusively establishing that Kleinschnitz lacked the necessary mens rea required for
obstruction.
With respect to the legality of Kleinschnitz’s arrest, the complaint alleges that Phares
activated his beacons and sirens and attempted the initial stop of Kleinschnitz “without any
legitimate basis whatsoever.” (Doc. #1, ¶ 21.) If Phares lacked information establishing
either actual or arguable probable cause that Kleinschnitz was committing a crime, or the
reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop, then Phares lacked legal authority to stop
Kleinschnitz. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Kleinschnitz could not be guilty of
obstruction for refusing to stop when such a seizure was not legally authorized and was
instead a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Under the facts alleged in the complaint,
Kleinschnitz is like the defendant in Strange v. City of Tuscaloosa, who was not guilty of
obstruction in resisting police officers’ unauthorized entry into a bedroom of her home
because the officers’ information that a male and female had been fighting in the street did
not give them probable cause to search her home and bedroom. 652 So. 2d at 776; contrast
with A.A.G., 668 So. 2d at 126–27 (finding probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstruction
when she resisted police officers’ search of her home since they had probable cause for their
search based on the activation of the home’s burglar alarm and the lack of contact with the
homeowners due to the telephone being disconnected). Accepting Kleinschnitz’s allegations
as true and reading them in the light most favorable to him, the Court finds that Phares lacked
any basis or legal authority to initially stop Kleinschnitz, and therefore lacked arguable
probable cause to arrest him for obstruction when he failed to stop.
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The Court further finds that Phares lacked arguable probable cause to arrest
Kleinschnitz for obstruction because Phares had information that would establish to a
reasonable officer that Kleinschnitz lacked the necessary mens rea of intent. After Phares
attempted his initial stop by activating his beacons and siren, Kleinschnitz turned on his
emergency flashers, lowered his window, and waved his hand in an attempt to indicate that
he acknowledged Phares but was looking for a safe place to pull over. (Doc. #1, ¶ 23.)
Kleinschnitz subsequently continued to drive at an extremely low rate of speed and explained
to the 911 dispatch operator that he was looking for a safe place to stop his vehicle. (Doc.
#1, ¶ 29–30.) The 911 operator told Phares at least two times that Kleinschnitz was “trying
to pull over.” (Doc. #1, ¶ 31.) Based on this, a reasonable police officer “in the same
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as” Phares could not have believed there
was probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz. Brown, 608 F.3d at 734. Rather, a reasonable
officer would have known that Kleinschnitz was attempting to comply with Phares’s request
to pull over, but out of safety concerns, did not want to pull over until he reached a well-lit
area with other people present. Cf. A.A.G., 668 So. 2d at 128–29 (finding requisite intent for
obstruction where, after officers explained they were responding to a burglar alarm,
defendant continually jumped up from a couch, flailed her arms, struck the police officer
repeatedly, and ran into a hallway, which prevented another officer from conducting a Terry
sweep of the house). Since Phares lacked initial authority to stop Kleinschnitz, and,
independently of this, knew or should have known that Kleinschnitz lacked intent to obstruct
any governmental function, Phares lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz for
11

obstruction.
2.

Failure to Comply with a Lawful Order of a Police Officer
Regulating Traffic

Although Kleinschnitz was not charged with this offense, Phares argues that he is
entitled to qualified immunity for his arrest of Kleinschnitz because Kleinschnitz could have
been arrested for a violation of Ala. Code § 32-5A-4. This statute states that “[n]o person
shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer
or fireman invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic.” Ala. Code
§ 32-5A-4 (1975). Similarly to obstruction, failure to comply requires the police officer’s
order to be “lawful.” The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that “for an order
of a police officer to be ‘lawful’ pursuant to [§ 32-5A-4], such order must be directly related
to the direction, control and regulation of traffic.” Coughlin v. State, 320 So. 2d 739, 742
(Ala. Crim. App. 1975). In addition to the requirement that a police officer’s order be lawful,
the defendant’s refusal to comply with the order must be “willful.” An act is “willful” if it
“is one of premeditated wrong, an act done with evil intent or bad motive or purpose,
unlawful, and without legal justification . . . Such is the meaning of the word as it is found
in our penal statutes . . . .” Parker v. Sutton, 254 So. 2d 425, 431 (Ala. Civ. App. 1971); see
also Roe v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 750, 754 (Ala. 1982) (stating that willfulness “denotes an
intention to cause an injury”). As in the case of obstruction, the Court finds that Phares
lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz for failure to comply because Phares’s
initial attempt to stop Kleinschnitz was illegal and because Phares had information

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conclusively establishing that Kleinschnitz lacked the necessary mens rea to violate the
statute.
Phares argues that he had arguable probable cause to believe Kleinschnitz committed
the offense of failure to comply when he failed to pull over after Phares gave him a verbal
order to do so. (Doc. #10, at 9.) But since Phares attempted to stop Kleinschnitz “without
any legitimate basis whatsoever,” (Doc. #1, ¶ 21), his order to Kleinschnitz to pull over was
not lawful. Phares cannot convert an unlawful stop of a vehicle into a lawful one by simply
adding the command to pull over. See Coughlin, 320 So. 2d at 742 (stating the failure to
comply statute “was not intended to, does not, and cannot give police officers unbridled
power to arrest for refusal to obey any order they may choose to direct at a citizen”). Indeed,
Alabama law upholds convictions for failure to comply incident to a traffic stop when the
police officer had constitutional authority to make the initial stop. See Ex parte Duvall, 782
So. 2d 244, 248 (Ala. 2000) (applying State-agent immunity to defendant conservation
officers because they had reasonable suspicion to justify Terry stop of vehicle and statutory
authority to issue order to produce driver’s license); Duncan v. State, 686 So. 2d 1279,
1280–82 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (upholding conviction where officer had authority to pull
over defendant for crossing the center line of a divided highway and statutory authority to
request to see defendant’s driver’s license but defendant refused to comply); Sly v. State, 387
So. 2d 913, 915–16 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (upholding conviction where officer had
authority to pull over defendant for a defective headlight and statutory authority to request
to see defendant’s driver’s license once he had been pulled over). Since, as alleged, Phares
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had no authority to stop Kleinschnitz’s vehicle, his verbal demand for Kleinschnitz to pull
over does not create arguable probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz for failure to comply
because the order was not “lawful” within the meaning of the statute.
Phares also lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz for failure to comply
because Phares had information that would establish to a reasonable officer that Kleinschnitz
lacked the necessary mens rea of willfulness. Kleinschnitz’s hand signal to Phares, the
activation of his emergency flashers, the contact with the 911 operator, and the 911
operator’s explanation to Phares that Kleinschnitz was trying to pull over should establish
to a reasonable officer in the same position as Phares that Kleinschnitz was not willfully
disobeying Phares’s order relating to a traffic regulation. A reasonable officer in the same
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as Phares would know that Kleinschnitz
intended to pull over at the first place he felt was safe, and that he was not acting with “evil
intent or bad motive or purpose, unlawful[ly], and without legal justification,” Parker, 254
So. 2d at 431, or with “an intention to cause an injury.” Roe, 416 So. 2d at 754. Since a
reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have known the required mental state of
willful disobedience was lacking, Phares lacked arguable probable cause to arrest
Kleinschnitz for failure to comply.
3.

Clearly Established Law

Since Phares lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz for either
obstruction or failure to comply, the Court must determine whether the constitutional rights
Phares violated were clearly established at the time. See Brown, 603 F.3d at 734. Binding
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precedent in the Eleventh Circuit existing at the time of Kleinschnitz’s arrest clearly
established that an arrest made without arguable probable cause violates the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. See Skop, 485 F.3d at
1143–44. Because the factual allegations in Kleinschnitz’s complaint, taken as true for the
purposes of deciding this motion, demonstrate that Phares lacked arguable probable cause
to arrest Kleinschnitz, Phares is not entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, Defendants’
motion to dismiss Kleinschnitz’s § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest as alleged in Count 1 is
thus due to be DENIED.7
B.

§ 1983 False Imprisonment and 12(b)(6) (Count 2)

Kleinschnitz alleges a § 1983 false imprisonment claim against Phares on the grounds
that Phares detained him subsequent to an arrest that occurred without probable cause.8 To
state a claim for § 1983 false imprisonment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish
the common law elements of false imprisonment and a due process violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1562–63 (11th Cir. 1993).
The elements of common law false imprisonment are (1) intent to confine; (2) acts resulting

7

The Court notes that Defendants also moved to dismiss Kleinschnitz’s § 1983 unlawful
arrest claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
However, because the Court has already found that Phares lacked any probable cause to arrest
Kleinschnitz for either obstruction or failure to comply, the Court is satisfied that Kleinschnitz has
adequately pled his § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. As a result, to the extent Defendants seek
dismissal of Kleinschnitz’s § 1983 unlawful arrest claim under Rule 12(b)(6), that motion is
DENIED.
8

Kleinschnitz confusingly styles Count 2 as § 1983 “False Arrest/False Imprisonment.”
Since Count 1 alleges a § 1983 unlawful arrest, the Court construes Count 2 as alleging only a §
1983 false imprisonment claim to avoid duplicative claims.
15

in confinement; and (3) consciousness of the victim of confinement or resulting harm. Id.
at 1562 n. 3 (citation and quotation omitted). The Fourteenth Amendment includes a due
process right to be free from continued detention after the state should have known the
detainee was entitled to release. West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007). To
establish such a violation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff’s due process rights. Id. (citation omitted) A plaintiff must show
the defendant had (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; and (2) the defendant
disregarded that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence. Id. (citation and
quotation omitted). The Court finds that Kleinschnitz has failed to allege sufficient facts to
state a cause of action for § 1983 false imprisonment.9
While the Court finds that Phares was objectively unreasonable in his arrest of
Kleinschnitz, Kleinschnitz nonetheless falls short of properly alleging that Phares had
subjective knowledge that Kleinschnitz was entitled to be released and that he disregarded
this knowledge. In fact, Kleinschnitz attempts to simply tack his § 1983 false imprisonment
claim on to his unlawful arrest claim. But a detention subsequent to an unlawful arrest does
not automatically establish a § 1983 false imprisonment claim because the plaintiff must
establish subjective deliberate indifference for the latter claim. The deliberate indifference
standard is “a difficult burden for a plaintiff to meet.” Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d
1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990). Since Kleinschnitz alleges no additional facts to establish that

9

Because the Court determined that Kleinschnitz has failed to allege sufficient facts to state
a cause of action for § 1983 false imprisonment, the qualified immunity analysis is unnecessary.
16

Phares was deliberately indifferent to his right to be released during the brief detention
following his unlawful arrest, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Kleinschnitz’s § 1983 false
imprisonment claim as alleged in Count 2 of the complaint is GRANTED.
II.

State Claims
A.

State Law Immunity

Kleinschnitz asserts state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault
and battery against Phares. Phares asserts the defense of both State-agent immunity and
discretionary-function immunity. State-agent immunity derives from Alabama’s constitution
and shields state employees from civil liability unless they act “willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond [their] authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the
law,” or if the Constitution or laws of the United States or Alabama require otherwise. Ex
parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000). In addition to State-agent immunity,
Alabama law also provides discretionary-function immunity from tort liability to law
enforcement officers acting within the scope of their discretionary law enforcement duties.
Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a) (1975). The Cranman test for State-agent immunity also determines
whether a police officer is entitled to discretionary-function immunity under § 6-5-338(a).
Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala. 2005). If the State agent establishes
that he was exercising a discretionary function with respect to the incident in question, then
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority. Downing v. City of Dothan, 59 So.
3d 16, 20 (Ala. 2010). Phares was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
17

when he stopped and arrested Kleinschnitz. See Telfare v. City of Huntsville, 841 So. 2d
1222, 1228 (Ala. 2002) (“Generally, arrests and attempted arrests are classified as
discretionary functions.”). Therefore, Kleinschnitz bears the burden of alleging sufficient
facts to establish that Phares’s actions are not entitled to either State-agent or discretionaryfunction immunity.
1.

False Arrest/False Imprisonment (Count 5)

Under Alabama law, false imprisonment is the “unlawful detention of the person of
another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty.” Ala. Code §
6-5-170 (1975).

In determining whether a police officer receives State-agent or

discretionary-function immunity from civil liability for making an arrest, Alabama applies
the federal standard of arguable probable cause. Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d
1168 (2003). The Court has already determined that Phares lacked arguable probable cause
to arrest Kleinschnitz, and placing someone under arrest without probable cause constitutes
false imprisonment. Therefore, Phares is not entitled to State-agent or discretionary-function
immunity for the state law claim of false arrest/false imprisonment. Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count 5 is, therefore, DENIED.
2.

Assault and Battery (Count 6)

Kleinschnitz also alleges assault and battery based on Phares pointing his gun at
Kleinschnitz and placing him under arrest. (Doc. #1, ¶ 103.) Before any force can be used
in making an arrest, probable cause must exist to make a lawful arrest. Franklin v. City of
Huntsville, 670 So. 2d 848, 852 (Ala. 1995). Since the Court found Phares lacked arguable
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probable cause to arrest Kleinschnitz, Phares was not entitled to use any force against
Kleinschnitz, including pointing a gun at Kleinschnitz and handcuffing him. Therefore,
Phares is not entitled to State-agent or discretionary-function immunity for Kleinschnitz’s
assault and battery claim, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 6 is DENIED.
B.

Negligence against Benton and Phares (Count 8), Neglectfulness
against the City of Dothan (Count 9) and 12(b)(6)

Kleinschnitz asserts negligence against Benton and Phares and neglectfulness against
the City of Dothan based on the negligence of Benton and Phares. A city can be held liable
for the “neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness” of an “agent, officer, or employee” of the city
acting in the course of his or her duty. Ala. Code § 11-47-190 (1975). Kleinschnitz has not
alleged a single fact concerning which acts were negligent on the part of Phares or Benton,
which is necessary to raise his negligence claim above the speculative level. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 677–78. Kleinschnitz does not identify a duty of care or suggest how Phares or
Benton breached this duty. Counts 8 and 9 are clear examples of the type of “formulaic
recitation of the elements” denounced in Twombly. 550 U.S. at 555. Although Kleinschnitz
has sufficiently pled state law claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery against
Phares, these are intentional torts for which the City of Dothan cannot be held liable under
§ 11-47-190. See Walker v. City of Huntsville, 72 So. 3d 474 (Ala. 2010). Thus, since
Kleinschnitz fails to state a claim for negligence against Phares and Benton, he also fails to
state a claim for municipal liability for employee negligence against the City of Dothan, and
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 8 and 9 is GRANTED.

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V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #9) Kleinschnitz’s § 1983 unlawful arrest

claim (Count 1), state law false arrest/false imprisonment claim (Count 5), and state law
assault and battery claim (Count 6) is DENIED;
2.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #9) Kleinschnitz’s claims for § 1983

false imprisonment (Count 2), § 1983 malicious prosecution (Count 3), negligence (Count
8), state law municipal liability (Count 9), and state law malicious prosecution as to Benton
(Count 10) is GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED without prejudice;
3.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #9) Kleinschnitz’s claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress (Count 7) is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED with
prejudice;
DONE this the 28th day of October, 2013.
/s/ Mark E. Fuller
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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