Jones v. Colvin (CONSENT)

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody on 12/15/2014. (wcl, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CASSIUS JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-440-CSC
(WO)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff, Cassius Jones, applied for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title
II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. and for supplemental security income
benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., alleging that
he was unable to work because of a disability. His application was denied at the initial
administrative level. Jones then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the claim. The Appeals
Council rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision consequently became
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner).1 See Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review

1

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No.
103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social
Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3).2 Based on the court’s review of the record
in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the decision of the
Commissioner should be affirmed.
II. Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the
person is unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.
To make this determination3 the Commissioner employs a five step, sequential
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
(1) Is the person presently unemployed?
(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?
(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific
impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?
(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?
(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?
An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next
question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative
answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not
disabled.”

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the United
States Magistrate Judge.
3

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

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McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).4
The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court
must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ingram v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir.
2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004). A reviewing court may not look only to
those parts of the record which supports the decision of the ALJ but instead must view the
record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied
on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986). The court “may
not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute . . . [its] judgment for that of
the [Commissioner].” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)
(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
[The court must, however,] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine
the reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar
presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal conclusions,
including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating
claims.
Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

4

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case (SSI).
The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately
cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

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III. The Issues
A. Introduction. Jones was 36 years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ
and has a 9th grade education. (R. 39-40). Jones’s prior work experience includes work as
an unskilled laborer and packing line worker. (R. 55). Following the administrative hearing,
the ALJ concluded that Jones has severe impairments of degenerative joint disease of the
right hip, history of hypertension, diabetes mellitus, and borderline intellectual functioning
(R. 24). The ALJ concluded that Jones was not disabled because he has the residual
functional capacity to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.
(R. 29-30).
B. The Plaintiff’s Claims. As stated by the plaintiff, his claims are
1. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity assessment is not supported by the evidence of record;
2. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ failed to
properly apply the two-part “pain standard” established by the Eleventh
Circuit; and
3. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ did not
properly evaluate Jones’s credibility.
(Doc. 12 p. 3).
IV. Discussion
A disability claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating an inability to return
to his past work. Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1990). In determining whether
the claimant has satisfied this burden, the Commissioner is guided by four factors: (1)

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objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3)
subjective evidence of pain and disability, e.g., the testimony of the claimant and his family
or friends; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history. Tieniber v. Heckler, 720
F.2d 1251 (11th Cir. 1983). The ALJ must conscientiously probe into, inquire of and explore
all relevant facts to elicit both favorable and unfavorable facts for review. Cowart v.
Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735-36 (11th Cir. 1981). The ALJ must also state, with sufficient
specificity, the reasons for his decision referencing the plaintiff’s impairments.
Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social Security which involves a
determination of disability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to such
individual shall contain a statement of the case, in understandable language,
setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner’s
determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is based.
42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (emphases added). Within this analytical framework, the court will
address the plaintiff’s claims.
A.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Decision to Give Little Weight to Dr.
Banner’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment.
The ALJ found that Jones
has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he cannot climb ladders or scaffolding and
he must avoid working at unprotected heights. Further, his borderline
intellectual functioning limits him to following short, simple and routine tasks
and to concentrating for two hour periods, and limits him to jobs that involve
gradual changes in the workplace.

(R. 27).
20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) define “light work” as follows:

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Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the
weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good
deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with
some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine
that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting
factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) & 416.967(b).
In conjunction with a September 15, 2011 consultative examination, Dr. Sam Banner
completed an RFC assessment in which he opined that Jones could lift, at most, no more than
10 pounds occasionally, could sit two hours at a time and eight hours total during a work day,
could stand no more than 1 hour in a work day and no more than 15 minutes at a time, could
walk no more than three hours in a work day and no more than 15 minutes at a time, and
could occasionally operate foot controls, and could frequently us his hands to reach, handle,
finger, feel, push, and pull.

(R. 352-54).

Dr. Banner also opined that Jones could

occasionally balance and climb stairs and ramps, but could never climb ladders or scaffolds,
stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, and that he could never be exposed to extreme temperatures
or unprotected heights. (R. 355-56).
Jones argues that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment is a product
of legal error and is not supported by substantial evidence because, in formulating Jones’s
RFC, the ALJ expressly gave “little weight” to the RFC assessment completed by Dr. Banner
in conjunction with a September 15, 2011 consultative examination. After specifically

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considering the medical evidence of record, the ALJ stated:
As for the opinion evidence, only Dr. Banner provided any opinion concerning
the claimant’s functional limitations. On a form he completed, Dr. Banner
indicated the claimant could not lift and carry objects weighing over 10
pounds, and he could not stand for more than one hour, or walk for more than
three hours, during a workday. Dr. Banner also indicated the claimant could
only occasionally use his lower extremities for operating foot controls and that
he could not climb ladders or scaffolds, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. He
opined the claimant could only occasionally climb stairs or ladders and he
could only occasionally balance. Dr. Banner further indicated the claimant
would have environmental limitations and could not work at unprotected
heights, or in areas of extreme heat or cold. That form was completed
following the consultative examination of September 15, 2011, and it is given
little weight because it is inconsistent with the specific examination and x -ray
findings detailed in the narrative report, which were basically normal except
for slight reductions of motion of the claimant’s hip and knee and some reflex
losses.
In sum, the [ALJ’s] residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the
claimant’s history of treatment since the alleged onset date, which shows that
he primarily sought treatment for dental problems. It is further supported by
the specific narrative report from Dr. Banner, which described essentially
normal findings, noting only slight loss of hip and knee motion and some
reflex changes. The x-rays described mild or minimal lumbar changes but the
overall impression was the claimant had a normal lumbar spine. The
Administrative Law Judge affords greater weight to the narrative report from
Dr. Banner in determining the claimant’s residual functional capacity.
(R. 28-29).
Jones argues that Dr. Banner’s RFC assessment is a medical opinion by an examining
physician, and that the ALJ failed to follow the correct legal standard by substituting her own
“medical opinion” in place of Dr. Banner’s RFC assessment. See Walden v. Schweiker, 672
F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir 1982) (“An administrative law judge may not arbitrarily reject
uncontroverted medical testimony.”). A medical source statement regarding a claimant’s
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RFC is evidence that must be considered, along with all relevant evidence, in the ALJ’s RFC
assessment.

20 CFR § 416.929(c)(1)&(d); 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(1),(3); 20 CFR §

404.1527(d). However, unlike Dr. Banner’s narrative report of the consultative examination
and X-ray findings, Dr. Banner’s RFC assessment is not a “medical opinion,” but an opinion
on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and it is not entitled to any special significance.
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d); 20 CFR § 404.1527(d). Thus, contrary to Jones’s argument, the ALJ
is not only entitled to “substitute” her own judgment in place of an examining physician’s
RFC assessment, but she is required to independently consider all the evidence and exercise
the “final responsibility” for determining that issue. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d); 20 CFR §
404.1527(d); Green v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 Fed. Appx. 915, 923, 2007 WL 1265988, 6
(11th Cir. 2007) (“Although a claimant may provide a statement containing a physician’s
opinion of her remaining capabilities, the ALJ will evaluate such a statement in light of the
other evidence presented and the ultimate determination of disability is reserved for the
ALJ.”).
Jones argues that the ALJ’s decision to afford little weight to Dr. Banner’s RFC
assessment is not supported by the evidence because “the ALJ’s explanation fails to account
for the . . . imaging taken of [Jones’s] thoracic spine and hips.” (Doc. 12 p. 7). However,
the ALJ did expressly account for the imaging of Jones’s thoracic spine and hips.
Specifically, the ALJ found that Dr. Banner’s RFC assessment was “inconsistent with the
specific examination and x-ray findings detailed in the narrative report, which were basically

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normal except for slight reductions of motion of the claimant’s hip and knee and some reflex
losses,” and that “[t]he x-rays described mild or minimal lumbar changes but the overall
impression was the claimant had a normal lumbar spine.” (R. 29).
Jones also argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by the evidence because she
failed to credit Dr. Banner’s opinion that Jones’s gait was inhibited and his opinion that Jones
likely required further orthopedic treatment. (Doc. 12 p. 7).

However, the ALJ did

specifically consider this evidence. The ALJ observed that “Dr. Banner noted the claimant’s
complaints, and that he was having difficulty with his gait because of [an] infected toe,”
which “was a temporary impairment.” (R. 25; R. 348-49). Further, Dr. Banner’s generic
statement that “Jones needs continued orthopedic care,” without more, does not contradict
either the ALJ’s RFC assessment or her decision to afford little weight to the RFC
assessment of Dr. Banner. Throughout her opinion, the ALJ recognized that Jones suffered
from orthopedic problems, and she accounted for those medical conditions in formulating
his RFC.
Jones also argues that, because the ALJ concluded that Dr. Banner’s RFC assessment
was inconsistent with his own narrative report of the examination and the accompanying Xrays, the ALJ was required to recontact Dr. Banner to resolve inconsistency. In support of
his argument that the inconsistency in the evidence required further development of the
record, Jones cites Johnson v. Barnhart, 138 Fed. Appx. 266 (11th Cir. 2005). However, not
every inconsistency in the evidence requires further development of the record. In Johnson,

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the court held that an ALJ must seek clarification or recontact physicians when an
inconsistency exists that cannot be resolved on the basis of the evidence and the ALJ cannot
make a disability determination without resolving the inconsistency. 138 Fed. Appx. at 27071 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404–1512(e)5 ). Here, the ALJ resolved the inconsistency on the basis
of the record before her by determining that Dr. Banner’s RFC assessment was “inconsistent
with the specific examination and x-ray findings detailed in [his own] narrative report, “ and
the ALJ gave greater weight to the narrative report Dr. Banner’s report and X-ray findings
in formulating Jones’s RFC. (R. 29). This was a perfectly acceptable way of resolving the
inconsistency on the basis of the record without recontacting Dr. Banner. See Johnson, 138
Fed. Appx. at 270 (holding that “the ALJ may have properly rejected [the treating
physician’s] RFC evaluation . . . as it was inconsistent with his own progress notes”).
Accordingly, the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and relied on substantial
evidence in support of her decision to accord little weight to Dr. Banner’s RFC assessment.
B.

The ALJ Applied the Proper Legal Standard When Evaluating Jones’s
Subjective Pain Testimony.
An ALJ “must consider a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain if she finds evidence

of an underlying medical condition, and either (1) objective medical evidence to confirm the

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Moreover, the court notes that 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e) was repealed effective March 26, 2012. 77
F.R. 10655, 10656. Currently, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c) (eff. March 26, 2012, see 77 FR 10651–01) provides
that where a disability determination cannot be reached due to an inconsistency in an underdeveloped
administrative record, the Commissioner has the discretion to determine how to resolve the inconsistency
and “may” choose to do so by recontacting a treating physician.

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severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition, or (2) that the objectively determined
medical condition is of a severity that can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged
pain.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). “If the ALJ refuse[s] to credit
subjective pain testimony where such testimony is critical, he must articulate specific reasons
for questioning the claimant’s credibility.” Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir.
1992). “[T]he ALJ may reject [the claimant’s complaints of pain] as not creditable, and that
determination will be reviewed for substantial evidence.” Id.
Jones argues that the ALJ failed to determine whether “(1) objective medical evidence
to confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from” Jones’s complaints of pain, “or (2)
that the objectively determined medical condition is of a severity that can reasonably be
expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560. However, the ALJ did
specifically consider those issues and resolved them in Jones’s favor. “After careful
consideration of the evidence, and to afford the claimant the benefit of any doubt,” the ALJ
found that Jones’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause a degree of the alleged symptoms.” (R. 28 (emphasis added)). The ALJ then
proceeded to consider and articulate specific reasons for discrediting some of Jones’s
subjective complaints of pain. (R. 28). Thus, the ALJ did apply the proper standard when
evaluating Jones’s subjective complaints of pain. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; Marbury, F.2d at
839.
C.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Findings Regarding The Credibility
of Jones’s Subjective Complaints of Pain
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At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Jones
had the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of the right hip, history of
hypertension, diabetes mellitus, and borderline intellectual functioning. (R. 24).
Subsequently, in determining Jones’s residual functional capacity (RFC), the ALJ considered
Jones’s subjective complaints of pain due to these severe impairments as well as other
alleged impairments.

20 CFR § 416.945(a)(2) (“We will consider all of your medically

determinable impairments of which we are aware, including your medically determinable
impairments that are not ‘severe,’ . . . when we assess your residual functional capacity.”).
The ALJ noted that Jones made subjective complaints of disability due to a “dislocated hip,
back pain, high blood pressure, seizures, and a right leg problem.” (R. 27-28). The ALJ
further noted that, at the administrative hearing, Jones
alleged back pain, vision problems, dizziness, shortness of breath, and pain in
his hands as limiting impairments. The claimant also alleged one seizure, six
months prior to the hearing, and further alleged he had no seizures when he
took his seizure medications. The claimant estimated he could walk for 15
minutes, stand for 20 minutes, and sit for 30 minutes at one time. He stated
that he would spend four to five hours a day with his leg elevated to alleviate
some of his pain, and at times he would soak his feet and ru[b] them with
alcohol to keep down swelling. He stated that moving too fast would make him
dizzy.
(R. 27).
After determining that Jones’s medically-determinable impairments could reasonably
be expected to cause a degree of the alleged symptoms, the ALJ considered the credibility
of those complaints and articulated specific reasons for rejecting them. See Foote, 67 F.3d

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at 1560 (holding that an ALJ “must consider a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain if she
finds evidence of an underlying medical condition, and . . . that the objectively determined
medical condition is of a severity that can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged
pain.”); Marbury, 957 F.2d at 839 (holding that, “[i]f the ALJ refuse[s] to credit subjective
pain testimony where such testimony is critical, he must articulate specific reasons,”
supported by substantial evidence “for questioning the claimant’s credibility”). Specifically,
the ALJ articulated the following reasons for concluding that certain of Jones’s subjective
complaints were not credible:
In terms of the claimant’s alleged need to elevate his leg several hours a day,
no medical evidence suggests any need for such periods of leg elevation, and
nothing in the medical records supports that allegation. The activities described
in his written report and in his testimony are consistent with a range of light
work, not with the extensive period of sitting with his leg eleva1ed he
described. His described activities are also inconsistent with his allegation of
back pain rated at a level of 9 out of 10. The record shows the claimant has
sought treatment for tooth and jaw problems, but not for back or hip pain, or
for seizures, symptoms of high blood pressure, or symptoms of diabetes.
Although the claimant alleged lack of funds to pay for medical care, he has
sought and received treatment at an emergency room on several occasions, but
not for any of his alleged disabling impairments. No specific episode of back
or hip pain has been treated since his alleged onset date, no seizure has been
described in the medical record, no symptoms of high blood pressure or
diabetes mellitus have been treated. The claimant testified that his seizures
were controlled with medications, and further testified that he had been
prescribed medications for his blood sugar, seizures, and his musculoskeletal
pain. He noted that his pain and seizures were controlled with medications and,
as noted above, neither his musculoskeletal pain nor any seizures were
documented since his alleged onset date. The claimant’s allegations of blurry
vision were not supported by any medical evidence. The claimant underwent
hip surgery in the remote past, but he requires no current treatment, other than
medications, for any impairment. His allegations of elevating his leg were not
supported by any medical evidence. The claimant’s allegations of disability are
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inconsistent with his medical history and are inconsistent with the specific
examination findings of record. His allegations of disability are not credible.
(R. 28).
Jones argues that the ALJ inaccurately stated the record when she found that he had
not sought medical care or emergency room care for back or hip pain, seizures, or symptoms
of high blood pressure or diabetes. Jones argues that he “did present to the emergency room
with complaints of back pain on at least one occasion.” (Doc. 12 p. 13). The ALJ did state
that, “[o]n January 13, 2010, the claimant was seen for a toothache, back pain, and an
abdominal virus.” (R. 25). However, on January 13, 2010, Jones was not diagnosed with
or treated for back pain, but only for dental carries and diarrhea. (R. 281-82). As the ALJ
explained regarding this treatment record:
The medical evidence . . . documented one single reference to back
complaints, in January 2010, but the claimant’s primary complaints at that time
were of a toothache and an abdominal virus. In fact, the reports from his
treating source did not describe allegations or symptoms related to high blood
pressure or seizures, and noted back and hip complaints only by history.
(R. 28).
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Jones had not
sought or received medical care for his back pain.6
Jones also argues that the ALJ failed to consider whether poverty, rather than lack of

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In a 2009 opinion adjudicating a previous claim by Jones, an ALJ noted that Jones had a series of
back injuries in 2007 and 2008 that did not last for 12 consecutive months. (R. 85). In this case, the ALJ
considered those medical records and the prior decision. (R. 25). Jones does not contend that the pre-2009
medical records undermine the opinion of the ALJ in this case or that those records support his current
complaints of continuing back pain.

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medical necessity, was the reason for his failure to seek treatment and the lack objective
medical medical evidence supporting many of his subjective pain allegations. In evaluating
the credibility of a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, one factor the ALJ may consider
is the frequency and level of medical treatment sought by the claimant.

20 CFR §

404.1529(c)(3); Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 425 Fed. Appx. 813, 817 (11th Cir. 2011);
Watson v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1984). However, “[t]o a poor person, a
medicine [or medical treatment] that he cannot afford to buy does not exist.” Dawkins v.
Bowen, 848 F.2d 1211,1213 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 59
(5th Cir. 1987)). Therefore, “the ALJ may not draw an adverse inference from a claimant’s
lack of medical treatment without first considering the claimant’s explanation for his failure
to seek treatment.” Brown, 425 Fed. Appx. at 817 (citing SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at
*7).
The ALJ was not required to uncritically accept Jones’s allegation that his lack of
treatment was due to poverty, only to consider the allegation and to articulate the reasons for
her conclusions based on substantial evidence. See id. It is clear from the ALJ’s opinion that
she did specifically consider whether poverty was the reason for Jones’s failure to seek
treatment and the lack objective medical evidence supporting many of his subjective
allegations. The ALJ acknowledged and did not dispute Jones’s allegation of poverty; rather
the ALJ noted that poverty did not prevent Jones from attempting to obtain medical care for
other medical issues, and, thus, the ALJ concluded that many of Jones’s subjective

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complaints were inconsistent with his attempts to obtain treatment for some things and not
others. Further, in discounting Jones’s subjective testimony, the ALJ did not rely solely or
primarily on lack of medical treatment; she also explained that his subjective complaints
were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence that did exist, as well as with his selfreported daily activities.

Cf. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003)

(holding failure to consider claimant’s ability to pay is not reversible error where the ALJ’s
decision was primarily was based on factors other than the claimant’s failure to obtain
medical treatment).
Accordingly, the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in discrediting Jones’s
subjective complaint of pain, and her decision is supported by substantial evidence.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons as stated, the court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner
denying benefits to Jones should be affirmed. See Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551,
1551-52 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Because the factual findings made by the [ALJ] . . . are supported
by substantial evidence in the record and because these findings do not entitle [the claimant]
to disability benefits under the appropriate legal standard, we affirm.”).
The Court will enter a separate final judgment.
Done this 15th day of December, 2014.
/s/Charles S. Coody
CHARLES S. COODY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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