Johnson v. United States of America
Filing
26
OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/03/14. (scn, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION
COREY JARREL JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
AMANDA JO PEACOCK,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14cv220-MHT
(WO)
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14cv221-MHT
(WO)
KA.I.P., a minor, by and
through her maternal
grandmother, custodian and
next friend, Stephanie
Jones; KE.I.P., a minor,
by and through his
maternal grandmother,
custodian and next friend,
Stephanie Jones; and
K.J.P., a minor, by and
through his maternal
grandmother, custodian and
next friend, Wendy Hall;
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14cv222-MHT
(WO)
OPINION
These
automobile
three
consolidated
accident
in
cases
Coffee
arise
County,
out
an
Alabama.1
1. The three cases are styled as follows: Johnson
v. United States of America, 1:14cv220-MHT (LEAD),
Peacock v. United States of America, 1:14cv221-MHT
(MEMBER), and Ka.I.P., et al. v. United States of
America,
1:14cv222-MHT
(MEMBER).
Although
these
actions were consolidated by court order, dated July
23, 2014 in 1:14cv220-MHT (doc. no. 17), in 1:14cv221MHT (doc. no. 15), and in 1:14cv222-MHT (doc. no. 22),
(footnote continued)
2
Plaintiffs Corey Jarrel Johnson, Amanda Jo Peacock, and
Ka.I.P. (a minor child) suffered injuries when their
automobile
Naval
collided
Second
siblings,
Class
plaintiffs
with
an
Petty
Officer.
Ke.I.P.
automobile
and
driven
Ka.I.P.
K.J.P.
by
and
(also
a
her
minor
children) bring claims for loss of parental consortium
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b), et seq., based on the injuries their parents
sustained in the accident.
the
court
on
defendant
These cases are now before
United
States
of
America’s
motion to dismiss the three minor children’s claims for
loss
of
parental
consortium.
For
the
reasons
that
follow, the motion will be granted.
I. STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The United States is seeking to dismiss the minor
children’s claims for loss of parental consortium under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) through a facial attack on the
court’s
subject-matter
jurisdiction
or,
in
the
the motion to dismiss currently before the court was
filed in only 1:14cv222-MHT, prior to consolidation.
3
alternative,
under
basis
that
these
under
Alabama
Fed.
R.
claims
law.
Civ.
are
“‘A
P.
not
12(b)(6)
legally
facial
attack
on
the
cognizable
[under
Rule
12(b)(1)] questions the sufficiency of the pleading and
the
plaintiff
enjoys
similar
safeguards
to
those
provided when opposing a motion to dismiss’ under Rule
12(b)(6).”
Supp.
When
2d
Cardwell v. Auburn Univ. Montgomery, 941 F.
1322,
deciding
1327
(M.D.
either
type
Ala.
of
2013)
(Fuller,
motion,
“[t]he
J.).
court
accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, construes
them most favorably to the plaintiff, and will not look
beyond
the
jurisdiction.”
face
of
the
complaint
to
determine
Id.; see also Pielage v. McConnell, 516
F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
The court should
make reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor but
is “not required to draw [a] plaintiff’s inference” or
to “accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions.”
Aldana v.
Del Monte Fresh Produce, N. Am., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242,
1248 (11th Cir. 2005).
“The general rule is that a
complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears
4
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.”
Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345,
347 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
II.
BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2012, Johnson was driving a sedan on a
highway in Coffee County, Alabama, when his vehicle
collided with a vehicle owned and maintained by the
United States and driven by a Naval Second Class Petty
Officer.
The complaint alleges that, in driving his
vehicle, the officer was acting in the course and scope
of his employment with the Navy.
were
passengers
in
Johnson’s
Peacock and Ka.I.P.
vehicle.
Johnson,
Peacock, and Ka.I.P. were injured in the collision.
Johnson, Peacock, and Ka.I.P. filed three separate
lawsuits
against
the
United
States.
Ka.I.P.’s
siblings, Ke.I.P. and K.J.P., joined as plaintiffs in
Ka.I.P.’s lawsuit, and they each assert claims for loss
of
parental
consortium
based
5
on
the
injuries
their
parents sustained in the collision.
As stated, the
United States has moved to dismiss the minor children’s
claims for loss of parental consortium.
III.
The
FTCA
DISCUSSION
provides
a
limited
waiver
of
the
government’s sovereign immunity for tort claims.
The
statute vests the district courts with jurisdiction to
hear
“civil
actions
on
claims
against
the
United
States, for money damages, ... for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office
or
employment,
under
circumstances
where
the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where
the
act
§ 1346(b)(1).
or
omission
“State
law,
occurred.”
28
U.S.C.
therefore,
governs
the
question of whether the United States has waived its
sovereign
immunity
against
6
liability
for
the
acts
complained
Dunbar,
curiam)
of
919
by
F.2d
the
plaintiff[s].”
1525,
(citations
1528
(11th
omitted).
Lawrence
Cir.
Thus,
1990)
v.
(per
“[u]nless,
according to the law of [Alabama], the United States
could be liable for [the] alleged tort of its employee
if it were a private person, then not only is the
sovereign’s immunity intact, but the district court is
without subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss
the suit.”
Id. (citations omitted).
The United States argues that, because Alabama does
not recognize claims for loss of parental consortium,
those
claims
must
be
dismissed,
for
this
court,
in
turn, lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear them
under the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
The court agrees.
1142,
1146
(Ala.
In Patterson v. Hayes, 623 So. 2d
1993),
the
Alabama
Supreme
Court
explained: “[D]enying a child a right to prosecute a
loss of consortium claim for injuries to his parent ...
is
the
law
in
Alabama.
Any
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further
discussion
is
unnecessary.”2
The
plaintiffs’
citations
do
not
contradict or undermine this clear statement of Alabama
law.
Because the minor children’s claims for loss of
parental consortium are not recognized under Alabama
law, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and
must dismiss these claims.
Also, because Ke.I.P. and
K.J.P. have no other claims, they will be dismissed as
parties.
2.
The minor children point out that this court
held in Barton v. American Red Cross, 804 F. Supp.
1455, 1464 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (Thompson, J.), that the
Alabama Supreme Court would recognize a right to loss
of parental consortium, but only to the extent of loss
of services.
It must be noted, however, that the
court’s Barton holding was based on an interpretation
of Alabama law at that time; the Alabama Supreme Court
had not yet addressed whether such a cause of action
existed under Alabama law.
Since then, as explained
above,
the
Alabama
Supreme
Court
clarified
in
Patterson, 623 So. 2d at 1146, that a claim for loss of
parental consortium is not cognizable under Alabama
law. Once the Alabama Supreme Court--the final arbiter
of Alabama law--spoke to the viability of loss of
parental consortium claims in Patterson, this court’s
holding in Barton vanished “like the proverbial bat in
daylight, only faster.”
Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d
1494, 1504 (11th Cir. 1994) (Carnes, J., dissenting).
8
An appropriate judgment will be entered.
DONE, this the 3rd day of December, 2014.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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