Gray v. City of Dothan

Filing 98

OPINION AND ORDER: It is therefore ORDERED as follows: (1) Plf Ivan "Keith" Gray's 73 motion to set aside the judgment of dismissal and reinstate this case, and his 74 motion amending that motion, are granted to the extent that the 68 'conditional' judgment is set aside and the case reinstated for the limited purpose of adjudicating his challenges to the enforceability of the settlement agreement and denied to the extent that plf Gray seeks to set aside the settlem ent agreement for any other purpose; (2) The court declares that the settlement agreement is enforceable; (3) Plf Gray's 70 motion to clarify is granted to the extent that the foregoing opinion provides the requested clarification; (4) Plf Gra y's 76 motion for a status update and an order to dissolve the confidentiality agreement and release is denied; (5) An appropriate unconditional judgment dismissing this case with prejudice will be entered. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/9/2016. (wcl, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

IVAN “KEITH” GRAY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF DOTHAN,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14cv592-MHT
(WO)

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ivan “Keith” Gray, a former captain of
the

Dothan

Police

Department,

brought

this

action

against defendant the City of Dothan, Alabama, claiming
that

the

City

had

discriminated

against

him

on

the

basis of race, retaliated against him for challenging
that

discrimination,

and

violated

prohibiting race discrimination.
that

the

parties

had

signed

a

consent

decree

After being informed
a

written

settlement

agreement, which included a confidentiality agreement
and a release, the court entered a judgment dismissing
the case.

Gray then filed a stipulation of dismissal.

The case is now before the court on Gray’s motions
to clarify, to set aside the judgment of dismissal and
reinstate the case, and for a status update and an
order

to

dissolve

release.

the

confidentiality

agreement

and

Gray originally filed these motions pro se,

and his original attorneys were permitted to withdraw,
but

he

is

now

represented

by

new

counsel.

An

evidentiary hearing was held on all three motions on
June 30, 2016, at which the court heard testimony from
Gray,

Gray’s

brother,

and

Gray’s

attorneys,

Sonya

Edwards and Jeffrey Bennitt.

A.
If the parties to a lawsuit reach a

settlement

agreement and voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit, but a
subsequent

dispute

over

the

settlement

arises,

the

court has the authority to adjudicate the matter only
if

the

prior

jurisdiction

to

dismissal
do

so,

order
or

expressly

“unless

there

independent basis for federal jurisdiction.”
2

retained
is

some

Kokkonen

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994).
Here, the court’s prior judgment dismissing the case
expressly retained jurisdiction over the settlement as
well as granted “leave to any party to file, within 49
days, a motion to have the dismissal set aside and the
case reinstated or the settlement enforced, should the
settlement not be consummated.”

Judgment (doc. no. 68)

at 1.
Now, since a settlement dispute has arisen, the
court

will

grant

Gray’s

motion

to

set

aside

the

judgment and reinstate the case to the extent that the
court

can

settlement

adjudicate
agreement

whether
that

the

should

parties

be

have

enforced.

a
See

Stoudmire v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., 2013 WL 1363484, at *2
(M.D.

Ala.

Apr.

3,

2013)

(Thompson,

J.).

However,

based on the evidence presented, the court will uphold
and

enforce

the

settlement

and,

pursuant

to

that

settlement, dismiss the case again, albeit this time
unconditionally,

that

is,

3

with

prejudice,

without

retaining jurisdiction, and without leave to have the
dismissal set aside under certain express conditions.

B.
“Settlement

agreements

are

contracts,

and,

like

other contracts, once a party has manifested assent to
an agreement that meets all requirements for a legally
binding
unless

contract,
he

invalid,

he

shows
is

the
some

bound

party

is

reason
by

bound.

why

it.”

the

Therefore,
agreement

Stoudmire,

2013

is
WL

1363484, at *3 (citations omitted). 1

1. Although federal courts ordinarily apply the
contract law of the forum State in assessing whether a
settlement agreement is enforceable, federal courts
have sometimes “enforced oral settlement of federal
claims under principles of federal common law.” Hogan
v. Allstate Beverage Co., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1274,
1279 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (Thompson, J.). This is because
federal common law allows for the enforcement of
unwritten settlement agreements, but the law of some
States, including Alabama, does not.
See Jowers v.
Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 2013 WL 424726, at *1
(M.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2013) (Thompson, J.). Here, because
the settlement agreement was written and signed--both
in short form during the mediation and in long form a
few days later--the choice of which law to apply is
immaterial.
4

In

his

motions

and

at

the

hearing,

Gray

has

identified what are essentially three grounds that he
believes render the settlement agreement unenforceable.
Even

accepting

surrounding

Gray’s

the

description

settlement

as

of

true,

the

events

each

of

his

court

will

arguments is unavailing.

C.
Before

addressing

them,

however,

the

recount the salient portions of his testimony.

At the

hearing on Gray’s motions, he stated as follows:
Gray

and

his

attorneys,

Edwards

and

Bennitt,

attended a settlement conference with Judge Walker on
June 18, 2015.

After some hours of mediation, late in

the afternoon, Gray and Edwards were in a witness room
and

discussed

whether

“the

mediation

was

going

according to what we wanted and ... the monetary amount
and the compensation was where we wanted”; he “decided,
no, that it wasn’t,” and he “conferred with [Edwards]
and asked her opinion about it, and she said that she
5

didn’t think that we were where we should be as well.”
Then, Gray stated, “I made the decision to stop and
tell her, ‘Let’s go.

I’m done.

Let’s go.’

said--her reply was, ‘I’m a gambler.’

And she

And she gave me

a hug and we went back into the courtroom with Judge
Walker.”

Hr’g Tr. (doc. no. 97) at 10.

Gray and Edwards went to speak with Judge Walker in
her courtroom.

Edwards said, “I’m sorry, Judge.

We’re

not going to be able to come to an agreement,” and
extended her hand, but Judge Walker did not shake it.
Hr’g Tr. at 11.

Gray did not remember Judge Walker’s

exact words, but recalled that she said, “sternly,”
“something to the fact of wasting the Court’s time” and
asked

multiple

times

when

he

had

decided

“bottom line was going to be $ 200,000.” 2

that

his

Hr’g Tr. at

2. The record is unclear as to the import of this
figure.
According to Gray, he had already made a
counteroffer below that amount.
Edwards does not
recall any reference to that specific figure, but does
remember Gray raising, rather than lowering, the amount
of money he was requesting, and Judge Walker saying
“something to [the] effect” of “if you’re going
(continued...)
6

12.

Gray initially “didn’t say a thing” in response to

her questions, but Edwards eventually “tried to explain
how [they] came to the figures [they] were at,” and
Gray explained that he sought adequate compensation for
the loss of his health insurance.

Hr’g Tr. at 13-14.

Then, Judge Walker left the courtroom to take a
personal call, and Gray told Edwards that he “did not
mean to upset the judge,” and then said to her, twice,
“If we just have to take the settlement, go ahead and
take it.”

When Judge Walker returned, Gray apologized

for upsetting her.

Hr’g Tr. at 15-16.

She reminded

him that the City had said it would seek reimbursement
of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $ 700,000 should
the case go to trial; Bennitt opined that paying that
amount

would

“financially

cripple”

Gray;

and

Judge

Walker clarified that the amount would be “$ 717,000,
to be exact.”

Hr’g Tr. at 19.

discussion

the

of

City’s

There was no further

attorneys’

fees,

but

backwards, we’re not going to get there today.”
Tr. at 73.
7

the

Hr’g

possibility
significantly
settlement. 3

of
into

having

to

Gray’s

pay

decision

them
to

factored

accept

the

Gray also recalls Edwards’s suggestion at

some point (he did not remember the precise timing of
this statement) that if he proceeded to trial, he would
be “drug through the mud.”

Hr’g Tr. at 21.

Gray described feeling “taken aback,” “like ... we
couldn’t leave,” and “nauseous.”

Hr’g Tr. at 17-18.

Apparently, he worried about being “held in contempt of
court.”

Hr’g Tr. at 22.

However, Gray acknowledged

that he was never threatened with contempt of court or
any other sanction, or told that he could not leave the

3. Edwards
offered
unrebutted
and
credible
testimony that she “advised him there’s a remote
possibility that you could have fees awarded against
you,” and that “it is a risk that’s out there” if his
case were “deemed not meritorious,” because she “felt
that we had a professional responsibility to advise Mr.
Gray of that in his consideration of the settlement.”
Hr’g Tr. at 79.
Although Gray contends that this
consideration weighed heavily in his decision to settle
the case, he did not mention it in his subsequent
communication with his attorneys.

8

mediation. 4
verbally

Although Gray admitted that he had not
informed

intimidated,

he

his

believed

attorneys
that

that

Edwards

he

should

felt
have

inferred as much from his demeanor and “eye contact.” 5
Hr’g Tr. at 58.
After

further

both

sides,

for

negotiations
in

which

between
Gray

agrees

participated, an agreement was reached.
terms

were

memorialized

in

a

the

attorneys
that

he

Its primary

handwritten

document,

which Gray signed in the presence of the City officials
4. Edwards offered credible testimony that she had
explained the mediation process, and his freedom to
“decide whether to accept or reject settlement offers,”
to Gray in advance of the conference.
Hr’g Tr. at
62-63.
She credibly testified that she “explained to
Mr. Gray before and during the mediation that he did
not have to accept anything the city offered, and that
he could walk.”
Hr’g Tr. at 65.
Gray’s counsel
credibly stated at the hearing that he had received his
“Miranda rights” regarding his freedom not to settle at
the beginning of the mediation. Hr’g Tr. at 125.
5. Edwards recalls telling Gray at this juncture,
“Perhaps what you’re sensing is frustration with the
fact that we’re not--we don’t appear to be mediating in
good faith toward a resolution when we’re going
backwards on our offers instead of trying to come to a
mutual compromise.” Hr’g Tr. at 78.

9

and attorneys.
communicated

Edwards and counsel for the City then

the

final

settlement

to

Judge

Walker,

while Gray sat with Bennitt in the witness room. 6
The next day, Gray read in a local newspaper, the
Dothan Eagle, comments made by two City commissioners
regarding

the

settlement.

Although

he

could

not

“remember the specifics,” he believes that the comments
“were regarding how they thought that they would have
won,

but

opted--some

of

them

opted

to

pay

minimize costs, something along those lines.”

it

to

Hr’g Tr.

at 51-52.
Gray left town that day.

That night, Gray sent

Edwards an email in which he stated, in the midst of a
message expressing appreciation for her assistance with
his case: “I was under the impression that I could
withdraw

[from

mediation]

without

any

obligation

to

6. Gray stated that Bennitt told him, “You might
not feel good about it right now, but you’ll feel good
about it when you cash the check.”
Hr’g Tr. at 25.
Edwards remembers that Gray “seemed tired and ready to
have it over with ... [and] relieved to have some
closure ... to me, as we were leaving.”
Hr’g Tr. at
83.
10

accept settlement.

Well, I didn’t feel that the judge

had the same understanding.

After voicing our want to

withdraw, I definitely felt intimidated and pressured
by the judge when she began questioning if I had wasted
her time over and over again.”
next

morning,

described

as

he
a

texted

Hr’g Tr. at 56.

Edwards

“hypothetical

to

ask

question”:

The

what

“If

I

he
felt

intimidated/pressured, compelled by the Court to settle
during mediation, is there any recourse in reversing
prior to the official paperwork [meaning the long-form
release] being signed?”

Hr’g Tr. at 44.

(Gray did not

testify as to Edwards’s response; Edwards stated that
she “could only give him my professional opinion, that
I

didn’t

believe

that

Judge

Walker

intimidated him into any settlement.”
Gray

received

the

long-form

coerced

or

Hr’g Tr. at 85.)

release

by

email,

reviewed it over the phone with Edwards and asked her
questions about some of its terms.

After he agreed to

all of them, Judge Walker held a telephone conference
on

the

record,

during

which
11

counsel

for

both

sides

stated to Judge Walker that they had authority to bind
their

clients

and

reported

that

a

full

settlement of the case had been reached.

and

final

The next day,

Gray signed the long-form release and faxed it back to
Edwards. 7
Later

that

month,

after

reading

this

court’s

opinion on the City’s summary-judgment motions, Gray
texted Edwards to say that the opinion was “good” and
to suggest that “we could have made more money.”
Tr.

at

45.

Gray

then

met

with

his

attorneys

Hr’g
and

expressed his displeasure with the settlement, saying
that he received “no justice.”

Hr’g Tr. at 35.

He

also learned that the urgency regarding the signing of
the long-form release had been due to the Mayor of
Dothan’s travel plans, not Judge Walker’s.

Gray asked

his attorneys about the possibility of seeking to set

7. Gray testified that Edwards called him and told
him that “Judge Walker was going to be out of town for
the weekend and needed to have that signed before she
left.” Hr’g Tr. at 32. Edwards recalled telling Gray
instead that it was a City official who was going out
of town.
12

aside the settlement agreement, and they informed him
that it would be a conflict of interest for them to
represent him in doing so.

He refused to accept the

checks his attorneys attempted to give him, and now
seeks

to

have

the

court

set

aside

the

settlement

agreement and reinstate the case for trial.

D.
1.
First, Gray contends that the settlement has not
yet been “consummated” because he has refused to accept
or

cash

the

settlement

checks

defendants to his attorneys.

tendered

by

the

(During the pendency of

these motions, the funds at issue have been deposited
with the clerk of the court.)

Gray believes that,

pursuant to the terms of the judgment, his own refusal
to accept payment entitles him to void the settlement
agreement and thereby avoid his waiver of claims.
Elementary contract law reveals why this is wrong:
the settlement agreement in this case was a bilateral
13

contract (one accepted by giving a promise rather than
by performing an act), in which Gray promised not to
proceed on his claims against the City in exchange for
the City’s promise to pay him.
additional

(There were, of course,

terms--other promises--not relevant here.)

An offer to pay a monetary amount was made, and Gray
accepted it, in the manner requested by the City, by
giving

as

promise

to

consideration
dismiss

parties were bound.

(that
case.

the

is,
At

in

exchange)

that

point,

his
both

See Pezold Air Charters v. Phoenix

Corp., 192 F.R.D. 721, 725 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (Sharp,
J.).
this

(“With a bilateral contract such as the one in
case,

complete

acceptance
the

is

the

contract.

last
An

act

necessary

acceptance

is

to
‘a

manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by
the offeree in a manner invited or required by the
offer.’

Restatement

(Second)

of

Contracts

§ 50

(1979).”).
The

court

retained

jurisdiction

to

enforce

the

settlement or allow the claims to proceed to trial in
14

case

one

breach

party

of

the

issue--indeed,

was

aggrieved

agreement.
what

it

by

What

would

the
the

have

other
court

party’s
not

without

been

did

the

authority to enter--is a judgment granting either party
the

option

to

already-binding

withdraw

unilaterally

settlement

agreement

by

from

an

refusing

to

accept the other party’s performance.

2.
Second, Gray argues that he did not authorize his
attorneys, Edwards and Bennitt, to settle the case on
his behalf; that his attorneys coerced him to agree to
settle

the

case;

or

that

Judge

Walker

coerced

him.

These contentions are belied by the record.
In

some

sense,

Gray’s

attorneys’

authority

is

beside the point, because he himself manifested assent
to the settlement by signing the handwritten agreement
and the long-form release.

However, for the sake of

completeness, the court will assess his argument that
they lacked authority.
15

“For an attorney to bind his client to a settlement
agreement with an opposing party in litigation, the
attorney must act with either ‘express authority’ or
‘apparent
HarWin,

authority.’
Inc.,

733

See

F.2d

Mid-South

386,

391

Towing

(5th

Co.

Cir.

v.

1984)

(federal common law); Alexander v. Burch, 968 So. 2d
992, 996-97 (Ala. 2006) (Alabama law).

In settling a

lawsuit, an attorney acts with express authority when,
based on the statements and conduct of the client, the
attorney reasonably believes that he is acting as the
client

wishes.

§ 2.01.

See

Restatement

(Third)

Of

Agency

By contrast, an attorney acts with apparent

authority when, based on the client's statements and
conduct,

the

opposing

party

in

the

litigation

reasonably believes that the client has authorized the
attorney to settle the lawsuit (regardless of whether
the client in fact gave such authorization).
§ 2.03.
to

See id.

Therefore, if a client instructs her attorney

refuse

settlement

offers,

but

conducts

herself

before the opposing party in a manner that indicates
16

the opposite, she is nevertheless bound to a settlement
agreement made by her attorney.”

Jowers v. Ala. Bd. of

Pardons & Paroles, 2013 WL 424726, at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Feb. 4, 2013) (Thompson, J.), aff’d sub nom. Jowers v.
Alabama, 551 F. App’x 525 (11th Cir. 2014).
Here, the evidence reflects that Gray’s attorneys
had both apparent and express authority to agree to the
settlement
before

at

Judge

the

end

Walker.

of

the

There

mediation

can

be

no

conference
doubt

that

Edwards and Bennitt acted with apparent authority, for
“throughout

the

entirety

of

the

mediation

session,

[Gray] did not state to the defendants’ representative
or counsel that [he] desired not to settle, nor did
[his] outward conduct [in their presence] in any other
way

provide

such.”

the

defendants

with

any

Jowers, 2013 WL 424726, at *2.

indication

of

Indeed, Gray’s

counsel virtually conceded that at the hearing on his
motions that his attorneys had apparent authority.
The

court

reasonably

also

believed

concludes
that

he
17

that
had

Gray’s

actually

attorneys
authorized

them to settle the case.

As in Jowers, the evidence

reveals that Gray “expressed misgivings,” and at one
point expressed his desire to end the mediation, but
then

continued

to

participate

“begrudgingly

consented

circumstances

were

to

and,

settlement

otherwise.” 8

2013

in

the

while
WL

end,

wishing

424726,

at

*2-*3.
Furthermore, the conduct of his attorneys and Judge
Walker

was

neither

coercive

nor

otherwise

improper.

Gray’s attorneys properly advised him that he was free
to accept or reject settlement offers, and gave him
ethical advice regarding his potential liabilities in
going to trial.
he

felt

Gray did not inform his attorneys that

intimidated

or

unfree

to

end

the

mediation

prior to signing the handwritten agreement at the end
of the session, and they cannot be expected to have
divined his feelings.

8. At the hearing, Gray’s counsel “agree[d] that
he continued” to participate in the mediation process
after expressing his desire to leave. Hr’g Tr. at 118.
18

At

this

point,

Gray

entered

into

a

binding

settlement agreement; by the time he first articulated
to Edwards that he had felt pressure to settle, he was
no

longer

declining

free
to

to

withdraw

execute

the

from

the

long-form

settlement
release.

by
See

Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209
(5th Cir. Dec. 7, 1981) (“If a party to a Title VII
suit who has previously authorized a settlement changes
his mind when presented with the settlement documents,
that

party

remains

bound

by

the

terms

of

the

agreement.”). 9
As for Judge Walker: If she had in fact threatened
to hold Gray in contempt unless he settled, that would
have been patently inappropriate.
thing.

To

the

extent

that

But she did no such

Judge

Walker

appeared

9. Because this case was decided after the
Eleventh Circuit’s split from the former Fifth Circuit,
it is merely persuasive precedent, and not binding on
this court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding
precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to the close of business on September
30, 1981).
19

“stern”

or

productively

questioned
towards

entirely appropriate.
encourage

and

whether

Gray

settlement,

these

moving

actions

were

The function of a mediator is to

facilitate

non-coercive

was

manner,

settlement

see

in

Menaged

a

reasonable

v.

City

of

Jacksonville, Fla., 2013 WL 461999, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Jan.

14,

2013)

(Toomey,

M.J.),

as

Judge

Walker

did

here.
The

court

finds

that

Gray

knowingly

and

voluntarily--with a full understanding of his rights
and

without

coercion--entered

into

the

settlement

agreement.

3.
Third and finally, Gray contends that the City of
Dothan

has

breached

the

settlement

agreement

by

commenting publicly on it.
As a preliminary matter, the court notes that it is
somewhat difficult to evaluate this claim in light of
the

indefinite

evidence

as
20

to

the

content

of

those

comments:

Gray

did

not

place

in

the

record

the

newspaper article at issue, and testified that he was
unable to “remember the specifics” and that he did not
“want

to

speculate.”

What

Gray

did

recall

were

statements “along [the] lines” of “how they thought
that they would have won, but opted--some of them opted
to pay it to minimize costs.”

Hr’g Tr. at 52.

Even assuming that this is competent evidence from
which the court could conclude that city commissioners
made public statements to this effect, Gray has not
demonstrated that they represent a material breach of
the settlement agreement entitling him to rescission.
“For

there

to

be

a

breach

of

the

settlement

agreement that is sufficient to discharge a party from
her

obligations

under

the

contract,

and

that

would

allow her to open up the underlying claims for further
adjudication, the breach must be ‘material.’”
v.

Brown,

987

F.

Supp.

893,

905

(M.D.

Malladi

Ala.

1997)

(Thompson, J.), aff'd sub nom. Malladi v. Gober, 150
F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 1998).
21

“According to the original

Restatement of Contracts, if the failure of one party
to perform part of a contract is so material that it
results in the other party not receiving substantially
what he bargained for, the duty of the injured party is
discharged
carrying

and

out

he
his

is,

thereby,

wholly

undertaking.

Contracts § 274, 397 (1932).

See

excused

from

Restatement

of

If, on the other hand,

the failure to perform is not material, the injured
party retains his duty to render his performance.
id. § 274i(1).

See

There is still a breach of contract,

but the innocent party must recoup his losses, if any,
for such an immaterial breach through an action for
damages or one of the other procedural devices designed
for that purpose.”

Ferrell v. Sec’y of Def., 662 F.2d

1179, 1181 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 1981).
Gray
statements
the

suggests
breached

settlement

that
the

the

confidentiality

agreement.

disclosure

of

the

settlement

negotiations,

commissioners’

That

agreement,

its

except
22

provision

provision
contents,
that

alleged

the

of

prohibits
and

the

City

was

permitted to disclose the final settlement amount (and,
therefore, the existence of the settlement) in order to
obtain approval by the City Commission.
this

provision

prohibited

the

Nothing in

commissioners

from

commenting publicly on their reasons for settling the
case, so long as, in doing so, they did not reveal the
contents

of

the

negotiations.

settlement

agreement

or

of

the

Simply stating that they had decided to

settle in order to save the City money and not because
they believed they would lose the case did not reveal
either

the

contents

of

either

the

agreement

or

the

negotiations. 10
Although Gray did not explicitly argue as much, he
could plausibly have contended that the City breached
10. The commissioners’ statement that “they thought
that they would have won” arguably comes close to
revealing one term of the agreement: that the City
denied liability. However, the court will not consider
this argument, both because Gray has not raised it, and
because the commissioners’ statement is not necessarily
inconsistent with an admission of liability; in theory,
if a plaintiff insists on an admission of liability as
a condition of settlement, a defendant might make that
admission while still believing that it would likely
have prevailed at trial.
23

another provision of the settlement agreement, which
prohibits

the

commissioners

from

“mak[ing]

any

disparaging or negative statement, written or verbal,
to any third parties relating to Gray, the facts or
circumstances

surrounding

Agreement,”

when

“how

thought

they

the

his

claims,

commissioners
that

they

or

allegedly

would

this
stated

have

won.”

Confidential Agreement & Release (doc. no. 70-1) at 8.;
Hr’g Tr. at 52.
To

the

extent

that

this

constitutes

a

negative

statement, it could hardly be a milder or more generic
one.

(Of course, a detailed statement as to why the

commissioners believed the City would have prevailed in
light of the perceived weaknesses of his claims might
have been a much more serious matter.)
has

offered

no

evidence

to

show

Moreover, Gray

either

that

the

non-disparagement provision was one he bargained for or
cared much about--his focus was clearly
compensation

(which

he

obtained)

24

and

on monetary
reinstatement

(which he did not)--or that he has suffered any injury
as a result of this alleged breach. 11

E.
As stated, the court will grant Gray’s motion to
set aside the judgment and reinstate the case to the
extent that the court can adjudicate, as it has now
done

above,

whether

the

parties

have

a

settlement

agreement that should be enforced. However, because the
court

has

now

found

that

an

enforceable

settlement

exists, Gray’s motion to reinstate the case will be
denied to the extent he seeks to litigate the claims in
his complaint, and this case will be dismissed anew in
a

judgment

to

follow,

on

the

basis

of

Gray’s

stipulation of dismissal.

* * *

11. At worst, this was a minor breach, for which
Gray could obtain nominal damages (he has not sought
damages
here);
rescission
would
be
wholly
inappropriate.
25

It is therefore ORDERED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff

Ivan

“Keith”

Gray’s

motion

to

set

aside the judgment of dismissal and reinstate
this

case

(doc.

no.

73),

and

his

motion

amending that motion (doc. no. 74), are granted
to the extent that the ‘conditional’ judgment
(doc.

no.

reinstated

68)
for

adjudicating

is

set

aside

the
his

and

the

case

limited

purpose

of

challenges

to

the

enforceability of the settlement agreement and
denied to the extent that plaintiff Gray seeks
to set aside the settlement agreement for any
other purpose.
(2) The

court

declares

that

the

settlement

agreement is enforceable.
(3) Plaintiff Gray’s motion to clarify (doc. no.
70) is granted to the extent that the foregoing
opinion provides the requested clarification.

26

(4) Plaintiff Gray’s motion for a status update and
an

order

to

dissolve

the

confidentiality

agreement and release (doc. no. 76) is denied.
(5) An

appropriate

dismissing

this

case

unconditional
with

prejudice

judgment
will

entered.
DONE, this the 9th day of August, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

be