Hooks v. Dollar General Corporation et al
Filing
79
OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Dft Dollar General Corporation's 27 motion for summary judgment and dfts Farmers Home Furniture and Glass Properties, LLC's 29 motion for summary judgment are granted as to all claims except the premises-liability claim; (2) The premises-liability claim will go to trial. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/10/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist) (wcl, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRIDGETT HOOKS,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
DOLLAR GENERAL
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14cv1053-MHT
(WO)
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a slip-and-fall case.
Hooks
brings
liability,
claims
and
of
negligence
wantonness
against
Plaintiff Bridgett
per
se,
premises
defendants
Dollar
General Corporation, which operates the store where she
fell,
and
premises
Farmers
to
Home
Dollar
Furniture,
General. 1
which
leases
the
This
court
has
1. The motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 29)
filed by Farmers Home Furniture and Glass Properties,
LLC explains that, subsequent to the incident at issue,
“[a]ny ownership interest Glass had in the property was
taken over by Farmers Home Furniture,” and thus refers
to both defendants as one.
This court will adopt the
same approach.
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (diversity)
and 1441 (removal).
This cause is before the court on the motions for
summary judgment filed by Dollar General and by Farmers
Home Furniture.
the
same
except
Because the two motions mostly raise
arguments,
where
noted.
they
are
For
the
considered
reasons
together,
stated
below,
these motions will be granted in part and denied in
part.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant
shows
that
there
is
no
genuine
dispute
as
to
any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”
asserting
that
a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
fact
cannot
be
or
is
“A party
genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to
parts of materials in the record, including depositions
...
[or]
showing
that
the
2
materials
cited
do
not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute,
or
that
an
adverse
party
evidence
to
support
the
cannot
produce
fact.”
Fed.
admissible
R.
Civ.
P.
56(c)(1).
In making its determination, the court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party
and
draw
favor of that party.
Zenith
Radio
Corp.,
all
reasonable
inferences
in
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
475
U.S.
574,
587
(1986).
To
defeat a motion for summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party “must do more than show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Id. at
586.
Because this is a diversity case, the court applies
the substantive law of Alabama, as articulated by the
state
courts.
Hanna
v.
Plumer,
380
U.S.
460,
465
(1965) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938)).
3
II. FACTS
Hooks was a regular customer of a Dollar General
Store in Enterprise, Alabama.
Dollar General leases
the store from Farmers Home Furniture. 2
Hooks had shopped at this store an average of two
or three times per week for the five years preceding
the incident at issue here.
She generally entered and
exited the store using the handicap ramp--which was in
front of the store and painted blue--because she had
knee problems stemming from rheumatoid arthritis and
2. Dollar General (the lessee) argues that a term
of its lease with Farmers Home Furniture (the lessor)-which warrantied that the premises were safe, that the
lessor would maintain them, and that they were in
compliance with the ADA--relieves it of any liability
under Hooks’s negligence-per-se theory (founded on an
alleged violation of the ADA). However, Dollar General
nowhere makes the same argument with respect to Hooks’s
premises-liability and wantonness claims.
Because
summary judgment will be granted on Hooks’s negligenceper-se claim, the court need not address here whether
any liability eventually found would be imposed jointly
and severally on the two defendants.
4
had undergone knee surgeries. 3
She had never noticed
any problems with the ramp.
On the day in question, Hooks arrived at the store
in the early afternoon.
spot
and
walked
handicap ramp.
wet.
across
She parked in a ‘handicap’
the
parking
lot
and
up
the
Because it was drizzling, the ramp was
Hooks was wearing flip-flops.
In her deposition, Hooks stated that she did not
have any difficulty walking up the ramp as she entered
the store.
At that time, she did not notice anything
wrong with the ramp; specifically, she did not see any
broken concrete on the ramp.
She was having no trouble
with her vision, and nothing obstructed her view of the
ramp.
On her way into and out of the store, she was
cautious, on account of the rain and her knee problems.
On the way out of the store, Hooks took the same
path by which she had
entered the store.
She was
3. The defendants do not appear to dispute that
Hooks is disabled.
5
carrying one shopping bag.
As she stepped on the ramp,
she slipped and fell, suffering significant injuries.
Hooks stated that she stepped onto the ramp with
her left foot, and that it slid, ending up on the
ground beside the ramp.
and did not trip.
She was clear that she slid,
However, she was unable to identify
where on the ramp she first stepped, or how many steps
she had taken on the ramp prior to sliding.
See doc.
no. 27, ex. A, at 212-15.
When asked whether she had “any idea what caused
[her] to begin to fall,” Hooks initially said no.
at 173.
Id.
However, she later answered affirmatively the
question: “Was it your left foot that began to slide?
Is that what started your fall?”
Id. at 177.
Hooks
further testified that “the piece [she] stepped on was
loose,” agreed that “a piece came off the ramp after
[the] fall,” and stated that after she fell, that piece
was “laying off beside [her].”
Id. at 175.
When Hooks
was asked again whether she “recall[ed] what it was
6
that made [her] slip and fall,” she replied that “[i]t
was the looseness of the ramp”; when asked to confirm
that “it was a loose piece of the ramp [that] caused
you to slip,” she nodded her head. 4
See doc. no. 40,
ex. A, at 198-99.
Hooks did not report the accident to the store at
the time; she later called to make a report.
III. DISCUSSION
Hooks seeks damages for injuries she sustained when
she slipped and fell on a ramp connecting the parking
lot to the sidewalk in front of the store.
that
the
ramp
was
constructed
applicable
law
and
was
in
inadequately
She alleges
violation
of
maintained.
Specifically, she raises three claims: (1) that the
construction
of
the
ramp
failed
to
comply
with
the
4. A color photograph of the ramp, submitted in
evidence, reveals that it was transected by cracks, and
that portions of the concrete along both edges were
chipped away. Doc. no. 44, ex. C.
7
requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
and that this failure constituted negligence per se;
(2) that the defendants breached the duty of care they
owed her as an invitee in how they maintained the ramp,
that
this
breach
caused
her
injury,
and
that
the
defendants were therefore negligent under a premisesliability theory; and (3) that the defendants knowingly
disregarded
the
likelihood
that
injury
would
result
from their inadequate maintenance of the ramp, that
this
disregard
caused
her
injury,
and
that
defendants were therefore liable for wantonness.
the
Each
claim is addressed in turn below.
1. Negligence Per Se
Hooks suggests that the ramp on which she slipped
and fell was not compliant with the ADA, because it was
‘built-up,’ extending out from the curve, rather than
concave (i.e., cut into the curb).
negligence
per
se
under
the
8
ADA
Hooks’s claim of
fails,
however,
because,
as
hearing,
she
evidence
to
counsel
has
prove)
acknowledged
not
at
alleged
(much
this
violation
that
the
less
of
pretrial
offered
the
ADA
caused her injuries. 5
In order for a plaintiff to show that violation of
a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se in
Alabama, she must show: “(1) The party charged with
negligent conduct [has] violated the statute; (2) the
statute was enacted to protect a class of persons which
includes the litigant seeking to assert the statute;
(3)
the
injury
was
of
a
type
contemplated
by
the
5. The defendants suggest that Hooks is also making
a claim directly under the ADA.
The court does not
read her complaint to raise such a claim.
To the
extent that Hooks’s responses to the motions to dismiss
do discuss, quite briefly, a claim that the defendants
were
deliberately
indifferent
to
her
federally
protected rights under the ADA, this claim fails
because although private plaintiffs can obtain damages
for intentional discrimination (including deliberate
indifference) under Title II of the ADA, no private
right of action for money damages is available under
the provision of the ADA relevant to this case, Title
III. Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1283 & n.7 (11th
Cir. 1998).
9
statute; and (4) the statutory violation proximately
caused the injury.
Edwards v. United States, 552 F.
Supp. 635, 637 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (Thompson, J.) (quoting
Fox
v.
Bartholf,
374
So.
2d
294,
295
(Ala.
1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Even assuming that the ramp at issue was indeed
constructed
in
violation
of
the
ADA
and
its
implementing regulations, and that Hooks is a disabled
person
who
failed
to
suggesting
is
protected
identify
that
the
caused her to fall.
by
any
the
statute,
evidence
design
of
the
in
ramp
Hooks
the
has
record
proximately
Indeed, Hooks testified in her
deposition that it was the loose, broken concrete of
the
ramp
that
caused
her
to
implicated the cut of the ramp.
fall;
she
nowhere
The defendants are
therefore entitled to summary judgment on Hooks’s claim
of negligence per se.
The court notes, moreover,
that the
ADA is not
relevant to the standard of care applicable to Hooks’s
10
premises-liability claims, for much the same reason:
ADA standards governing the construction of the ramp
are
in
no
way
relevant
to
whether
the
failure
to
Next, Hooks raises a premises-liability claim. 6
In
maintain the ramp breached a duty of care.
2. Premises Liability
a premises-liability case, a plaintiff must prove the
same elements of negligence as in any tort case: duty,
breach of duty, causation, and damages.
Sessions v.
Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 2002).
Under
Alabama law, “[a] store patron is generally considered
6. Hooks also appears to articulate a ‘traditional’
negligence
claim,
as
distinct
from
her
premises-liability claim. As this court has explained,
however, only “[w]hen the affirmative conduct of the
landowner causes the injury [do] traditional negligence
principles apply” under Alabama law; when the injury
arises from a “condition of the premises,” by contrast,
premises-liability standards govern. Shelley v. White,
782 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1296 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (Albritton,
J.) (quoting Lilya v. Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc.,
855 So. 2d 1049, 1053 (Ala. 2003)).
Hooks contends
that she was injured by a condition of the premises,
not any affirmative act by the defendants.
11
a
business
invitee
for
premises-liability
purposes,”
Blalock v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 1:06cv381, 2007
WL 1412445, at *1 (M.D. Ala. May 11, 2007) (Thompson,
J.), and the parties agree that the duty of care owed
to invitees is applicable here.
That
duty
is
“to
exercise
reasonable
care
to
provide and maintain reasonable safe premises for the
use of [] customers.”
Denmark v. Mercantile Stores
Co., 844 So. 2d 1189, 1192 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Maddox
v.
Kmart
Corp.,
565
So.
2d
14,
16
(Ala.
1990)).
However, under Alabama law, “a landowner is not the
insurer of the safety of his invitees, [so] the owner’s
duty is negated where the invitee or customer knew or
should have known about the hazard that
caused his injury.”
purportedly
Blalock, 2007 WL 1412445, at *1
(citing Ex parte Moutain Top Indoor Flea Mkt., 699 So.
2d 158, 161 (Ala. 1997); Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981
So. 2d 355, 361-63 (Ala. 2006)).
12
With respect to this claim, the defendants contend
that Hooks has failed to create a dispute of material
fact as to (1) the cause of her fall and (2) whether
the hazard that caused the fall was open and obvious.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Hooks, the court disagrees.
First, the defendants assert that Hooks has offered
only speculation as to the cause of her fall.
On this
point, they cite Ex Parte Howard L. Martin Distributing
Co., Inc., 769 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala. 2000) (“Alabama
juries are not permitted to speculate as to the cause
of
an
accident.
See
Brookwood
Medical
Ctr.
v.
Lindstrom, 763 So. 2d 951 (Ala. 2000); Turner v. Azalea
Box
Co.,
evidence
508
So.
points
2d
253,
equally
254
to
(Ala.
1987)
inferences
(‘[w]hen
that
are
favorable and to inferences that are unfavorable to the
moving party, the evidence lacks probative value; and
the evidence may not be used to support one inference
13
over another because such use is mere conjecture and
speculation’).”).
However, this case is distinguishable from Ex Parte
Howard L. Martin Distributing Co.
There, the plaintiff
agreed that she “would have to speculate” as to what
she tripped on, because she did not “know” or “see”-either before or after her fall--what aspect of the
entryway to the store caused her to fall.
at 315.
769 So. 2d
She addressed the cause of her fall multiple
times in her deposition, and every single statement was
qualified (with phrases like “As far as I know...” and
“I think...”).
Here, while Hooks was not a model of clarity or
conviction in her deposition testimony regarding the
moments leading up to her fall, she stated that she
fell because of “the looseness of the ramp”: a piece of
the concrete along the edge of the ramp came loose
underfoot.
Compare Tice v. Tice, 361 So. 2d 1051, 1052
(Ala. 1978) (affirming a grant of summary judgment in a
14
case where the plaintiff “could not state the cause of
her fall,” and “show[ed] only that there were things in
the yard over which she might have tripped,” including
children’s toys, one of which she “believed ... must”
have caused her fall).
In an additional and important
contrast to Ex Parte Howard L. Martin Distributing Co.,
Hooks also testified that she observed and identified
the
mechanism
of
injury--the
concrete--once she fell to the ground.
315 (“Q.
...
now-fragmented
Compare id. at
So you couldn’t say one way or the other
what it was that caused you to trip, is that fair to
say?
A.
Right.
There was nothing there when I got up
that I could tell.”).
Hooks’s testimony could be more compelling, and a
factfinder
trial
that
might
be
her
fall
persuaded
was
by
caused
other
by
the
evidence
at
rain-slicked
surface of the ramp and not by its crumbling edges.
But she stated in her deposition that the loose ramp
did cause her fall, not that she believed that it did.
15
Although
“a
court
may
disregard
[the
non-moving]
party’s sworn testimony if the testimony is internally
inconsistent” in “determining whether [that] party has
created facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment,” Willis v. City of Los Angeles, 57 F. App’x
283,
285
(9th
Cir.
2002),
this
principle
does
warrant summary judgment in the present case.
not
Hooks
did respond with a one-word denial when initially asked
whether she knew “what caused [her] to begin to fall,”
but a factfinder could reasonably decide to believe her
later, more fully articulated testimony identifying the
cause of her fall.
Moreover, Hooks offered collateral
support for this later statement, in testifying that
after she fell, she saw a piece of concrete off to the
side of the ramp.
Her earlier answer might impact her
credibility, but credibility determinations are not to
be made at the summary-judgment stage.
See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
16
In sum, a factfinder that credits Hooks’s testimony
could decide the case in her favor.
See Lancaster v.
Carnival Corp., 85 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1346-47 (S.D. Fla.
2015) (Moore, J.) (“Although Plaintiff stated at one
point
in
his
deposition
that
he
never
saw
what
he
tripped over, he also stated at other times that he saw
the bag he tripped over and he described it in detail.
Defendant
argues
that
Plaintiff’s
account
should
be
ignored because it is internally inconsistent; however,
implicit in Defendant’s argument is its concession that
the
over
record
a
contains
piece
of
evidence
luggage.
that
Plaintiff
The
tripped
inconsistency
in
Plaintiff’s account is a credibility and fact-finding
determination
for
the
jury,
but
the
evidence
when
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff could
lead
a
tripped
rational
over
a
juror
piece
of
to
conclude
luggage.”).
causation should therefore go to trial.
17
that
The
Plaintiff
issue
of
Second,
the
defendants
argue
that
there
is
no
dispute of material fact as to whether the defect in
the ramp that allegedly caused Hooks’s fall was open
and obvious.
“For
a
defect
to
be
‘known,’
[or
‘open,’]
the
plaintiff must be made aware of the existence of the
condition and must appreciate the danger it involved.
‘Obvious’
means
that
the
condition
and
risk
are
apparent to, and would be recognized by, a reasonable
person in the position of the invitee.
Therefore, the
‘obvious’ test is an objective one, whereas the ‘known’
test is subjective.”
Blalock, 2007 WL 1412445, at *2
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 7
7. The Alabama Supreme Court has vacillated as to
whether the openness and obviousness of a hazard is an
affirmative defense or the negation of the duty element
of the tort, and thus whether defendant or plaintiff
bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Blalock, 2007
WL 1412445, at *3 (observing that although Denmark v.
Mercantile Stores Co., 844 So. 2d 1189, 1194 (Ala.
2002), suggests that it is an affirmative defense,
“this interpretation of the law [is] contradicted by
more recent cases,” such as Jones, 981 So. 2d at 361(continued...)
18
Hooks states in her deposition that she did not
notice the broken concrete, or appreciate its danger,
until after her fall.
Subjectively, the defect was not
known to her.
The more difficult question is whether the broken
concrete
was
repeatedly
objectively
emphasize
obvious.
that
The
Hooks
defendants
admitted
at
her
deposition that the damage to the ramp was “in the
open” and “obvious” to her after she fell.
27, ex. A, at 215-16.
Doc. no.
They also point out that Hooks
had seen and used the ramp many times before she fell.
But in some cases, a hidden trap will become obvious
only after it has sprung (and no matter how many times
it
has
been
observed);
an
iceberg
calving looks very much intact.
on
the
verge
of
Hooks alleges that
loose concrete gave way under her foot and separated
62).
Summary judgment is due to be denied on this
claim under either standard, so the court need not
decide the issue here.
However, the parties are to
address it in their pretrial briefs.
19
from the ramp; based on this testimony, a reasonable
factfinder
could
conclude
that
before
the
piece
on
which Hooks stepped had separated from the ramp, it was
not obvious. 8
Whether the defect in the ramp was an
obvious one is thus a question for trial.
3. Wantonness
The Supreme Court of Alabama has defined wantonness
as “the conscious doing of some act or the omission of
some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and
being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an
act, injury will likely or probably result.”
Alfa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998)
(citation
omitted).
“Wantonness
may
arise
after
8. As the defendants point out, Hooks’s expert,
Traci Campbell, stated in her deposition that the
broken concrete along portions of the ramp’s edge was
“easy to see without much effort,” because “there is a
contrast between the gray of the [broken] concrete and
the blue of the [unbroken] painted part.” Doc. no. 49,
ex. 1, at 115.
However, Campbell nowhere suggested
that it would be easy to see that a piece of concrete
along the edge was about to break off.
20
discovery of actual peril, by conscious failure to use
preventative means at hand.”
Tolbert v. Gulsby, 333
So. 2d 129, 132 (Ala. 1976) (citation omitted). 9
The Alabama Supreme Court has held, as Hooks notes,
that wantonness claims should be “submitted to the jury
unless there is a total lack of evidence from which the
jury could reasonably infer” that the defendant was
conscious of the serious risk of injury its actions or
omissions
created,
228,
(Ala.
231
holding
came
McDougle v. Shaddrix, 534 So. 2d
1988)
down
(citation
before
the
omitted),
“scintilla
but
rule”
that
of
evidence was replaced in 2006 by the requirement that
“proof by substantial evidence shall be required to
9.
Hooks
has
certainly
presented
evidence
sufficient
to
allow
a
reasonable
factfinder
to
conclude--as required for a finding of premises
liability--that the defendants knew or should have
known (because they inspected the ramp) that the
concrete along the edge of the ramp was broken.
However, to prevail on her wantonness claim, Hooks
would have to prove not only that the defendants knew
of the broken concrete along the edge of the ramp, but
also
that
they
were
aware
of
and
consciously
disregarded the danger it posed.
21
submit an issue of fact to the trier of the facts,”
Ala. Code § 12-21-12.
Critically, for present purposes, evidence that a
defendant is aware that another person has previously
“fallen
broken,”
in
the
absent
same
area
evidence
where
showing
the
pavement
that
the
[i]s
broken
pavement is “what caused th[at] fall,” does not suffice
to carry a plaintiff past the summary judgment stage on
a wantonness claim, even under the no-longer-applicable
scintilla rule.
Berness
v. Regency Square Assocs.,
Ltd., 514 So. 2d 1346, 1350 (Ala. 1987).
Although
Hooks
has
presented
evidence
that
the
defendants were aware of two other patrons who fell on
the ramp, one in 2009 and one in 2010, she has offered
no evidence to suggest that these falls were caused by
the defect that she alleges caused hers: loose concrete
along the edge of the ramp.
In fact, the evidence
makes clear that both the 2009 and 2010 falls were due
to the ramp being wet.
22
The documents and deposition testimony in evidence
regarding
the
2009
incident
show
that
the
store
recorded, on a form signed by the customer who fell,
the “Cause of Incident” to be “slippery ramp.” 10
no. 40, ex. C, at 4.
Doc.
Dollar General’s District Manager
agreed in her deposition that the store had made a
“report to corporate concerning a need for maintenance
on
the
ramp”
and
that
“the
landlord
was
contacted”
after the incident, but there is no indication that
this
communication
concerned
edges of the ramp.
the
2010
cause
is
response
to
the
one
concrete
Doc. no. 40, ex. B, at 66.
incident,
in
broken
the
form
of
only
of
Hooks’s
evidence
Famers
on
As for
regarding
Home
the
its
Furniture’s
interrogatories,
which
10. In follow-up notes, a store employee reported
that the customer’s sister called and said that the
customer “fell on a big crack on the ramp.”
However,
after another employee found “no visible cracks” in the
ramp, the customer herself was contacted again “to find
out exactly what her claim was”; she again stated that
she “slipped b/c of the rain in the parking lot.” Doc.
no. 40, ex. C, at 5.
23
states that the customer “slipped on the ramp due to
[it] being wet.”
Doc. no. 40, ex. C, at 2.
Finally, Hooks points to an email exchange between
a
property
inspector
and
a
property
maintenance
supervisor, both employed by Farmers Home Furniture,
which occurred a few months before her fall.
the
inspector
stated
that
the
ramp
In it,
“need[s]
to
be
replaced with one that cuts into the sidewalk.”
The
supervisor
the
replied
that
there
was
no
“money
in
budget for this,” but asked whether “painting it with
slip resistant paint would ... help the problem with
people
slipping.”
The
inspector
answered
in
the
affirmative, and then informed the supervisor that when
Farmers Home Furniture
“fix[es]
the ramp, [it] will
most likely be required to bring all of them up to
code.
Budget $ 13,000.”
While
this
Doc. no. 40, ex. F.
evidence
does
suggest
that
the
defendants were aware that their ramp was dangerously
slippery,
and
were
quite
irresponsible
24
in
remedying
that problem, Hooks specifically contends that she fell
not because the ramp was slippery, but rather because
of
loose
concrete
along
its
edge. 11
As
a
result,
summary judgment is due to be granted on her wantonness
claim.
11. It is of course true that if the defendants had
responded appropriately to the known risk of injury
posed by the slipperiness of the ramp, they might well
have opted to replace the ramp (as they eventually did,
after Hooks’s fall).
Had the ramp been replaced, the
broken concrete along its edge would have been removed,
and could not have caused her to fall.
This sort of
incidental
causal
relationship,
however,
is
not
sufficient to support a wantonness claim.
Consider
this analogy:
Multiple patrons of a cafeteria have
burnt themselves on the poorly insulated handle of a
decrepit toaster oven.
If it had been promptly
replaced with a new one, the person in whose face its
glass door recently exploded would not have been
injured.
But the cafeteria’s knowledge that patrons
had been burnt shows its awareness that failing to
replace the microwave would likely result in future
burns--not any awareness of the risk of future shrapnel
injuries.
25
* * *
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
it
is
ORDERED
as
follows:
(1) Defendant Dollar General Corporation’s motion
for
summary
Farmers
Home
judgment
(doc.
Furniture
and
no.
27)
Glass
and
defendants
Properties,
LLC’s
motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 29) are granted
as to all claims except the premises-liability claim.
(2) The premises-liability claim will go to trial.
DONE, this the 10th day of November, 2015.
_ /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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