United States of America v. 2014 Mercedes-Benz GL350BLT, VIN: 4JGDF2EE1EA411100, with all appurtenances and attachments thereon

Filing 35

OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/18/2016. (kh, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
2014 MERCEDES-BENZ
GL350BLT, VIN:
4JGDF2EE1EA411100, with all
appurtenances and
attachments thereon,
Defendant;
NGHIA LE,
Claimant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:14cv1112-MHT
(WO)

OPINION
In this case, the government filed a complaint for
civil forfeiture of the defendant 2014 Mercedes-Benz
GL350BLT

automobile

Forfeiture Reform Act

pursuant

to

the

Civil

Asset

(CAFRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-87.

The government seized the car from its purchaser, Nghia
Le, and he has made a claim for the car.

The court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (action commenced

by the United States) and 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a) (action
for forfeiture).

The court has in rem jurisdiction

over the vehicle under 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b).
Now

pending

before

the

court

are

claimant

Le’s

motion to dismiss and motion for return of property.
Le argues that the government filed its civil complaint
too late.

The dismissal motion will be treated and

granted

a

as

motion

for

summary

judgment,

and

the

return-of-property motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND
Claimant Le bought defendant Mercedes-Benz from a
Mercedes-Benz dealer in Dothan, Alabama.

Shortly after

he purchased the vehicle, the government seized it as
part of an investigation.
Le

planned

to

export

The government alleges that
the

vehicle

for

profit

in

violation of a “no-export” agreement that he signed
with the dealer at the time of purchase.
After the United States Secret Service seized the
vehicle and gave Le notice of the seizure, Le filed an
2

administrative

claim to the vehicle with the Secret

Service as required by 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2).
his

claim

to

Washington,

the

agency’s

Communications

at

address

D.C.,

the

the

Le sent

Center
agency

in
had

provided him to submit any claim-related documents.

He

sent the claim by an overnight FedEx courier, and it
arrived the next day, July 25, 2014.

The parties agree

that Le’s claim was timely filed.
Four

days

later,

Forfeiture Division.

Le’s

claim

reached

the

Asset

As the government explains, all

incoming mail addressed to the Secret Service’s offices
in Washington, D.C. is first processed through a remote
delivery site for security screening.

From there, the

mail is sent on to the Communications Center at the
headquarters building, where it is sorted for internal
distribution.

After being delivered to the appropriate

department, an employee opens and date-stamps the mail,
then forwards it to the reviewing official.

It is not

uncommon for this process to take several days.

3

When

Le’s

claim

finally

reached

the

Asset

Forfeiture

Division, it was stamped July 29, 2014.
On October 24, 2014--91 days after Le’s claim had
first

arrived

at

the

Secret

mail-processing center--the

Service’s

remote

government initiated this

civil in rem forfeiture action, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(C).

By

statute,

any

civil

forfeiture

complaint must be filed within 90 days after a claim is
received.

18

U.S.C.

§ 983(a)(3)(A).

Thus,

as

Le

argues, when the government filed its complaint, the
statutory

deadline

for

this

complaint

had

already

passed.
The government does not contest that it filed its
complaint 91 days after Le’s claim was received by the
mailroom.
the

As the government explains, it calculated

statutory

period

from

the

date

stamped

on

the

claim, and it was not aware that this date might be
different from the date the claim was first received by
the agency.

It also was not aware that the claim in

fact had been received at the remote mail processing
4

center

several

brought

to

government’s

days

its

earlier,

attention

counsel

by

until
Le’s

represented

that

fact

was

As

the

counsel.

to

the

court,

only

after it had filed its complaint did it learn that the
Secret

Service’s

standard

protocol

is

to

date-stamp

forfeiture claims when they are received by the Asset
Forfeiture Division, not on the date they are received
in the mailroom.
Le therefore filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the government’s complaint was untimely and that
the vehicle therefore must be returned to him.

The

government responds with two arguments: first, that the
court should construe Le’s filing date as the date his
claim

reached

the

Asset

Forfeiture

Division,

which

would put the filing of its complaint within the 90-day
time limit; and, second, in the alterative, that the
court should equitably toll the 90-day filing period by
one day.

5

II. VEHICLE FOR RELIEF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Though Le does not specify the procedural basis for
his motion to dismiss, the court construes it as a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).
the

court

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

must

“limit[]

its

consideration

pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.”

to

the

Grossman v.

Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

If

the parties present evidence outside the pleadings, and
if the court considers that evidence, then the Rule
12(b)(6)

motion

judgment

motion

safeguards
parties.

must

of

be

“converted

necessitating

Rule

56,”

all

including

into

a

the

procedural

notice

summary

to

the

Finn v. Gunter, 722 F.2d 711, 713 (11th Cir.

1984); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) ..., matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion

must

be

treated

as

one
6

for

summary

judgment

under Rule 56.
opportunity
pertinent

All parties must be given a reasonable

to

to

present

the

all

motion.”).

the

material

“The

that

purpose

of

is
this

requirement is to make certain that the parties are
aware

of

the

conversion

and

have

an

opportunity

to

present documents and arguments for and against the
granting of summary judgment.”

Prop. Mgmt. & Invs.,

Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 605 (11th Cir. 1985).
However, the notice requirement is excused “when
the parties are aware of the court’s intent to consider
matters outside the record and have presented all the
materials

and

arguments

notice had been given.”

they

would

have

if

proper

Starship Enters. of Atlanta,

Inc. v. Coweta County, Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, 1253 n.13
(11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, both the parties have attached exhibits to
their motion-to-dismiss briefing, which the court has
considered in rendering its decision.

The court has

also taken into consideration various representations
made by the parties during an on-the-record conference
7

call.

Because it has considered evidence outside the

pleadings,

the

court

now

converts

Le’s

motion

to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
The

parties

were

given

notice

that

the

court

intended to do so on a conference call held on the
record on January 22, 2016; counsel for both parties
consented

and

waived

the

opportunity

to

submit

additional argument and evidence.
Under
views

the

favorable
reasonable

the

summary-judgment

admissible
to

the

evidence

non-moving

inferences

standard,

in

in

and
of

court

light

the

party

favor

the

most

draws

that

all

party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

“The court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute

as

to

any

material

fact

and

the

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).

movant

is

Fed. R. Civ.

The court therefore adopts that standard

here.

8

III. DISCUSSION
Because

this

interpretation

of

case
the

turns

on

procedural

the

rules

court’s

for

civil

forfeiture proceedings set forth under the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act or CAFRA, the court begins with a
survey of the relevant statutory language.
Under CAFRA, “[a]ny person claiming property seized
in a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a
civil

forfeiture

statute

may

file

a

claim

appropriate official after the seizure.”
§ 983(a)(2)(A).

with

the

18 U.S.C.

This claim must be filed within “the

deadline set forth in the personal notice letter (which
deadline may not be earlier than 35 days after the date
the

letter

is

mailed).”

18

U.S.C.

§

983(a)(2)(B).

“Not later than 90 days after a claim has been filed,
the

Government

shall

file

a

complaint

for

forfeiture ..., except that a court in the district in
which the complaint will be filed may extend the period
for filing a complaint for good cause shown or upon
agreement of the parties.”

18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A).
9

The government does not argue that it made such a
request to the court to extend the filing period for
good cause.
that

an

Moreover, courts have consistently held

extension

must

be

requested

before

the

complaint deadline has elapsed, and that retroactive
extensions are not permitted.

See United States v.

Funds from Fifth Third Bank Account, 2013 WL 5914101,
at *9 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2013) (Cox. J.) (“Given the
narrow language used [in § 983(a)(3)(A)], this Court
concludes that the Government has to seek the extension
before the limitations period passes and that it cannot
seek

a

‘retroactive

extension.’”);

see

also

United

States v. One 1991 Ford Mustang LX, 909 F. Supp. 831,
834 (D. Colo. 1996) (Kane, J.) (same); United States v.
1986 Ford Bronco, 782 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (Garber, J.) (same); United States v. One White
1987 Tempest Sport Boat, 726 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D. Mass.

10

1989) (Tauro, J.) (same). 1
also

noted

that

the

Some of these courts have

legislative

history

of

the

extension provision makes clear that it was intended to
apply

to

“situations

in

which

the

filing

of

the

complaint within the 90 day deadline might interfere
with

an

witnesses

ongoing
or

criminal

undercover

investigation,
operations”--all

or

endanger

situations

which would arise in advance of the deadline--and not

1. Although courts have focused on the text of
§ 983(a)(3)(A) alone, the next, related subparagraph is
perhaps even more instructive.
Section 983(a)(3)(B)
states that, “If the Government does not (i) file a
complaint for forfeiture or return the property, in
accordance with subparagraph (A); or (ii) before the
time for filing a complaint has expired [initiate
criminal forfeiture proceedings,] the Government shall
promptly release the property pursuant to regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General, and may not take
any further action to effect the civil forfeiture of
such property ....” (Emphases added.) This provision
makes plain that the government’s right to effect
forfeiture is immediately and permanently cut off if it
fails timely to act (in any of a variety of ways) or
seek an extension.
Permitting retroactive extensions
would gut this limitation; indeed, even the act of
requesting
a
retroactive
extension
is
arguably
impermissible, because it is “further action” to effect
the forfeiture.

11

designed to excuse a “good faith mistake.”
Fifth

Third

Bank

Account,

(citations omitted).

2013

WL

Funds from

5914101,

at

*9

In sum, the statute would not

allow an extension request at this juncture.
“If the government does not ... file a complaint
for forfeiture” in accordance with the 90-day rule, and
it does not obtain a criminal indictment before the
time

for

filing

a

complaint

has

expired,

“the

Government shall promptly release the property ... and
may not take any further action to effect the civil
forfeiture

of

such

underlying offense.”

property

in

connection

with

the

18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B).

The parties agree that the claimant’s filing date
triggers
period.

the

start

of

the

government’s

statutory

See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A) (“Not later than

90 days after a claim has been filed, the Government
shall file a complaint for forfeiture ....”).

In other

words,

for

the

date

that

the

claim

is

“filed”

the

purposes of meeting the claimant’s 35-day deadline is
the

same

date

that

the

government’s
12

90-day

period

begins to run.
this

dispute

properly
first

Therefore, the court’s first step in
is

to

determine

filed

by

the

received

in

the

when

claimant:
mail

the

claim

was
was

when

the

claim

of

the

designated

room

agency or when the claim was received by the agency’s
Asset Forfeiture Division.

If it is determined that

the government’s complaint was untimely filed, the next
step will be to decide whether to equitably toll the
deadline and allow the government to file its complaint
one day late.

A. Statutory History
CAFRA was enacted in 2000 as part of “a reaction to
the perception that there was some inequity in imposing
strict

deadlines

and

sanctions

on

property

owners

contesting civil forfeiture actions, while not imposing
similar deadlines and sanctions on the government.

The

logic was that if property owners were required to file
claims within a fixed period of time and were made to
suffer

consequences

for

failing
13

to

do

so,

the

government

should

face

consequences as well.”

deadlines

and

suffer

United States v. $ 229,850.00

in U.S. Currency, 50 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1176 (D. Ariz.
2014)

(Pyle,

J.)

(quoting

Stefan

D.

Cassella,

“The

Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded
Government
Imposed

Forfeiture

on

(2001));

All

see

Authority

Parties,”

also

United

27

and
J.

States

Strict

Legis.
v.

One

Deadlines

97,

122-25

2007

Harley

Davidson Street Glide Motorcycle, 982 F. Supp. 2d 634,
640-41 (D. Md. 2013) (Williams, J.) (“In mandating that
the United States file forfeiture complaints within the
specified

amount

of

time,

Congress

effectively

determined that the interest in apprising claimants of
the alleged basis of the forfeiture and expeditiously
processing forfeiture complaints outweighed the loss of
dismissing potentially meritorious claims for untimely
filing.

This is hardly surprising considering that

forfeiture is a harsh remedy that the law generally
disfavors.”).

14

District
claimant’s
rules,

courts,

“strict

though

of

course,

compliance”

they

do

have

claimant’s filing period.

may

“insist”

with

the

discretion

on

a

forfeiture

to

extend

a

United States v. $ 12,126.00

in U.S. Currency, 337 F. App’x 818, 819 (11th Cir.
2009).

By

the

same

token,

“[f]orfeitures

are

not

favored in the law; strict compliance with the letter
of the law by those seeking forfeiture”--that is, the
government--“must

be

required.”

United

States

v.

$ 38,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1547 (11th
Cir. 1987).
to

adhere

“If anything, the burden on the government
to

the

procedural

rules

[when

it

forfeiture] should be heavier than on claimants.”

seeks
Id.

As such, the 90-day deadline for the government to
file a complaint is mandatory and should be strictly
construed against the government.

See United States v.

Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 795 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining
that

§

requiring

983(a)(3)
the

contains

government's

a

“mandatory

prosecutor

to

limitation
file

its

complaint not later than 90 days after a claim has been
15

filed”); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 910
(9th Cir. 2003) (“Because forfeitures are disfavored,
forfeiture

laws

and

their

notice

provisions

are

strictly construed against the government.”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); $ 229,850.00, 50
F.

Supp.

mandatory

3d
and

at

1176

the

(“The

90–day

requirement

time

that

the

limit

is

Government

release the seized property where it fails to file a
timely complaint for forfeiture is the ‘sanction’ that
CAFRA

imposes

for

such

failure.”)

(citation

and

internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts have dismissed cases when the government has
missed the filing deadline even by a day or two.

See,

e.g., One 2007 Harley Davidson, 982 F. Supp. 2d 634
(dismissing

complaint

filed

one

day

late);

United

States v. $ 80,891.25 in U.S. Currency, 2011 WL 6400420
(S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2011) (Edenfield, J.) (dismissing
complaint filed two days late); United States v. Funds
in the Amount of $ 314,900.00, 1:05-cv-3012 (N.D. Ill.
Dec.

21,

2005)

(Gettleman,
16

J.)

(doc.

no.

26)

(dismissing

complaint

filed

one

day

late),

reconsideration denied, 2006 WL 794733; but see United
States v. $ 39,480.00 in U.S. Currency, 190 F. Supp. 2d
929 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (Furgeson, J.) (excusing one-day
delay

for

good

cause,

because

the

government

incorrectly date-stamped the claim).

B. Timeliness of Filing
As

discussed

above,

the

government

has

conceded

that it filed its complaint 91 days after Le’s claim
was received by the mail room.

It argues, however,

that its complaint was not untimely because Le’s claim
should not be considered properly filed until received
by an agent within the Asset Forfeiture Division.
As

a

threshold

matter,

the

court

rejects

government’s argument on due-process grounds.
of

this

case,

of

course,

is

a

government’s 90-day filing period.

dispute
But

the

The crux
about

the

the court’s

decision has serious implications for the claimant’s
ability to meet his own 35-day deadline: as discussed
17

above, a claimant’s claim is filed on the same date
that the government’s period begins to run.

Yet, if a

claim is not properly filed the date it is received by
the agency, it would be impossible for a claimant to
ensure

that

his

35-day

statutory

claim

was

timely

deadline.

In

filed
other

within

his

words,

the

government would have unfettered discretion over the
administrative viability of forfeiture claims against
it.

It is one thing for Congress to set a strict

statutory

deadline.

It

is

quite

another

for

a

government agency to be able to prevent a claimant from
controlling his or her ability to meet that deadline.
As seen in this case, a claim may spend several
days en route to the forfeiture department of an agency
after being received and processed by the mail room.
Here, for example, the claim was not received by the
Asset Forfeiture Division until four days after it was
delivered to the mail-processing center.
the

pace

of

the

government’s

18

In light of

mail-distribution

procedure,

the

above

concern

becomes

even

more

troubling.
Admittedly, the relevant statutory language could
be construed to support the government’s argument: the
statute provides that “filing” under the statute means
filing

“with

the

§ 983(a)(2)(A);
language). 2

appropriate

see

also

28

official.”
C.F.R.

§

18
8.10

U.S.C.
(same

Under a narrow reading, this could mean

that a claim is filed only when it is received by an
agent

within

the

Asset

Forfeiture

Division

who

has

power over the claim, rather than by an agent within
the Secret Service more generally.

And this is the

interpretation that the government asks the court to
adopt.
By

the

government’s

logic,

timely

filing

of

administrative claims would depend on sheer luck, or

2. Because the government does not contend that the
court should consider, much less defer to, the agency’s
own regulatory scheme, the court does not pursue that
avenue.

19

the

mercy

of

the

government’s

internal

bureaucracy.

See Beck v. United States, 2011 WL 862952, at *4 (D.
Md. Mar. 10, 2011) (Nickerson, J.) (“[A] requirement
that

filing

occurs

only

when

a

claim

reaches

‘the

appropriate official’ would wrest from claimants all
control over timely filing, as they could only hope
that whatever mailroom procedures the agency has in
place would get their claim to the right person by the
deadline.”).

Indeed, a simple analogy shows the folly

in the government’s argument: no one would dispute that
the

government’s

complaint

is

filed

the

day

it

is

received in the court clerk’s office, not by the judge
who decides the issue. 3
Because

such

a

strict

reading

of

this

statute

appears to violate fundamental notions of procedural
fairness,

the

court

rejects

it.

“[I]f

an

otherwise

3. Perhaps for this reason, the government’s
counsel admitted that its argument, taken to its
logical conclusion, becomes “illogical.” Dec. 31, 2014
Hearing Tr. (doc. no. 27), at 9:17-18.

20

acceptable
serious

construction
constitutional

alternative

of

a

statute

problems,

interpretation

is

would

and

raise

where

‘fairly

an

possible,’

[courts] are obligated to construe the statute to avoid
such problems.”

I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300

(2001) (citations omitted); see also Clark v. Martinez,
543

U.S.

371,

381

(2005)

(“[T]he

canon

of

constitutional avoidance ... is a tool for choosing
between

competing

plausible

interpretations

of

a

statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption
that

Congress

did

not

intend

the

alternative

which

raises serious constitutional doubts.”).
The government relies on a district court decision
which reasoned that a claim is “filed” when it reaches
a “proper official” within the forfeiture division, not
when it arrives in the mail room, because “the remote
delivery site merely screens all incoming mail packages
for

contamination;

incoming

claims

it

within

does

not

accept

those

packages,

or

nor

review
does

it

likely even read, identify, or otherwise deal with such
21

claims.”

United States v. One GMC Yukon Denali, 2003

WL 27177023, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2003) (Baird,
J.).

For support, this case relies on a 1916 Supreme

Court decision, United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73
(1916), which held that the filing date for a document
is the date of receipt by the government agency, not
the date of mailing by the civilian party.

Yet this

proposition is inapposite to the question at hand here.
Lombardo does not support the decision in One GMC Yukon
Denali, because Lombardo decided only that a document
is

filed

upon

receipt

rather

than

on

dispatch;

the

Lombardo Court was not confronted with, and therefore
cannot have decided, the question whether a document is
filed on the date it is received at the address at
which an official receives mail or only after it has
been

internally

forwarded

official

herself.

(“Filing

...

is

See
not

from

that

Lombardo,

complete

until

address
241
the

U.S.

to

the

at

76

document

is

delivered and received. ‘Shall file’ means to deliver
to the office, and not send through the United States
22

mails.”) (citation omitted).

The court finds One GMC

Yukon Denali unpersuasive.
Recently,

a

district

court

in

Arizona

disagreed

with One GMC Yukon Denali, reasoning that a “claim is
filed when it is received by the mailroom of the agency
where

the

claimant

is

directed

to

send

the

claim,”

because “the government ought not be able to manipulate
the deadlines to evade the delay reforms enacted by
CAFRA.”

$ 229,850.00, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 1176, 1178

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Funds from
Fifth

Third

Bank

Account,

2013

WL

5914101,

at

*7

(finding that claim is “filed” when received by agency
because to find otherwise would “as a practical matter,
eviscerate the 90-day limitation period imposed on the
Government”);

$ 314,900.00,

1:05-cv-3012

(N.D.

Ill.

Dec. 21, 2005) (doc. no. 26, at 5) (“[Claimant] was
directed by DEA to file his claim with the ‘Forfeiture
Counsel.’ ... [Claimaint’s] claim was received at that
address. ... That is all the statute requires, and that
is when the ninety days began to run.”).
23

While
Circuit
Appeals

no

binding

squarely
has

authority

decides

recognized

the

within
issue,

long-held

the
the

Eleventh
Court

precedent

of
that

forfeiture rules must be strictly construed against the
government.

See $ 38,000.00, 816 F.2d at 1547 (citing

United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach,
307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939)).
the

Eleventh

Circuit

has

For the same reason that
held

that

courts

may

hold

claimants to strict deadlines, see $ 12,126.00, 337 F.
App’x at 819, so may courts hold the government.
Therefore, Le’s claim was filed the date it was
received by the Secret Service at the address to which
the Secret Service directed it be sent.
filing period began on July 25, 2014.

The 90-day

The government’s

complaint is therefore untimely, because it was filed
91 days later.

C. Equitable Tolling
Because the court has found that the government’s
complaint is untimely, it must next decide whether the
24

deadline

should

be

equitably

tolled

by

one

day

or

whether summary judgment is due for the claimant.
“Principles
every

federal

“equitable

of

equitable

statute

tolling

of

is

tolling

are

limitation,”

a

matter

of

read

but,

into

because

congressional

prerogative,” equitable tolling should not be applied
when Congress has clearly spoken otherwise.

Cook v.

Deltona Corp., 753 F.2d 1552, 1562 (11th Cir. 1985).
Here, because no part of § 983(a)(3)(A) expressly
disallows equitable tolling, and because the statute is
procedural, rather than jurisdictional, it is within
the

court’s

statute.

discretionary

authority

to

toll

the

See United States v. Vazquez, 760 F.3d 193,

198 (2nd Cir. 2014) (“[T]he provisions of § 983 are
procedural rules for pursuing the forfeiture of seized
assets,

not

jurisdiction.”)

conditions
(internal

of

subject

quotation

marks

matter
omitted);

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-646 (2010) (“[A]
nonjurisdictional

federal

statute

of

limitations

is

normally subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor
25

of

equitable

tolling.”)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
A party is generally entitled to equitable tolling
if he shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently,

and

(2)

that

some

extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way and prevented the timely
filing.”

Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Equitable powers such as tolling allow

a court to provide relief on a “case-by-case basis” if
“specific

circumstances,

advance,

could

warrant

appropriate case.”
Because
remedy”

circumstances,

correct
it

hard

special

to

predict

treatment

in

in
an

Id. at 650.

“[e]quitable

to

often

is

tolling

injustices
“typically

is

an
in

extraordinary
extraordinary

applied

sparingly.”

Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000).
Attorney negligence or other “garden variety claim of
excusable neglect” does not justify equitable tolling,
nor does a “miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss

26

a filing deadline.”

Holland, 560 U.S. at 651 (internal

quotation marks omitted).
To support its request, the government relies on
$ 39,480, 190 F. Supp. 2d 929.

In

that case, the

government agency had forwarded its counsel a copy of
the claim with an incorrect date stamp, even though the
agency’s

copy

had

the

correct

date

stamp.

The

government filed its civil forfeiture complaint one day
late, and the court tolled the statute for equitable
reasons.
diligently

As the court explained, the government “acted
and

with

good

faith

in

prosecuting

the

instant case,” and
“the one-day delay does not prejudice [the
claimant] in any meaningful way....
She will
still have her day in court.... In contrast to
the lack of prejudice to [the claimant],
dismissal of the Government’s complaint would
have a draconian effect on the Government’s
case.”
Id. at 932-33.

In a similar case, $ 229,850.00, the

district court equitably tolled the government’s filing
deadline,

noting

the

government’s

reliance

on

“unsettled” case law on the filing issue--that is, the
27

question of whether a claim is properly “filed” when it
reaches

the

mailroom

or

the

agency’s

forfeiture

department--constituted an “extraordinary circumstance”
that

favored

“diligently

equitable
calculated

tolling
the

when

statutory

filing relying on the date-stamp.”
1184-85.
the

the

government

deadline

for

50 F. Supp. 3d at

Finding that the claimant had not shown that

government’s

one-day

delay

was

“significant

or

prejudicial,” the court decided the case on the merits.
Id. at 1185.
The government here argues that the statute should
be tolled because it, too, has acted in good faith.

As

it explains, government counsel merely relied on the
date

that

was

stamped

on

the

claim

form,

without

knowledge that stamp did not reflect the date the claim
was in fact received by the agency.
The

court

is

not

persuaded

advanced by the courts cited above.

by

the

arguments

First, to merit

equitable tolling, a party need not simply “diligently
calculate[]” the number of days between the beginning
28

and

the

Equitable

end

of

a

tolling

filing
does

mathematical skill.

period.

not

Id.

hinge

on

at
a

1184.
party’s

Instead, the law requires that, to

merit equitable tolling, a party must have “pursu[ed]
his

rights

obstacle.

diligently”

despite

an

extraordinary

And “when faced with mandatory deadlines,

the requirement of due diligence may obligate attorneys
to

go

beyond

standard

respect the deadlines.”
F.

Supp.

“Equitable

2d

at

640.

tolling

is

practice

to

ensure

that

they

One 2007 Harley Davidson, 982
Holland,

560

appropriate

U.S.
when

at
a

649.

movant

untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances
that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even
with diligence.”

Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d

1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
Here,

the

government

has

conceded

that

its

mistake--even if made in good-faith--was entirely of
its own making.
accurate

Had the Secret Service developed an

method

communicating

those

for

date-stamping

practices
29

to

its

claims

and

counsel,

the

government would have filed its complaint on time.

Its

failure to do so sounds more in “a garden variety claim
of

excusable

neglect”

circumstance.”
Indeed,

than

an

“extraordinary

Holland, 560 U.S. at 649, 651.

the

extraordinary,

circumstance
for

the

here

evidence

was

ordinary,

reflects

that

not
the

agency had a protocol or routine of not stamping claims
as filed until they have been received in a particular
department

or

division

or

by

a

particular

type

agent, rather than received merely by the agency.

of
And

pursuant to that policy, Le’s claim was received by the
mail

room,

Division,

processed,

and

only

sent

then

to

the

Asset

date-stamped.

Forfeiture

There

is

allegation that Le engaged in wrongful conduct.
government

does

not

contend

that

it

was

relying

no
The
on

conflicting case law to determine the start date of its
filing period, such that unsettled precedent stood in
the

way

of

its

timely

filing.

The

government’s

good-faith calculation does not excuse its failure to

30

exercise due diligence to record properly the filing of
Le’s claim on the date it was received by the agency.
And the recurrence of similar circumstances in case
law

shows

caught

that

by

commented

the

government

surprise.
that

this

should

Indeed,
“recurring

not

have

other

courts

problem”

“has

been
have

arisen

with some frequency in recent years,” and “could be
eliminated by minor procedural improvements either at
the

agency

Level.”

level

or

at

the

U.S.

Attorney’s

Office

United States v. $ 34,769.49, More or Less, in

U.S. Currency, 2015 WL 1643582, at *7 n.10 (S.D. Ala.
Apr. 13, 2015) (Steele, J.).
Finally, the court rejects the argument that it
should equitably toll the statute because the claimant
was not prejudiced by the one-day delay.

Forfeitures

are a “harsh penalty” for individuals deprived of their
personal property.
F.3d

1325,

1329

United States v. $ 125,938.62, 370
(11th

Cir.

2004).

And,

because

“[f]orfeitures are not favored in the law[,] strict
compliance with the letter of the law by those seeking
31

forfeiture must be required.”
1547.

$ 38,000.00, 816 F.2d at

Moreover, CAFRA was enacted, at least in part,

to reform forfeiture practices and hold the government
to a strict statutory period for filing complaints.
Undoubtedly, if Le had made a similar error, the
government

would

hold

him

to

the

same

standard.

Indeed, when questioned by the court on this point, the
government explained that when a claimant’s claim is
filed

outside

denies

the

claim

administrative
statute.

the

statutory
as

period,

untimely

forfeiture,

as

the

and

government

proceeds

provided

under

with
the

The court will require of the government the

same strict compliance with the law as it requires of
its people.
timely

Simple subjective belief that a filing was

should

no

more

excuse

the

government’s

nonfeasance than it should excuse a claimant’s.
court will not grant equitable relief.

* * *

32

The

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Le’s motion
to dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary
judgment, and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B),
that motion will be granted and summary judgment will
be

entered

in

favor

of

Le.

Also,

pursuant

to

§ 983(a)(3)(B), Le’s motion for return of property will
be

granted,

and

the

government

will

be

required

release promptly the Mercedes-Benz vehicle to Le.
An appropriate judgment will be entered.
DONE, this the 18th day of February, 2016.
_/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

to