Ballenger v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, et al

Filing 193

OPINION AND ORDER that defendant Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation's 123 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/3/2011. (dmn)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

ANN L. BALLENGER,
individually and as
Administratrix of the
Estate of Thomas
Ballenger, deceased, and
MARY ANNA WOEPPEL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT
CORPORATION, a foreign
Corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:09cv72-MHT
(WO)

OPINION AND ORDER
In this products-liability litigation, plaintiffs Ann
L. Ballenger and Mary Anna Woeppel have sued defendant
Sikorsky

Aircraft

Corporation

on

Louisiana

state-law

theories of design defect, negligence, and failure to
warn.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332

(diversity).

Sikorsky

moves

for

judgment

on

the

pleadings on federal-preemption grounds, arguing that

federal law occupies the field of aviation regulation and
displaces state-tort remedies (Doc. No. 123).

For the

reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.

I.

Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), judgment
on

the

material

pleadings
fact

is

exist,

appropriate
and

the

judgment as a matter of law.”

when

movant

“no
is

issues

of

entitled

to

Ortega v. Christian, 85

F.3d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996).

“A motion for judgment

on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).

II.

Factual Background

On January 4, 2009, the plaintiffs’ decedent and
eight others boarded a Sikorsky helicopter bound for an
oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico.

Shortly after

takeoff, the helicopter suffered a catastrophic failure

2

due to a hawk colliding with the windshield.

The pilots

were

helicopter

unable

to

maintain

control

and

the

crashed in swampy terrain, killing all but one aboard.
The plaintiffs contend that faults in the helicopter’s
windshield and throttle design caused the crash.

III. Discussion
Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law trumps state
law.

Congress can preempt state law in three ways:

express

preemption,

363

particular

preemption,

and

conflict

See Cliff v. Payco General American Credits,

preemption.
Inc.,

field

F.3d

1113,

importance

1122
here

(11th
is

Cir.

the

2004).

concept

of

Of
field

preemption, which occurs “when federal regulation in a
legislative

field

is

so

pervasive

that

[one]

can

reasonably infer that Congress left no room for the
states to supplement it.”
Sikorsky
species

of

argues
field

that

Id.
federal-aviation

preemption

3

and

that,

law

because

is

a

the

complaint raises only state-law claims, it is entitled to
See Sikorsky’s Reply, Doc.

judgment as a matter of law.

No. 145, at 5 n.3 (“[T]he fact of the matter is defendant
relies on ‘field preemption.’”).

Sikorsky notes that

federal law prescribes detailed and comprehensive safety
regulations for air carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(1)
(“The

Administrator

Administration

shall

of

the

promote

Federal

safe

flight

Aviation
of

civil

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing minimum standards
required

in

the

interest

of

safety.”);

14

C.F.R.

§ 29.1141 (prescribing rules for throttle controls).
According to Sikorsky, there is clear “Congressional
intent to centralize air safety authority with the FAA.”
Sikorsky’s Brief, Doc. No. 124, at 28.
To be sure, aviation regulation gravitates toward a
uniform system of governance.

See Northwest Airlines,

Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)

(“Congress

has

the

national

responsibility for regulating air commerce.

Federal

4

recognized

control is intensive and exclusive.

Planes do no wander

about in the sky like vagrant clouds.”).

Against this

practical reality and legal background, the prevailing
rule in the federal courts of appeals favors preemption.
See Goodspeed Airport LLC v. East Haddam Inland Wetlands
& Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2011);
Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir.
2007); Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc.,
409

F.3d

784

(6th

Cir.

2005);

Abdullah

v.

American

Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999); French v.
Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
But, as plaintiffs point out, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has found against preemption in the
field of aviation.

In Public Health Trust of Dade Cty.,

Fla. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir.
1993), a passenger was injured when his seaplane struck
a submerged rock during takeoff.

The passenger claimed

that a design defect in the seat enhanced his injuries.
Id. at 292.

5

In finding against preemption, the Eleventh Circuit
relied, in part, on Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992), which espoused a rule that “Congress’
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach
of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are
not pre-empted.”

Id. at 517.

The appellate court found

it significant that the preemption clause in the Airline
Deregulation
“airline

Act

rates,

applied
routes

Trust, 992 F.2d at 295.

to

or

only

matters

services.”

related

Public

to

Health

Thus, the court found that the

plaintiff’s “design defect claims [were] outside the preemptive reach of [the ADA].”
Sikorsky

responds

essentially,

that

this

precedent.

Sikorsky’s

in

Id.
its

brief

court

should

Brief,

Doc.

by

arguing,

ignore

binding

No.

124,

at

38

(“[T]his Court may not consider itself bound by Public
Health Trust.”).
Court

has

Sikorsky contends that the Supreme

narrowed

preemption clauses.

Cipollone’s

approach

to

express

See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda

6

Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (“[T]he express
pre-emption

provision

imposes

no

unusual,

‘special

burden’ against [implied] pre-emption.”); Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289 (1995) (“At best,
Cipollone supports an inference that an express preemption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does
not establish a rule.”).

As Sikorsky points out, one

circuit court recently recognized the Supreme Court’s
rejection of Cipollone and narrowed its prior holdings
that were contrary to preemption.

See US Airways, Inc.

v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1325-27 (10th Cir. 2010)
(finding preemption of state regulations, but leaving
state tort remedies intact).

Similarly, a district court

within the Eleventh Circuit has questioned Public Health
Trust’s

validity.

See

North

v.

Precision

Airmotive

Corp., 2011 WL 679932, *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2011)
(“Public Health Trust remains good law. . . . If the
question were presented today, the Eleventh Circuit might
very well reach a different conclusion.”).

7

This court agrees that, if the Eleventh Circuit were
confronted

with

this

issue

as

a

question

of

first

impression today, it may decide in favor of preemption.
But

this

decision

court
and

is

should

bound
not

by

the

forecast

Eleventh
the

Circuit’s

overruling

of

precedent on mere speculation. Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in
a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).
In fact, at the recent pretrial conference in this case,
counsel for Sikorsky conceded that, despite the argument
Sikorsky made in its brief, this court has no choice but
to

follow

the

Health Trust.

Eleventh

Circuit’s

decision

in

Public

With this concession, the court concludes

that, because the plaintiffs’ state-law claims do not

8

relate to

airline rates, routes or services, they are

not preempted by federal law.*
***
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant Sikorsky
Aircraft

Corporation’s

motion

for

judgment

on

the

pleadings (Doc. No. 123) is denied.
DONE, this the 3rd day of November, 2011.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*

The plaintiffs also make two procedural arguments.
They contend that Sikorsky violated the scheduling order
by filing its motion after the deadline for briefs
pertaining to jurisdiction and choice of law.
But
Sikorsky’s Rule 12(c) motion falls within the deadline
for dispositive motions under the amended scheduling
order (Doc. No. 117).
The plaintiffs further argue that Sikorsky should be
judicially estopped from making its preemption argument
because it took an inconsistent position in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana. “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine
invoked at a court’s discretion, designed to protect the
integrity of the judicial process.”
Transamerica
Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 430
F.3d 1326, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005). The court declines to
exercise its discretion to preclude Sikorsky from making
this argument.