Toodle v. Allen

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting the 31 Motion for summary judgment and dismissing this case with prejudice. Signed by Honorable William Keith Watkins on 6/28/2010. (br, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA N O R T H E R N DIVISION C L A R K TOODLE, P la in tif f , v. R IC H A R D F. ALLEN, D e f e n d a n t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CASE NO. 2:09-CV-150-WKW [WO]

M E M O R A N D U M OPINION AND ORDER P la in tif f Clark Toodle was an employee of J.F. Ingram State Technical College (" J F I" ), a unit of the Alabama community college system. JFI operates campuses on-site at v a rio u s Alabama state correctional institutions, which are managed by the Alabama D e p a rtm e n t of Corrections ("ADOC") and headed by Defendant Commissioner Richard F. A lle n . While teaching at JFI/ADOC's Draper/Staton facility, a random canine search or Mr. T o o d le 's vehicle led to the discovery of a green leafy substance, which later tested positive f o r marijuana. ADOC barred him from its property, he lost his job with JFI, and he then c o m m e n c e d this lawsuit. Before the court is Commissioner Allen's motion for summary ju d g m e n t (Doc. # 31), which is due to be granted. I . JURISDICTION AND VENUE T h e court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1441. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court f in d s adequate allegations in support of each.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW S u m m a ry judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure m a te ria ls on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact a n d that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see G r e e n b e rg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007). The party m o v in g for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the d is tric t court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record, in c lu d in g pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the a b s e n c e of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1 9 8 6 ). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no d is p u te of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present e v id e n c e in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of p ro o f . Id. at 322-24. If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to each of its c la im s for relief exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) ("When a motion for summary judgment is p ro p e rly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or d e n ia ls in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a g e n u in e issue for trial."); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); C e lo te x , 477 U.S. at 324. What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable

2

to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Lofton v. Sec'y of th e Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only factual d is p u te s that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry o f summary judgment."). Furthermore, "[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will n o t defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the o u tc o m e of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th C ir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence th a t would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F .3 d at 1263; Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). If the evidence on which the nonmoving party relies, however, "is merely colorable, or is not s ig n if ic a n tly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (c ita tio n s omitted). "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the [nonmovant's] position w ill not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably f in d for that party," Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation o m i tt e d ) , and the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some m e ta p h ys ic a l doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio C o r p ., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts s u p p o rte d by appropriate evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

3

to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary ju d g m e n t should be granted in favor of the defendant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. T h u s , in cases where the evidence is admissible on its face or can be reduced to a d m is sib le form and establishes there is no genuine issue of material fact, and where the p a rty moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. I I I . DISCUSSION M r. Toodle's Amended Complaint (Doc. # 23) contains four counts against Mr. Allen. First, he brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U .S . Constitution, for deprivation of procedural due process in his barring from ADOC f a c ilitie s . (Doc. # 23, ¶¶ 8-11.) Second, he brings another section 1983 claim for "releasing d e ro g a to ry information to the President of Ingram about Plaintiff that effected [sic] or im p a ire d his property interest without providing him due process." (Doc. # 2, ¶¶ 12-14.) Third and fourth, he purports to bring counts somehow related to ADOC's lack of state-law a u th o ri t y to bar individuals from JFI property. (Doc. # 2, ¶¶ 15-18, 19-22.) While the A m e n d e d Complaint claims that this dispute presents a "justiciable controversy," there is no c ita tio n to, or explanation of, what cause of action underlies these counts, or what form of re lie f could be obtained by Mr. Toodle on the basis of this court refereeing the state-law q u e s tio n of which of two state agencies owns or leases particular parcels of property.1
1

Perhaps out of an abundance of caution, Commissioner Allen seeks summary judgment on these claims by arguing that his actions were not "arbitrary or capricious." (Doc. # 32, at 6.) But because

4

Therefore, Counts III and IV are due to be dismissed and will not be discussed further. As re le v a n t to the constitutional claims, the state-law property issue is addressed below. A . Procedural Due Process A t issue in Count I is Mr. Toodle's claim that he was entitled to additional due process b e f o re he was barred from ADOC facilities. Notably, Mr. Toodle does not contest that he was g iv e n a pre-termination hearing by his employer, JFI. (Doc. # 15, Exs. 8, 9.) A reading of the H e a rin g Officer's opinion on Mr. Toodle's motion in limine, (Doc. # 15, Ex. 9) reveals that th e Hearing Officer did not inquire into the validity of Mr. Toodle's barring from ADOC p ro p e rty, but only into the validity of Mr. Toodle's termination by JFI given that he could no lo n g e r enter ADOC premises.2 Mr. Toodle argues that he is entitled to an ADOC hearing at w h ic h he could contest his having been barred from its property. A claim for procedural due process has three elements: "(1) whether there is enough o f a property interest at stake to be deemed `protectable'; (2) the amount of process that s h o u ld be due for that protectable right; and (3) the process actually provided, be it before or

there is no free-floating cause of action against anyone who performs an "arbitrary or capricious" act ­ or even against a state actor who does so, without more ­ these counts do not state valid claims. In any event, case law cited relating to federal agencies under the federal Administrative Procedure Act is plainly irrelevant to the duties and authority of an Alabama state agency. According to Mr. Toodle's briefing, he prevailed before the Hearing Officer, who ordered JFI and Mr. Toodle to "enter into collaborative discussions" to find Mr. Toodle alternative employment within JFI "that did not run afoul of DOC's ban." (Doc. # 33, at 19; Ex. T.) JFI then sought review in the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, where the case remains pending. (Doc. # 33, at 19; Exs. X, Y.) While not dispositive, this outcome would appear somewhat at odds with Mr. Toodle's claim that ADOC's ban inevitably led to his termination from JFI, rather than merely preventing him from performing particular jobs within JFI.
2

5

after the deprivation." Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1264 (1 1 th Cir. 2003). With respect to the first element, "no procedural due process claim exists u n til a sufficiently certain property right under state law is first shown." Id. at 1265. It is on th is question that Mr. Toodle's claim founders. M r. Toodle is correct in arguing that it is well established that a public employee with te n u re rights has a property interest in his or her employment. See Bd. of Regents of State C o ll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Nolin v. Douglas County, 903 F.2d 1546, 1552-53 (1 1 th Cir. 1990) overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1558 (11th C ir. 1994) (en banc); Urban Sanitation v. City of Pell, Ala., 662 F. Supp. 1041, 1042-43 (N.D. A la . 1986). Mr. Toodle's difficulty is that he cannot contend that he did not receive due p ro c e s s in being terminated from his employment with JFI. Rather, to succeed in his claim a g a in s t Commissioner Allen, he must show that he also has a property interest in being p e rm itte d to enter ADOC property. "It is well-established that `[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have m o re than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of e n title m e n t to it.'" Price v. Univ. of Ala., No. 03-15511, 2004 WL 1253201, at *2 (11th Cir. A p ril 20, 2004) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). Mr. Toodle's argument is that ADOC's b a rrin g of him from its facilities makes it practically impossible for him to do his job at JFI; th e re f o r e , ADOC, in essence, terminated his employment, and must provide him with due p ro c ess.

6

First, as the Hearing Officer noted, it is unclear whether Mr. Toodle's factual premise is correct ­ that is, whether there is no job Mr. Toodle could perform with JFI that would not re q u ire him to enter ADOC property. (Doc. # 15, Ex. 9, at 26.) To the extent Mr. Toodle's te rm in a tio n took place in spite of the fact that he could have been reassigned to other duties, i t is JFI's decision, and not ADOC's, that led to his firing. Second, even assuming Mr. T o o d le is correct that ADOC's barring of him from its property led inevitably to his te rm in a tio n by JFI, he still must explain why he has a property interest in being permitted onto A D O C premises. He simply fails to do so. Mr. Toodle himself repeatedly emphasizes that A D O C and JFI are separate state agencies, with their own chains-of-command and spheres o f authority. Indeed, he devotes much of his response brief (Doc. # 33) and supplemental re s p o n s e (Doc. # 37) to a largely irrelevant discussion of which agency owns or leases p re c is e ly which of the parcels of land on which JFI and ADOC facilities are located. But no a u th o rity is cited for the proposition that one state actor must provide some particular level o f access or authorization to employees of a separate state actor, and that the employees have a property interest in such access. Much of Mr. Toodle's argument is based on the contention that ADOC lacks the a u th o rity under state law to bar him from all of JFI's facilities, which typically adjoin and are c o n n e c te d to ADOC correctional institutions, and are governed by various leasing and o w n e rs h ip arrangements between the two agencies. (Doc. # 33, at 19-24.) The court is unsure w h a t Mr. Toodle seeks to achieve by making this argument. Assuming it is true, it makes it

7

even more obvious that Mr. Toodle's remedy cannot be against ADOC, since (according to M r. Toodle's interpretation of state law) it can only be JFI, and not ADOC, that has the a u th o rity to bar him from the premises in question. Yet JFI is not a defendant in this action, a n d in any event did provide Mr. Toodle with procedural due process in the form of a hearing. To the extent that Mr. Toodle is arguing that JFI and ADOC are misinterpreting the s c o p e of ADOC's state-law authority, that question of state law is not somehow converted in to a federal constitutional cause of action by being brought under the guise of a due process c la im . See Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that violations o f state law are not the basis, in themselves, for federal constitutional claims). It is true that p ro p e rty interests for due process purposes are created by state law, but neither the absence n o r the presence of ADOC's state-law authority to bar Mr. Toodle from JFI facilities would c re a te a property interest on the part of Mr. Toodle. The "dispute" Mr. Toodle alleges would b e between JFI and ADOC, not between either agency and himself (although, to be clear, n e ith e r agency appears to believe that any such dispute exists)3 . If ADOC did have the
In its summary judgment brief, ADOC specifically disavows any authority or intent to ban Mr. Toodle "from non-ADOC property." (Doc. # 32, at 3.) Mr. Toodle cites statements by JFI's President that JFI would like to have Mr. Toodle back as an employee, but is prevented from doing so by ADOC's ban. (Doc. # 33, at 18.) But there is no indication that JFI believes that ADOC is overstepping its legal authority in barring Mr. Toodle from the relevant premises; only that JFI's President wishes that ADOC would exercise that authority differently. If JFI has a legal dispute with ADOC about their respective powers, there is no sign of that dispute in the record here, and this case would not be the forum to resolve such a dispute. The testimony from JFI's President also indicates that, in practice, ADOC may enforce its displeasure with particular JFI instructors by simply not allowing prisoners to attend programs conducted by that instructor, which in effect causes JFI to terminate the instructor for inability to do his or her job. (Doc. # 33, at 17.) Mr. Toodle does not, and could not plausibly, claim that he has a property interest in having ADOC actually provide him inmates to teach.
3

8

authority to ban him, then he has shown no property interest in being permitted on its p ro p e rty. If ADOC lacks such authority because the property in question is owned or leased b y JFI, then any claim Mr. Toodle has is against JFI and not ADOC. If the ADOC officers w h o guard the entrances to JFI facilities are acting ultra vires in enforcing the ban against Mr. T o o d le , that is a matter between the two agencies, and is not the basis for a constitutional c la im . B e c a u s e Mr. Toodle has not shown that he had any property interest in access to A D O C facilities or property, his procedural due process claim fails on the first prong of the G r e e n b r ia r Village test. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted o n this count. B . Constitutional Defamation Claim C o u n t II of the Amended Complaint states a constitutional due process claim based on a theory endorsed by the Supreme Court in Roth, permitting recovery in some instances for p u b lic employees who suffer defamation by their employers. See 408 U.S. at 573-74 (holding th a t due process requires a hearing when charges affecting "reputation, honor, or integrity," o r implying guilt of "dishonesty[] or immorality" are given as the basis for an employment d e c is io n ) (citations omitted). Mr. Toodle does not discuss or analyze this claim in his s u m m a r y judgment briefing, so arguably he has abandoned it. Assuming it has not been a b a n d o n e d , it fails for at least three reasons.

9

First, Roth speaks to an entitlement to a hearing conducted by the employer who te rm in a te d an employee. In Roth, the employee, a university professor, might have been e n title d "to refute the charge before University officials." Id. at 573. As explained earlier, M r. Toodle did have a hearing to adjudicate his complaints against his employer, JFI; Roth d o e s not say that he is entitled to another hearing from an agency that did not employ him. Second, it is apparent from subsequent case law that there is a "publication" re q u ire m e n t in such cases; that is, an employee is not entitled to due process protections for d e f a m a tio n unless the state employer has somehow distributed or otherwise publicized the a lle g e d l y defamatory reasons for the termination. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1 9 7 6 ) (holding that claims attaching a "badge of infamy" to individuals are actionable); Tebo v . Tebo, 550 F.3d 492, 503-04 (5th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he stigma must have been `published' by th e government."); Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (c la im must be "made public"). While Cannon held that an allegation being placed in a public p e rs o n n e l file was sufficient to constitute publication, Mr. Toodle has not contended that the a lle g a tio n s against him were placed in a public personnel file, and has not otherwise explained h o w the state "published" them. Third, and most simply, Mr. Toodle's claim fails because he does not argue that the " d e f a m a to ry" statements made by ADOC are untrue. In the Amended Complaint, he states th a t Commissioner Allen sent the President of JFI "a memo stating that . . . a `green leafy' s u b s ta n c e believed to be marijuana was found in" Mr. Toodle's car. (Doc. # 23, ¶ 14.) Mr.

10

Toodle nowhere disputes that this is a correct statement of fact. In his summary judgment b rie f , he admits that "a Skoal can containing a green leafy substance alleged to be marijuana w a s removed from Toodle's vehicle." (Doc. # 33, at 5.) His prospective defense to the c h a rg e appears to be that the green lefty substance could have been placed there by an inmate o r unknown other person. (Doc. # 33, at 16.) But the supposed defamatory statement did not c o n ta in any assertion about who had put the Skoal can in Mr. Toodle's car, only that it c o n ta in e d a green leafy substance believed to be marijuana, and was found in his car. (Doc. # 23, ¶ 14.) A true statement cannot be the basis for a defamation claim. Casey v. M c C o n n e ll, 975 So. 2d 384, 390 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). Accordingly, Mr. Toodle has not established any genuine issue of material fact with re s p e c t to his constitutional defamation claim, and the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted. I V . CONCLUSION. For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED Commissioner Allen's motion for summary ju d g m e n t (Doc. # 31) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Final ju d g m e n t will be entered separately. DONE this 28th day of June, 2010. /s/ W. Keith Watkins UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11