Wyrosdick v. Riley et al (INMATE 2)

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Susan Russ Walker on 2/25/13. (scn, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
PETER WYROSDICK, #196 364,
Plaintiff,
v.

GOVERNOR BOB RILEY, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:10-CV-800-SRW
[WO]

MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiff, a state inmate, alleges that rights, privileges,
or immunities afforded him under the Constitution or law of the United States have been
abridged by Defendants. The defendants are identified as former Governor Bob Riley; former
Attorney General Troy King, former Director of Public Safety; J. Christopher Murphy, former
Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, Richard Allen; Director of Central
Records, Kathy Holt; and Director of Classification, Carolyn Golson. Plaintiff requests trial
by jury, damages, declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and costs.
Defendants filed an answer, special report, and relevant supporting evidentiary
materials addressing Plaintiff’s claims for relief. The court informed Plaintiff that Defendants’
special report may, at any time, be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and explained
to Plaintiff the proper manner in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff responded to the special report filed by Defendants. Thus, this case is now pending

on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, the
evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and the Plaintiff’s opposition, the court
concludes that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no
genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (“The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).1 The party moving
for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings,
discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of

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Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and
deciding summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision,
“[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c),
changing only one word -- genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of
a summary-judgment determination.“ Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary
judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and,
therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule.

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material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support
of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.
Defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any
genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims properly before this court. Thus,
the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that
a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608
(11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly
support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact by
[citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials]
the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including
the facts considered undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”) A genuine dispute
of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a
reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.
In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts
must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of
professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord
deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to
sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail
on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to
survive Defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff is required
to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting
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his claim(s) for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is
merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.”
Id. at 249-250.
A plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient evidence to oppose a
motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995); Fullman v.
Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). Consequently, when a party fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be
granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Barnes v. Southwest
Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1987). Where all the materials before the court
indicate that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the party moving for
summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro
se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard,
548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Plaintiff’s
pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard of elementary principles of
production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a requisite
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genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, supra.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Elmore Correctional Facility in Elmore,
Alabama. The evidentiary material before the court shows that he is serving concurrent
twenty year sentences following his 1997 convictions for first degree rape of a child under the
age of twelve in the Circuit Court for Tallapoosa County, Alabama. Plaintiff’s projected
release date is April 3, 2017. (Doc. No. 25, Exh. D.)
In the present action, Plaintiff alleges that the Alabama Community Notification Act
[“the Act” or “ACNA”], Ala. Code 1975 § 15-20-1 et seq. (1975, as amended), is
unconstitutional as applied to him. He makes a variety of allegations claiming abuse,
harassment, discrimination, and general hardship based on application of the ACNA to him.
Plaintiff also asserts several federal causes of action as follows: (1) Defendants’ enactment,
application, and enforcement of the ACNA violates his substantive rights, privileges and
immunities protected by the Constitution; (2) Defendants’ enactment, application, and
enforcement of the ACNA violates the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act [CRIPA],
42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq.; (3) Defendants’ enactment, application, and enforcement of the
ACNA violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act [RLUIPA], 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(1)(a), et seq.; (4) Defendants’ enactment, application, and enforcement of
the ACNA violates the Americans with Disabilities Act [ ADA], 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.;
and, (5) Defendants’ enactment, application, and enforcement of the ACNA violates the
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Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment [ARFA], under art. I, § 3.01 of the Alabama
Constitution. (Doc. No. 1.) In an amendment to the complaint, Plaintiff complains that the
State of Alabama does not provide a classification system for sex offenders on its public
registry which would allow them to be grouped according to an individual assessment of
dangerousness and risk of re-offending. (Doc. No. 15.)

III. DISCUSSION
A. The ACNA Claims
The Alabama Community Notification Act became effective in 1996. On July 1, 2011,
the Act was repealed by the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification
Act, Alabama Act No. 2011–640, § 49, Ala. Code § 15–20A–1, et seq., [“ASORCNA”].
ASORCNA now governs the legal registration and community notification requirements
applicable to adult sex offenders as defined in § 15-20A-4(1) and is “applicable to every adult
sex offender convicted of a sex offense as defined in Section 15-20A-5, without regard to
when his or her crime or crimes were committed or his or her duty to register arose.” Ala.
Code § 15-20A-3. Plaintiff’s first degree sexual abuse conviction subjects him to the
provisions of ASORCNA upon his release from incarceration.
Because the ACNA was repealed by the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification Act. Ala. Code § 15–20A–1, et seq., the court must decide whether
repeal of the ACNA renders Plaintiff’s challenges to the statute moot. If repeal of the ACNA
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has rendered Plaintiff’s challenges moot, then such claims must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
As explained, Plaintiff is currently imprisoned on his 1997 convictions for first degree
rape of a child under the age of twelve. The court concludes that any past or current
challenges Plaintiff seeks to bring regarding the validity of the ACNA and its applicability to
his rape convictions with regard to requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, and any
challenges to the Act’s potential future application to him or enforcement against him are now
moot due to repeal of the statute.
Article III of the United States Constitution confers jurisdiction on the district courts
to hear and determine “cases” or “controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III, 2. Federal courts are
not permitted to rule upon questions which are hypothetical in nature or which do not affect
the rights of the parties in the case before the court. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 US.
472, 477 (1990). This is because courts do not sit to render advisory opinions. North Carolina
v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971). An actual controversy must exist at all times when the case
is pending. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974).
A claim becomes moot when the controversy between the parties is no longer alive
because one party has no further concern in the outcome. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147
(1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“Where the question sought to be adjudicated
has been mooted by developments subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable
controversy is presented.”). “Article III requires that a plaintiff's claim be live not just when
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he first brings suit, but throughout the litigation.” Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th
Cir. 1987). Because mootness is jurisdictional, dismissal is required when an action is moot,
as a decision in a moot action would be an impermissible advisory opinion. Al Najjar v.
Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001).
In Saladin v. Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 693 (11th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals determined:
A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the litigation, such as
where there is no reasonable expectation that the violation will occur again or
where interim relief or events have eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation.
(citations omitted).
“Generally, a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is mooted by repeal of the
statute.” Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004);
National Advertising Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (“the repeal
or amendment of an allegedly unconstitutional statute moots legal challenges to the
legitimacy of the repealed legislation.”); Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 128-29 (1977)
(holding moot a constitutional challenge to a state statute governing the involuntary
commitment of mentally ill minors, because the law had been replaced with a different
statute). Here, repeal of the ACNA has rendered Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and
declaratory relief in relation thereto moot and deprives the court of jurisdiction.
However, the repeal of a challenged law does not necessarily moot a claim for
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damages by a plaintiff alleging a past violation of his rights. Outdoor Media Group, Inc., v.
City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2007). In this regard, the court must first
consider whether Plaintiff suffered any injury with respect to his challenges concerning
application to him of the ACNA as presented in the complaint. Artway v. Attorney General
of State of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1246 (3rd Cir. 1996). The mere speculative threat of injury is
insufficient for Article III purposes. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442
U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979).
Here, the record before the court fails to demonstrate that the provisions of the ACNA
were ever applied to Plaintiff. Plaintiff appears to base his claim for damages on the potential
threat of application of various provisions of the now-repealed statute. Plaintiff may not,
however, bring a prospective damage claims under § 1983. See Tanner Advertising Group
v. Fayette County, 451 F.3d 777, 786 (11th Cir. 2006). As explained, damages are reserved
for constitutional deprivations that have occurred, not those that are merely speculative. Id.
Accordingly, because there is no present case or controversy to support the court’s
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenges to application of various provisions of the ACNA to
him, such claims shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
B. The Remaining Federal Causes of Action
i. Official Capacity
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue Defendants in their official capacities, the
defendants, as state officials, are absolutely immune from suit for damages. See Harbert Int’l,
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Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (state officials sued in their official
capacities are protected from suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment). “A state, a
state agency, and a state official sued in his official capacity are not ‘persons’ within the
meaning of § 1983, thus damages are unavailable.” Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d
1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995).
ii. Individual Capacity
Plaintiff maintains that by enacting, applying and enforcing the ACNA, Defendants
willfully subjected him to and/or conspired to subject him to violations of his substantive
rights, privileges and immunities protected by the Constitution, including various rights
under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well rights
protected under Art. 1, § 9, the Constitutional Rights of Incarcerated Persons Act [“CRIPA”],
42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq., the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
[“RLUIPA”], 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(1)(a), et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act
[“ADA”], 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment
[“ARFA”], Art. I, § 3.01 of the Alabama Constitution. To the extent that these allegations
are not subject to dismissal for the reasons explained infra, and to the extent that Plaintiff
may bring a cause of action under the amendments and/or Acts noted above, his contentions
are merely broad assertions of constitutional violations without any facts to support his
contentions that Defendants violated or conspired to violate his rights under the Constitution

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and statutory provisions through enactment, application and/or enforcement of the ACNA.2
See Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a conspiracy
allegation that is vague and conclusory fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and is subject to dismissal); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Marsh v. Butler
County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of
mixed fact and law have long been recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”).
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 556 (2007)). Plaintiff cannot rely on subjective suspicions and

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With respect to Plaintiff’s challenge to Defendants “enactment” of the ACNA, none of the named
Defendants are or were responsible for enacting state laws. Even if Plaintiff had named a proper defendant,
the Supreme Court has “recognized that state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their
legislative acts” and that this immunity can shield officials against suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
seeking damages, declaratory relief, or injunctive relief. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the
U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980) (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)); see also Yeldell v.
Cooper Green Hosp., Inc., 956 F.2d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 1992) (legislative immunity applies to “those acts
which are ‘necessary to preserve the integrity of the legislative process.’”) (quoting United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972)). In Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005), the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that state legislators who act in their legislative capacities are entitled to absolute
legislative immunity whether a suit seeks damages or prospective relief and regardless of whether the state
legislators are named in their individual or official capacity.

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unsupported speculation but must provide sufficient facts to show how the conduct or actions
of a defendant amounted to a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. Further, “[b]ecause
vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... [section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution.” Id. at 1948 (emphasis added). A plaintiff must plead that a defendant acted
with “purpose rather than knowledge” to satisfy this standard. Id. at 1949.
Here, Plaintiff fails to specify the injury or harm caused by any of Defendants’
allegedly unconstitutional conduct and only conclusorily asserts that the “sex offender laws
impact almost all areas of our life in an egregious and harmful way.” (See Doc. No. 1,
Wyrosdick Affidavit at 1.) Plaintiff’s allegations of injury are speculative at best, and coupled
with his broad and unsubstantiated assertions of constitutional violations against the named
defendants without any factual development to support his claims against them, are
insufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment. The court, therefore, concludes that
Defendants’ dispositive motion should be granted with respect to the allegations set forth
above to the extent they are not otherwise subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.3

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The court notes that Plaintiff asserts that Defendants conspired to violate his rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985, as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under § 1985, Plaintiff must establish (a) the existence of a
conspiracy; (b) that Defendants intended to deny Plaintiff of his equal protection of laws, or equal privileges
and immunities under the laws; (c) injury or deprivation of a federally-protected right; (d) an overt act in
furtherance of the object of the conspiracy; and (e) some racial or otherwise class-based invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirator’s action. See Arnold v. Board of Education of Escambia
County, Alabama, 880 F.2d 305, 317-318 (11th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). As the court has already
determined, Plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy between Defendants are conclusory, vague, and general
which is insufficient. Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir.1990); Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-57.

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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Harris, 65 F.3d at 916.
C. The Sex Offender Registry Classification Claim
In an amendment to his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants should institute
a tiered classification system based on a convicted sex offender’s individual dangerousness.
Plaintiff argues that the failure of the State of Alabama to use such a classification system
on its website registry of sex offenders violates his constitutional rights. Plaintiff maintains
that without providing information on the registry of sex offenders as to a registrant’s
dangerousness, those presumably not dangerous must endure the stigma of the general
public’s erroneously thinking otherwise. (Doc. No. 15.)
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155
L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), the Court addressed a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenge to
Connecticut’s sex offender registration and notification law on grounds that it did not provide
registrants a pre-deprivation hearing to determine whether they were currently dangerous.
Reasoning that “due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not
material to the State’s statutory scheme,” Id. at 4, and that Connecticut’s registration
requirement was “based on the fact of previous conviction, not the fact of current
dangerousness,” the Supreme Court found that “due process does not entitle [a defendant]
to a hearing....” Id. at 4, 7.

Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants’ conduct was motivated by race or any other classbased invidiously discriminatory animus. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under § 1985.

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Here, Plaintiff’s contention that he has a constitutional right not to be stigmatized due
to omission of a registrant’s dangerousness on Alabama’s sex offender registry and website
listings entitles him to no relief. Although Plaintiff does not assert violation of a specific
federal constitutional right with regard to this claim, the court understands his claim to be
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The law is well-settled,
however, that damage to reputation alone does not implicate a protected liberty or property
interest. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). In order for a defamation claim to be
viable under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that the “governmental action taken ... deprived
[him] of a right previously held under state law.” Id. at 708. That is, in addition to showing
reputational harm, Plaintiff must also show an alteration or extinguishment of an interest
protected by the Constitution or state law. Id. at 708-09. This is known as the “stigma-plus”
test. Id. at 711.
The Doe Court applied the “stigma-plus” test in context of the challenge to
Connecticut’s sex offender registry law. As noted, the Court determined that because the
basis of Connecticut’s registration requirement is the fact of conviction alone, dangerousness
and the opportunity to be heard on the issue of dangerousness are simply not material issues.
See Doe, at 7-8. Alabama’s current sex offender website registry is similarly based upon the
fact of an offender’s conviction. There is no indicator or statement regarding the
dangerousness of the persons listed on the registry. See Alabama Department of Public Safety
Community Information Center, available at http://dps.alabama.gov. See Ala. Code § 1514

20A-8.4 Further, there is no indicator on the website that the State has made an individual
determination regarding a registrant’s dangerousness, and the site cautions persons viewing
it that “the information contained on th[e] site may not reflect the current residence, status,
or other information regarding the offender.” See Id. Thus, as in Connecticut Dept. of Public
Safety v. Doe, the State here “has decided that the registry of information of all sex offenders
– currently dangerous or not – must be publicly disclosed,” and “states are not barred by
principles of ‘procedural due process’ from drawing such classifications.” Id. 538 U.S. at 11
(emphasis in original). Based on the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s sex offender registry classification claim.
D. The Exercise of Supplemental Jurisdiction
Plaintiff seeks to invoke the supplemental jurisdiction of this court with respect to his
claims arising under state law. In the posture of this case, however, the exercise of such
jurisdiction is inappropriate.
For a federal court “[t]o exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction over state law claims not
otherwise cognizable in federal court, ‘the court must have jurisdiction over a substantial
federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from a “common nucleus of
operative fact.”’” L.A. Draper and Son v. Wheelabrator Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 427 (11th
Cir. 1984). The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. United Mine Workers

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Ala. Code § 15-20A-8 concerns registration information for the public registry website and
delineates the information which is to be provided.

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v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). “If the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs
strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of the state claims.” L.A. Draper and Son,
735 F.2d at 428. In view of this court's resolution of the federal claims presented in the
complaint, Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims are due to be dismissed. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
at 726 (if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the state claims should be dismissed
as well); see also Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 677 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1982).
A separate order follows.
DONE, this 25th day of February, 2013.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker
SUSAN RUSS WALKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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