Crymes v. City of Montgomery, Alabama et al

Filing 31

OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/16/2011. (br, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

WILBUR CRYMES,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al., )
)
Defendants.
)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:10cv879-MHT
(WO)

OPINION
Plaintiff Wilbur Crymes asserts federal and state-law
claims arising out of his seven-day detention at the
municipal

jail

in

Montgomery,

Alabama;

he

asserts

constitutional claims under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments

(enforced

through

42

U.S.C.

negligence claims under Alabama law.

§

1983),

and

In addition to the

City of Montgomery, the defendants are the jail’s former
administrator, A.J. Hardy, and assistant administrator,
Janice Hopkins.

Count One of the complaint alleges that

the

violated

defendants

the

eighth

and

fourteenth

amendments by acting with deliberate indifference to

Crymes’s medical needs; Count Two charges negligence
under

Alabama

law

for

the

same

allegedly

inadequate

medical care; and Count Three seeks to impose liability
on the defendants for their alleged failure to train or
supervise their employees adequately. This court has
original jurisdiction over the federal claims, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343, and supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The

case

defendants’

is

currently

motions

for

before

summary

the

court

judgment.

on

the

Summary

judgment is warranted if, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Finding this standard met, the

court will grant the motions.

2

I.
On

October

15,

FACTS

2008,

Crymes

was

stopped

at

roadblock set up by Montgomery police officers.

a

The

officers placed Crymes under arrest after a background
check revealed that he had outstanding warrants.

During

intake, Crymes was asked a number of questions about his
medical health and condition, and a guard recorded his
answers on an intake and screening form.

While the form,

along with other intake records, did not indicate that
Crymes has any medical condition, disease, or history of
medical problems the officers would need to be aware of,
Crymes did tell the guard that he has hemophilia.

Once

booked, Crymes was put in the “drunk tank,” where he was
made to stand for about five hours.

In the meantime,

Crymes began to have stiffness in his knee and started
experiencing pain.*

Crymes did not say much to the jail

* In his response to the defendants’ summary-judgment
motion and for the first time, Crymes’s attorney contends
that Crymes’s knee pain began before having to stand in
(continued...)
3

guards or nursing staff about any knee stiffness or pain
he experienced while in the lock-up; he said only that he
“needed to go to the emergency room.” Crymes Depo. (Doc.
No.

22,

Ex.

1,

at

33).

From

there,

Crymes

was

transferred to another area of the jail where he was able
to sit comfortably.
The next day, Crymes appeared in municipal court and
was convicted and sentenced to seven-days imprisonment.
Over the next week, Crymes repeated his request to go to
the hospital and was temporarily placed in the “special
need” observation unit (what Crymes calls the “suicide
watch”

area)

for

roughly

a

day

on

the

basis

of

*(...continued)
the drunk tank. He says that, “During the arrest,
[Crymes] sustained a contusion to his knee,” which caused
him “to bleed internally and swell in the area
surrounding his knee.” Pl. Resp. Br. (Doc. No. 22, at
1). Crymes’s attorney later made similar allegations at
oral argument.
However, there is no sworn testimony
supporting this contention, and Crymes points to nothing
in the record describing any contusion he might have
sustained during his arrest.
This sort of showing is
required at summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1). Given the lack of evidence in the record on
this fact, the court does not credit Crymes’s assertion.
4

unspecified “medical needs.”

Id. at 35; Hardy Depo.

(Doc. No. 22, Ex. 2, at 22-23).

The record is unclear as

to which medical issue led to the move, but Crymes knew
the transfer was done to help him and was an indication
that he “finally got through to one of the officers.”
Crymes Depo. (Doc. No. 19, Ex. 2, at 38).
a

nurse

Though it was

who

requested

Crymes’s

transfer,

Administrator

Hopkins’s

initials

appear

on

Assistant
the

log

documenting the fact that Crymes had been placed in the
observation unit.
receive

any

It is undisputed that Crymes did not

additional

medical

attention

for

his

hemophilia.
Following his release, Crymes filed this lawsuit.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Deliberate Indifference (Count One): Count One of
the

complaint

alleges

that

the

defendants

were

deliberately indifferent to Crymes’s medical needs while
he was detained at the jail.

5

Crymes does not specify

whether this claims arise from his pre-trial detention
(in which case the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment covers his claim) or from the time spent in the
jail following the judge giving him a sentence (in which
case the eighth amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments would cover his claim) or both.

See

Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703
& n.5 (11th Cir. 1985).

This ambiguity need not be

resolved, however, because the court treats the eighth
and

fourteenth

amendments

as

involving the denial of a basic

coextensive

for

claims

need like medical care.

Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n.5 (11th
Cir.

2001)

Constitution

(en
is

banc).

For

violated

by

both

provisions,

officials

the

deliberate

indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs.

Hamm

v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572-74 (11th Cir.
1985).
To prevail, Crymes “must satisfy both an objective
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d

and a subjective inquiry.”

6

1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

First, he “must prove an objectively

serious medical need,” id., that “poses a serious risk of
Taylor v. Adams, 221

serious harm” if left unattended.
F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000).

A “serious medical

need is considered one that has been diagnosed by a
physician

as

mandating

treatment

or

one

that

is

so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.”

Farrow v. West, 320

F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

Second, as a subjective

matter, Crymes must prove that the prison official acted
with

deliberate

Deliberate

indifference

indifference

is

to

more

that
than

need.

negligence;

Id.
it

requires knowledge of the risk and disregard of the
inference that such a risk could harm an inmate or
prisoner.
Cir. 2004).

Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th
Once an officer has knowledge of a serious

medical risk, a finding of deliberate indifference can

7

come in many ways: it “may be established by a showing of
grossly inadequate care as well as by a decision to take
an easier but less efficacious course of treatment”;
deliberate indifference can occur when “the need for
treatment is obvious” but the medical care provided “is
so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all”; and even
where “medical care is ultimately provided, a prison
official may nonetheless act with deliberate indifference
by delaying the treatment of serious medical needs, even
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d

for a period of hours.”

1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).

For several reasons, Crymes

cannot meet this standard.
First, there is nothing in the record substantiating
Crymes’s contention that he had an objectively serious
medical

need.

The

court

agrees

with

Crymes

that

hemophilia is a serous medical condition. Hemophilia, a
bleeding
properly,

disorder
can

that

subject

prevents
a

person

blood
to

from

clotting

“spontaneous”

or

excessive bleeding (both internally, from a bruise or

8

fall, and externally, from a cut or scrape), and “can
cause

severe

arthritis,

crippling,

or

death.”

Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1187 (11th
Cir. 1995).
medical

The problem for Crymes, however, is that a

condition

does

serious medical need.

not

necessarily

equate

to

a

While Crymes has a serious medical

condition, he has not submitted any evidence that could
show he experienced an objectively serious need during
his time in the city’s lockup.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to
Crymes, the court assumes that Crymes told the officers
about his hemophilia; that he experienced knee stiffness
and

pain

from

standing

in

the

drunk

tank;

that

he

complained that he needed an emergency room while in the
drunk tank; and that he told nurses about his desire to
go to the hospital throughout the remainder of detention.
In addition, the parties dispute why Crymes never filled
out

a

“sick

slip,”

which

inmates

who

have

medical

problems are given if they have a medical complaint,

9

illness, or need.

The defendants fault Crymes for not

filling out a sick slip and suggest that this failure
dooms his claim.

Crymes says that he was never given a

sick slip to fill out in spite of his complaints.

Taking

the facts in his favor, the court assumes that Crymes was
never given a sick slip.
Nonetheless, Crymes’s claims fail because he has not
adduced evidence demonstrating that he had a specific
need related to his hemophiliac condition while detained
by the city.

For instance, there is nothing in the

record, either through affidavit, exhibit, or deposition,
that would demonstrate the extent of Crymes’s pain or
that would reveal a serious medical need (one that a lay
person would recognize) during his time in the lock-up.
Crymes has submitted no evidence describing the extent of
his hemophilia (the severity of which can vary), nor has
he provided the court with medical evidence (such as a
doctor’s

report

or

an

affidavit

from

his

treating

physician) that would document harm caused to him from

10

his

time

in

the

city’s

jail.

And,

while

Crymes

experienced some stiffness and pain in the drunk tank,
nothing in the record demonstrates the extent of this
pain relative to the knee pain he experiences regularly
(which is described in the record) or even whether this
pain was attributable to standing for a few hours, his
hemophilia, or both.
a

claim

missing.

for

Such evidence is necessary to prove

deliberate

Unlike

the

indifference

and

motion-to-dismiss

is

simply

phase

of

litigation, at summary judgment this lack of evidence is
fatal.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248-49 (1986); cf. Walker v. Peters,233 F.3d 494
(7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that when a plaintiff puts
forth “no evidence that he was injured by the defendants’
refusal on some occasions to provide him” with medication
to treat his hemophilia, “he cannot make out a claim of
deliberate indifference relating to his treatment as a
hemophiliac”).

11

But, even assuming these that evidentiary gaps had
been filled and that Crymes were able to demonstrate a
serious

medical

need

related

to

his

hemophiliac

condition, Crymes has not met his burden of satisfying
the

subjective

indifference

component

inquiry)

(that

of

his

is,

the

deliberate-

constitutional

claim.

Administrator Hardy was not in the jail at the time and
did

not

meet

hemophilia,

or

until

even

hear

Crymes,

litigation

after

about

began.

or

his
While

Assistant Administrator Hopkins signed off on Crymes’s
transfer into the observation unit, there is no evidence
establishing a further risk that she both knew of and the
chose

to

ignore.

Indeed,

Crymes’s

counsel

admitted

during oral argument that there is no evidence in the
record demonstrating that either Hardy or Hopkins had any
knowledge of Crymes’s hemophilia, medical requests, or
knee stiffness and pain.

And, even assuming other jail

guards or nurses knew of Crymes’s condition and need,
there is no respondeat superior for a § 1983 claim.

12

See

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1315 n.24 (11th Cir.
2010).
Finally, to be liable, the city must have had a
practice,

policy,

or

custom

of

jail

guards

acting

deliberately indifferent to objectively serious medical
Monell v. New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

complaints.

U.S. 658 (1978).

Given that Crymes has not proven a

violation

constitution,

of

the

which

is

the

minimal

requirement for demonstrating municipal liability, the
See id. at 694.

city cannot be liable either.
addition,

even

if

Crymes

had

proven

a

In

single

constitutional violation, there is nothing in the record
demonstrating

a

formal

policy

or

even

an

informal

practice or custom (for example, of officers routinely
ignoring inmates requests for help with the imprimatur of
higher-ups like Hardy and Hopkins) that could make the
city liable here.
will

be

granted

For these reasons, summary judgment
will

be

granted

defendants on Count One.

13

in

favor

of

the

B.

Negligence

(Count

Two):

Count

Two

of

the

complaint alleges that, even if the defendants were not
deliberately indifferent to Crymes’s medical needs, they
were negligent in a manner that makes them liable in tort
under Alabama law.

The defendants raise various forms of

state-law immunity in response.
not

delve

into

doctrines.

these

The court, however, need

complex

state-law

immunity

Instead, the same evidentiary failings above

apply with equal force here.

As the court mentioned,

there is no evidence of damage or injury in the record
flowing from the defendants’ conduct.

Unlike an action

pursued under § 1983, where nominal damages are permitted
without a showing of quantifiable injury, see, e.g.,
Amnesty Int’l v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1177 (11th Cir.
2009), a showing of injury and damages caused by the
defendant is essential to proving a negligence tort under
Alabama law.
308

(Ala.

See Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So.2d 291,

2008)

(“‘Alabama

law

has

long

required

a

manifest, present injury before a plaintiff may recover

14

in tort.’” (quoting Southern Bakeries, Inc. v. Knipp, 852
So.2d

712,

716-17

(Ala.

2002));

Davis

v.

Hanson

Aggregates Southeast, Inc., 952 So.2d 330, 335 (Ala.
2006) (“Damages are an essential element of the tort of
negligence.

[P]roof of damage [is] an essential part of

the plaintiff's case.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).

Without any showing of injury or

damage, Crymes cannot prevail, and summary judgment is
due to the defendants on the negligence claim.
C. Failure to Train and Supervise (Count Three):
Given the foregoing, the court can dispose of Count Three
expeditiously.
arises

under

Without specifying whether this claim
the

federal

constitution

or

state

law,

Crymes argues that the defendants are liable for their
failure
guards.

to

train

Having

and
found

supervise
no

adequately

violation

of

the

the

jail

federal

constitution or Alabama tort law upon which this sort of
claim could rest, the court holds that Crymes cannot
prove the defendants are liable for any failures related

15

to training and supervision.

See Connick v. Thompson,

131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359-60 (2011) (describing the showing
necessary to find a city liable for a failure to train
claim under § 1983); Bedsole v. Clark, 33 So.3d 9, 15-16
(Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (discussing standards for failure
to

train

claims

under

Alabama

law).

Thus,

summary

judgment for the defendants is proper on this count as
well.

*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment will be granted.

An appropriate

judgment will be entered.
DONE, this the 16th day of September, 2011.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson
_____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE