Coleman v. Holt et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that defendants' 20 MOTION to Dismiss is GRANTED; that plaintiff's 18 Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice; that an appropriate final judgment will be entered. Signed by Honorable Judge Mark E. Fuller on 12/13/2011. (cc, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
LEON COLEMAN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
KATHY HOLT, et al.,
Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:10-cv-1016-MEF
(WO)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Leon Coleman filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Amended Complaint (Doc. # 18)
alleging that Defendants Kathy Holt, Terry McDonnell, Richard Allen, Vernon Barnett, and
J.C. Giles (collectively “Defendants”), acting in their individual and official capacities as
officers in the Alabama Department of Corrections, violated his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights by refusing to award him good time while serving a state prison sentence.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 20), which
is fully-briefed and ripe for review (Docs. # 22, 23). Defendants’ motion is due to be granted
because Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Subject matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).
The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate
allegations in support of both.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may
raise a statute of limitations defense when the complaint shows on its face that the limitations
period has run. Avco v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 676 F.2d 494, 495 (11th Cir. 1982); see
also Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment CSX Transp. N.
Lines v. CSX Transp., Inc., 522 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the
complaint that the claim is time-barred.”).
In assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that all the
factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true and construe them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., Inc., 640 F.3d 1338,
1344-45 (11th Cir. 2011). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint need not contain “detailed
factual allegations,” but must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In addition to considering the properly

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pleaded allegations in a complaint, the court may also consider on a motion to dismiss any
exhibits attached to the complaint, see Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275,
1288 (11th Cir. 2005), as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference,
and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
III. BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2006, Coleman was sentenced to three years custody in the Alabama
Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) for possession of a controlled substance, a class C
felony under Alabama law, Ala. Code. § 13A-12-212, and to six months suspended for
possession of marijuana 2nd degree, a class A misdemeanor under Alabama law, Ala. Code
§ 13A-12-214. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) Coleman began serving his sentence on April 2, 2007.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) At some point soon thereafter, Coleman became aware of and requested
to know why he was not receiving “good time” in compliance with Ala. Code § 14-9-41.1
In response, he received a letter from Defendant Kathy Holt of ADOC’s Central Records
Division which stated, in part: “You will not earn good time on your case because it is a split
sentence and one is a Class A felony.” (March 12, 2008 Letter.) Defendant Holt explained

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The Amended Complaint states that “Plaintiff began inquiring why he was not receiving good
time” on “December 2, 2008[.]” (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) As evidenced by Plaintiff’s response brief to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss as well as the March 12, 2008 letter from Defendant Holt to Plaintiff that
is attached to the Amended Complaint, the date provided in this factual allegation – December 2, 2008 –
is clearly a drafting error. (Pl.’s Resp. 3 (Doc. # 22) (“Sometime prior to March of 2008[,] Plaintiff
started inquiring as to why he was not receiving good time . . . .”); March 12, 2008 Letter (Am. Compl.,
Ex. A) (“In response to your recent request . . . .”).)

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that “[g]ood time is not earned on cases that are over 15 years, Class A felonies, or split
sentences.” (Id.)
Of course, Coleman did not receive a split sentence (a sentence consisting of
imprisonment and probation) and his possession of marijuana 2nd degree conviction was a
class A misdemeanor, not a class A felony. (Am. Compl., Exs. B & C.) Because of ADOC’s
error, Coleman alleges that he was not awarded “good time,” and that, as a result, he “served
approximately [two] years more than he should have . . . .” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14.)
Coleman filed his initial Complaint on December 1, 2010, and seeks $500,000 in damages
in this lawsuit.
IV. DISCUSSION
“‘All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute
of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been
brought.’” Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting McNair, 515
F.3d at 1173). Because Alabama’s statute of limitations governing general tort actions is two
years, see Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l), Coleman must have brought these claims within two years
of their accrual date. See Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989).
“The statute of limitations on a [§] 1983 claim begins to run when ‘the facts which
would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a
reasonably prudent regard for his rights.’” Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 867 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008)). By Coleman’s

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own admission, he was aware of his claim at some point before March of 2008. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 8,9; March 12, 2008 Letter; Pl.’s Resp. 3.) From that date, Coleman had two years
to file his § 1983 claim. He did not. His initial Complaint (Doc. # 1) was filed on December
1, 2010, and it is barred by the statute of limitations.
However, Coleman attempts to revive his stale claim by arguing that his cause of
action did not accrue until he began to suffer damages from the alleged constitutional
violation. (Pl.’s Resp. 10.) In other words, Coleman argues that it was not until he would
have been released with a proper application of good time credit, but was not, that his claim
accrued. That this argument is without merit is demonstrated by simple analogy to the
jurisprudence regarding § 1983 Eighth Amendment method of execution claims. If
Coleman’s statute of limitations argument were to be accepted and applied in this context,
a condemned inmate’s method of execution claim would not ripen until the moment he is
executed. This would create unjust results, which is why it is not the law. See, e.g., McNair,
515 F.3d at 1173. Plaintiff’s moment-of-injury argument is due to be rejected.2 3

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Plaintiff does not argue that ADOC’s refusal to apply good time credit constituted a continuing
violation. Furthermore, the Court is unaware of any decision that would support such an argument. See
Adair v. Lewis, No. 91-15739, 952 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (rejecting
argument); see also Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that “district
courts cannot concoct . . . arguments neither made nor advanced by the parties”).
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Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, the Court need not
consider and expresses no opinion on Defendants’ other grounds for dismissal.

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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
# 20) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. # 18) is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
An appropriate final judgment will be entered.
DONE this 13th day of December, 2011.
/s/ Mark E. Fuller
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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