Hayes v. Alabama Department of Corrections Commissioner et al (INMATE 1) (LEAD CASE)

Filing 107

CORRECTED OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/8/14. (scn, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

NATHANIEL HAYES,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
COMMISSIONER, et al.,
Defendants.

NATHANIEL HAYES,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
COMMISSIONER, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION. NO.
2:11cv38-MHT
[WO]

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:11cv44-MHT
[WO]

CORRECTED OPINION
In

these

consolidated

lawsuits,

the

plaintiff

Nathaniel Hayes brings claims for relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and names the following as defendants:
the

Alabama

Department

of
1

Corrections

Commissioner;

Kilby Correctional Facility Warden John Cummings, whose
last name is actually “Cummins”; Correctional Captain
Victor

Napier;

Classification

Officer

Angela

Lawson;

and Correctional Officers Douglas McKinney and Taurean
Crawford.

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question).
Pursuant to the orders of the court, the defendants
have

filed

complaints.

a

special
Hayes

report

in

response

to

Hayes’s

was instructed to file a response

to the special report and informed that at any time
after the filing of his response the special report
could be treated by the court as a motion for summary
judgment.
how

to

These instructions also informed Hayes about
properly

judgment.
therefore,

respond

Hayes
these

to

has

filed

cases

are

a

motion
his

before

for

summary

response,

the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

court

on

and,
the

For reasons

that follow, summary judgment will be entered in favor
of the defendants.

2

I.

LEGAL STANDARD

"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or
defense--on

which

summary

judgment

is

sought.

The

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The court must view

the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II.

THE FACTS

On December 22, 2010, Hayes was transferred from
Holman Prison to Kilby Correctional Facility where he
was initially placed in general population.

The next

day, however, Hayes was transferred to administrative
segregation where he remained for 48 days.

He does not

dispute

status

that,

while

in

segregation
3

his

was

reviewed

once

officials,
transfer

weekly

which

of

team

Hayes

by

a

included

to

team
a

segregation

of

correctional

psychologist.

The

precipitated

this

lawsuit.

III.
A.

DISCUSSION

Respondent-Superior Claim.

Hayes claims that

the Alabama Corrections Department Commissioner and the
Kilby Warden should be held liable for the violations
of “staff subordinates.”

Of course, it “is axiomatic,

in section 1983 actions, that liability must be based
on

something

superior.”
Cir. 1990).
in

the

more

than

a

theory

of

respondeat

Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th
A supervisor must have either participated

constitutional

deprivation

or

taken

actions

linked to the deprivation through a causal connection.
This link can be established when a history of abuse
puts the supervisor on notice of deprivations and the
supervisor fails to correct them; when improper custom
or policy breed indifference to constitutional rights;
4

or when the “supervisor directed the subordinates to
act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act
unlawfully

and

failed

to

stop

them

from

doing

so.”

Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
Hayes presents absolutely no evidence showing that
these two defendants participated in the actions about
which he complains; had any knowledge of any alleged
violations of his constitutional rights; or otherwise
is

subject

to

subordinates.

liability

for

actions

of

their

Therefore, summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of the Alabama Corrections Department
Commissioner and the Kilby Warden.
B.
that

Hayes claims

Administrative-Segregation Claim.

the

placement

of

him

in

the

Kilby

Facility’s

administrative segregation without cause violated his
constitutional

rights.

segregation

at

Holman

transferred

to

the

Hayes

was

in

Prison

at

the

Kilby

Facility,

administrative
time

and

he

he

was

further

contends that his rights were violated at the Kilby
Facility

because

he

was

not
5

given

an

extension

notification of his continued placement in segregation.
Hayes specifically alleges that Captain Napier should
be held liable because he “was aware of the violations
of plaintiff’s rights because he’s responsible for the
operation of the Segregation Unit, as he review (sic)
the status of each inmate on a weekly basis w/ the
Segregation Review Board.”

With regard to Correctional

Officer Crawford, Hayes claims he “was a party that
processed plaintiff into Administrative Segregation w/o
cause.”1
As a matter of law, Hayes is entitled to no relief
on this claim. Placement of an inmate in segregation or
administrative confinement for limited periods of time
does not impose an “atypical, significant deprivation”
1. It is unclear which, if any, of the other
defendants Hayes contends violated his constitutional
rights
because
he
was
placed
in
administrative
segregation. For example, with respect to Classification
Officer Lawson, Hayes states she was "put on notice of
the violations of plaintiff's rights, but failed to
respond in any manner." Since the court concludes that
on the merits Hayes is not entitled to relief on any of
his claims, it is unnecessary for the court to parse the
complaint, as amended, claim by claim and defendant by
defendant.
6

sufficient to give rise to a constitutionally protected
liberty
485–87

interest.
(1995)

Sandin

v.

(concluding

515

Conner,

30

days

of

U.S.

472,

disciplinary

segregation did not give rise to a protected liberty
interest);

see

also

Rodgers

v.

Singletary,

142

F.3d

1252, 1253 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding two months in
administrative

confinement

did

not

constitute

deprivation of a protected liberty interest).
While

at

the

Kilby

Facility,

Hayes

was

in

segregation for 48 days during which his status was
reviewed weekly.
show

that

this

Hayes has presented no facts that
confinement

imposed

an

“atypical

and

significant hardship on ... [him] in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life” that would qualify
as

a

Sandin,

liberty
515

deprivation

U.S.

at

implicating

484-85.

The

due

process.

defendants

are

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on
Hayes’s segregation claim.
C.

Adulterated-Food

Claim.

In

his

original

complaint, Hayes alleges that the “[Alabama Department
7

of Corrections] Administration is continuing to spike
my food trays and store draw with mood altering drugs.”
More specifically, he contends that Sergeant McKinney2
“spiked

plaintiff’s

food

trays

plaintiff’s past behavior.”

continuously

due

to

To the extent that this

claim is premised on a retaliation theory, the court
will separately address that issue in a later section
of this opinion.
Hayes’s

spiked-food

claim

arises

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
requires

that

prisoners

adequate food. ...

be

under

both

the

The Eighth Amendment
provided

“reasonably

A well-balanced meal, containing

sufficient nutritional value to preserve health, is all
that is required.”
1567,

1575

(11th

Hamm v. De Kalb County, 774 F.2d
Cir.

1985).

In

addition,

it

is

undeniable that Hayes possesses a significant liberty
interest

in

avoiding

the

unwanted

administration

of

2. The original complaint names Sergeant Jenkins as
a defendant in this claim. In an amended complaint filed
February 7, 2011, Hayes substituted McKinney for Jenkins
whom Hayes “erroneously identified.”
8

mood-altering drugs under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth

Amendment.

Washington

See

v.

Harper,

494

U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
The difficulty for Hayes is that he has presented
to the court absolutely no evidence that supports his
adulterated

food

verification

of

sufficient

to

oppose

Harris

Ostrout,

v.

claim.

A

conclusory
a
65

motion
F.3d

plaintiff’s

allegations
for
912

summary
(11th

is

mere
not

judgment.

Cir.

1995);

Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir.
1984).

And, “although [the court] must view factual

inferences favorably toward the nonmoving party and pro
se complaints are entitled to a liberal interpretation
by the courts, ... a pro se litigant does not escape
the essential burden under summary judgment standards
of establishing that there is a genuine ... [dispute]
as to a fact material to his case in order to avert
summary judgment." Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670
(11th Cir. 1990) (a pro se litigant's allegation of
contaminated drinking water found unsubstantiated and
9

completely speculative because the litigant failed to
submit a doctor's diagnosis or any medical examination
evidence

supporting

those

allegations).

Hayes

has

submitted no evidence that would support a conclusion
that the food he received at Kilby was nutritionally
inadequate

and

no

evidence

substantiating

his

mere

contention that mood-altering drugs were placed in his
food or store-draw items.
failed

to

produce

In other words, Hayes has

“sufficient

[favorable]

evidence”

that would be admissible at trial supporting his claim
See Anderson v. Liberty

of a constitutional violation.
Lobby,

Inc.,

supra;

Civil Procedure.
a

genuine

Rule

56(e)(1),

Federal

Rules

of

In the absence of such proof creating

dispute,

the

defendants

are

entitled

to

summary judgment on this claim.
D.

Retaliation Claim.

To understand this claim,

it is necessary that the court look closely at Hayes’s
complaints.

The

original

complaint

was

filed

on

January 14, 2011, on a form provided by the court.

In

the section of that form in which Hayes is asked to
10

explain

his

claim

briefly,

is

retaliating

“Administration
behavior

code(s)

disciplinaries.”

in

he

my

wrote

that

the

for

the

harassment

file,

due

to

past

In the next sections of the complaint

form, Hayes is asked to explain his claim against each
named defendant.

In these sections of the complaint,

there is no direct reference to any retaliation claim.
With respect to Sergeant Jenkins (later identified as
Sergeant

McKinney),

plaintiff

(sic)

Hayes

food

trays

plaintiff’s past behavior.”
retaliation
amended
2011,

otherwise.

complaints
and

on

February

states

he

continuously

“spiked
due

to

But there is no mention of
Hayes

January
7,

that

filed
21,

2011.

several

2011,
In

other

January

none

25,

of

these

in

their

amendments did Hayes mention retaliation.
In

the

defendants’

special

report

and

separate affidavits, the defendants understandably do
not

mention

retaliation.

Hayes

response:

11

then

filed

his

“Defendant(s)
has
overlooked
plaintiff’s
underlying
claim
of
retaliated harassment, which now is
fully developed.
“Plaintiff was charged with an Assault
at Holman Prison, and while in Lockup, he was arbitrarily classed under a
(Seg Boarded) Campaign Demonstration,
due
to
a
framed
disciplinary
transcript.
Seg. Boarded--meaning,
subjected an inmate to demonstrated
harassment, due to disciplinary files.
“However, plaintiff transferred from
Holman to Kilby on a lay over, en
route
to
Donaldson;
as
Kilby
Classification
received
special
Instructions to prep a Seg. Boarded
Rally:
(by
serenading
propaganda
[false]
campaigns
throughout
the
Institution),
before
transferring
plaintiff to Donaldson on a Hostile
Seg. Boarded Rally Campaign, in a
conspiracy to provoke entrapment; as
demonstrated
by
defendant(s)
orchestrated harassment.”
The method of establishing a retaliation claim is
essentially the same as for a claim of race or sex
discrimination.

Donnellon v. Fruehauf Corporation, 794

F.2d 598, 600-01 (11th Cir. 1986).

An inmate has the

initial burden of establishing a prima-facie case of
unlawful

retaliation

by

a
12

preponderance

of

the

evidence, which once established raises a presumption
that prison officials retaliated against the inmate.
Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981).

Merely

alleging

the

ultimate

retaliation, however, is insufficient.
857

F.2d

1139,

Additionally,

1142,

conclusory

n.6

of

Cain v. Lane,

(7th

allegations

fact

Cir.

are

1988).

insufficient

to demonstrate the existence of each element required
to establish retaliation.

Morales v. MacKalm, 278 F.3d

126, 131 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); see also
Bennett v. Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2nd Cir. 2003)
(because
abuse,

prisoner
“we

are

allegation.”).

retaliation
careful

to

claims
require

are

prone

to

non-conclusory

If an inmate establishes a prima-facie

case, the burden then shifts to the prison officials to
rebut the presumption by producing sufficient evidence
to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
prison official retaliated against the inmate.
may

be

done

by

the

prison
13

official

This

articulating

a

legitimate,

non-retaliatory

reason

for

the

adverse

decision or action, a reason which is clear, reasonably
specific and worthy of credence.

The official has a

burden of production, not of persuasion, and thus does
not have to persuade a court that he or she actually
was motivated by the reason advanced.
Once

the

jail

production,

the

persuading
evidence

official

the

that

inmate
court

the

by

Burdine, supra.

satisfies

this

burden

of

then

the

burden

of

has

sufficient

proffered

reason

and
for

admissible
the

adverse

decision or action is a pretext for retaliation.
Given

the

liberality

with

which

the

Id.

court

must

construe pro se complaints, the court construes Hayes’s
complaints as raising a retaliation claim with respect
to spiking his food and store draws and with regard to
placement of him in segregation.

With regard to the

food and store-draw claims, Hayes’s retaliation claim
founders

on

the

first

prong

of

establishing

such

a

claim because, as earlier noted, he failed to adduce
any evidence that the defendants placed in his food or
14

store draw any foreign objects or mood-altering drugs.
His allegations are merely conclusory and as such are
insufficient

to

establish

that

the

defendants

retaliated against him.
With regard to segregation, the court will assume
that

Hayes

presented

a

prima-facie

case.

The

defendants have come forward with a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing Hayes in segregation.
In his affidavit, the Kilby Warden states:
“On December 22, 2011, Inmate Hayes
arrived at Kilby and was placed in BDormitory
which
is
a
population
dormitory. On December 23, 2011, Ms.
Lawson was off and Kilby's other
Classification Supervisor, Ms. Ashley
Slatton reviewed Inmate Hayes file
which
indicated
that
he
was
in
Administrative Segregation at Holman
Correctional
Facility.
Ms.
Slatton
then
contacted
the
Director
of
Classification,
Carolyn
Golson,
to
verify if inmate Hayes placement in
population was accurate due to the
fact
that
Inmate
Hayes
was
in
Administrative Segregation at the time
of transfer. Ms. Golson informed Ms.
Slatton that Kilby could not release
an inmate that was in Administrative
Segregation into population and that
only
the
approved
receiving
15

institution (William E. Donaldson or
St. Clair) could release Inmate Hayes
to population. Inmate Hayes had been
approved to be transferred to William
E. Donaldson or St. Clair Correctional
Facility. Inmate Hayes was immediately
removed
from
Kilby
Correctional
Facility population and placed in
Administrative Segregation to await
transfer to his approved facility.
Inmate Hayes was given a detention
notification,
as
required
by
Administrative
Regulation
#433
Administrative Segregation, informing
him that he was being placed in
Administrative
Segregation
and
he
refused to sign....”
These facts, which Hayes does not dispute, except
if at all in a conclusory fashion, are sufficient to
meet the defendants’ burden of producing a legitimate,
non-retaliatory
segregation.

reason

for

placing

Hayes

in

Thus the burden now shifts to Hayes to

produce admissible evidence that demonstrates that the
reason proffered by the defendants is a pretext for
retaliation.
The court has set forth above Hayes’s response to
the

defendants’

motion

for

summary

judgment.

As

interpreted by the court, Hayes appears to claim that
16

his placement in segregation at Holman was caused by a
“framed disciplinary....”

It is well established in

this circuit that, in meting out discipline to inmates,
prison officials may not rely on information they know
to be false. See Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437,
1441–42

(11th

Cir.1991).

But

Hayes

presents

no

evidence that any of the defendants had any knowledge
that disciplinary action taken against him by prison
officials

at

information.

Holman

Prison

was

based

on

false

Hayes suggests that the actions against

him were the result of a conspiracy, but he fails to
present any non-conclusory and meaningful evidence that
the prison officials reached an agreement to violate
his

constitutional

rights.

Rowe

v.

City

of

Fort

Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283–84 (11th Cir.2002).

In

short, Hayes has failed to meet his burden of showing
that

any

reason

proffered

pretext for retaliation.

by

the

defendants

is

a

The defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on Hayes’s retaliation claim.

17

There is one final matter the court must address.
In his response to the motion for summary judgment,
Hayes argues that the defendants “overlooked ... [his]
underlying claim of Retaliated Harassment....”
it

is

correct

judgment,

the

retaliation

as

that

in

defendants
a

claim

their
did
on

motion

not

which

for

directly
they

were

While
summary

identify
seeking

summary judgment, Hayes did not name specifically any
of the defendants as retaliating against him.

Instead,

he claimed that the “DOC Administration,” which is not
a party, was responsible for retaliation.
these

circumstances

defendants
retaliation

for

the

failing

claim.

court
to

Moreover,

cannot

fault

the

address

his

defendants

have

directly
the

Thus, under

presented a sufficient evidentiary basis for the court
to determine Hayes’s retaliation claim on the merits,
and, for the reasons already set forth, the court finds
that claim to lack merit.

***
18

The defendants are, therefore, entitled to summary
judgment in their favor on all of Hayes’s claims.
appropriate

judgment

will

be

entered

in

these

cases.
DONE, this the 8th day of April, 2014.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

An
two