Rawls v. State of Alabama Department of Human Resources
Filing
61
OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/17/12. (scn, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
CAROLYN RAWLS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN RESOURCES,
Defendant.
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)
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:11cv59-MHT
(WO)
OPINION
Plaintiff Carolyn Rawls, an African-American, brings
this employment-discrimination lawsuit against defendant
Alabama Department of Human Resources, charging it with
race discrimination in violation of Title VII (Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981a & 2000e-2000e-17) and § 1981 (the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as enforced through 42
U.S.C. § 1983).1
Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
This cause is now
1. “[Section] 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal
remedy for violation by state actors of the rights
guaranteed under § 1981.”
Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d
1281, 1288 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2009).
before the court on the Human Resources Department’s
motion
for
summary
judgment.
For
the
reasons
that
follow, the motion will be granted.
I.
SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that
party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
II.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an internecine budget dispute
among several state agencies.
Resources
provides
essential
The Department of Human
services
to
Alabama
residents, such as overseeing adoptions, distributing
2
food stamps, and investigating elder and child abuse.
To
achieve these objectives, the department oftentimes has
to run criminal background checks, a task that is handled
internally by the Office of Criminal History Checks.
This
office,
however,
does
not
conduct
criminal background investigations.
responsibility
to
the
Alabama
all
of
its
It outsources this
Department
of
Public
Safety, which conducts the background investigation and
then bills the Criminal History Checks Office for this
service.
Rawls served as the Criminal History Checks Office’s
“Program Manager,” functioning as its director.
Her
immediate supervisor was Deputy General Counsel James
Long (black).
Until February 2009, the office was housed
in the Human Resources Legal Office, which was run by
General Counsel Sharon Ficquette (white).
Rawls alleges
that Ficquette racially discriminated against her by
reprimanding
her
and
transferring
her
to
the
Human
Resources Office of Quality Control in February 2009.
3
Rawls was at the center of a protracted disagreement
between the Office of Criminal History Checks and the
Department of Public Safety over unpaid invoices for
background checks.
Since at least 2006, the two entities
struggled to develop a coordinated electronic system for
tracking invoices and payments between them.
Public
Safety implemented a software program that failed to
rectify the situation; Human Resources also attempted to
design a program to handle the invoices.
Neither entity
had successfully put in place a system by the fall 2008.
In October 2008, the Alabama Board of Adjustment--an
agency charged with hearing monetary claims against the
State--became involved in the ongoing dispute and served
as a mediator between the Human Resources and Public
Safety Departments.
In this role, the board sought to
reconcile the budgets of the two departments by sending
Public Safety’s pending claims to Human Resources and
determining whether and how much Human Resources had paid
already.
4
On October 20, 2008, the Adjustment Board sent a
claim
to
Human
Resources
attorney
Elizabeth
Hendrix
(black), who worked in the department’s Legal Office and
was tasked with resolving this dispute.
In Claim # 2009-
0048, Public Safety sought a $ 217,055 payment for 12
past-due invoices for background checks provided to the
Criminal
History
Checks
Office.
Claim
#
2009-0048
covered invoices from October 2007 to June 2008.
On
November
4,
2008,
Hendrix
alerting her to Claim # 2009-0048.
Rawls
to
action,
review
such
as
the
claim
making
a
and
sent
Rawls
memo
The memo instructed
recommend
payment
a
to
appropriate
Public
Safety,
denying a payment, or requesting additional information.
Rawls did not immediately respond to Hendrix.
Instead, on November 25, 2008, Rawls sent an email to
Long, her immediate supervisor.
Rawls’s email contained
a chart with entries for every month between October 2007
and September 2008.
from
Public
Safety,
The chart had columns for invoices
bills
from
5
Human
Resources,
net
savings,
and
percentage
paid.
That
same
day,
Long
forwarded Rawls’s email to Hendrix, commenting that the
“inability of the Department of Public Safety and [the
Human Resources Department] to reconcile bills has been
a problem for years.”
Chart Email (Doc. No. 38-1) at 19.
According to Hendrix, Rawls’s chart was not “immediately
useful to me in responding to [the Adjustment Board]”
because it did not address the specific unpaid invoices
in Claim # 2009-0048.
Hendrix Affidavit (Doc. No. 38-1)
at 5.
On December 3, 2008, Hendrix received a second claim
from the Board of Adjustment.
In Claim # 2009-0178,
Public Safety sought a $ 78,201.50 payment for three
past-due invoices for background checks conducted between
July 2008 and September 2008.
On January 7, 2009,
Hendrix sent the second claim to Rawls and asked for a
response.
On January 14, 2009, Long sent Ficquette and Human
Resources Commissioner Nancy Buckner (white) an email
6
detailing staff discord at the Criminal History Checks
Office; Rawls was copied on this email.
Long,
“[Criminal
complaining
and
History
feeling
Checks
very
According to
Office]
much
staff
unappreciated
are
by
management” despite numerous new electronic programs that
had just been implemented.
31.
Long Email (Doc. No. 49-1) at
Long approvingly mentioned that Rawls was doing the
best she could to keep office staff motivated.
On January 16, 2009, Hendrix sent another email to
Rawls demanding a response to Claim # 2009-0048 and Claim
# 2009-0178.
On January 26, Rawls replied to Hendrix by
saying that Human Resources had made “partial payments”
to Public Safety for fiscal year 2008.
Rawls also
explained that Human Resources had built a new software
program to review the invoices for fiscal year 2009.
Rawls-Hendrix Email (Doc. No. 38-1) at 32.
Next, on
January 29, 2009, Rawls copied Hendrix on an email where
she stated that she had just completed working through
the October 2007 invoices and that Public Safety would be
7
owed an unspecified additional payment.
And, on January
30, 2009, Rawls responded to the second Adjustment Board
claim and sent Hendrix an email with the same chart that
she had previously sent to Long.
Tensions reached a tipping point in early February.
On February 2, 2009, Rawls emailed Patricia Evans, a
Public Safety employee, about the October 2007 invoice
reconciliation. Rawls informed Evans that the department
“will be eligible for an additional $ 8,330.00 payment
via [the Board of Adjustment] for 10-2007 after the
[board] hearing is held.”
38-1) at 44.
Rawls-Evans Email (Doc. No.
According to Hendrix, Rawls never received
prior authorization to tell Public Safety that Human
Resources would pay $ 8,330 for the October invoice.
Also,
on
February
2,
2009,
Paul
Lista,
a
Human
Resources administrative assistant, sent Rawls an email
and copied Hendrix, stating that he had received a phone
call
from
Judy
Earnest,
an
employee
at
the
Alabama
Finance Department who handled Adjustment Board work.
8
Lista related that Earnest had expressed concern that
Human Resources was attempting to circumvent the Board of
Adjustment process.
Early in the morning on February 4, 2009, Evans
called Hendrix to discuss Rawls’s promise.
Lista then
forwarded Hendrix the email in which Rawls promised Evans
the
$
8,330
conversations
payment.
in
an
Hendrix
email
to
memorialized
Long,
which
reads
pertinent part:
“Patricia [Evans] and her supervisor
called the office this morning regarding
the [Public Safety] claims. During the
conversation, Ms. Evans referenced some
communication that she had received from
Carolyn Rawls regarding the amount that
was owed and partial payments. I told
her that [I] was unaware of any such
communication[,] that the Department had
not submitted an answer to the Board
because we were still investigating and
attempting to determine what was and was
not owed to them. I later received an
email from Paul [Lista], which details
the
information
that
Carolyn
communicated to Ms. Evans at [Public
Safety] regarding partial payment of the
claim on February 2, 2009. As indicated
below, Ms. Evans contacted the Board
regarding
that
communication
and
9
these
in
Carolyn’s/[Human Resources Department]’s
ability to make such payments.
That
explains why Judy [Earnest] at the Board
called here on Monday, February 2,
200[9]
and
insinuated
that
the
Department was seemingly circumventing
the [Board of Adjustment] process.
I
don’t understand how partial payments
can be made once a claim has ben
submitted to the Board.
It was my
understanding that the Department loses
the ability/authority to legally pay a
claim
that
is
outside
of
the
current ... fiscal year and that such
claims were to be submitted to the
Board.
“Ms. Evans’ supervisor expressed to me
that he was not happy about the time
that had elapsed between the time the
work was performed by [Public Safety]
personnel and the receipt of payment.
He also expressed concern regarding what
he described as the inability to reign
Carolyn in about the recurring delay in
payments. He asked me who was ‘running
[Human Resources]’ and whether that
person was Carolyn because it was his
understanding
that
we
had
a
Commissioner.”
Hendrix-Long Email (Doc. No. 38-1) at 42 (emphasis in
original).
On February 11, 2009, Ficquette issued a reprimand to
Rawls.
Ficquette’s reprimand noted that the Office of
10
Criminal History Checks’s process for reconciling bills
from Public Safety was “burdensome, cumbersome, and far
too time consuming.”
Reprimand (Doc. No. 47) at 8.
The
reprimand initially focused on Rawls’s failure to respond
promptly and adequately to Hendrix’s memos concerning the
two Adjustment Board claims.
criticized
Rawls
for
The reprimand further
“expect[ing]
Public
Safety
to
develop a system for our tracking of what we paid” and
for failing to develop an internal means of tracking
clearances and paying pills due Public Safety.
Id. at 9.
Ficquette emphasized Rawls’s $ 8,330 promise to Evans,
stating that it was “an unauthorized promise to pay,
binding the Department.”
Id.
Ficquette recounted how
this promise angered Evans and other Public Safety staff,
caused a Public Safety supervisor to question Rawls’s and
the
Human
Resources
Department’s
leadership,
exacerbated tensions between the two departments.
and
Next,
the reprimand detailed the Human Resources Department’s
interactions
with
Lista
and
11
the
fact
that
Rawls’s
behavior
conclude
had
led
that
others
Human
outside
Resources
the
department
was
to
“seemingly
circumventing the [Board of Adjustment] process.”
Id. at
10.
The reprimand concluded with a list of the ways Rawls
violated
state
personnel
rules.
Specifically,
reprimand states that:
“a. You have failed to put in place
processes to allow for quick processing,
tracking and monitoring of requests for
clearances.
“b. You have failed to put in place
adequate processes to ensure obtainable,
identifiable results in a timely manner.
“c. You have failed to correct broken
processes that you knew and have known
about since as early as 2006.
“d. You made a false statement to the
[Board of Adjustment] without authority
to do so.
“e. You violated Department policy by
keeping money orders in the [Office of
Criminal History Checks] overnight and
for as long as several months. Money
orders are to be sent to the Office of
Finance on the day of receipt. No money
is to be kept in offices overnight.
12
the
“f.
You
have
compromised
the
Department’s relationships with other
agencies.”
Id.
The “false statement” referenced in the reprimand is
Rawls’s email to Evans.
the
reprimand
replacement
were
and
The money orders mentioned in
found
in
Rawls’s
subordinates
office;
provided
Rawls’s
deposition
testimony that outdated money orders were discovered.
As a result of the reprimand, Rawls was removed from
her position as Office of Criminal History Checks Program
Manager.
She was replaced by Tommy Crabtree (white), who
became acting manager/director of the office effective
February 11, 2009.
Buckner also moved the office out of
the Human Resources Legal Office and placed it under the
supervision
of
Human
Jinright.
According
Resources
to
both
Chief
Crabtree
of
Staff
and
Nancy
Jinright,
Crabtree did not seek the Criminal History Checks Office
job
and,
in
position.
fact,
voiced
Rawls’s
disappointment
supervisor,
reprimanded.
13
Long,
in
his
was
new
also
Rawls
was
immediately
transferred
to
the
Human
Resources Department’s Office of Quality Control, which
performs monthly reviews of food-stamp cases to ascertain
whether the recipients’ eligibility has been correctly
determined.
She
retained
her
status
Manager” and her pay remained the same.
longer supervised any employees.
as
a
“Program
However, she no
She requested a private
office, but was given the only available space in the
office-–a
supervisor.
cubicle
across
the
hall
from
her
new
During her time at the Office of Quality
Control, Rawls complained of frequent migraine headaches.
On February 17, 2009, Rawls submitted a rebuttal to
her letter of reprimand.
denied
all
charges
Her response categorically
against
her
and
recited
her
accomplishments at the Office of Criminal History Checks.
She then pointed out that a new electronic system to
monitor background-check invoices would be in place the
next
day:
February
18,
2009.
Rawls
admitted
to
communicating with Evans about the $ 8,330 payment but
14
stated that this was a “gesture to show that we were
working in good faith” and that she “was never advised
that I could not communicate with Public Safety about
their claim.”
Rawls Rebuttal (Doc. No. 47) at 14.
Rawls
further stated that the “relationship between [the Human
Resources
Department]
and
the
Department
has
Public
Safety has been good,” id., but that Public Safety was to
blame for the invoice confusion.
The rebuttal concluded
with an assertion that white supervisors–-such as Cheri
Martin, who supervised the Human Resources information
systems office--involved with the invoice dispute were
not reprimanded or transferred.
On March 9, 2009, Rawls announced her intent to
retire
effective
April
1,
2009.
Rawls
cited
her
“unjustified removal” from the Office of Criminal History
Checks
and
Control.
the
conditions
at
the
Office
of
Quality
Rawls further stated that she was performing
work appropriate for a “Program Specialist,” a lower
15
classification than a “Program Manager.”
Rawls Letter
(Doc. No. 36-2) at 5.
Meanwhile,
on
February
24,
2009,
the
Human
Resources-Public Safety dispute was resolved with the
entry of two consent judgments totaling $ 177,688.25.
The
consent
judgments
included
a
detailed
chart
indicating the claim number, month, amount requested,
amount
Human
Resources
paid,
and
balance
due.
The
consent-judgment chart was more precise and contained
different figures from the ones Rawls had forwarded to
Long and Hendrix.
Compare Rawls Chart (Doc. No. 38-1) at
40 with Consent-Judgment Chart (Doc. No. 38-1) at 51.
III.
DISCUSSION
Rawls asserts two race-discrimination claims: (1) the
February 2009 reprimand and transfer to the Office of
Quality Control; and (2) a constructive discharge.
16
A.
Reprimand and Transfer
Both Title VII and § 1981 “have the same requirements
of
proof
and
use
the
same
analytical
framework.”
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330
(11th Cir. 1998).
Under the familiar burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792
(1973),
a
plaintiff
has
the
initial
burden
of
establishing a prima-facie case of unlawful employment
discrimination by a preponderance of evidence.
802.
the
Id. at
In this case, because Rawls claims “racial bias in
application
of
discipline
for
violation
of
work
rules,” she may establish a prima-facie case by showing
“either (a) that [she] did not violate the work rule, or
(b) that [she] engaged in misconduct similar to that of
a
person
outside
the
protected
class,
and
that
the
disciplinary measures enforced against [her] were more
severe than those enforced against the other persons who
engaged in similar misconduct.”
F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989).
17
Jones v. Gerwens, 874
If the plaintiff establishes a prima-facie case, the
burden
then
shifts
presumption
by
to
the
defendant
articulating
a
to
rebut
legitimate,
non-
discriminatory reason for its employment action.
defendant
has
the
burden
of
production,
the
not
The
of
persuasion, and thus need not convince the court that the
reason advanced actually motivated its action.
Combs v.
Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1539 n.11 (11th Cir.
1997).
Once
the
presumption
defendant
of
satisfies
discrimination
plaintiff
has
the
evidence,
including
opportunity
the
is
this
burden,
eliminated
to
previously
come
and
forward
produced
“the
the
with
evidence
establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit
a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons
given by the [defendant] were not the real reasons for
the
adverse
employment
decision.”
Chapman
v.
Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000).
AI
In
other words, a plaintiff must show that a defendant’s
18
proffered
explanation
is
a
mere
pretext
for
discriminatory conduct.
The parties spend considerable time briefing the
question of whether Rawls has made out a prima-facie case
of
race
discrimination.
But
where
a
“court
has
sufficient evidence to determine whether the employee has
been a victim of discrimination, the court need not go
through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process and
should
instead
discrimination.”
reach
the
ultimate
issue
of
Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
978 F. Supp. 1008, 1017 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (Thompson, J.).
“In most cases, the real question lies in whether the
employer’s
pretextual.”
legitimate
non-discriminatory
reason
is
Bailey-Potts v. Alabama Dep’t of Public
Safety, 2012 WL 566820, *4 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2012)
(Thompson, J.).
This insight is particularly true where,
as here, a plaintiff’s discriminatory-discipline claim
rests on whether the employee actually violated workplace
rules.
19
The
Department
of
Human
Resources
has
provided
detailed evidence to support Ficquette’s reprimand.
The
record includes numerous email conversations involving
Rawls, Long, Hendrix, Evans, and Lista.
These emails
confirm the reasons given in Ficquette’s reprimand for
Rawls’s transfer.
For example, Rawls’s email to Evans
promising the $ 8,330 is in the record; the tension with
Public
Safety
personnel
and
their
complaints
about
Rawls’s leadership are also documented.
Even Rawls’s rebuttal cuts against her case.
Rawls
admits that she emailed Evans about the $ 8,300 payment,
perhaps
the
Resources.
she
blames
most
serious
charge
alleged
by
Human
The invoice backlog is conceded by Rawls, but
Public
Safety
and
responsibility for the problem.
diminishes
her
own
And while Rawls mentions
the forthcoming (but unimplemented) software tracking
program, it only went online in February 2009, three
years after the two departments began having problems.
20
Indeed, the Office of Criminal History Checks was still
processing invoices from October 2007 in February 2009.
In short, Human Resources submits that it disciplined
Rawls because she violated work rules (the Evans email)
and failed to keep up with background-check invoices sent
by Public Safety.
discipline
Moreover, Human Resources declined to
Rawls’s
alleged
white
comparators
because
their involvement in the Human Resources-Public Safety
dispute
was
not
the
same-–their
offices
were
not
responsible for solving that problem.
Against this evidentiary backdrop, Rawls submits that
Ficquette’s actions were racially motivated.
Rawls
Deposition
(Doc.
No.
36-1)
at
See, e.g.,
70-71.
Rawls,
however, does not provide any direct evidence of racial
animus.
Rawls also cites deposition testimony from Long,
her immediate supervisor, who claims that Ficquette was
racially
motivated
disciplined him.
when
she
transferred
Rawls
and
See Long Deposition (Doc. No. 54) at
138 (“Q: Do you believe that [the Rawls] reprimand was an
21
intentional discriminatory move on the part of Sharon
Ficquette?
A: I believe that it was part of the process
to get [Rawls] out of the way.”).
While Rawls and Long allege racial discrimination at
the hands of Ficquette, the Department of Human Resources
has
provided
numerous
critics
perform her duties adequately.
concerned
Rawls’s
of
Rawls’s
ability
to
The bulk of the evidence
interactions
with
Hendrix,
who
repeatedly complained that Rawls’s replies were tardy and
unresponsive
Resources
to
the
actual
Commissioner
question
Buckner
decision-making process.
was
asked.
also
part
Human
of
the
Buckner took the drastic step
of reorganizing the department after Rawls’s transfer,
which is further evidence of the systematic problems at
the Office of Criminal History Checks.
Criticism
supervisors.
of
Rawls
was
not
limited
to
her
Rawls’s behavior angered Public Safety
personnel
and
deepened
the
agencies.
Even Rawls’s subordinate employees testified
22
strife
between
the
two
that the Office of Criminal History Checks was “very
disorganized
and
dysfunctional”
during
her
tenure.
Stanton Deposition (Doc. No. 38-11) at 3.
Rawls has also failed to provide any white comparator
who engaged in similar behavior but received less-severe
punishment, evidence which if provided would have raised
the specter of racially discriminatory treatment. “To
make a comparison of the plaintiff’s treatment to that of
non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show that he
and the employees were similarly situated in all relevant
respects.”
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals requires that “the quantity and
quality
identical
of
the
to
comparator's
prevent
courts
misconduct
from
be
nearly
second-guessing
employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with
oranges.”
Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th
Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
Rawls was the sole Program
Manager in the Office of Criminal History Checks.
23
While
she points to potential comparators in other divisions,
none of these employees was responsible for overseeing
the
same
type
of
backlogged
invoice
system.
Most
significantly, none of these individuals ever made a
false
statement
concerning
reconciliation
process
Thus,
and
whether
to
to
the
an
Board
of
Adjustment
out-of-agency
extent
what
employee.
Resources
Human
disciplined these other employees is irrelevant. Because
these comparators are not “nearly identical,” id., Rawls
cannot use them to rebut Human Resources Department’s
legitimate,
non-discriminatory
rationale
for
its
of
race
disciplinary decision against Rawls.
Ultimately,
discrimination,
in
support
Rawls
of
asserts
her
that
claim
Human
Resources
overreacted when it disciplined her and, therefore, race
had to be a motivating factor in the decision-making
process.
But “[f]ederal courts do not sit as a super-
personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business
decisions.”
Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d
24
1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“The inquiry into pretext centers upon the
employer’s
beliefs,
and
not
perceptions of his performance.”
1565.
the
employee’s
own
Holifield, 115 F.3d at
Rawls’s subjective belief that Human Resources
overreacted
and
insufficient
to
engaged
in
racial
demonstrate
that
discrimination
the
is
department’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale was a pretext
for race discrimination.
Accordingly, the court finds that there is no genuine
dispute that Human Resources reprimanded and transferred
Rawls because she violated workplace rules and failed to
implement an adequate system for processing backgroundcheck invoices.
B.
Constructive Dismissal
“A claim for constructive discharge requires the
employee to demonstrate that the work environment and
conditions
of
employment
were
25
so
unbearable
that
a
reasonable person would be compelled to resign.”
Virgo
v. Riviera Beach Assoc., 30 F.3d 1350, 1363 (11th Cir.
1994).
As such, the court must engage in an objective
inquiry and “do[es] not consider a plaintiff’s subjective
feelings about his employer’s actions.”
Doe v. Dekalb
County School Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1450 (11th Cir.
1998).
“A reasonable employee is one who does not assume
the worst or jump to conclusions too fast.”
Hellums v.
Webster Indus., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297 (M.D.
Ala. 2000) (Albritton, C.J.) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Rawls contends that the conditions in the
Office of Quality Control compelled her early retirement.
Rawls
argues
that
the
cubicle-office
space
was
objectively intolerable. Rawls also believes that taking
away
her
subordinate
responsibilities
employees
indicated
demoted.
26
that
and
diminishing
she
was
her
effectively
Human Resources contends that Rawls cannot satisfy
the high threshold for a constructive-discharge claim.
Rawls was neither demoted nor was her pay impacted.
Rawls was assigned to an important task–-verifying food
stamp recipients’ eligibility.
And, while Rawls may have
not had any employees to supervise and had to work in a
cubicle, this hardly qualifies as objectively unbearable
working conditions. Rather, Rawls subjectively found the
conditions
intolerable:
she
served
in
the
Office
of
Quality Control for under a month before submitting her
retirement
letter.
Because
“hurt
feelings
are
insufficient as proof of constructive discharge,” id.,
Rawls’s constructive-discharge claim must fail.2
Moreover, a statute prohibiting racial discrimination
does not constitute “a general civility code for the
American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
Such a law, therefore,
2. In the alternative, Human Resources submits that
it is immune from suit under § 1981. Because this court
grants summary judgment on both the Title VII and § 1981
claims, it need not address the immunity argument.
27
“does
not
regardless
prohibit
as
the
all
nature
constructive
of
or
motive
discharges,
behind
the
intolerable conditions that caused the discharge, that
is, regardless as to whether the intolerable conditions
were caused by the type of discriminatory ... conduct
that [the law] was intended to address.”
Cowan v.
Jackson Hosp. & Clinic, Inc., 572 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1292
(M.D. Ala. 2008) (Thompson, J.).
Because Rawls has
failed to put forth sufficient evidence establishing that
the
conditions
leading
to
her
allegedly
compelled
retirement were motivated, or any way connected, to the
type of discrimination Title VII and § 1981 address, her
constructive-discharge claim must fail.
*
*
*
An appropriate summary judgment in favor of the
Alabama Department of Human Resources and against Rawls
will be entered.
DONE, this the 17th day of April, 2012.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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