Daniels v. Astrue (CONSENT)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. Signed by Honorable Judge Terry F. Moorer on 4/30/12. (scn, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
FOSTER WILLIAMS DANIELS,
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security
CASE NO. 2:11-cv-569-TFM
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 2, 2009, Foster Williams Daniels, (“Plaintiff” or “Daniels”) applied
for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under
Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) alleging disability beginning on
December 12, 2008. (Tr.18, 120-25). Daniels applications were initially denied on
March 24, 2009. (Tr. 55-59). Daniels timely filed for and received a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who rendered an unfavorable decision on June 17,
2010. (Tr. 15-26). The Appeals Council denied Daniels request for review, which made
the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”). (Tr. 1-4). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), the parties have consented
to entry of final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge.
proceeds pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). After careful scrutiny
of the record and briefs, for reasons herein explained, the Court AFFIRMS the
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. The Court’s
sole function is to determine whether the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial
evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. See Jones v. Apfel, 190
F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th
“The Social Security Act mandates that ‘findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.’” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553,
1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §405(g)). Thus, this Court must find the
Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. Graham v.
Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla
— i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a
fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support the conclusion. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir.
1997) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d
842 (1971)); Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560 (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th
If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district
court will affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact,
and even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings. Ellison v.
Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584
n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir.
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1986)). The Court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence
favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560 (citing Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The Court “may not decide facts anew,
reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner],” but
rather it “must defer to the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Bloodsworth,
703 F.2d at 1239).
The Court will also reverse a Commissioner’s decision on plenary review if the
decision applies incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide the district court with
sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Keeton
v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing
Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991)). There is no presumption
that the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are valid. Id.; Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d
1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053).
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The Social Security Act’s general disability insurance benefits program (“DIB”)
provides income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement,
provided they are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence.1 See 42 U.S.C. §
423(a). The Social Security Act’s Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is a separate
and distinct program. SSI is a general public assistance measure providing an additional
DIB is authorized by Title II of the Social Security Act, and is funded by Social Security taxes.
See Social Security Administration, Social Security Handbook, § 136.1, available at
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resource to the aged, blind, and disabled to assure that their income does not fall below
the poverty line.2 Eligibility for SSI is based upon proof of indigence and disability. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(C). However, despite the fact they are separate
programs, the law and regulations governing a claim for DIB and a claim for SSI are
identical; therefore, claims for DIB and SSI are treated identically for the purpose of
determining whether a claimant is disabled. Patterson v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1455, 1456 n.
1 (11th Cir. 1986). Applicants under DIB and SSI must provide “disability” within the
meaning of the Social Security Act which defines disability in virtually identical language
for both programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(G); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1505(a), 416.905(a). A person is entitled to disability benefits when the person is
Engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” is one
resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
The Commissioner of Social Security employs a five-step, sequential evaluation
process to determine whether a claimant is entitled to benefits.
See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920 (2010).
SSI benefits are authorized by Title XVI of the Social Security Act and are funded by general
tax revenues. See Social Security Administration, Social Security Handbook, §§ 136.2, 2100,
available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.html
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(1) Is the person presently unemployed?
(2) Is the person’s impairment(s) severe?
(3) Does the person’s impairment(s) meet or equal one of the specific impairments
set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?3
(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?
(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?
An affirmative answer to any of the questions leads either to the next
question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative
answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). Claimants establish a prima facie case of
qualifying disability once they meet the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 4. At
Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a significant
number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id.
To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still
able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other
evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at
1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and
work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the
This subpart is also referred to as “the Listing of Impairments” or “the Listings.”
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claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical
Vocational Guidelines4 (“grids”) or hear testimony from a vocational expert (VE). Id. at
The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary
or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job
experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available
to an individual. Id. at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a statutorily-required
finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
At the hearing before the ALJ, Daniels testified that he was 54 years old and
completed the eleventh grade. (Tr. 35). Daniels also testified that he was single and
previously in the military. (Tr. 36-37). Daniels prior work includes driving a forklift,
wrapping pallets and construction work. He last worked in March 2008, as a forklift
driver, and he stopped working after he was diagnosed with neurological sarcoidosis. (Tr.
36, 38). Daniels claims his condition led to headaches and that he eventually began
passing out. He reported having syncope spells every two to three months. (Tr. 41).
Daniels also testified that he treated his condition with prednisone and that during
a typical day, he ate, took his medications, fed his dog, and then slept all day because the
medications he takes make him drowsy. (Tr. 40, 41). Daniels explained that he lives
with his mother and does no housework. (Tr. 41). Daniels testified that he could lift 10-
See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.969 (use of the grids in SSI
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15 pounds, sit “about an hour or two, or a half hour, or something like that”, stand 30
minutes and walk about a block. (Tr. 43-44). He testified that he has headaches two or
three times per week and his gout flares up once or twice a month. (Tr. 44-45).
Linda Williams, a vocational expert, (“VE”) testified that Daniels’ past work as a
forklift operator was medium and semi-skilled, his construction work was heavy and
unskilled and his work as a wrapper was medium and unskilled. (Tr. 47-48). The ALJ
asked the VE to assume a person of Daniel’s age, education, and past relevant work, who
could perform light work, but could not climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, nor work at
unprotected heights, nor with hazardous machinery. The ALJ then asked the VE whether
this person would be able to perform Daniels’ past work. The VE responded, “No, sir.”
(Tr. 48). Then the ALJ asked the VE whether there would be any jobs this person could
perform. The VE responded that this person could work as an inspector, small parts
assembler, and cafeteria attendant. (Tr. 48-49).
The ALJ found that Daniels had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
December 12, 2008, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 20). The ALJ further found that Daniels
has “severe” impairments of “vasovagal syncope; history of renal mass; hypertension; left
ventricular hypertrophy; hydrocele of the scrotum; history of cerebrovascular accident;
and gout”, but that he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals a listing.
Finally, the ALJ concluded “[a]fter careful
consideration of the entire record,” that Daniels has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work with the exceptions as follows: “no climbing ropes,
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ladders, or scaffolds; no working at unprotected heights; and no working with hazardous
machinery.” (Tr. 21).
IV. MEDICAL HISTORY
In May 2008, Plaintiff began complaining of a swollen right testicle to treatment
providers at the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). (Tr. 303). He was diagnosed
with hydrocele (a fluid-filled sack in the scrotum) and in early September 2008, he
underwent a hydrocelectomy (removal of the fluid-filled sack in the scrotum). (Tr. 275).
In November 2008, his wound had healed well. (Tr. 206).
In mid-September 2008, Plaintiff was admitted to the VA after he presented with
“visual changes and pain in left eye, numbness over entire forehead and weakness and
sensation over left extremities.” (Tr. 385).
He was ultimately diagnosed with
neurosarcoidosis5. (Tr. 385-86). He was prescribed Prednisone. (Tr. 207). In early
October, Plaintiff followed up with his primary care physician at the VA, Jayesh Patel,
M.D., who diagnosed, among other things, gout and hypertension with a mildly elevated
systolic blood pressure. (Tr. 208). Dr. Patel noted Daniels gout was “stable” and advised
Daniels to “avoid alcohol”. Id.
In December 2008, plaintiff presented to the Jackson Hospital Emergency
Department three times with complaints of a headache and blurred vision. (Tr. 617-731).
The medical diagnosis was that plaintiff suffered from headache and bilateral temporal
Neurosarcoidosis is a manifestation of scarcoidosis– a chronic inflammatory disorder – in the
nervous system, which can result in, among other things, fatigue, dizziness, and vertigo, double
vision or other vision problems, headache, seizures, abnormal sensations or weakness in any part
of the body. See PubMed Health, Neurosarcoidosis,
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lobe anterior masses slightly improved from a CT scan a couple of months prior. (Tr.
In February 2009, Plaintiff presented to Shin Oh, M.D., a professor of neurology at
the University of Alabama Birmingham.
Dr. Oh diagnosed
neurosarcoidosis and reported that Daniels’ symptoms were well controlled with
Prednisone and his neurological examination was completely normal. (Tr. 613). As a
result, the doctor reduced Daniels’ Prednisone dosage from 60 mg per day to 40 mg per
day. (Tr. 613).
In June 2009, Daniels presented to Baptist Health with right elbow pain and
swelling. (Tr. 645). Plaintiff reported that he used alcohol every other day. (Tr. 653).
He was diagnosed with gout, arthritis and cellulitis of the right upper extremity. (Tr. 65354). Daniels returned to Baptist Health in October 2009 after he passed out. (Tr. 673).
He also report his left hydrocele appeared to come back. (Tr. 674). Ghulam Anwar,
M.D., diagnosed vasovagal syncope and hypertension. (Tr. 674).
Finally, in January, 2010, Daniels returned to Jackson Hospital Emergency
Department with complaints of chest pain. (Tr. 726). Plaintiff reported that he had
passed out at a family gathering.
(Tr. 727). He was diagnosed with syncope and
sinusitis. (Tr. 729).
Daniels raises three issues for judicial review:
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Whether the ALJ failed to fulfill his duty to develop the record by not
providing an RFC supported by a physician’s opinion and by not ordering a consultative
examination for purposes of establishing an RFC? (See Doc.12 at 5).
(2) Whether the ALJ erred in failing to explain the weight given the medical
opinions of record. (See Doc. 12 at 5).
(3) Whether the ALJ failed to follow the “slight abnormality” standard in finding
that Daniels’ gout and headaches are non-severe (See Doc. 12 at 5).
The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment was Reasonable.
A residual functional capacity assessment is used to determine the claimants’
capacity to do as much as they are possibly able to do despite their limitations. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (2010). An RFC assessment will be made based on all relevant
evidence in the case record. Id.; Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d at1440. The
Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed “if it is supported by substantial evidence
and the correct legal standards were applied.” Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F. 3d 1211, 1213 (11th
Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but rather such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F. 3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
Daniels argues that the ALJ erred by not making a residual functional capacity
determination which was supported by a treating or examining physician’s opinion as
required by Coleman v. Barnhart, 264 F. Supp.2d 1007, 1010 (S.D. Ala. 2003). (Pl. Br.
at 5-8). However, this court has previously addressed this very argument in Daniels v.
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Astrue, 2012 WL 353756 (M.D. Ala. 2012), and distinguished Coleman on the basis of its
facts and because the Coleman court gave no citation to any source of law requiring a
physician’s assessment for the purposes of making an RFC determination. Id. *4.
This court further explained that it was persuaded by the reasoning of Judge Foy
Guin in Langley v. Astrue, 777 F .Supp.2d 1250, 1257-60 (N.D. Ala. 2011). Indeed,
Langley disagreed with the Coleman reasoning finding that it “attempt[s] to place the
burden of proving the claimant’s RFC on the Commissioner at step five” and this shifting
of the burden is “inconsistent with the Commissioner’s regulations, Supreme Court
precedent and unpublished decisions in this Circuit.” Daniels, supra, at * 5 citing Id. at
1260. (Citations omitted). Accordingly the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in
finding Plaintiff’s RFC without the benefit of a physician’s assessment in the record.
Daniels further argues that the ALJ erred by not ordering a consultative
examination for the purpose of establishing an RFC. At an ALJ hearing, “the [ALJ] is
responsible for assessing [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1546(c) (2010). The claimant is “responsible for providing the evidence [the ALJ]
will use to make a finding about [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(3) (2010). The ALJ is “responsible for developing [the claimant’s]
complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if
necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports
from [their] own medical sources. Id.; Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1209-10 (11th
Cir. 1988). (The ALJ is not required to order a consultative examination unless the
record establishes it is necessary to render a fair decision). The Commissioner’s duty to
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develop the record includes ordering a consultative examination if one is needed to make
an informed decision. Reeves v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 519, 522 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1984).
However, where no physician recommends an additional consultation and the record is
sufficiently developed for the ALJ to make a determination, the failure to order an
additional consultative examination is not error. Good v. Astrue, 240 Fed. Appx. 399,*3
(11th Cir. 2007) citing Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). The court
finds there is no evidence in the record that any physician recommended Daniels undergo
a consultative exam. The court also finds that the ALJ carefully considered the entire
record, including all the medical evidence, which he summarized in detail, (Tr. 21-24) in
finding Daniels had the RFC to perform light work with some limitations. (Tr. 21).
Accordingly, the court concludes Daniels’ argument that the ALJ erred by failing to order
a consultative exam is without merit; and that based upon a review of the record as a
whole, the ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence. Moore, 405 F.3d at
The ALJ adequately explained the medical opinions of record.
The Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred because he failed to explain the weight
accorded to any of the medical opinions of record other than that of Dr. Oh (Pl. Brief at p
9). Discretion is given to the ALJ because the Eleventh Circuit stated “there is no rigid
requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision so
long as [his] decision . . . is not a broad rejection which is ‘not enough to enable [a court]
to conclude that the ALJ considered [a claimant’s] medical condition as a whole.’” Dyer
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v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206,1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561). Even
so, here, the ALJ summarized all Daniels’ medical evidence in detail. (Tr. 21-24).
In addition, Daniels points to no specific piece of opinion evidence which he
claims the ALJ failed to sufficiently articulate the weight which the ALJ gave to the
evidence. Moreover, as Daniels recognizes there is no functional capacity evaluation in
the record. (Pl. Br. at 5-9). Daniels, instead, points generally to hundreds of pages of
treatment notes which include his subjective complaints and various diagnoses. (Pl. Br. at
11). Indeed, the evidence identified by Daniels’, merely documents his complaints and
the subsequent medical treatment provided for these complaints. Id. This evidence does
not constitute “opinion” evidence, which must include statements about “what you can
still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the court concludes that the treatment records
cited by Daniels do not equate to “opinion evidence” and do not trigger the ALJ’s
obligation to state with “particularity” what weight was afforded such evidence. See
Jones v. Astrue, 2009 WL4671712, at * 3 (M.D Ala. Dec. 3, 2009) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ was required to state with particularity the weight
assigned to “opinion evidence”, where the “opinion evidence” at issue did not include any
The ALJ did not commit reversible error in finding Daniels’ headaches were
Daniels claims that the ALJ erred in finding that his headaches were non-severe.
(Pls. Br. 12-15).
With respect to Plaintiff’s headaches, the ALJ specifically
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considered Plaintiff’s neurosarcoidosis, which can cause headaches among other
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001736/. The record, however, does
not reflect that Plaintiff experiences functional limitations from his headaches. Rather,
Dr. Oh opined that Plaintiff had an unremarkable neurological examination and his
symptoms of neurosardoidosis were well controlled with medication. (Tr. 24, 613). See
Dawkins v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir.1988). (A remediable or controllable
medical condition is generally not disabling.) (Citations omitted). Also the record does
not reflect that Plaintiff received sustained treatment for headaches other than being
prescribed medication. See Giles ex rel. Dowdell v. Barnhart, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1195,
1200 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
(The court affirmed the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s
impairments were “non severe” where “[a]lthough the claimant has been treated for these
conditions, the medical records do not document any long-term or sustained treatment
for these conditions nor any restrictions upon the claimant’s functioning as a result of
these conditions.”). (Emphasis in original.).
Regardless of whether the ALJ found headaches to be a severe impairment at step
three of the sequential evaluation, it is undisputed that the ALJ specifically discussed the
Plaintiff’s headaches in his decision. (Tr. 24). See Newsome ex rel. Bell v Barnhart, 444
F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1201 (M.D. Ala. 2006). (Failure of ALJ to make determination as to
severity of impairment was harmless error where ALJ thoroughly discussed the evidence
of the impairment.)
Under agency regulations the ALJ considers all of Plaintiff’s
impairments, both “severe” and “nonsevere”, in the sequential evaluation process. See 20
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C.F.R.§ 416.923 (In determining whether your physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or impairments
could be the basis of eligibility under the law, we will consider the combined effect of all
of your impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered
separately, would be of sufficient severity.) Accordingly, the court concludes that any
error committed by the ALJ with respect to analyzing the severity of Plaintiff’s headaches
is “harmless”, see Newsome, id., at 1201, and that “substantial evidence” supports the
Commissioner’s decision. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400.
The ALJ found Daniels’ gout to be severe and considered it in the sequential
The ALJ included gout as a “severe” impairment listed at step three. (Tr. 20).
Furthermore, the ALJ discussed this impairment at step five of the sequential evaluation
process where he found Daniels had the RFC to perform light work with exceptions. (Tr.
21-24). Specifically, the ALJ noted Daniels’ testimony about gout as follows:
“it flares up one to two times a month and last[s] about four to
five days. The claimant rated his pain as an eight on a ten
scale. He testified that he does not go [to] the emergency
room for this pain.”
(Tr. 23, 45-46). The ALJ found gout did not affect Daniels’ RFC “due to the lack of
treatment and the fact that the claimant does not take any medication nor does he go to
the doctor for this impairment.” (Tr. 24).
The court notes, however, that the ALJ used the word “non-severe” to describe
Daniels’ gout in his analysis at step five (Tr. 24), which is contradictory to the finding at
step three. (Tr. 20). However, immediately preceding this statement the ALJ found
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“the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above
residual functional capacity assessment.”
(Tr. 23-24). Accordingly, the court concludes that in the context of the ALJ’s entire
analysis at step five, he considered the effect of gout and its symptoms on Daniels’ ability
to work and did not reconsider his prior finding that gout was “severe”. Furthermore, the
court concludes that “substantial evidence” supports the Commissioner’s decision. Miles,
84 F.3d at 1400.
Pursuant to the findings and conclusions detailed in this Memorandum Opinion,
the Court concludes that the ALJ’s non-disability determination is supported by
substantial evidence and proper application of the law. It is, therefore, ORDERED that
the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A separate judgment is entered
DONE this 30th day of April, 2012.
/s/ Terry F. Moorer
TERRY F. MOORER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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