Central Alabama Fair Housing Center et al v. Magee et al

Filing 83

OPINION AND ORDER that the temporary restraining order entered on 11/23/2011, (doc. no. 50 ), is extended to 12/12/2011, at 4:30 p.m., at which time it will expire. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/7/2011. (dmn, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR
HOUSING CENTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JULIE MAGEE, in her
official capacity as
Alabama Revenue
Commissioner, and
JIMMY STUBBS, in his
official capacity as
Elmore County Probate
Judge,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:11cv982-MHT
(WO)

OPINION AND ORDER
On November 18, 2011, the plaintiffs filed this
lawsuit charging that defendants Julie Magee (in her
official capacity as Alabama Revenue Commissioner) and
Jimmy Stubbs (in his official capacity as Elmore County
Probate Judge) violated the United States Constitution,
as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, by applying § 30 of the

Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 535, to Alabama’s manufactured homes
statute, 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255.

The plaintiffs’

complaint was accompanied by both a motion for temporary
restraining

order

and

a

motion

for

preliminary

injunction.

After meeting with counsel for both sides,

the court set both motions for a November 23 evidentiary
hearing.
On

November

23,

after

conducting

an

evidentiary

hearing and entertaining oral argument from both sides,
the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
restraining

order,

with

the

order

December 7, 2011, at 4:30 p.m.

set

to

expire

on

Cent. Ala. Fair Hous.

Ctr. v. Magee, 2011 WL 5878363 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2011).
On November 28, defendant Magee filed a motion to
dissolve

the

temporary

restraining

order,

and,

on

November 30, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce and
amend it.

The court set the plaintiffs’ motion for a

December 1 evidentiary hearing.

2

On December 1, after receiving and reviewing briefs
from the parties, the court denied the defendants’ motion
to dissolve.

Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 2011

WL 6010501 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2011).

Also just prior to

the December 1 hearing, the parties resolved the issues
presented by the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce and amend,
and the motion was withdrawn on December 2.
At the December 1 hearing, defendant Magee asked for
clarification of an issue.

The court stated that the

issue would be clarified in its order resolving the
plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion after further
briefing by the parties.

Defendant Magee filed her

supplemental brief on December 5, and the plaintiffs
filed their supplemental brief on December 6.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2) provides
that a temporary restraining order will expire no later
than 14 days after its issuance “unless before that time
the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period
or the adverse party consents to a longer extension.”

3

The

Rule

further

provides

that

“The

reasons

extension must be entered in the record.”

for

an

Because the

court has had to spend substantial time addressing issues
that arose after entry of its order granting the motion
for temporary restraining order; because of the need to
review the recently filed briefs (with the last one filed
only

yesterday)

clarification;

on
and

defendant
because

of

Magee’s
the

request

complex

for

issues

presented by this litigation, the court needs more time
to

resolve

the

plaintiffs’

motion

for

preliminary

injunction.
***
Accordingly,

and

“for

good

cause,”

Fed.R.Civ.P.

65(b)(2), it is ORDERED that the temporary restraining
order entered on November 23, 2011, (doc. no. 50), is
extended to December 12, 2011, at 4:30 p.m., at which
time it will expire.
(1st

Cir.

1973)

See Maine v. Fri, 483 F.2d 439, 441

(“as

long

as

the

hearing

on

the

preliminary injunction is held expeditiously within the

4

appropriate time frame, the district court should be able
to extend the restraining order while it prepares its
decision”);

see

also

Assocs.

Fin.

Servs.

Co.

v.

Mercantile Mortg. Co., 727 F. Supp. 371, 375 (N.D. Ill.
1989)

(Moran,

J.)

(granting

several

month

extension

because 20 days was “a woefully inadequate time in which
to prepare for, hear and decide a motion for preliminary
injunction”).
DONE, this the 7th day of December, 2011.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE