Loucks, et al. v. Shorest, LLC, et al.

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 12 MOTION to Strike Dfts' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, or in the Alternative, Plfs' Motion for a More Definite Statement. Signed by Honorable Judge W. Harold Albritton, III on 6/13/2012. (wcl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

VALERIE MALISSIA VEAZEY LOUCKS
and AMANDA VICTORIA WOODHAM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHOREST, LLC, and RHI, INC. d/b/a
SHONEY’S OF CLANTON,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv304-WHA
(wo)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This cause is before the court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendants’ Answer and
Affirmative Defenses, or in the Alternative, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a More Definite Statement
(Doc. #12).
The Plaintiffs, Valerie Malissia Veazey Loucks and Amanda Victoria Woodham (“the
Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint and an Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for sexual harassment (Count I), discrimination on
the basis of gender (Count II), and retaliation (Count III), as well as state law claims for
negligent and wanton hiring, training, supervision, and retention (Count IV), invasion of privacy
(Count V), assault and battery (Count VI), and outrageous conduct (Count VII).
In response to the Amended Complaint, the Defendants, Shorest, LLC and RHI, Inc.
d/b/a Shoney’s of Clanton (“Defendants”), filed an Answer which included affirmative defenses.

The Plaintiffs have asked the court to strike the Answer, or alternatively to require a more

definite statement, on the grounds that the Answer contains insufficient denials under Rule
8(b)(1)(A), and that the affirmative defenses do not meet the plausibility pleading standard of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
II. DISCUSSION
A motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests
whether a pleading sets forth “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "A motion to strike is a drastic remedy[,]" which is disfavored by the
courts and "will usually be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the
controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties." Augustus v. Board of Public
Instruction of Escambia County, Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962).1
In opposition to the Motion to Strike filed in this case, the Defendants state that their
statements of denial in their Answer are consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and that the plausibility standard relied on by the Plaintiffs ought not be applied to affirmative
defenses.
The court agrees with the Defendants that the denials in the Answer comply with Rule 8.
The portion of that rule cited by the Plaintiffs, Rule 8(b)(1)(A), applies to defenses, and requires
that they be stated in short and plain terms. Rule 8(b)(1)(B), however, is the portion of the rule
which governs denials and admissions of the facts in the Complaint, and it states that the party
responding to a pleading must “admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B). Rule 8 further provides that a “party that does not intend to

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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed
down prior to October 1, 1981.
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deny all the allegations must either specifically deny designated allegations or generally deny all
except those specifically admitted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(3). The Answer in this case identifies
each paragraph of the Amended Complaint, and admits or denies the paragraphs, meeting the
requirements of Rules 8(b)(1)(B) and 8(b)(3). The Motion to Strike is, therefore, due to be
DENIED as to the denials in the Answer.
The affirmative defenses stated in the Answer have been challenged by the Plaintiff as
being devoid of factual content and/or as not constituting affirmative defenses at all.
The Defendants concede that some of the defenses listed in their Answer as affirmative
defenses are not affirmative defenses, but are actually just specific denials of particular factual
allegations.
This court is persuaded that “the improper designation should not operate to prejudice the
pleader.” 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1269 (3d
ed. 2004). Rather than strike these defenses, this court will follow the approach of other district
courts and simply view the defenses as specific denials, rather than affirmative defenses. See,
e.g., CI Int'l Fuel, LTDA v. Helm Bank, S.A., No. 10–20347–CIV, 2010 WL 3368664, at *2–3
(S.D. Fla. Aug.23, 2010) (denying motion to strike and treating defenses as denials).
The paragraphs which do appear to assert an affirmative defense, paragraphs 4, 6, and 16,
state that the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Defendants’ policy regarding reporting of
sexual harassment, that the Plaintiffs did not provide notice of discrimination, and that all
reasonable and appropriate remedial actions were taken by the Defendants. These assertions
relate to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to sexual harassment claims. See Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742

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(1998). The Defendants argue that their affirmative defense paragraphs are sufficient, and the
plausibility standard from Iqbal and Twombly does not apply to affirmative defenses.
There is a split in authority over whether Iqbal and Twombly apply to affirmative
defenses. See 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1274
(Supp. 2012). No federal Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have addressed this issue. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit cases cited by the Plaintiffs in this case were decided before Iqbal and Twombly
and address different pleading issues. See Anderson v. District Bd. of Trustees of Fla. Cmty.
Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the affirmative defenses were as
incomprehensible as the complaint in the case and affirming a denial of qualified immunity);
Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1129 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that one sentence affirmative
defenses were comprehensible but vague because they were addressed to the complaint as a
whole), abrogated on other grounds by Douglas Asphalt Co. v. QORE, Inc., 657 F.3d 1146 (11th
Cir. 2011).
Upon review of the split in authority among district court cases, this court finds
persuasive those cases which have not applied Iqbal and Twombly to affirmative defenses, based
at least in part on the reasoning that Iqbal and Twombly were interpreting the language of Rule
8(a), not Rule 8(c). See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Centreville, 269 F.R.D. 661, 662 (N.D. Ala.
2010); Floyd v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 1:10cv2620, 2011 WL 2441744, at *7 (N.D. Ga. June
13, 2011).
Rule 8(a), which applies to claims for relief, requires a short and plain statement of the
claim “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” whereas Rule 8(c), which applies to
affirmative defenses, only requires that a pleader “must affirmatively state any avoidance or

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affirmative defense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The difference in the language of the rule,
therefore, cautions against an extension of Iqbal and Twombly to affirmative defenses.
In addition, although the Eleventh Circuit has not spoken on this issue, it has reiterated in
an unpublished opinion issued after Twombly that “[w]hen a plaintiff has notice that an
affirmative defense will be raised at trial, the failure of the defendant to plead the affirmative
defense does not prejudice the plaintiff, and it is not error for the district court to hear evidence
on the issue.” Hewitt v. Mobile Research Technology, Inc., 285 F. App’x 694, 696 (11th Cir.
2008). That reasoning indicates that sufficient notice required in the pleading of an affirmative
defense is given as long as a plaintiff is not prejudiced by assertion of the affirmative defense.
See Jackson, 269 F.R.D. at 696.
In this case, the Defendants have adequately given notice that they intend to rely on the
Plaintiffs’ failure to follow the policy regarding reporting sexual harassment, the Plaintiffs’
failure to provide notice, and that the Defendants took reasonable appropriate and remedial
actions. Finding no prejudice to the Plaintiffs in the assertion of the Faragher/Ellerth
affirmative defense, and bearing in mind that granting a Motion to Strike is a drastic remedy, the
court concludes that the affirmative defenses paragraphs are not due to be stricken.2
Finally, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to their requested alternative relief because a
Motion for More Definite Statement is not available relief in response to an Answer, but only in
response to a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e); see
also Jackson, 269 F.R.D. at 663.

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To the extent that the statement in the Answer that punitive damages are limited by law
is an affirmative defense, notice has also been given as to that defense.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Motion to Strike Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative
Defenses, or in the Alternative, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. #12), is
due to be and is hereby ORDERED DENIED.
Done this day of 13th day of June, 2012.

/s/ W. Harold Albritton
W. HAROLD ALBRITTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE