Hughes v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama
Filing
52
OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/6/2013. (jg, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
TERRY HUGHES,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY,
ALABAMA, a municipality,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:12cv1007-MHT
(WO)
OPINION
A police officer for defendant City of Montgomery,
Alabama stopped plaintiff Terry Hughes without cause.
Under threat of violence, the officer forced Hughes to go
to a bank and withdraw money, which the officer then took
from Hughes. Hughes claims that Montgomery is liable for
the officer’s actions under both the federal and state
law. Jurisdiction is properly invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C.
§
1331
(federal
question)
(supplemental jurisdiction).
1
and
§
1367(a)
This case is now before the court on the city’s motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the
motion will be granted.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or
defense--on which summary judgment is sought.
The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The court must view the admissible
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that
party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
2
II. BACKGROUND
On August 29, 2011, Montgomery Police Officer Ronald
C. Daniels pulled Hughes over, allegedly for speeding.
Daniels demanded that Hughes travel with him to a bank to
withdraw money that Daniels believed Hughes owed to friends
of Daniels. When Hughes resisted, Daniels threatened to put
him in jail. Hughes finally complied, and Daniels took him
to a bank, where he instructed Hughes to withdraw $ 650.
Daniels confiscated the funds and gave them to friends to
whom he believed Hughes owed money.
Hughes complained to the City of Montgomery. Officer
Daniels was suspended and then terminated for his actions
against Hughes.
Hughes then filed this lawsuit against the City of
Montgomery.
III. DISCUSSION
Hughes presents three theories by which Montgomery
could be liable for Daniels’s actions. First, the city
could be liable based on state-law respondeat superior for
3
municipalities. 1975 Ala. Code § 11-47-190. Second, the
city could be liable under state law for negligent training
and supervision.1 Finally, the city could be liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a municipal policy or practice of
constitutional violations. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
A. State Law: Respondeat Superior
Relying on respondeat superior, Hughes seeks to hold
Montgomery liable based on two alleged state-law violations
by Daniels: outrage; and assault and battery.
As a municipality, the city can be held liable for
state-law torts only if the “injury or wrong was done or
suffered
through
the
neglect,
carelessness,
or
unskillfulness” of Daniels. 1975 Ala. Code § 11-47-190(a).
The
city
cannot
be
held
vicariously
liable
for
its
employees’ intentional torts, which by definition are not
1. Hughes also seems to argue a state-law negligence
claim based on an affirmative duty to intervene on the
city’s part. The court could find no legal support that
the city owed such a state-law duty to Hughes.
4
undertaken
through
“neglect,
carelessness,
or
unskillfulness.” Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d
474, 501-502 (Ala. 2010). Because outrage and assault and
battery are intentional torts, Potts v. Hayes, 771 So. 2d
462, 465 (Ala. 2000) (outrage);
USA Petroleum Corp. V.
Hines, 770 So. 2d 589, 595 (assault and battery), the city
could not be held liable under respondeat superior for
Daniels’s actions.
B. State Law: Negligent Failure
to Train and Supervise
Hughes next seeks to hold the city liable for Police
Chief
Kevin
Murphy’s
negligent
failure
to
train
and
supervise Daniels.
The city argues that, “No Alabama court has expressly
recognized a cause of action against a municipality for a
supervisor’s
negligent
training
or
supervision
of
a
subordinate.” Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No.
37) at 3 (quoting Cheatham v. City of Tallassee, 2012 WL
3890127 at *13 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (Albritton, J.); Borton v.
5
City of Dothan, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1258 (M.D. Ala 2010)
(Watkins, J.)). Although many federal district courts have
made this statement over the years, the statement may no
longer be accurate. It could be argued that, in Ex parte
City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 299 (Ala. 2012), the
Alabama Supreme Court recently recognized the potential for
a negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim against
the City of Montgomery itself.
However, while Montgomery
seems to show that these claims may be viable against
municipalities under Alabama law, the case also illustrates
why Hughes cannot bring his claim in this circumstance.
The
Montgomery
court
was
primarily
considering
defenses based on Alabama’s doctrine of “state-agent”
immunity.
Under Alabama law,
“Every
peace
officer
...
whether
appointed or employed as such peace
officer by the state or a county or
municipality thereof ... shall at all
times be deemed to be officers of this
state, and as such shall have immunity
from tort liability arising out of his
or her conduct in performance of any
discretionary function within the line
6
and scope of his or her law enforcement
duties.”
1975 Ala. Code § 6-5-338. Section 6-5-338, therefore,
overlaps with Alabama’s common-law doctrine of state-agent
immunity. In Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 177-78 (Ala.
2000), the Alabama Supreme Court adopted a restatement of
common-law state-agent immunity as follows, in part:
“A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity
when the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the agent is based upon the
agent's ...
(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency
of government, including, but not limited
to, ... (d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; ...
(4)
exercising
judgment
in
enforcement of the criminal laws of
State, including, but not limited
law-enforcement officers' arresting
attempting to arrest persons; ....”
the
the
to,
or
Id. at 177-78 (quoting Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392, 405
(Ala.
2000)
(plurality
opinion)).
The
court
also
recognized certain exceptions to, or limitations on, this
immunity as follows, in part:
7
“[However,] a State agent shall not be
immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
(1) when the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or the Constitution of
this
State,
or
laws,
rules,
or
regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating
the activities of a governmental agency
require otherwise; or
(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond his or her authority, or under a
mistaken interpretation of the law.”
Id.
Although this common-law doctrine speaks to “State
agents,” it has since been modified to be coextensive with
the § 6-5-338 statutory immunity offered peace officers for
“a county or municipality,” with the result that the
immunity in ¶ (4) above is no longer limited to state
employees but now extends to county and municipal police
officers.
Paragraph 4, along with the opening paragraph,
now reads, in part, as follows:
“A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity
when the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the agent is based upon the
agent's ...
8
(4)
exercising
judgment
in
the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons, or serving
as peace officers under circumstances
entitling such officers to immunity
pursuant to § 6–5–338(a), Ala. Code
1975.”
Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So.2d 300, 309 (Ala.2006).
Thus, even the exceptions to, or limitations on, stateagent immunity apply to § 6-5-338 as well. Downing v. City
of Dothan, 59 So. 3d 16, 19-20 (Ala. 2010). Finally, “[i]t
is well established that, if a municipal peace officer is
immune pursuant to § 6–5–338(a), then, pursuant to §
6–5–338(b), the city by which he is employed is also
immune.” Montgomery, 99 So.3d at 298.
A
municipality
is
therefore
entitled
to
two
overlapping forms of immunity against state-law claims for
the actions of employees in its police department. First,
under § 11-47-190, in general, the city can be held liable
only for the negligence of its employees.
Second, state-
agent immunity, as engrafted with § 6–5–338, further grants
9
the city immunity from suit for the negligent actions of
its peace officers in the exercise of discretionary lawenforcement functions. In Ex parte City of Montgomery, the
court
appeared
to
suggest
that
hiring,
training,
and
supervision are discretionary functions which would be
covered by state-agent immunity. 99 So. 3d at 299. However,
the
court
also
appeared
to
suggest
that,
while
city
employees who are police officers are protected by stateagent immunity, those who are not peace officers are not
protected by state-agent immunity (for, obviously, they are
also not state employees either) and could be sued under
a negligent hiring, training, and supervision theory. Id.
In this case, Hughes alleges that Montgomery Police
Chief Kevin Murphy was negligent in hiring, training, and
supervising Daniels.
Because Chief Murphy, although not
a state employee, is a peace officer, state-agent immunity
protects him and the city from suit based on negligence in
10
his discretionary acts in hiring, training, and supervising
Daniels.2
C. Federal Law: § 1983
Finally, relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hughes argues
that, although Daniels is not a defendant, the city should
be held liable for his acts because it failed to train and
supervise him adequately and failed to intervene to prevent
his acts.
to
due
Hughes contends that Daniels violated his right
process
(Fourteenth
Amendment);
right
against
excessive force (Fourteenth Amendment); and right against
unreasonable seizure (Fourth Amendment).
A municipality may be a proper defendant under § 1983.
The
statute
provides
for
“every
person”
who
violates
another’s constitutional rights under color of state law
2. Arguably, Daniels would not necessarily be
protected under state-agent immunity, since his treatment
of Hughes was arguably willful, malicious, in bad faith,
or beyond his authority. Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178.
However, as discussed in § III.A, the city cannot be held
liable for Daniels’s intentional torts, regardless of
state-agent immunity.
11
to be liable. Local governments are “persons” for the
purposes of the statute. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, “‘[p]roof of a single
incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to
impose liability’ against a municipality.” Craig v. Floyd
County, Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985)
(plurality opinion)). There is a three-part process for
determining whether a municipal defendant is liable under
§ 1983: “a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional
rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a
custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference
to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or
custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d
1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
Hughes does not argue that the city had a policy or
custom of police officers pretextually stopping citizens
and extorting cash. He does not identify another individual
who experienced similar treatment at the hands of Daniels
12
or another Montgomery police officer. In fact, soon after
the
city
learned
of
Daniels’s
actions,
it
initiated
termination proceedings against him.
Hughes claims instead that the city failed to train and
supervise Daniels adequately to prevent his actions. In
order for a failure to train or supervise to constitute a
“custom or policy” that establishes § 1983 liability, the
failure must “amount[] to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To show
deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff must present some
evidence that the municipality knew of a need to train
and/or supervise in a particular area and the municipality
made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Gold v.
City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998).
“Establishing notice of a need to train or supervise is
difficult.
...
[I]t
must
have
been
obvious
that
the
municipality’s failure to train or supervise its employees
13
would result in a constitutional violation.” AFL-CIO v.
City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011).
Hughes argues that the city did not have a training or
supervisory policy that would have prevented Daniels’s
actions, but he provides no deposition or documentary
evidence which supports this proposition.
Also, in the
absence of such policy, Hughes does not identify a single
previous incident in which an officer treated a civilian
the way Daniels treated Hughes. The closest Hughes comes to
identifying notice of a need to supervise is an allegation
that Daniels used the police department computer system to
track Hughes. However, Hughes provides no evidence that
Daniels was in fact using the computer system to track
Hughes, let alone evidence that officers’ computer use was
monitored or that Daniels’s use would have raised a red
flag.
Instead of presenting any evidence to support his
claim, Hughes speculates: “Where is the oversight for the
search of the computer system used by the Officer that
14
allowed him to seek and hunt down the Plaintiff on duty?
Where
is
the
policy
or
supervision
that
detected
the
conduct of the Officer?” Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc.
No. 39) at 4. Hughes further insinuates that he would need
additional discovery to answer these questions. Admittedly,
Hughes filed his response approximately two weeks before
the final deadline for discovery to be completed. However,
if Hughes had outstanding discovery requests which would
provide the court with evidence supporting his claims, the
appropriate
extension
completed.
response
from
the
would
court
Alternatively,
have
so
the
Hughes
been
to
request
discovery
could
have
an
could
be
filed
an
affidavit or declaration setting forth the specific reasons
that he is unable to provide facts which would support his
Monell claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). However, Hughes took
none of these steps. In fact, Hughes seems to have little
to show for the six months of discovery that had passed
before he filed his summary-judgment response.
15
Absent any evidence of a policy, a custom, or any
deliberate indifference underlying Daniels’s treatment of
Hughes,
the
court
finds,
as
a
matter
of
law,
that
Montgomery is not liable for Daniels’s actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party
fails to properly support an assertion of fact ... as
required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion.”)
* * *
Accordingly,
the
City
of
Montgomery’s
summary judgment will be granted.
motion
for
An appropriate judgment
will be entered in favor of the city and against Hughes.
DONE, this the 6th day of November, 2013.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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