Mulvaney v. Meeks et al
Filing
62
OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that defendants Southern Health Partners, Inc., Jeffrey Reasons, and Diane Wilson's 11 & 37 motions to dismiss are denied, as further set out in Order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/30/2020. (am, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
TRISTA C. MULVANEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DENNIS MEEKS, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:13cv677-MHT
(WO)
OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, plaintiff
Trista C. Mulvaney brought this case contending that
the
defendant
government
officials,
county,
correctional officers, and medical providers violated
her
rights
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
by
their
deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs
while she was in custody in the Covington County Jail.1
Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.
§§
1331
(federal
question)
and
1343
(civil
rights).
1. She also cites the First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments in her complaint, although it appears
that only the Fourteenth Amendment is relevant to her
claim.
The case is now before this court on the motions to
dismiss
(doc.
nos.
11
and
37),
filed
by
defendants
Southern Health Partners, Inc., Jeffrey Reasons, and
Diane Wilson, for failure to state a claim due to the
passage of the statute of limitations.
For the reasons
that follow, the motions to dismiss will be denied.
I. MOTION-TO-DISMISS STANDARD
In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the
court
accepts
the
plaintiff’s
allegations
as
true,
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and
construes the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, Duke
v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993).
issue
is
not
whether
a
plaintiff
will
“The
ultimately
prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claims.”
416
U.S.
232,
236
(1974).
To
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
2
555 (2007), “only enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570.
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual
content
that
allows
the
court
to
draw
the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”
662, 678 (2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
“The plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more
than
a
sheer
acted unlawfully.”
possibility
that
a
defendant
has
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
II. BACKGROUND
Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, as
the court must at this stage, the relevant facts are as
follows.
During the period of time at issue in this
case, Covington County had entered into an agreement
with
defendant
Southern
Health
Partners
health care to the inmates at the jail.
3
to
provide
Defendant
Wilson was a nurse employed by Southern Health Partners
at the jail.
Defendant Reasons was the Chief Executive
Officer of Southern Health Partners.
refer
to
these
three
defendants
The court will
as
the
“medical
defendants.”2
On September 13, 2011, plaintiff Mulvaney was taken
into
custody
on
a
warrant
Covington County Jail.
and
incarcerated
in
the
Within hours of her arrival at
the jail, Mulvaney began “screaming, hallucinating, and
acting in such a manner that other detainees asked that
Correction Officers provide medical treatment” to her.
Complaint (doc. no. 1) at 6-7.
September
18,
September
erratically,
18,
she
refused
while
correctional
she
to
From September 13 until
eat
or
drink.
continued
officers
ordered
to
two
On
behave
other
2. Mulvaney also sued an additional individual
allegedly involved in providing medical care, Nurse
Annette Kane.
Nurse Kane has not been served and has
not appeared in this case.
Therefore, when the court
refers to the “medical defendants” in this opinion,
Nurse Kane is excluded.
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inmates to wash Mulvaney, who at that time had dried
urine and feces all over her body.
During Mulvaney’s
incarceration in the jail, defendant Wilson “refused to
see or treat” her, and did not recommend or order that
she be seen by a doctor offsite.
Complaint (doc. no.
1) at 8.
At some point, Mulvaney fell from her bed onto the
floor and cut her eye and was then was transported to a
hospital.
Her eye was sutured at that hospital, but
her condition was so severe that she was transferred to
another
hospital
for
further
treatment.
Testing
revealed that she was suffering from paracentral disc
protrusions and a urinary-tract infection, and had been
experiencing a series of seizures.
She was unconscious
in the intensive-care unit for three days.
III. DISCUSSION
The
medical
defendants
argue
that
Mulvaney’s
deliberate-indifference claim is barred by the statute
5
of
limitations.
Mulvaney
September 19, 2013.
filed
this
lawsuit
on
The statute of limitations on her
§ 1983 claim is two years.
See Powell v. Thomas, 643
F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2011).
The defendants argue that the complaint states that
Mulvaney
2011,
was
and
out
that
of
custody
the
beginning
limitations
September
period
expired
18,
on
September 18, 2013, and that she therefore filed suit
one day too late.
The complaint does not state that
Mulvaney was out of custody on September 18th; it does
not specify what day or time she was released from
custody or left the jail.
Mulvaney admits in her response to the motions to
dismiss
hospital
that
on
she
was
taken
from
18,
2011.
September
the
jail
See
to
Brief
the
in
Opposition to Motions to Dismiss (doc. no. 49) at 3.
However,
she
argues
that
the
statute
of
limitations
should be tolled because she was mentally disabled and
unconscious beginning on September 18, and because her
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cause of action did not accrue until she awoke several
days later.
She also contends, in her brief, that she
was still in the Covington County Jail’s legal custody
as late as September 27, 2011, when she was released
from such custody by the order of a state court judge,
and that her claim did not accrue until her release.
”Dismissal ... on statute of limitations grounds is
appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the
complaint that the claim is time-barred.”
Tello v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th
Circ. 2005) (citation omitted).
As mentioned above, it
is not apparent from the face of the complaint that the
limitations period has run.3
dismiss will be denied.
Therefore, the motions to
As such, the court need not
resolve Mulvaney’s arguments that her cause of action
did
not
begin
to
accrue
until
days
after
she
was
3. Further, “[a] statute of limitations bar is ‘an
affirmative defense, and ... plaintiff[s] [are] not
required to negate an affirmative defense in [their]
complaint.’” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358
F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
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transferred to the hospital, or that the statute of
limitations should be tolled.
to
re-raise
the
statute
The defendants are free
of
limitations
in
an
appropriate motion with evidentiary support, at which
point the court will address these issues.
***
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants Southern
Health
Partners,
Inc.,
Jeffrey
Reasons,
and
Diane
Wilson’s motions to dismiss (doc. nos. 11 & 37) are
denied.
DONE, this the 30th day of December, 2020.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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