Cleveland v. City of Montgomery et al
Filing
58
OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/17/2014. (wcl, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
HARRIET DELORES CLEVELAND, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF MONTGOMERY and
)
THE HONORABLE MILTON J.
)
WESTRY,
)
)
Defendants.
)
MARKIS ANTWUAN WATTS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, THE
HONORABLE MILTON J.
WESTRY, and THE HONORABLE
LES HAYES III,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:13cv732-MHT
(WO)
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:13cv733-MHT
(WO)
OPINION
“Providing equal justice for poor and
rich, weak and powerful alike is an
age-old problem. People have never
ceased to hope and strive to move
closer to that goal.”
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16, (1956).
Plaintiffs
Harriet
Delores
Cleveland
and
Martin
Antwuan Watts bring these consolidated federal cases
against defendants City of Montgomery and two of the
City’s municipal judges, claiming that they were thrown
in jail for being too poor to pay parking tickets in
violation of their rights to counsel, equal protection,
and due process under the following federal and state
laws: the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution; Article I, §§ 1, 6, and 22 of the
Alabama Constitution; and the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1343(a)(3) (civil
rights),
and
1367
(supplemental).
These
cases
are
before this federal court on the parties’ joint motion
for entry of agreed settlement order.
The motion will
be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Cleveland
and
Watts
allege
that
they
were
unconstitutionally jailed because they were too poor to
2
pay Montgomery city traffic-ticket fines and associated
court costs.
Although the facts remain disputed, to
give background for the settlement the court briefly
reviews them as alleged by Cleveland and Watts.
Cleveland
alleges
that,
over
a
period
of
five
years, she received a number of traffic tickets that
she could not afford to pay.
The first tickets were
for a lack of car insurance.
Over a two-year span,
police
set
up
roadblocks
in
her
West
Montgomery
neighborhood, and she was ticketed each time she could
not present proof of insurance.
Because she could not
afford to pay these tickets, the City of Montgomery
suspended
driving
her
to
eventually
license.
work
and
received
without a license.
Nevertheless,
her
child’s
additional
she
school,
tickets
for
continued
and
she
driving
She remained unable to pay the
fines owed, and, in August 2013, her outstanding fines
3
were
converted
into
a
term
of
imprisonment
in
the
Montgomery Municipal Jail.1
Similarly, Watts alleges that he was taken into
custody to serve a 54-day sentence based solely on his
inability
before
to
the
unrelated
pay
a
traffic
Montgomery
misdemeanor
ticket
Municipal
charge.
when
Court
he
appeared
regarding
Although
the
an
court
dismissed the misdemeanor, it learned that Watts had
outstanding
traffic
fines.
The
court
options: either pay or face jail time.
gave
him
two
After he stated
that he could not afford to pay the outstanding fines,
the court sentenced him to jail.
In
August
Montgomery
2013,
while
still
in
Municipal
Jail,
Cleveland
custody
and
brought suit individually in state court.
removal
to
this
federal
court,
the
in
Watts
the
each
Following
cases
were
1. Cleveland also alleges that she was jailed at
least twice prior to 2013 due to her inability to pay
the traffic tickets she received during 2008 and 2009.
Little information was provided, however, regarding
those periods of incarceration or the municipal-court
proceedings that produced them.
4
consolidated.
and
Cleveland and Watts sought declaratory
injunctive
defendants
orders
relief.
agreed
of
to
a
The
stay
incarceration
City
of
and
the
and
the
other
municipal-court
the
collection
of
outstanding debts pending discovery in this matter.
During discovery, another federal case, Mitchell v.
City of Montgomery, No. 2:14cv186-MHT, was filed.
facts
in
Mitchell
plaintiffs
Mitchell
raise
analogous,
substantially
court,
injunction.
are
however,
and
similar
entered
the
The
Mitchell
claims.
a
The
preliminary
As part of the injunction, the City of
Montgomery was ordered to submit a comprehensive set of
proposed judicial procedures that it would implement
for
the
collection
Cleveland’s
and
of
fines
Watts’s
going
cases
have
forward.
been
While
litigated
separately from Mitchell, this court allowed Cleveland
and Watts to participate in the briefing and proposed
hearing regarding the proposed judicial procedures.
All
parties
then
decided
to
engage
in
private
mediation to develop agreed-upon procedures that would
5
facially
The
satisfy
parties
procedures
federal
contend
now
and
that
establish
defendants
will
inability
to
restitution.”
not
a
state-law
the
scheme
be
requirements.
resulting
proposed
whereby
indigent
“incarcerated
pay
fine[s]
or
Ala.
R.
P.
Crim.
for
court
[their]
costs
26.11(i)(2).
or
The
procedures are guided by four key components: access to
counsel, notification forms, “indigence/ability-to-pay”
hearings, and express judicial findings.
Under the proposed judicial procedures, a debtor
who
does
not
otherwise
have
counsel
is
to
be
represented by a public defender at all compliance and
indigence/ability-to-pay hearings.
A public defender
will also be available to a debtor who needs assistance
completing
related
an
affidavit
documentation
of
prior
substantial
to
hardship
hearings.
and
Lastly,
public defenders are instructed to inform any debtor
who
is
ultimately
subject
appellate rights.
6
to
imprisonment
of
her
If a debtor is unable to pay her fine, she will be
notified of her right to a public defender, the date of
her
compliance
hearing,
and
her
right
to
present
evidence of financial hardship through a set of forms:
Form One (“Payment of Fines and Costs”) and Form Two
(“Order Setting Hearing for Compliance Review”). The
forms notify the debtor that an individual “cannot be
put in jail solely for [her] inability to pay ... fines
and costs” absent a finding of willful non-payment. The
forms
go
on
to
indicate
how
a
debtor
would
begin
establishing inability to pay at her first compliance
hearing.
During
a
debtor’s
first
compliance
hearing--scheduled for all debtors who do not pay their
fines and costs in full at their first appearance--the
debtor must be given the opportunity to dispute the
amount
allegedly
owed.
Additionally,
the
municipal-court judge is required to ask why the debtor
has failed to pay in full, specifically asking whether
the
debtor
“is
able
to
pay
7
[that
day].”
If,
in
response to the municipal court’s inquiry, the debtor
indicates that she is unable to pay, the court will
direct the debtor to a public defender and schedule an
indigence/ability-to-pay hearing.
Even if the debtor
does not indicate an inability to pay, the court is
prohibited from converting the debtor’s fines into a
prison
sentence
without
first
conducting
an
indigence/ability-to-pay hearing.
At an indigence/ability-to-pay hearing, the court
is required to make an express indigence/ability-to-pay
determination,
taking
into
account
testimony,
the
debtor’s affidavit of substantial hardship, any other
documents submitted by the debtor, and any additional
information
the
court
deems
necessary.
If,
after
questioning and the presentation of evidence, the court
determines that the debtor is at or below 125 % of the
federal
poverty
level,
the
debtor
will
be
presumed
indigent and unable to pay the fines, court costs, and
restitution
previously
levied,
unless
the
debtor
is
found to have substantial liquid assets with which to
8
pay the obligations.
above
125 %
of
the
If the debtor is found to be
federal
poverty
presumption of indigence will attach;
level,
no
such
the debtor will,
however, still be afforded an opportunity to show the
court
that
she
consideration
is
unable
disposable
to
income,
pay,
liquid
taking
assets,
into
and
earning potential.
If, following the hearing, the debtor is determined
to be indigent or otherwise unable to pay, the court
will have the option of proposing a new payment plan
guided by the debtor’s available financial resources,
remitting the fines and costs, or ordering any other
remedy
deemed
incarceration.
just
and
appropriate
other
than
Additionally, the court is required to
provide the debtor the option of completing community
service in lieu of making monetary payments.
The court
will be able to order the debtor to serve jail time
only if the hearing results in an express finding of
willful non-payment, that is, the debtor refuses to pay
despite having the ability to pay.
9
II. JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
AGREED SETTLEMENT ORDER
The parties have submitted to this federal court
the proposed judicial procedures as an exhibit to their
joint motion for entry of agreed settlement order.
In
the joint motion, they request that the court issue
certain declarations under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 addressing
the
proposed
judicial
procedures’
facial
compliance
with applicable federal and state law.
For each of these requested declarations, the court
will
now
determine
whether
the
proposed
judicial
procedures facially comply with federal and state law.
It need not--and will not--determine whether the new
procedures
represent
the
minimum
requirements
under
federal and state constitutional law or, instead, go
beyond what is required.
A.
Declaration 1
The parties ask this federal court to declare that,
under the current status of the law, the constitutional
10
principles set out in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660
(1983),
regarding
incarceration
for
non-payment,
and
Turner v. Rogers, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011),
regarding notice, apply in municipal-court proceedings,
and
that,
to
the
extent
applicable
in
a
particular
case, the judges of the Montgomery Municipal Court are
legally required to follow them.
It
is
uncontroverted
municipal-court
that
proceedings.
these
Both
cases
cases
apply
to
addressed
state judicial proceedings, see Bearden, 461 U.S. at
662 (addressing Georgia state courts); Turner, --- U.S.
at ---, 131 S. Ct. at 2512 (addressing South Carolina
family
court),
subordinate
and
“[m]unicipalities
departments
of
state
are
but
government.”
Alexander v. State ex rel. Carver, 274 Ala. 441, 443
(1963); see also Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555
U.S. 353, 662 (2009) (“Political subdivisions of States
... are [] subordinate governmental instrumentalities
created by the State.”). As such, judges in municipal
courts,
like
judges
in
state
11
courts,
must
follow
Bearden and Turner, and the judges in the Montgomery
Municipal Court are no exception.2
B.
The
parties
next
Declaration 2
request
this
federal
court
to
declare that the proposed judicial procedures facially
comply with the constitutional principles set out in
Bearden, regarding incarceration for non-payment, and
Turner,
regarding
notice.
In
Bearden,
the
Supreme
Court held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process
Clause
and
Equal
Protection
Clause,
a
trial
court cannot “automatically revok[e] probation because
[a]
petitioner
could
not
pay
his
fine,
without
2. The parties’ proposed order for declaratory
relief specifically requests that “to the extent
applicable in a particular case, the judges of the
Montgomery Municipal Court are legally required to
follow” Bearden and Turner. Am. Joint Mot. for Entry of
Agreed Settlement: Proposed Order (Doc. No. 56-3)
(emphasis
added).
This
court
reads
the
“extent
applicable” phrase to mean only that the municipal
judges are bound by these Supreme Court cases whenever
an issue before the municipal court implicates them
rather than implying exceptions for municipal judges in
certain cases.
12
determining
that
petitioner
had
not
made
sufficient
bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative
forms of punishment did not exist.”
461 U.S. at 662.
This holding breaks down into a three-part process.
First, a court must ask why a person could not pay a
fine.
Id. at 672.
Second, if the person has the
resources and willfully refuses to pay, the court may
imprison her; if she does not have the resources, the
court must ask whether she made bona-fide efforts to
obtain the resources.
Id.
Last, if she made bona-fide
efforts, the court must consider if there are adequate
alternative measures--such as giving more time to pay
the
fine,
reducing
the
fine,
or
requiring
labor
or
public service in lieu of the fine--that could satisfy
the State’s interest in punishment and deterrence.
Id.
at
not
672-673.
“Only
if
alternate
measures
are
adequate to meet the State’s interests in punishment
and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who
has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.” Id. at
672.
Indeed,
“[t]o
do
otherwise
13
would
deprive
the
[debtor] of his constitutional freedom simply because,
through no fault of his own, he cannot pay a fine.”
Id. at 672-73.
Turner expanded on Bearden by defining an indigent
person’s
due-process
rights
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment when facing civil contempt. Turner, --- U.S.
at ---, 131 S. Ct. at 2512.
Although the Supreme Court
found that a State did not have to provide counsel,
drawing
a
distinction
criminal-contempt
between
proceedings,
it
held
civilthat
and
a
State
should provide “substitute procedural safeguards” that,
when “employed together, can significantly reduce the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”
Id. at
---, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (internal citation omitted).
These
safeguards
could
include
“(1)
notice
to
the
defendant that his ability to pay is a critical issue
in the contempt proceedings; (2) the use of a form (or
the
equivalent)
to
elicit
relevant
financial
information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for the
defendant to respond to statements and questions about
14
his financial status ... ; and (4) an express finding
by the court that the defendant has the ability to
pay.” Id.
Here,
the
proposed
judicial
procedures
facially
comply with the constitutional requirements outlined in
Bearden.
Under Bearden, a court may imprison a debtor
only upon a finding of willful non-payment or when,
despite the debtor making a bona-fide effort to pay,
“alternative measures [of punishment] are not adequate
to
meet
the
deterrence.”
State’s
interests
461 U.S. at 672.
in
punishment
and
The judicial procedures
agreed to by the parties here conform to that standard,
allowing a debtor to be imprisoned only if (1) the
municipal
ability
court
to
pay
determines
and
(2)
that
the
the
court
debtor
makes
an
had
the
express
finding that the non-payment was willful.
Similarly,
facially
comply
the
proposed
with
provided for in Turner.
the
judicial
due-process
procedures
requirements
Although the Sixth Amendment
does not provide debtors facing incarceration a right
15
to
counsel
during
Due
Process
Clause
civil-contempt
does
require
proceedings,
several
the
“substitute
procedural safeguards” during these civil proceedings.
Turner, --- U.S. at ---, 131 S. Ct. at 2519.
The
judicial procedures offered by the parties incorporate
all of the procedural safeguards discussed in Turner.
Under
the
individual
procedures,
cannot
be
debtors
are
incarcerated
notified
solely
that
due
to
an
an
inability to pay; the court utilizes a form to elicit
debtors’ financial information and debtors are afforded
an opportunity to respond to questions regarding their
financial capabilities; and the court is required to
make an express finding regarding each debtor’s ability
to pay.
to
The judicial procedures then go a step further
safeguard
against
the
“erroneous
deprivation
of
liberty” and provide for public-defender representation
at
all
facing
indigence/ability-to-pay
the
possibility
of
non-payment.
16
hearings
for
incarceration
debtors
following
C.
Declaration 3
Last, the parties request that this federal court
declare that the proposed judicial procedures facially
comply
Sixth
with
the
Amendments
requirements
to
the
of
United
the
Fourteenth
States
and
Constitution,
§§ 13, 64, and 225 of the Alabama Constitution, and Rule
26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.6
3.
Section 1 provides,
“That all men are equally free and
independent; that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable
rights; that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”
Ala. Const. Art. I, § 1.
4.
Section 6 provides,
“That in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused has a right to be heard by
himself and counsel, or either; to
demand the nature and cause of the
accusation;
and
to
have
a
copy
thereof; to be confronted by the
witnesses
against
him;
to
have
compulsory
process
for
obtaining
witnesses in his favor; to testify in
all cases, in his own behalf, if he
elects
so
to
do;
and,
in
all
prosecutions by indictment, a speedy,
public trial, by an impartial jury of
(continued . . .)
17
the county or district in which the
offense was committed; and he shall
not be compelled to give evidence
against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, except by
due
process
of
law;
but
the
legislature may, by a general law,
provide for a change of venue at the
instance of the defendant in all
prosecutions by indictment, and such
change of venue, on application of the
defendant, may be heard and determined
without the personal presence of the
defendant
so
applying
therefor;
provided, that at the time of the
application for the change of venue,
the defendant is imprisoned in jail or
some legal place of confinement.”
Ala. Const. Art. I, § 6.
5.
Section 22 provides,
“That no ex post facto law, nor any
law, impairing the obligations of
contracts, or making any irrevocable
or
exclusive
grants
of
special
privileges or immunities, shall be
passed by the legislature; and every
grant or franchise, privilege, or
immunity shall forever remain subject
to
revocation,
alteration,
or
amendment.”
Ala. Const. Art. I, § 22.
6.
The relevant part of Rule 26.11 provides,
(continued . . .)
18
First,
comply
the
with
proposed
the
judicial
Fourteenth
procedures
Amendment.
As
facially
discussed
above, Bearden and Turner govern the application of the
Due
Process
Clause
civil-contempt
and
Equal
proceedings
for
Protection
indigent
Clause
parties,
to
and
the proposed judicial procedures meet the requirements
set out in those two cases.
Second,
Sixth
the
procedures
Amendment.
indigent
Under
defendant
government-appointed
facially
with
the
Sixth
Amendment,
an
the
the
right
to
has
counsel
civil--contempt proceedings.
in
comply
criminal--but
not
Turner, --- U.S. at ---,
131 S. Ct. at 2516. The court, however, need not speak
to
the
nature
case.
of
Because
procedures
provide
the
municipal
the
for
parties’
the
proceedings
proposed
representation
in
this
judicial
of
all
“In
no
case
shall
an
indigent
defendant
be
incarcerated
for
inability to pay a fine or court costs
or restitution.”
Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 26.11.
19
debtors during compliance and ability-to-pay hearings,
they would comply with the Sixth Amendment.
Third, the procedures facially comply with the due
process,
right
to
counsel,
and
any
equal-protection
principle embodied in Article I, §§ 1, 6, and 22 of the
Alabama Constitution for the same reasons they comply
with
the
United
States
Constitution.
As
to
due
process, “[t]he right to due process is guaranteed to
the citizens of Alabama under the Alabama Constitution
of 1901, Sections 6 and 13,” and it applies to both
criminal and civil cases.
Ross Neely Exp., Inc. v.
Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 437 So. 2d 82, 84 (Ala.
1983).
These clauses have been likened to the Due
Process Clause in the federal Constitution. Limestone
Cnty. Dep't of Human Res. v. Long, --- So.3d ---, ---,
2014 WL 5394522, at *4 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (“[The
Alabama] supreme court ‘has interpreted the due process
guaranteed
under
the
Alabama
Constitution
to
be
coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the
United States Constitution’ .... Alabama's constitution
20
does not afford a state agency any additional right to
due process not found in the federal constitution.”)
(citing Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So.2d 726, 730 (Ala.
2002)); Vest v. Vest, 978 So. 2d 759, 763 n.1 (Ala.
Civ.
App.
2006)
(“Alabama
courts
have
likened
the
due-process provision of Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. 1,
§ 13,
to
Amendment
the
of
Due
the
Process
United
Clause
States
of
the
Fourteenth
Constitution.”).
As
discussed above, the proposed procedures facially meet
the
due-process
requirement
by
providing
counsel
to
indigent debtors and guaranteeing no debtor will go to
prison unless she willfully refuses to pay.
Similar
due-process
to
their
rights
in
interpretation
light
of
federal
of
state
due-process
rights, Alabama courts have also frequently interpreted
the Alabama Constitution’s right to counsel in light of
the federal right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
See, e.g., Hill v. Bradford, 565 So. 2d 208, 210 (Ala.
1990); Pinkerton v. State, 395 So. 2d 1080 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1980).
Because every debtor unable to pay her
21
fines
will
be
procedures,
provided
the
counsel
procedures
meet
under
the
the
proposed
right-to-counsel
requirement under the Alabama Constitution.
As to equal protection, there is an open question
whether
Article
Constitution
can
I,
§§
be
1,
6,
read
770
So.2d
49,
59
22
together
equal-protection principle.
Ctr.,
and
of
to
the
Alabama
establish
an
Hutchins v. DCH Reg’l Med.
(Ala.
2000)
(“The
question
whether §§ 1, 6, and 22 of Article I, Constitution of
Alabama
1901,
combine
to
Alabama
equal
protection
guarantee
under
the
the
citizens
of
remains
in
laws
dispute.”); see also Dyas v. City of Fairhope, 2010 WL
5477754 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (Steele, C.J.) (analyzing past
Alabama Supreme Court cases on the issue).
Assuming
arguendo
for
that
these
clauses
do
combine
an
equal-protection principle, the court finds that the
proposed procedures meet this principle for the same
reason the procedures fulfill the requirements of the
federal Equal Protection Clause.
Cf. State v. Adams,
91 So. 3d 724, 738-41 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (holding
22
Alabama
sex-offender
federal
Equal
law
unconstitutional
Protection
Clause
under
and
the
the
state
equal-protection principle because it deprived indigent
and
homeless,
but
not
wealthy,
offenders
of
liberty
based on their poverty).
Last,
the
requirements
26.11.
procedures
of
Alabama
facially
Rule
of
comply
with
Criminal
the
Procedure
The rule mandates that, “Incarceration shall
not automatically follow the nonpayment of a fine or
restitution.”
Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11.
Indeed, a state
court may not incarcerate an indigent defendant for the
inability to pay a fine.
the
state
court
ability
to
payment
schedule,
obligation
procedures
hearings,
pay,
may
or
incarceration
as
the
release
altogether.
a
of
into
debt
the
Id.
for
facially conform to this rule.
23
owed,
defendant’s
modify
proposed
from
the
the
judicial
indigence/ability-to-pay
counsel,
remedy
the
defendant
The
require
guarantee
To avoid this result,
inquire
reduce
(which
Id.
and
exclusion
indigent
of
defendants)
***
This
federal
court
will,
therefore,
grant
the
parties’ joint motion for entry of agreed settlement
order.
An accompanying judgment will be entered.
DONE, this the 17th day of November, 2014.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson___
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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