Barnes v. Corizon Health, Inc. et al

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that Defendant Corizon Health, L.L.C.'s 54 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the federal claims in Counts I and II. It is further ORDERED that Defendant Kelly Rice's 55 motion for s ummary judgment is GRANTED as to the federal claims in Counts I and II. Supplemental jurisdiction will not be exercised over the state law claims in Counts III and IV. A separate final judgment will be entered. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 2/18/2016. (kh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
JAMIE BARNES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON HEALTH, L.L.C., et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 2:13-CV-862-WKW
[WO]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants
Corizon Health, L.L.C. (Doc. # 54) and Kelly Rice (Doc. # 55). Plaintiff Jamie
Barnes filed a response to each motion (Docs. # 64 and 65), and each Defendant
filed a reply (Docs. # 67 and 68). Upon consideration of the arguments, evidence,
and relevant law, the motions are due to be granted as to the federal law claims and
supplemental jurisdiction will be declined as to the state law claims.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Subject-matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1367. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must
demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
court must view the evidence and the inferences from that evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816,
820 (11th Cir. 2010).
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party “always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes
identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute
of material fact.

Id.

If the moving party does not bear the trial burden of

production, it may assert, without citing the record, that the nonmoving party
“cannot produce admissible evidence to support” a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) advisory committee’s note to 2010
amendment (“Subdivision (c)(1)(B) recognizes that a party need not always point
to specific record materials. . . . [A] party who does not have the trial burden of
production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden
cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact.”). If the
moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine dispute of material
fact exists as to each of its claims for relief. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine
dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence
2

allowing a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley
Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. BACKGROUND
The events giving rise to this case transpired while Plaintiff Jamie Barnes
(“Barnes”) was incarcerated in various Alabama Department of Corrections
(“ADOC”) facilities. Throughout his time in ADOC custody, Barnes complained
of issues with his eyesight. He brought this action against various entities involved
in his treatment, generally alleging deprivation of Eighth Amendment rights and
negligence. The procedural history and facts will be described.
A.

Procedural History
Barnes commenced this action on November 26, 2013. (Doc. # 1.) He

initially named nine defendants, only two of whom remain:

Corizon Health,

L.L.C. and Kelly Rice. Briefly, this is how the other Defendants left this action.
Barnes filed an amended complaint in which he abandoned all claims against
Defendants Corizon, Inc., Michael Bradford, and Corizon Health, Inc. (Doc. # 36.)
These parties were terminated per the amended complaint. Defendant Kimberly
Griffin was later terminated pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Doc. # 62.)
After the above-mentioned parties were culled from the action, five
defendants remained: Corizon Health, L.L.C.; Kelly Rice; Darryl Ellis; Michelle
3

Copeland; and Dyjerlinn Copeland.1
motions for summary judgment.

All of these remaining defendants filed

(Docs. # 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58.)

Barnes

responded only to the motions filed by Corizon Health, L.L.C. and Kelly Rice.
(Docs. # 64 and 65.) In his responses, Barnes abandoned all claims against Darryl
Ellis, Michelle Copeland, and Dyjerlinn Copeland. (Docs. # 64 and 65.) Those
parties were terminated (Doc. # 70), and the dust has fully settled.
In addition to responding to the motions for summary judgment, Barnes filed
a motion to strike certain evidence. (Doc. # 61.) The motion to strike was denied.
(Doc. # 71.) Defendants Corizon Health, L.L.C. (“Corizon”) and Kelly Rice
(“Rice”) each filed replies in support of their motions for summary judgment.
(Docs. # 67 and 68.) Only Corizon’s and Rice’s motions for summary judgment
are now under consideration.
B.

Facts
The facts are drawn from the evidentiary submissions of the parties and are

viewed in the light most favorable to Barnes.

The only evidence under

consideration is that which is admissible on its face or can be reduced to an
admissible form and complies with Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

1

In her motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 58), Ms. Copeland spells her first name
“Dyjerlynn.” The record has not been corrected to reflect the proper spelling, but she has already
been eliminated as a party.
4

Procedure. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); Macuba v.
DeBoer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-24 (11th Cir. 1999). (See Doc. # 71.)
The circumstances giving rise to this case are complex, but a full marshaling
of the facts is necessary to the resolution of the instant motions. The facts will be
described categorically and in the following order:

Barnes’s history of

incarceration; Corizon’s role in the ADOC system; Barnes’s health issues and
initial diagnosis; the treatment Barnes received while he was in ADOC custody;
and Barnes’s treatment after his release from ADOC custody.
1.

Barnes’s Incarceration

At some time in 2008, Barnes pleaded guilty to state charges of trafficking
and possession of marijuana. (Barnes Dep., Doc. # 54-3, at 6, 8.) He received a
sentence of ten years of imprisonment, which he began serving at the Montgomery
County Jail on November 20, 2008. (Barnes Dep., Doc. # 54-3, at 8; Inmate
Movement Hist., Doc. # 54-2, at 3.)
Barnes spent three months in the Montgomery County Jail, after which time
correctional authorities transferred him to the Wilcox County Jail. (Barnes Dep.,
Doc. # 54-3, at 8.) On January 23, 2009, the authorities transferred Barnes to the
Kilby Correctional Facility (“Kilby”). (Inmate Movement Hist., Doc. # 54-2, at 2.)
ADOC then moved Barnes to Staton Correctional Center (“Staton”) on February 3,
2009. (Inmate Movement Hist., Doc. # 54-2, at 2.) ADOC transferred Barnes to
5

Frank Lee Work Release Center (“Frank Lee”) on February 16, 2011. (Inmate
Movement Hist., Doc. # 54-2, at 2.) He remained at Frank Lee until his release on
February 6, 2012. (Inmate Movement Hist., Doc. # 54-2, at 2.)
2.

Corizon’s Role in the ADOC System

Corizon has been in a contractual relationship with ADOC since November
1, 2007. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 3.) Pursuant to the agreement between
Corizon and ADOC, Corizon provides healthcare services to inmates in ADOC
facilities. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 3.) Hugh Hood (“Hood”), a medical doctor
licensed to practice in the state of Alabama, serves as the Regional Medical
Director for Corizon. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 2–3.) He oversees the care
provided to inmates in ADOC facilities. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 3.)
Corizon, as a medical contractor, has no say in the way that ADOC transfers
inmates in its custody. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 8.) Corizon did not employ a
full time medical staff at Frank Lee, but a nurse visited the facility twice per day.
(Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 8.)
Rice, who is also employed by Corizon, is a registered nurse licensed to
practice in the state of Alabama. (Rice Aff., Doc. # 55-4, at 2.) She worked as a
nurse at both the Staton and Frank Lee facilities. (Rice Aff., Doc. # 55-4, at 2.) As
a registered nurse, Rice does not perform the functions of a “medical provider.”
(Rice Aff., Doc. # 55-4, at 3.) That is, she does not diagnose patients, prescribe
6

medication, or make referrals to outside specialists. (Rice Aff., Doc. # 55-4, at 3.)
She merely provides nursing care and follows orders from medical providers.
(Rice Aff., Doc. # 55-4, at 3.)
3.

Barnes’s Health Issues and Initial Diagnosis

Barnes’s health issues began in 2010.

His January 14, 2010 health

examination indicated suboptimal vision. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 4.) Barnes
had 20/50 vision in his right eye, 20/25 in his left eye, and 20/25 in both eyes.
(Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 4.) Barnes alleges that on or around March 1, 2010, he
notified prison staff that he was experiencing problems with his vision. (Doc. # 36,
at 3.) On March 31, 2010, Barnes went to see Dr. Michael Bradford (“Bradford”),
an independent optometrist in Montgomery, Alabama. (Hugh Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at
4.)

Bradford determined that Barnes was suffering from iritis, which is

characterized as inflammation of the front part of the eye. (Hugh Aff., Doc. #54-4,
at 4.)
Barnes experienced a different vision issue in August of 2010. During an
altercation with another inmate, Barnes injured his right eye. (Hugh Aff., Doc. #
54-4, at 6.) Records from his treatment show that Barnes experienced swelling and
blurred vision as a result of the altercation. (See Hugh Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 6.) He
again reported blurry vision in his right eye when he underwent a yearly health
exam on January 14, 2011. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 7.)
7

After being transferred to Frank Lee, Barnes continued to complain of blurry
vision. His March 3, 2011 eye exam showed 20/50 vision in the right eye, 20/40
vision in the left eye, and 20/40 vision in both eyes. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 8.)
Barnes again saw Bradford for treatment on March 22, 2011, at which time
Bradford diagnosed Barnes with chronic bilateral uveitis. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4,
at 9.) On December 10, 2011, Barnes complained that he was having trouble
seeing clearly. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 12.) Barnes refused his yearly medical
exam, which would have included an eye exam, on January 24, 2012. (Hood Aff.
Doc. # 54-4, at 13.) Despite this refusal, he complained again of blurred vision on
February 4, 2012. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 13.)
Barnes experienced other medical issues throughout his incarceration, but
these conditions, which do not relate to vision, do not form the basis of Barnes’s
claims. These other issues include skin problems, stroke-like symptoms, and flulike illness. (See generally Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 2–14.)
4.

Barnes’s Treatment During Incarceration

The parties agree that Barnes received some treatment during his
incarceration. They fundamentally disagree, however, as to the meaning of the
medical records produced from that treatment. More specifically, they disagree
about whether those records show when medications were available to Barnes,
when Barnes missed his appointments with medical providers, and why Barnes
8

missed treatment opportunities. Corizon and Rice rely on the affidavit testimony
of Hood, who based his opinions on his review of Barnes’s medical records.
Barnes, in response to Defendants’ motions, offers his own interpretation of these
records.
Hood’s interpretation of Barnes’s medical records will be addressed first.
Barnes’s analysis will be discussed second.
a.

Hood’s Interpretation

After diagnosing Barnes with iritis, Bradford prescribed medication. On
April 21, 2010, Bradford prescribed Atropine and Pred Forte, both of which are
administered in the form of eye drops. 2 (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 4.) Atropine
is a non-formulary medication, meaning that medical providers had to order it for
Barnes.

(Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 4.)

Pred Forte, however, is a stock

medication, meaning that it was readily available at all ADOC facilities. (Hood
Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 4.) Though the Pred Forte was available to Barnes in May of
2010, the Atropine was not available until August of that year. (Hood Aff., Doc. #
54-4, at 4–5.) Hood averred that the delay in the availability of Atropine would not
cause any vision issues for Barnes. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 5.)
All of Barnes’s vision-related medications were designated “keep on person”
(“KOP”), which meant that Barnes could pick them up at any time without needing
2

Bradford also ordered x-rays of Barnes’s spine and chest. (Hugh Aff., Doc. # 54-4.)
9

to have them administered at the facility pill call. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 5.)
On March 22, 2011, Barnes completed paperwork acknowledging that he
understood the sick call and pill call policies. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 9;
ADOC Medical Records, Doc. # 54-4, at 128.)3
Though the Pred Forte drops were available in May of 2010, the Medical
Administration Record (“MAR”) shows that Barnes failed to retrieve them. (Hood
Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 5.) Barnes requested a sick call appointment, noting that he
had not been able to pick up his eye drops or his eye glasses because he was at
trade school. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 5.) Barnes did not appear for his sick
call appointment on May 17, 2010. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 5.)

3

In their briefs, Defendants make no reference to the particular portions of Barnes’s
medical records on which they rely for their factual assertions. When they rely on factual
averments from Hood’s affidavit, they make general citations to that fourteen-page document
without specific reference to pages or paragraphs. There is no judicial duty to peruse the entire
record on a motion for summary judgment. The medical records are reviewed to the extent that
Barnes made specific reference to them in his response to the motions for summary judgment.
Hood stated in his affidavit that Barnes signed a document acknowledging his
understanding of the KOP policy, but there is no document in the medical records indicating
whether Barnes did so. Barnes did sign a document acknowledging his understanding of the
access to healthcare policy, but this policy did not explain the KOP procedure. (See ADOC
Medical Records, Doc. # 54-4, at 128.) In his own affidavit, Barnes acknowledged that his
medications were designated KOP. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 1.)
The fact that such a document is not included in the medical records does not indicate
that Barnes had no understanding of the KOP policy. As the medical director for Corizon, Hood
may well have personal knowledge that a particular inmate signed such a document. To the
extent that Barnes objects to Hood’s testimony as not being made on the basis of his personal
knowledge (see Motion to Strike, Doc. # 61), it must be noted that Hood is testifying in his
capacity as an expert. (See Hood Rule 26(a)(2) Report, Doc. # 66-2, at 16–23.) As an expert,
Hood is competent to testify as to facts of which he is personally aware or has been made aware.
Fed. R. Evid. 703.
10

The MARs show that Barnes failed to retrieve his medication each month
from May to December of 2010. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 5–7.) Barnes missed
sick call appointments on June 24, 2010, August 25, 2010, and May 24, 2011.
(Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 5–10.) On August 31, 2010, Barnes showed up for an
appointment, but left before actually being seen by a health care provider. (Hood
Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 6.) On January 14, 2011, Barnes refused to be seen by a
health care provider. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 7–8.)
It was not until April of 2011 that Barnes first picked up his prescribed eye
drops. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 9.) He only picked up Homatropine,4 though
both Homatropine and Pred Forte were available. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 9.)
He again failed to pick up his eye drops at the beginning May and June of 2011.
(Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 9.) He did retrieve a supply of Homatropine on June
30, 2011, but not Pred Forte, which also was available to him. (Hood Aff., Doc. #
54-4, at 10.) He again failed to pick up his medication in July and August of 2011.
(Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 10.)
On August 21, 2011, after over a year of Barnes’s sporadic medication
retrieval, Corizon staff completed a medication non-adherence report. (Hood Aff.,

4

On March 22, 2011, Barnes saw Bradford for a fourth time. After this appointment,
Bradford ordered Pred Forte and Homatropine. (Hood Aff. Doc. # 54-4, at 9.) Bradford
previously had prescribed Atropine instead of Homatropine. Atropine and Homatropine serve
essentially the same purpose. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 17.)
11

Doc. # 54-4, at 10.) Due to Barnes’s continued non-compliance, Corizon staff
completed similar reports on September 5, 2011, and October 25, 2011. (Hood
Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 11.)

Barnes again missed a medical appointment on

November 29, 2011. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 11.) He did not pick up his
medications in November of 2011. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 11.) On December
7, 2011, Barnes missed another appointment at the eye clinic at Staton. (Hood
Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 12.) He missed this appointment despite the arrangement of
transportation and posting of the appointment on the daily news letter. (Hood Aff.,
Doc. # 54-4, at 12.) Barnes did not pick up his medication for December of 2011
and January of 2012. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 11.)
On February 4, 2012, Barnes again complained of blurry vision. (Hood Aff.,
Doc. # 54-4, at 13.) Corizon staff, at the direction of a medical provider, tested
Barnes’s blood sugar and blood pressure. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 13.) Both
were normal. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 13.) Barnes did not pick up his
medication for February of 2012. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 13.)
ADOC released Barnes from its custody on February 6, 2012. (Inmate
Movement Hist., Doc. # 54-2, at 2.) Despite the number of appointments he
missed, Barnes received care from nurses or physicians over fifteen times during
his incarceration. (See generally Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 2–14.) According to
Hood, Barnes received care for his vision issues in the same manner as if he were
12

being treated in the free world. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 14.) Hood also opined
that the treatment Barnes received was within the appropriate standard of care for
medical providers practicing in the state of Alabama. (Doc. # 54-4, at 14.)
b.

Barnes’s Interpretation of the Medical Records

Barnes agrees that Bradford initially diagnosed him with iritis in April of
2010. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 1.) Bradford prescribed Pred Forte and
Atropine, designating both medications as KOP. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 1.)
Barnes disagrees, however, as to the availability of his medications.
Barnes made frequent visits to the nursing station to inquire about the
medications he had not received. He visited the nursing station four or five times
in April and May of 2010, but each time the nurses informed him that his
medications were unavailable.

(Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 1.)

They also

informed him that he would be notified when his medications arrived. (Barnes
Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 1.) The ADOC guard positioned at the nursing station
eventually told Barnes to stop making inquiries there, threatening to write Barnes
up for being “out of his area.” (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 1–2.) At the direction
of this ADOC guard, Barnes began making sick call requests in an effort to retrieve
his medications. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 1–2.)
On May 19, 2010, a dorm guard notified Barnes that his medication was
available. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 2.) He went to a pill call and received one
13

of his medications. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 2.) The record does not reveal
whether he received Pred Forte or Atropine at this pill call.
According to Barnes, the MARs do not show whether he retrieved his
medications on certain dates. The MARs for April, June, July, and August of 2010
do not indicate whether Barnes received either of his prescribed medications for
those months.5 (Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 125–34.) The MAR for
May of 2010 does indicate, however, that Barnes failed to retrieve his eye drops
for that month. (Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 127.)
Barnes also objects to Hood’s version of events with respect to his sick
appointment attendance. Barnes attended trade school during his incarceration,
where he studied to become an electrician. (Barnes Dep., Doc. # 54-3, at 19.) He
contends that his school schedule caused him to miss important notifications
regarding his treatment. ADOC made sick call announcements over the intercom,
identifying the inmates who had appointments each day. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 641, at 2.)

Barnes, along with fifty other inmates, left for trade school at

approximately 6:30 a.m. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 3.) ADOC personnel did
not make sick call and pill call announcements until 8:00 a.m., so those inmates
5

Barnes also contends that the MARs are unreliable as evidence of whether Barnes
retrieved his medication. The MARs for April, May, June, July, and August of 2010 list both
Pred Forte and Atropine as medications to be administered to Barnes. (Corizon Medical
Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 125–34.) But Hood testified that Atropine was not available until
August of 2010. (Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 4–5.)
14

going to vocational school missed the announcements. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1,
at 2.)
Barnes did acknowledge that ADOC guards notified vocational school
attendees whether they needed to remain on the premises for sick call. (Barnes
Aff., Doc. # 64-4, at 3.) These guards received a list of all inmates who were due
to stay behind for their sick calls. (Barnes Aff, Doc. # 64-1, at 3.) Barnes
maintains that these guards never notified him, however, of the sick calls he
ultimately missed. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 4.) The guards then changed
shifts at 2:00 p.m., and the later-shift guards were not provided with the sick call
and pill call information. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 4.)
As to the missed sick call on May 17, 2010, Barnes contends that he never
received notice of this appointment. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 2.) He had been
at trade school when the sick call announcement issued. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1,
at 2.) He noticed that other inmates were wearing new glasses, which led him to
believe that perhaps his own glasses had arrived while he was at school. (Barnes
Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 2.)
Barnes also takes issue with Hood’s assertion that Barnes missed an
appointment on June 24, 2010. The medical records do reflect a physician’s order
dated June 24, 2010, but nowhere does the record indicate that Barnes missed an
appointment on that day. (See Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 44.) Even
15

if he were aware of an appointment scheduled for that day, Barnes would not have
been able to attend the appointment. At that time, Barnes was incarcerated at
Staton and could not freely travel to Kilby for an eye appointment. ADOC guards
controlled inmate transportation for appointments at Kilby. (Barnes Dep., Doc. #
54-3, at 18.)
With respect to an alleged missed appointment on August 31, 2010, Barnes
contends that he was never scheduled for sick call that day. The medical records
do show that Barnes initially reported for an appointment, but then left before he
could be seen by the medical provider. (Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at
47.) Barnes averred, however, that he left this appointment after being told by staff
that he was in the wrong area.6 (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 3.) He had come to
sick call to check on his medication, so staff directed him to go to pill call instead.
(Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 3.)
Barnes also takes issue with Hood’s assertion that Barnes never followed up
after a March 3, 2011 appointment. At this time, Barnes was incarcerated at Frank
Lee, which did not have an established medical facility. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1,
at 4.) Barnes contends that he would have been unable to attend a follow-up
appointment because there was no medical facility at Frank Lee. (Doc. # 64, at 9.)

6

Barnes did not indicate whether the person who instructed him to leave was a member
of ADOC staff or Corizon staff. (See Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-2 at 3.)
16

Barnes did acknowledge, however, that Corizon staff regularly held sick call and
pill call in a small room at the Frank Lee facility. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 4.)
By the time Barnes collected his Homatropine drops for the first time on
April 4, 2011, he had already graduated from vocational school. (Barnes Aff.,
Doc. # 64-1, at 4.)

He avers that when he attempted to retrieve his other

medication, Pred Forte, medical staff informed him that it was unavailable.
(Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 5.) Though the nursing staff assured Barnes that they
would notify him when his medications were available, at no time between May of
2010 and April of 2011 did he receive such notification. (See Barnes Aff., Doc. #
64-1, at 2–4.)
In April of 2011, Barnes became ill with an unrelated condition.

He

received treatment at Staton on April 27, 2011. (Barnes Medical Records, Doc. #
64-2, at 68.)

Barnes did receive the medications he was prescribed for this

condition. (Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 151.)
In May of 2011, Barnes complained of having stroke-like symptoms.
(Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 66.) He complained that half of his face
felt paralyzed. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 4.) He contends that he never heard
back from a healthcare provider regarding these symptoms, but that the issues
subsided after about five days. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 4.) He never received

17

notification of his appointment scheduled for May 24, 2011. (Barnes Aff., Doc. #
64-1, at 4.)
Barnes further notes inconsistencies in Hood’s account of his treatment.
Hood stated in his affidavit that Barnes picked up his medication on June 30, 2011.
(Hood Aff., Doc. # 54-4, at 10.) The medical record from that date, however,
includes a contrary notation from Rice. In a note dated June 30, 2011, Rice
indicated that Barnes had not picked up his June medications. (Barnes Medical
Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 155.) Barnes contends that Rice must have been unaware
of whether Barnes was actually retrieving his medications.7 Building upon this
same theory, Barnes argues that Rice must not have checked the medical records
when she completed a medication non-adherence report dated October 25, 2011.
(See Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 167.) That report includes a notation
indicating that Barnes had not retrieved his medication since April of 2011.
(Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 167.) In light of the fact that Barnes
picked up his medication on June 30, 2011, Barnes contends that this evidence

7

The evidence does not conclusively establish the accuracy of this contention. Rice may
have made this notation earlier in the day, before Barnes came to retrieve his medication. It also
may be that the medications Barnes retrieved on June 30, the last day of that month, represented
his July supply. If that were the case, Rice’s assertion that Barnes did not collect his June
medication would be correct. Regardless, Barnes has not pointed to any evidence in the record
indicating that Rice would have or should have known that Barnes retrieved his medication on
June 30, 2011. The only evidence supporting the contention that he did so appears in Hood’s
affidavit, which was not available to Rice at the time she made these notations.
18

shows that Rice was in fact unaware of whether Barnes was collecting his
medications.8
With respect to Hood’s contention that Barnes missed a sick call on
November 29, 2011, Barnes avers that he was not notified of this appointment.
(Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 5.) This appointment related to a skin condition.
(Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 5.) Barnes completed a follow-up sick call request
and had his issue resolved on December 2, 2011. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 5.)
As to the missed appointment at Staton on December 7, 2011, Barnes again
contends that he never received notification of the appointment. (Barnes Aff.,
Doc. # 64-1, at 5.) Barnes also takes issue with Hood’s contention that ADOC had
already arranged transportation for this appointment. In reference to transportation
generally, Barnes testified that ADOC staff never notified him of his destination
before transporting him offsite. (Barnes Dep., Doc. # 54-3, at 47.) Though Barnes
was able to pick up his medications for an unrelated medical issue during
December of 2011, he did not receive medications that month for his vision issues.
(Barnes Medical Records, Doc. # 64-2, at 172–74.)
The final issue Barnes addressed with respect to his treatment during his
incarceration was his medical appointment on February 4, 2012. He contends that

8

Again, the only evidence indicating that Barnes received medication on June 30, 2011,
derives from Hood’s affidavit, which was unavailable to Rice when she prepared this report.
19

he requested this appointment because he woke up that morning and could not see.
(Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 5.) He avers that when he told the medical staff that
he would be released soon, they sent him back to camp. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1,
at 5.) His vision was so poor that ADOC staff had to lead him back and forth to
the appointment, but Corizon staff administered no medication on this date.
(Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 6.)
At the time ADOC released Barnes from its custody, Barnes contends, he
was essentially blind. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 6.) He could not even see to
walk. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 6.) With respect to the issue of missed sick
and pill calls, Barnes contends that he never missed one of which he was notified.
(Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 6.)

Throughout his incarceration, Barnes only

received three bottles of eye medication. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at 6.)
5.

Barnes’s Treatment After Release

After ADOC released Barnes from its custody, Barnes sought free world
treatment for his ongoing vision problems. At the time of release, his vision had
declined to the point that he could not see to walk. (Barnes Aff., Doc. # 64-1, at
6.) Barnes initially saw a Doctor Dobbs (“Dobbs”) in Montgomery. (Joiner Dep.,
Doc. # 64-5, at 7.) Dobbs found that Barnes suffered from elevated pressure in his
right eye. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 7.) At this initial appointment with Dobbs,

20

Barnes’s right eye pressure measured 45. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 10.) A
normal reading is around 20. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 9.)
On February 12, 2012, Barnes saw Doctor Wade Joiner (“Joiner”), an
ophthalmologist at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. (Joiner Deo., Doc.
# 64-5, at 5.) Joiner diagnosed Barnes with “angle closure glaucoma,” which he
determined was directly related to Barnes’s history of iritis. (Joiner Dep., Doc. #
64-5, at 8.)
During this appointment, Joiner placed eye drops in Barnes’s eye in an
attempt to relieve the pressure he was experiencing. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at
8–9.) He also administered a laser treatment, again in an effort to reduce eye
pressure. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 9.) Barnes’s eye pressure on this day read
56 in his right eye. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 9.) The laser treatment alleviated
the pressure, but not to Joiner’s satisfaction. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 10.)
Joiner eventually made a small incision in Barnes’s eye to further reduce pressure.
(Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 10.)
Joiner also tested Barnes’s visual acuity at this initial appointment. Barnes
had 20/200 vision in his right eye and 20/100 in his left eye. (Joinder Dep., Doc. #
64-5, at 12.) Barnes underwent surgery to correct a cataract in his left eye. (Joiner
Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 13.) He also underwent a procedure to correct pressure
issues. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 13.) By the time of Joiner’s last visit with
21

Barnes in August of 2013, Barnes’s vision had improved to 20/80 in the right eye
and 20/50 in the left. (Joinder Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 13.)
Joiner noted, in his record of his treatment of Barnes, several instances in
which Barnes failed to comply with recommended courses of treatment. These
included failure to take prescribed medication, leaving Joiner’s office before being
seen, and failing to refill spent medications. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 25–35.)
After he completed his treatment of Barnes, Joiner referred Barnes to Doctor
Russell Read (“Read”), another eye specialist. (Joiner Dep., Doc. # 64-5, at 14.)
Read’s medical records indicate that Barnes’s current vision is 20/40 in his right
eye and 20/30 in his left. (Read Records, Doc. # 54-7, at 2–10.)
IV. DISCUSSION
In the amended complaint (Doc. # 36), Barnes raises four claims. In Counts
I and II, he alleges liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. In Count I, he alleges that Corizon and Rice acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. In Count II, he alleges that
Corizon employed a policy or custom that resulted in his being denied essential
medical care.
Counts III and IV sound in state-law negligence. In Count III, Barnes
contends that Corizon and Rice are liable for negligent and/or wanton breach of

22

their duty to provide medical services. In Count IV, Barnes alleges that Corizon
and Rice are liable for negligent supervision.
Corizon and Rice brought their motions for summary judgment seeking
relief from all of Barnes’s claims. Corizon’s and Rice’s motions for summary
judgment on the § 1983 claims will be addressed seriatim. Corizon’s and Rice’s
motions for summary judgment on the state-law claims will be addressed together.
Corizon’s and Rice’s motions are due to be granted as to Counts I and II.
Supplemental jurisdiction over Counts III and IV will be declined.
A.

Corizon’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the § 1983 Claims:
Deprivation of Eighth Amendment Rights
In Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint, Barnes claims that Corizon is

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights.9
The law governing conditions of confinement claims will be addressed first. These
principles will then be applied to Corizon’s practices. With respect to Barnes’s
Eighth Amendment claims, Corizon is entitled to summary judgment.

9

It is unclear why Barnes alleged § 1983 liability in two separate counts. Count I alleges
liability generally for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Count II relies on the
theory that Corizon implemented a policy or custom violating Eighth Amendment rights.
Corizon, a limited liability company providing traditional state services pursuant to a
service contract, is only liable under § 1983 if it executed a policy or custom that inflicted
unconstitutional injury. If the policy or custom resulted in deliberate indifference to medical
needs, it is an actionable constitutional violation. Counts I and II thus turn on the same issue—
Corizon’s liability vel non for deprivation of Barnes’s Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly,
these nominally separate counts will be addressed as a singular claim for § 1983 liability.
23

1.

Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claims

Inmates, like free citizens, are entitled to certain constitutional protections.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that prisoners
shall not be subjected to “cruel and unusual” punishment. U.S. Const. amend.
VIII.

Subsumed within this elementary principle of human dignity is the

government’s obligation to provide medical care for persons in its penal custody.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But not all deficiencies in medical
treatment are actionable. It is incumbent upon the claimant prisoner alleging
deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights to establish that prison officials acted
with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Id. at 104.
To rectify deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights, a claimant may
bring an action under § 1983. That statute allows the imposition of civil liability
upon any “person” who, acting under color of state law, causes deprivation of
another’s rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Where a claimant brings a § 1983 action against a municipality, the
municipality cannot be held liable solely based on the tortious actions of its
employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that
a municipality cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior).

Instead,

the municipality is only liable under § 1983 where the execution of its official
policy or custom results in constitutional injury. Id. at 694. When a private entity
24

contracts with a municipal government to provide medical services to inmates, the
private entity is the functional equivalent of the municipality. Buckner v. Toro,
116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, such a private entity can only be
liable under § 1983 if the claimant inmate shows that the private entity’s policy or
custom resulted in a constitutional violation. See id.
The policy or custom limitation on § 1983 liability applies with equal force
where a private entity contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates.
Where the state and the entity enter such a contractual agreement, the private
healthcare company is a “person” acting under color of state law, and thus may be
liable under § 1983. Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723–24 (11th Cir.) vacated
pursuant to settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1991), and opinion reinstated sub
nom. Howell v. Burden, 12 F.3d 190 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).
By virtue of the contract, the private entity also “performs a function traditionally
within the exclusive prerogative of the state and becomes the functional equivalent
of the municipality under section 1983.” Craig v. Floyd Cty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310
(11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, under Monell, a
private entity providing medical services to inmates pursuant to a contract with the
state is only liable under § 1983 where it employs a custom or policy constituting
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need. See Howell, 922 F.2d

25

at 724 n.13 (noting that the policy or custom analysis applied to a corporation is
the same as the analysis applied to municipalities under Monell).
The policy or custom at issue need not be express. A policy is “a decision
that is officially adopted” or created on behalf of the entity. Sewell v. Town of
Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997). A custom is any practice that
is “so settled and permanent” as to carry the force of law. Id. To demonstrate the
existence of a custom, the claimant must show more than an isolated incident
leading to constitutional injury—the pattern must be widespread. McDowell v.
Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004). To show that the practice at issue is
sufficiently widespread to constitute a custom, the claimant ordinarily must
produce evidence that the practice resulted in deficient treatment of other inmates.
See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312 . Ultimately, the claimant must bring forth sufficient
evidence of a “series of constitutional violations from which deliberate
indifference can be inferred.” Id. (quoting Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty.
of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Under Eleventh Circuit law, to impose § 1983 liability on a medical services
contractor, an inmate must show three things: (1) that he suffered a violation of his
constitutional rights; (2) that the medical services contractor had a policy or
custom that constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; and
(3) that the policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. McDowell, 392
26

F.3d at 1289. These principles will be applied to the facts at bar. To survive
Corizon’s motion for summary judgment, Barnes must produce evidence
establishing a genuine dispute of material fact as to each of these elements. In this
endeavor, Barnes fails. Corizon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2.

Whether Barnes Suffered a Constitutional Violation

The parties do not dispute whether Barnes suffered a constitutional violation.
According to Barnes, Corizon ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide medication to treat his
iritis. Corizon offers no argument in response to this contention. The resolution of
Corizon’s motion ultimately turns on the remaining elements of the prima facie
case.
3.

Whether Corizon Employed a Policy or Custom Constituting
Deliberate Indifference to Barnes’s Serious Medical Needs

On this record, Barnes has not produced sufficient evidence to establish a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Corizon implemented a policy
or custom evidencing deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Barnes
offers two theories supporting the policy or custom element of his case. First, he
contends that Corizon implemented a constitutionally deficient custom of notifying
inmates of sick calls and pill calls. Second, Barnes argues that Corizon followed a

27

customary practice of failing to provide medications in violation of Eighth
Amendment rights. Neither of these arguments carries the day.
a.

Sick Call and Pill Call Notifications

Barnes’s evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Corizon
implemented a constitutionally deficient custom or policy of notifying inmates of
sick and pill calls. It is possible that some inmates in ADOC custody missed sick
and pill call announcements. Barnes, along with other ADOC inmates, left Staton
for vocational school early in the morning. Prison officials made the sick and pill
call announcements at 8:00 a.m., after the vocational school students left the
facility. The evidence indicates that vocational students were unable to hear these
sick and pill call announcements.
It is unclear, however, whether Corizon in fact implemented any policy or
custom regarding sick and pill call announcements.

There is no evidence

suggesting that Corizon controlled healthcare notification procedures in ADOC
facilities.

Barnes’s testimony, from both his affidavit and his deposition, is

insufficient to establish that Corizon staff ever made announcements over the
prison intercoms. It is also clear that Corizon has no control over the way that
inmates are transported to and from vocational school. Corizon, as a healthcare
contractor, merely provides healthcare to inmates in compliance with existing
ADOC procedures.
28

Without any evidence that Corizon staff in fact implemented the system of
pill call and sick call announcements, the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding that Corizon executed a policy or custom that deprived inmates of their
constitutional right to medical care.
b.

Failure to Provide Medications

Barnes also fails to bring forth evidence sufficient to support a finding that
Corizon implemented a policy or custom of failing to provide necessary
medications to inmates. It is clear that Barnes went without eye medication for
extended periods of time during his incarceration. But the evidence does not
establish that Corizon implemented the sort of widespread and permanent practice
necessary to give rise to § 1983 liability.
The evidence the parties submitted merely points to the issues Barnes
experienced with respect to his eye medication. There is nothing in the record
suggesting that other inmates suffered constitutional violations as a result of
Corizon’s practice of medication distribution.

See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312.

Though Barnes did not receive eye drops for a period of time, he did receive
medications for other afflictions, including skin conditions and flu-like illness.
The fact that Corizon supplied these other medicines without issue suggests that
there was no widespread, permanent practice by which Corizon denied access to
medications.
29

There is no disputing that Barnes was, at times, without his prescribed
medications.

But the evidence does not suggest that this unfortunate pattern

resulted from Corizon’s deliberate indifference to Barnes’s medical needs.
Corizon’s practice was to designate the eye drops as KOP, meaning that Barnes
bore some responsibility for retrieving them.

Even if the medications were

unavailable the handful of times that Barnes requested them at the medical station,
Barnes has not established that this unavailability resulted from any deliberate
practice. Nor has Barnes established an extensive pattern of unavailability of
medications. Without evidence suggesting a permanent, widespread practice of
withholding medication, Barnes cannot establish the existence of a genuine dispute
of material fact regarding the policy or custom element of his § 1983 claim. See
id.
4.

Whether Corizon’s Policy or Custom Caused the Constitutional
Violation

To make out a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs,
Barnes would also need to show that Corizon’s policy or custom caused the
constitutional violation. The parties have submitted substantial evidence regarding
Barnes’s record of compliance, or lack thereof, with his suggested course of
medical treatment.

It is clear that medical providers designated Barnes’s

prescriptions as KOP, meaning that he was responsible for retrieving medication
30

when it was available. Barnes has come forward with evidence suggesting that, on
several occasions, despite the KOP policy, he was unable to retrieve medication
when he sought it.
This evidence speaks to the issue of causation, but this aspect of Barnes’s
prima facie case need not be addressed. The evidence does not support a finding
that Corizon in fact carried out any such custom or policy, obviating the need to
address the result of its implementation. It is clear that there is no genuine dispute
of material fact, and Corizon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, Corizon’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted with
respect to Counts I and II of the amended complaint.
B.

Rice’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the § 1983 Claims:
Deprivation of Eighth Amendment Rights
In Counts I and II of the amended complaint, Barnes alleges that Rice is

liable under § 1983 for deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights.10 To prevail
on a claim for deprivation of Eighth Amendment rights under § 1983, the claimant
must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the claimant
inmate’s serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. In the case of a claim

10

As with the § 1983 claims Barnes asserted against Corizon, the § 1983 claims asserted
against Rice appear in two separate counts. Rice is only liable if she acted with deliberate
disregard to Barnes’s serious medical need. Because Barnes must satisfy this same standard to
succeed on both Counts I and II, these nominally separate claims will be addressed together.
31

asserted against an individual, the claimant must show three things: (1) that he had
an objectively serious medical need; (2) that the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference to that need; and (3) that the defendant’s wrongful conduct caused his
injury. Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). The evidence
and arguments presented in conjunction with Rice’s motion for summary judgment
will be addressed as they apply to these three elements.
1.

Barnes’s Objectively Serious Medical Need

To establish that he had an objectively serious medical need, Barnes must
show that his condition was “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or
was “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th
Cir. 1994.) In response to Rice’s motion, Barnes has produced evidence that he
suffered from iritis and chronic bilateral uveitis, as diagnosed by Bradford. After
making this diagnosis, Bradford prescribed eye drops to treat the inflammation
associated with the eye conditions.

It is clear that Barnes suffered from an

objectively serious medical need, and Rice offers little argument to the contrary.
Resolution of this motion turns on the second element of Barnes’s claim.
2.

Whether Rice Acted with Deliberate Indifference

Whether Rice acted with deliberate indifference to Barnes’s serious medical
need is a subjective inquiry. To ultimately satisfy this element of his claim, Barnes
32

must show that Rice had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to Barnes,
that Rice disregarded that risk, and that her conduct admitted of something more
than negligence. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327. Ultimately, the evidence must be
sufficient to allow the finder of fact to conclude that Rice intentionally refused to
provide care to Barnes. See Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995).
For purposes of surviving this motion for summary judgment, Barnes must come
forward with evidence sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
with respect to Rice’s alleged deliberate indifference. This he cannot do.
Rice, as a Corizon nurse, was not responsible for diagnosing Barnes’s
vision-related issues, prescribing medication to treat his condition, or making
referrals to eye specialists.

She made various notations in Barnes’s medical

records, keeping track of when he did or did not receive medication. This evidence
indicates that Rice was at least aware that Barnes was not receiving his prescribed
treatment. Whether this constitutes subjective knowledge of a serious risk to
Barnes is unclear, but this issue need not be fully resolved.

Barnes cannot

establish the requisite culpable state of mind to hold Rice liable under § 1983.
The evidence falls short of supporting a finding that Rice deliberately
disregarded the risk to Barnes’s health. Barnes’s medication was designated KOP,
and he was responsible for retrieving it.

The record is devoid of evidence

indicating that Rice deliberately denied Barnes access to his medication. Rice
33

neither instituted nor implemented the ADOC system of notifying inmates of their
pill calls and sick calls. There is no evidence suggesting that Rice personally
turned Barnes away from sick or pill call, prevented Barnes from retrieving his
medication, or failed to order any of his medication. In compliance with her duties
as a Corizon nurse, Rice maintained accurate records of his non-compliance and
ensured medications were reordered as necessary.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Barnes, is woefully
inadequate to show that Rice intentionally refused to provide care to Barnes. See
Adams, 61 F.3d at 1543. There is no genuine dispute of material fact with respect
to this element of Barnes’s claim, and it is clear that Rice is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
3.

Whether Rice’s Wrongful Conduct Caused Barnes’s Injury

To survive this motion for summary judgment, Barnes would also need to
produce evidence supporting a finding that Rice’s wrongful conduct caused his
injuries. Barnes has brought forth sufficient evidence to establish that he suffered
injury due to untreated iritis. His angle closure glaucoma, in Joiner’s opinion,
directly resulted from his history of inflammation associated with chronic iritis.
There is insufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact,
however, with respect to the causation element of Barnes’s claim. The evidence
cannot support a finding that Rice engaged in the sort of willfully wrongful
34

conduct necessary to impose § 1983 liability. There is insufficient evidence to
support a finding that Rice engaged in wrongful conduct at all. It follows that
Rice’s wrongful conduct could not have caused Barnes’s later complications. It is
clear that Rice is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Rice’s § 1983
claims.
C.

Corizon’s and Rice’s Motions for Summary Judgment on the State-Law
Negligence Claims
Barnes’s remaining claims against Corizon and Rice, which appear in

Counts III and IV of the amended complaint, allege liability for negligence under
state law. Supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims may be declined where
the claims invoking original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We
have encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state law claims when, as
here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”). Because Corizon and
Rice are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Barnes’s § 1983 claims,
supplemental jurisdiction will not be exercised over the state-law negligence
claims asserted in Counts III and IV.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant Corizon Health, L.L.C.’s
motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 54) is GRANTED as to the federal claims
35

in Counts I and II. It is further ORDERED that Defendant Kelly Rice’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. # 55) is GRANTED as to the federal claims in Counts I
and II. Supplemental jurisdiction will not be exercised over the state law claims in
Counts III and IV.
A separate final judgment will be entered.
DONE this 18th day of February, 2016.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

36