Jackson v. State of Alabama Department of Corrections et al (MAG+)
Filing
57
OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/5/2015. (wcl, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
SABRINA C. JACKSON,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF ALABAMA
)
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; )
KIM T. THOMAS,
)
individually; and LEON
)
FORNISS, individually;
)
)
Defendants.
)
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14cv18-MHT
(WO)
OPINION
Plaintiff Sabrina Jackson, a former employee of the
Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), filed suit
against defendants ADOC, former ADOC Commissioner Kim
Thomas, and ADOC Warden Leon Forniss.
Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17), and the Equal Protection
Clause (as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983), Jackson
sues ADOC, Thomas, and Forniss for sexual harassment.
Under Title VII, she sues ADOC for race discrimination
and retaliation.
And, under the First Amendment (as
enforced through § 1983), she sues Thomas and Forniss
for violation of her right to free speech.
has
original
(federal
jurisdiction
question)
and
under
1343
28
(civil
The court
U.S.C.
rights)
§§
1331
and
42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII).
This
cause
defendants’
is
now
before
motions
for
summary
the
court
judgment.
on
the
Summary
judgment will be granted in favor of all defendants on
all claims.
I.
SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD
“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or
defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The court must view the facts
2
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.
Matsushita
Elec.
Indus.
Co.,
Ltd.
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
v.
Zenith
Radio
If no reasonable jury
could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party,
there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary
judgment will be granted.
Beal v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994).
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
The following facts are taken in the light most
favorable to Jackson.
Jackson, an American woman of
African descent, worked for ADOC as an administrative
assistant.
She first worked at Tutwiler Prison for
Women and later was transferred to Staton Correctional
Facility.
After
an
altercation
with
a
coworker
at
Staton, she was transferred briefly to the ADOC central
office before being terminated.
3
A. The Tutwiler Prison Statement
On February 6 or 7, 2012, while working at Tutwiler
Prison, Jackson met with Associate Commissioner James
DeLoach and informed him that the prisoners at Tutwiler
were being mistreated, harassed, and sexually abused,
and
that
the
administration.
abuse
was
being
covered
up
by
the
DeLoach offered to transfer her to a
position at Staton Correctional Facility to protect her
from retaliation for reporting the mistreatment, and
she agreed to the transfer.
Later that day, she heard
DeLoach say to Commissioner Thomas, “let me speak to
you about what Ms. Jackson has just informed me of what
was going on at Tutwiler.”
31-2),
at
83:9-14.
Jackson Deposition (doc. no
DeLoach
and
Thomas
went
into
DeLoach’s office, and Jackson heard nothing further.
Soon thereafter, she was transferred to Staton.
Jackson did not complain to anyone else about the
conditions at Tutwiler Prison until May 25, 2012, when
4
she emailed Commissioner Thomas about the conditions
for prisoners at Tutwiler.
B. The Sexual Harassment
Beginning immediately after her transfer to Staton
Correctional Facility, and throughout her approximately
three-month
tenure
there,
Jackson
had
a
troubled
relationship with her supervisor, Warden Forniss.
On
three or four occasions, Forniss called her into his
office and asked her to sit near him on the same side
of his desk.
“At that point,” she testified, “he would
pull his pants leg tight, have a seat in his chair,
where the pants sit tight around his genitals.
Then he
would
Jackson
turn
Deposition
his
chair
(doc.
no
directly
31-2),
facing
at
me.”
43:21-44:1.
She
repeatedly told him that she did not feel comfortable
sitting there and that she would “prefer to sit on the
other side of the desk” if Forniss chose to sit in that
way.
Id., at 45:15-16.
Forniss responded: “Sit like
5
what?
This is how men sit.”
Id., at 45:17-18.
On at
least one occasion when she protested, he told her she
was being insubordinate.
On two other occasions, Forniss approached Jackson
from behind while she was working at her desk and got
so close to her that she could feel his breath on her
neck.
This made her uncomfortable.
Also, on four
separate occasions, he commented that he liked the way
she smelled or what she was wearing.
each time, using various tactics.
She rebuffed him
For example, she
mentioned her husband, to which he replied that he was
also
married.
She
also
expressed
to
Forniss
her
discomfort with his comments and her view that such
things
should
not
happen
in
Nevertheless, Forniss continued.
the
workplace.
Eventually, Forniss’s
behavior devolved to rudeness and hostility toward her.
Rather
than
making
suggestive
comments,
he
made
comments to the effect that she was incompetent.
described
one
such
occasion
6
on
which
she
went
She
to
Forniss’s
office
and
mentioned
problem with her computer.
having
a
technical
He replied, “It’s not the
computer; it’s just the person operating it.”
Id., at
49:22-23.
On May 4, 2012, Jackson told Warden Patricia Hood,
a supervisor at Staton, about Forniss’s behavior.
By
that time, all suggestive comments and acts giving rise
to Jackson’s sexual-harassment claim had ceased.
She
did not report the harassment to anyone else until the
day she received notice of termination, June 25, at
which point she reported the harassment to Commissioner
Thomas.
C. The Altercation
On
the
Forniss’s
same
harassment,
altercation with
Staton
day
she
told
Jackson
Warden
got
into
Hood
a
about
physical
Tracy McMahon, a white coworker
Correctional
Facility.
Jackson
gave
at
the
following version of events leading to the altercation.
7
Hood told Jackson to get a set of keys from McMahon,
but, when Jackson asked for the keys, McMahon refused
to give them to her.
McMahon then started walking
toward the business office, and Jackson followed her.
Jackson saw the keys in the office and reached for
them, but McMahon snatched the keys before she could
reach them.
Jackson told McMahon that Hood had told
her to get the keys.
McMahon then began to point her
finger in Jackson’s face, called her “bitch” and other
offensive names, and tried to hit her.
Report (doc. no. 31-8), at 35..
Investigative
Jackson put her hands
up in a defensive posture, which caused McMahon to fall
backward into and hit her head on a filing cabinet.
McMahon sustained a sizeable gash on her head and had
to go to the hospital and get five stitches.
Three
days later, Jackson was transferred to the ADOC central
office.
Errick
Demus
of
ADOC’s
Investigations
and
Intelligence Division investigated the incident.
The
8
story told by McMahon and other witnesses was different
from Jackson’s.
aggressor
in
intentionally
McMahon asserted that Jackson was the
the
incident
pushed
her
and
into
that
the
Jackson
filing
had
cabinet.
McMahon did admit telling Jackson that she was “acting
like
a
bitch”
but
denied
trying
to
Investigative Report (doc. no. 31-8), at 3.
coworker,
Artina
Jones,
told
the
hit
her.
Another
investigator
that
immediately after the incident, Jackson told her that
“[McMahon] called me a bitch, ... nobody calls me a
bitch, [so] I pushed her ass into the filing cabinet.”
Id., at 2-6, 19.
Demus’s investigation concluded that
Jackson was the aggressor.
D. Termination
A couple weeks later, after Demus submitted his
report and conclusions that Jackson was the aggressor,
Forniss
requested
that
Jackson
be
dismissed.
His
request was sent to Associate Commissioner DeLoach and
9
to the director of personnel, both of whom approved it.
Jackson received a notice of pre-dismissal conference
on June 25 and that day notified Commissioner Thomas
that Forniss had sexually harassed her.
investigated
the
sexual-harassment
Demus then
allegations
but
concluded that there was nothing to substantiate them.
Jackson had a pre-dismissal conference chaired by
Associate Commissioner Grantt Culliver, at which she
had the opportunity to tell her side of the story.
Following
Jackson
be
the
hearing,
terminated,
Culliver
and
DeLoach
recommended
and
that
Commissioner
Thomas approved the recommendation of dismissal.
Although Commissioner Thomas is white, many of the
people
involved
in
Jackson’s
termination,
including
investigator Demus, Wardens Forniss and Hood, Associate
Commissioners DeLoach and Culliver, and witness Artina
Jones, are black.
10
III. ANALYSIS
As stated, under Title VII and the Equal Protection
Clause (as enforced through § 1983), Jackson sues ADOC,
Thomas, and Forniss for sexual harassment; under Title
VII,
she
sues
retaliation;
ADOC
and,
for
under
race
the
discrimination
First
Amendment
and
(as
enforced through § 1983), she sues Thomas and Forniss
for violation of her right to free speech.
The court
will first examine each set of claims in turn.
A. Sexual-Harassment Claims
Jackson claims sexual harassment against all three
defendants.
VII.
the
Against ADOC, she proceeds under Title
Against Thomas and Forniss, she proceeds under
Equal
Amendment,
Protection
as
enforced
Clause
of
through
42
the
Fourteenth
U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Because the elements and analysis of sexual-harassment
claims
are
identical
under
Title
VII
and
the
Equal
Protection Clause, see Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d
1364,
1369,
n.16
(11th
Cir.
11
1982)
(analyzing
the
elements
of
a
§ 1983
Fourteenth
Amendment
equal-protection claim in parallel with a Title VII
claim
because
they
are
equivalent),
the
court
will
jointly analyze both claims under the applicable Title
VII case law.
Jackson
proceeds
harassment:
under
two
theories
hostile-work
of
sexual
environment
tangible-employment action.
and
The court addresses each
theory below.
1. Hostile-Work Environment
To
prove
employee
protected
must
a
hostile-work-environment
show
group;
(1)
(2)
that
that
she
she
is
has
a
claim,
member
been
of
subject
an
a
to
“unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances,
requests
for
sexual
favors,
and
other
conduct
of
a
sexual nature; (3) that the harassment [was] based on
the sex of the employee; (4) that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and
12
conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily
abusive
working
environment;
holding the employer liable.”
and
(5)
a
basis
for
Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.,
195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Jackson, as a woman, is a member of a protected
class, and she has shown that Forniss’s conduct was
unwelcome.
Taking
the
favorable
to
Jackson,
subjected
her
to
evidence
she
sexual
has
advances
in
the
shown
and
light
that
most
Forniss
conduct
of
a
sexual nature because of her sex: he directed her to
sit close to and directly facing him after purposefully
tightening his pants around his crotch; approached her
from behind while she was sitting at her desk and came
so close that she could feel his breath on the back of
her neck; repeatedly commented on her appearance and
smell; and continued doing so even after she made clear
to him that she felt his actions were inappropriate and
13
made her uncomfortable.1
However, Jackson cannot show
that the harassment she experienced was “sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions
of
employment
and
create
working environment.”
A
court
may
a
discriminatorily
abusive
Id.
consider
four
factors
to
determine
whether, considering the totality of the circumstances,
harassment
was
sufficiently
severe
or
pervasive
to
objectively alter the employee’s terms or conditions of
employment: “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the
severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is
physically
threatening
or
humiliating,
or
a
mere
1. In her response in opposition to the first
motion for summary judgment, Jackson contends for the
first time that part of the factual underpinning of her
hostile-work-environment theory is that she saw the
female prisoners treated poorly at Tutwiler Prison.
However, her amended complaint did not assert this
exposure as a basis for her sexual-harassment claims,
which focused entirely on Forniss’s actions at Staton,
and, as a result, the magistrate judge’s recommendation
construing the complaint did not either.
Admittedly,
she filed the complaint pro se, but after retaining
counsel, she did not seek to amend her complaint.
As
it is too late to bring this new theory to the fore,
the court will not address it here.
14
offensive
utterance;
unreasonably
interferes
performance.”
citations
and
Mendoza,
omitted);
see
(4)
whether
with
195
also
the
F.3d
the
conduct
employee's
at
1246
Johnson
v.
job
(internal
Booker
T.
Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 509 (11th
Cir. 2000) (applying the four factors).
As stated,
this is an objective test: the key is how a reasonable
person would experience the complained-of actions, not
how the plaintiff subjectively experienced them.
four
factors
are
not
applied
with
The
mathematical
precision; the court must weigh them in light of the
specific circumstances of a case, and the mere presence
or lack of one factor is not dispositive.
See, e.g.,
Johnson, 234 F.3d at 509 (finding severe or pervasive
harassment
where
supervisor
made
numerous
sexual
comments to employee, repeatedly acted in an obscene
manner while calling her name, repeatedly attempted to
massage
her
inappropriately
shoulders
rubbed
against
his
15
body
her
parts
will,
against
and
her);
Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1247-52 (finding harassment was
not
severe
or
pervasive
where
supervisor
frequently
followed, watched, and looked employee up and down in
what she viewed as a sexual manner, once brushed his
hip
against
her
hip
while
walking
by
her
and
then
smiled, made an ambiguous remark that she viewed as
sexual, and on a few occasions while looking her up and
down, made a sniffing motion when he looked at her
private area).
Viewing
the
totality
of
the
circumstances
here,
the court holds that the alleged harassment was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level
of
a
hostile-work
environment.
Forniss for about three months.
Jackson
worked
for
Jackson alleges that,
on three or four occasions during part of that period,
Forniss asked her to sit near him after tightening his
pants
around
occasions,
he
his
got
crotch
close
and
enough
breath on the back of her neck.
16
that,
to
her
on
to
two
feel
more
his
On about four more
occasions, he told her that she looked good or smelled
good.
to
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable
Jackson,
about
ten
the
court
separate
is
informed
that
during
less
events
months, which is not infrequent.
actions
were
not
sufficiently
actionable sexual harassment.
she
alleged
than
three
However, Forniss’s
severe
to
constitute
While he engaged in some
arguably offensive behavior, he did not try to touch or
grab her, did not proposition her, and did not use any
vulgar or sexually degrading language.
Cf. Johnson,
234 F.3d at 506.
Forniss’s actions were not physically
threatening
sufficiently
or
humiliating,
and
his
comments about her appearance and smell constituted, at
most,
offensive
utterances.
Finally,
while
Forniss
told her at least once that she was being insubordinate
for complaining and at some point began making critical
comments to her, Jackson presented no evidence that
this
behavior
performance.
actually
interfered
with
her
job
In sum, Jackson cannot establish that
17
Forniss’s actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the terms and conditions of employment and
create a discriminatorily abusive working environment.
Therefore, summary judgment is due to be granted in
favor
of
all
three
defendants
on
Jackson’s
hostile-work-environment theory.
2. Tangible-Employment Action
Jackson
also
proceeds
under
a
theory
of
sexual
harassment resulting in a tangible-employment action:
that is, she contends that she was terminated because
she refused to comply with Forniss’s sexual advances.
See, e.g., Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367 F.3d
1238,
1245-47
(11th
sexual-harassment
Cir.
2004)
claim
tangible-employment-action
theory).
(analyzing
based
However,
on
to
succeed on this theory, there must be a causal link
between her refusal to submit to his sexual advances
and her termination.
Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield
18
of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007); see
also
Frederick
v.
Sprint/United
Management
F.3d 1305, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2001).
show
this
could
causal
conclude
refused
to
link.
that
Indeed,
she
to
submit
was
no
Forniss’s
Co.,
246
Jackson cannot
reasonable
terminated
jury
because
sexual
she
advances.
Accordingly, she cannot succeed on this theory.
In
Frederick,
harassment
on
the
a
plaintiff
sued
for
tangible-employment-action
sexual
theory.
Although she alleged that she was denied a promotion
for
which
submit
she
to
was
her
qualified
supervisor’s
because
sexual
she
refused
advances,
to
the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of the employer.
246 F.3d at 1312-13.
The plaintiff
had failed to rebut the employer’s proffered evidence
that
it
had
independent
refused
of
her
to
promote
qualifications
her
for
for
reasons
the
job;
specifically, the court noted that the employer had
19
shown that she had a history of attendance problems and
that her supervisors believed she needed more time to
develop before advancement.
Id.
Because the plaintiff
had failed to rebut this evidence, she had failed to
show a causal link, and summary judgment was proper.
Id.
Jackson has not put forth sufficient evidence to
establish a causal link between her termination and her
rejecting
Forniss’s
advances.
While
Forniss
did
request her termination after Jackson had rejected his
advances, he did not do so until after an independent
investigation
determined
that
she
assaulted and injured a coworker.
had
intentionally
The investigation
report presented overwhelming evidence that Jackson had
physically attacked a coworker causing serious injury.
The injuries McMahon sustained were well documented.
McMahon claimed that Jackson initiated the altercation
and intentionally pushed her into the filing cabinet.
Other witnesses corroborated all or part of McMahon’s
20
version
of
events.
Coworker
Artina
Jones,
in
a
recorded statement to the investigator, reported that
Jackson admitted shortly after the fight that she had
intentionally pushed McMahon into the filing cabinet
because McMahon called her ‘bitch.’
Another employee
reported that she saw Jackson come up behind McMahon in
an agitated manner and saw McMahon attempt to avoid
Jackson by going around her and into the office where
the violence occurred and that Jackson followed closely
behind McMahon into the office.
Warden Hood claimed
that Jackson lied about being told to go get the keys
from McMahon in the first place.
The evidence against
Jackson was, as stated, simply overwhelming.
Thomas, DeLoach, Culliver, Forniss, and the others
involved in the decision had before them this clear
evidence
of
a
serious
terminate Jackson.
evidence
seriously
that
she
injured
offense
when
they
decided
to
Given such clear and overwhelming
initiated
another
21
an
employee,
altercation
any
and
reasonable
employer would have terminated her.
And while Jackson
denies that she assaulted McMahon, her denial is of
little moment: the key issue is whether the employer
reasonably
violation.
believed
the
employee
committed
the
See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d
1466, 1469-72 (1991) (overturning verdict for plaintiff
in termination case because evidence showed supervisors
believed that plaintiff was guilty of harassment, and
this belief was the reason behind his discharge); Damon
v.
Fleming
Supermarkets
of
Florida,
Inc.,
196
F.3d
1354, 1363 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An employer who fires
an employee under the mistaken but honest impression
that the employee violated a work rule is not liable
for discriminatory conduct.”).
Here, it was undeniably
clear that Jackson had assaulted McMahon.
circumstances,
no
rational
jury
could
Under these
conclude
that
Jackson was terminated for refusing Forniss’s sexual
advances.
22
For these reasons, summary judgment will be granted
in favor of all three defendants on Jackson’s sexualharassment claims.
B. Title VII Race-Discrimination
and Retaliation Claims
Against ADOC, Jackson claims that, in violation of
Title VII, she was terminated because of her race and
in retaliation for complaining about the treatment of
the female prisoners at Tutwiler.2
Courts analyzing
discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII
often
apply
framework.
the
McDonnell
Douglas
burden-shifting
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
2. One might very liberally read the amended
complaint to claim retaliation in violation of Title
VII also based on Jackson’s complaints about Forniss’s
sexual harassment, but earlier the magistrate judge
interpreted the amended complaint to state a Title VII
retaliation claim based only on her reports of the
Tutwiler prisoner abuse, and Jackson did not object to
this
characterization.
Regardless
of
the
interpretation, however, the outcome is the same.
Also, the court need not address whether Title VII
covers a claim of retaliation based on the abuse of
female prisoners because it resolves the retaliation
claim on other grounds.
23
U.S. 792, 800-06 (1973) (applying burden shifting in
Title
VII
race-discrimination
case);
Hairston
v.
Gainesville Sun Publ’g. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir.
1993) (“The burden of proof in Title VII retaliation
cases
is
governed
McDonnell-Douglas
plaintiff
case
of
plaintiff
first
by
....”).
attempts
discrimination
has
the
framework
Under
to
or
established
established
this
establish
in
approach,
the
a
prima-facie
retaliation.3
a
prima-facie
Once
case,
the
a
presumption of illegal action arises, and the burden
shifts to the employer to rebut it.
The employer may
rebut the presumption by “clearly articulating in a
3.
A
prima-facie
case
of
discrimination
or
retaliation can be established in a variety of ways,
depending on the facts present in a particular case.
See, e.g., Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th
Cir. 1989) (setting forth two ways to establish
prima-facie case of discriminatory discharge in case
involving violation of work rules); Brungart v.
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798
(11th Cir. 2000) (a prima-facie case of retaliatory
discharge is established by employee showing “that (1)
she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is
a causal connection between the protected conduct and
the adverse employment action.”).
24
reasonably
specific
manner
a
legitimate
non-discriminatory [and non-retaliatory] reason for the
discharge.”
Conner v. Fort Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d
1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Olmsted v. Taco
Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1998) (same
in retaliation context).
On a race-discrimination claim based on disparate
treatment, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
demonstrating
with
“significant
probative
evidence”
that the employer’s explanation is pretext and that
race
was
a
likely
experienced.
VII
a
factor
in
the
treatment
See Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470.
retaliatory-discharge
claim,
the
she
On a Title
plaintiff
bears
the ultimate burden of showing that she would not have
been terminated but for the retaliatory motive.
See
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517, 2533 (2013) (“Title VII retaliation claims must
be proved according to traditional principles of butfor
causation
....”).
But
25
when
either
claim
is
justified by disciplinary action for violation of a
work
rule,
the
critical
issue
is
not
whether
the
employee committed the alleged violation; instead, it
is whether the employer had a good-faith belief that
the employee had committed the violation.
See Jones v.
Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The law
is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in
fact commit the violation with which he is charged, an
employer successfully rebuts any prima-facie case of
disparate
treatment
by
showing
that
it
honestly
believed the employee committed the violation.”); Damon
v.
Fleming
Supermarkets
of
Florida,
Inc.,
196
F.3d
1354, 1363 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An employer who fires
an employee under the mistaken but honest impression
that the employee violated a work rule is not liable
for discriminatory conduct.”); see also Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rahall Commc'ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.
1984) (Title VII does not “require the employer to have
good cause for its decisions.
26
The employer may fire an
employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason
based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as
long
as
its
action
is
not
for
a
discriminatory
reason.”)
Here, even assuming that Jackson has established a
prima-facie case for each claim, the court holds that
her claims fail because she has not shown that the
defendants’ reason for terminating her was pretextual.
ADOC
proffered
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
and
nonretaliatory reason for terminating Jackson: she was
involved in a fight in which she was the aggressor and
caused
significant
injuries
to
a
coworker.
Though
Jackson alleges that most of the witnesses against her
lied, what is critical is whether ADOC’s leaders had a
good-faith belief that she had assaulted her coworker.
As
her
discussed
above,
confession
to
event--supported
intentionally
overwhelming
a
the
attacked
co-worker
conclusion
and
27
evidence--including
shortly
that
injured
after
the
Jackson
had
her
coworker.
Presented with the investigative report, ADOC’s leaders
reasonably believed that she had committed this serious
offense.
Furthermore,
the
offense
clearly
merited
termination: any reasonable employer would terminate an
employee
after
who
had
initiating
defendants’
seriously
an
injured
altercation.
reasonable
belief
another
employee
Accordingly,
that
Jackson
the
had
assaulted her colleague overcomes her prima-facie case
of discrimination and retaliation.
For
the
same
reasons,
Jackson
has
not
met
her
ultimate burden of showing that the she would not have
been
terminated
but
prisoners at Tutwiler.
overwhelming
evidence
for
her
complaints
about
the
The defendants had, as stated,
that
Jackson
had
committed
a
serious rule violation, one for which any reasonable
employer would terminate her.
Given the seriousness of
the offense, Jackson simply cannot show that ADOC would
not have terminated her but-for her complaints.
28
Nor has Jackson demonstrated that race was probably
a
factor
in
her
termination.
As
evidence
of
race
discrimination, Jackson points out that McMahon, who is
white, was not disciplined as harshly as Jackson for
her
involvement
stated,
the
in
the
evidence
altercation.
was
simply
However,
overwhelming
as
that
Jackson was the one primarily at fault. Because their
culpability for and involvement in the incident was not
the same, the difference in punishment is justifiable;
accordingly,
that
difference
does
not
alone
prove
racial discrimination.
Moreover, while not dispositive, it is noteworthy
that many, if not most, of the key players involved in
her termination are black: investigator Errick Demus;
witnesses Artina Jones and Warden Hood; Warden Forniss,
who recommended her termination; Associate Commissioner
Culliver,
who
oversaw
Associate
Commisioner
her
termination
DeLoach,
termination.
29
who
hearing;
and
recommended
her
For all of the above reasons, the court further
finds that no reasonable jury could conclude
either
that Jackson was terminated based on race or that she
would not have been terminated but for retaliation for
her
complaint
about
the
prisoners.
Accordingly,
summary judgment will be granted in favor of ADOC on
Jackson’s Title VII race-discrimination and retaliation
claims.
C. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Jackson also claims that, in violation of the First
Amendment,
Thomas
retaliation
for
and
Forniss
complaining
terminated
about
her
Forniss’s
in
alleged
sexual harassment and for reporting the abuse of the
female prisoners at Tutwiler.
A
public
employee
not
be
Amendment.
See Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d
1562,
(11th
1989).
30
under
Whether
the
in
for
Cir.
protected
discharged
retaliation
1565
speech
may
an
First
employee
suffered such retaliation is determined by a four-part
test:
“First, a court must determine whether
the employee’s speech may be fairly
characterized as constituting speech
on a matter of public concern. If so,
the district court must weigh the
employee’s first amendment interests
against the interest of the state, as
an
employer,
in
promoting
the
efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees. Should
the employee prevail on the balancing
test,
the
fact-finder
determines
whether the employee’s speech played a
‘substantial part’ in the government's
decision to demote or discharge the
employee.
Finally, if the employee
shows
that
the
speech
was
a
substantial motivating factor in the
employment decision, the state must
prove
by
a
preponderance
of the
evidence that it would have reached
the same decision even in the absence
of the protected conduct.”
Morgan
v.
Ford,
6
F.3d
750,
754
(11th
Cir.
1993)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Even
matter
of
assuming
public
that
Jackson’s
concern,
that
complaints
she
prevails
are
on
a
the
balancing test, and that her speech was a substantial
31
motivating factor in her termination, Jackson cannot
succeed on this retaliation claim.
For as discussed
above, no reasonable employer would allow an employee
who
had
intentionally
attacked
and
injured
another
employee to remain employed, and the defendants had
overwhelming
evidence
that
Jackson
had
done
so.
Therefore, Jackson has failed to rebut the defendants’
showing that they would have terminated her even in the
absence
of
her
complaints.
In
addition,
the
court
finds as a matter of law that a reasonable jury would
have to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendants would have terminated Jackson even
in the absence of her complaints.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in
favor
of
Thomas
and
Forniss
Amendment claim.
* * *
32
on
Jackson’s
First
For the above reasons, summary judgment will be
granted in favor of all defendants on all of Jackson’s
claims.
An appropriate judgment will be entered.
DONE, this the 5th day of May, 2015.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson____
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?