Craft et al v. Triumph Logistics, Inc. et al

Filing 57

OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/8/2015. (wcl, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
GWENDOLYN CRAFT, BRANDY
CRAFT, and JULIE BUTLER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
v.
TRIUMPH LOGISTICS, INC.,
and RECO GEROME WILLIAMS,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14cv93-MHT
(WO)

OPINION
In

this

case

stemming

from

a

traffic

accident

between a car and a large truck, plaintiffs Gwendolyn
Craft, Brandy Craft, and Julie Butler sued defendants
Triumph

Logistics,

Inc.

and

Reco

Gerome

Williams,

asserting claims of not only negligence but also claims
of wantonness against Triumph and Williams (hereinafter
“wantonness

claims”),

wanton-training
(hereinafter

as

claims

“training

well

as

against
claims”).

negligentTriumph
Jurisdiction

proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity).

and
only
is

The case is before the court on the defendants’
motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs’
wantonness claims against both Triumph and Williams and
on the plaintiffs’ training claims against Triumph.*
The motion will be granted.

I.

SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or
defense--on

which

summary

judgment

is

sought.

The

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

*

The plaintiffs also charge the defendants with
“gross
negligence.”
Under
Alabama
law,
gross
negligence is a degree of negligence; it is not the
same as wantonness.
See Miller v. Bailey, 60 So. 3d
857, 867 (Ala. 2010) (“Gross negligence is negligence,
not
wantonness.”)
(internal
citations
omitted);
Armistead v. Lenkeit, 160 So. 257, 259 (Ala. 1935)
(“Gross negligence is defined as a want of slight care,
as distinguished from ordinary care, on the one hand,
and less culpable than wanton injury, on the other.”)
Because the defendants did not move for summary
judgment on negligence, this opinion will not address
these claims. These claims survive.

2

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The court must view

the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND
Gwendolyn Craft was driving a rented minivan from
New Orleans, Louisiana to Atlanta, Georgia to watch a
professional football game.

She had three passengers

in the car, including the two other plaintiffs in this
suit.

The

weather

conditions

were

clear,

and

the

traffic was normal for a weekday afternoon.
On a northbound stretch of highway between Mobile
and Montgomery, Alabama, the plaintiffs were involved
in a car accident with Reco Williams, who was employed
by

Triumph

and

driving

a

commercial-freight

truck.

Craft was driving in the left lane, and Williams was
adjacent in the right lane.
3

Without looking into his

driver-side mirror, Williams crossed over into Craft’s
lane.

Craft swerved left off the highway to avoid a

collision
shoulder

with
and

Williams’s

then

truck,

driving

into

passing

the

onto

grass.

the

Without

slowing down, Craft then swerved right, and her minivan
began to spin.

Craft reentered the roadway mid-spin,

crashing twice into Williams’s truck.

Craft and her

passengers sustained injuries.

III. DISCUSSION
Triumph

and

Williams

move

for

partial

summary

judgment on the plaintiffs’ wantonness claims based on
Williams’s operation and driving of the truck, and on
the plaintiffs’ negligent- or wanton-training claims.

A. Wantonness Claims Against
Triumph and Williams
To hold a defendant liable for wanton conduct in
Alabama, a plaintiff must establish a high degree of
culpability.

While negligent conduct is characterized

by “inattention, thoughtlessness, or heedlessness” and
4

“a lack of due care,” Monroe v. Brown, 307 F. Supp. 2d
1268, 1271 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.), wantonness
is

characterized

by

“a

conscious

act.”

Ex

parte

Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007) (internal citations
omitted).

Wantonness is willful misconduct undertaken

with the knowledge that the likely or probable result
will be injury, that is, with a conscious disregard for
the rights or safety of others.

See, e.g., Alfa Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998);
Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South, 646 So. 2d 601
(Ala. 1994).

Wantonness can also be established by

reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others.
See 1975 Ala. Code § 6–11–20(b)(3).
therefore,

“[c]onduct

which

is

Wantonness is,

carried

on

with

a

reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety
of

others.”

Id.

Because

negligence

is

the

“inadvertent omission of duty,” and wantonness is about
the “state of mind with which the act or omission is
done,” Essary, 992 So. 2d at 9, the Alabama Supreme
Court has explained: “Wantonness is not merely a higher
5

degree of culpability than negligence. Negligence and
wantonness,
different

plainly

tort

and

concepts

simply,
of

are

qualitatively

actionable

culpability.”

Tolbert v. Tolbert, 903 So. 2d 103, 114 (Ala. 2004)
(internal

citations

omitted);

see

also

Jinright

v.

Werner Enterprises, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1275-76
(M.D. Ala. 2009) (Thompson, J.).
Alabama

courts

will

allow

a

jury

to

determine

whether conduct was wanton if there is any evidence
that would allow that determination.

Cash v. Caldwell,

603 So. 2d 1001, 1003 (Ala. 1992) (“Wantonness is a
question of fact for the jury, unless there is a total
lack of evidence from which the jury could reasonably
infer

wantonness.”).

This

determination

of

consciousness or recklessness underlying the question
of wantonness may rely on inferences drawn from the
circumstances.

Klaber v. Elliott, 533 So. 2d 576, 579

(Ala. 1988).
The

plaintiffs

argue

that

Williams

was

wanton

because he failed to look to his left or signal before
6

he drove his vehicle into the left lane.

However, this

conduct, on its own, is not sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact concerning wantonness.
To establish wantonness, the evidence must support a
conclusion

that

the

defendant

engaged

in

conduct

conscious, or in knowing disregard, that it was likely
to cause injury.

But the plaintiffs have not pointed

to any evidence that would allow a jury to determine,
consistent

with

Alabama

law,

that

Williams

had

the

requisite level of consciousness and awareness that his
moving into the plaintiffs’ lane would likely cause
injury.

Simply put, the fact that Craft saw Williams’s

truck move over into her lane does not prove that he
knew that he was moving into their lane--for he could
have been drifting without realizing he was doing so-and

that

by

doing

so

he

knew,

or

recklessly

disregarded, that he likely would harm others on the
road.

See

wantonness
while

as

knowing

Essary,
“the
of

992

So.

conscious
the

doing

existing
7

2d

at

9.

of

some

conditions

(defining
act

and

...

being

conscious

that,

from

doing

...

an

act,

injury

will

likely or probably result.”) (emphasis in original).
If

mere

inattention,

contributes

to

the

without

accident,

something
that

is,

more

that

without

some

exacerbating circumstance, could constitute wantonness,
then the concepts of negligence and wantonness would
collapse into one.
Moreover, under Alabama law, there is a presumption
that “courts do not expect an individual to engage in
self-destructive behavior.”
at

1276

(internal

Jinright, 607 F. Supp. 2d

citations

dangerous behavior at issue is

omitted).

When

the

“similarly likely to

harm the perpetrator (as it is, for example, in most
cases involving car accidents),” Alabama courts presume
that

defendants

behavior.

Id.

do

not

engage

consciously

in

that

Here, for example, the presumption is

that Williams would not have changed lanes deliberately
if he were aware that it would cause an accident in
which he could be injured.

8

The

court

recognizes

the

limitations

of

this

presumption in a situation, such as this one, where the
defendant is driving a tractor-trailer truck.

When a

large commercial truck is involved in a crash with a
much smaller passenger vehicle, the truck driver may be
shielded from some of the impact of the crash.
Yet

this

asymmetry

analysis here.
a

series

presumption

of

does

not

change

large

unpredictable

against

truck

court’s

First, automobile accidents can set off
reactions,

self-destruction

driver will attempt to avoid them.
a

the

cannot

be

sure

and
that

means

the
any

Second, a driver of
that

surrounded by only smaller vehicles.

he

or

she

is

Because there are

so many trucks on highways, the driver of a large truck
bears the substantial risk of colliding with not only
smaller vehicles but also with equally large, if not
larger,

vehicles.

(Indeed,

because,

under

the

plaintiffs’ version of the facts, Williams did not look
before crossing over, there reasonably could have been
a vehicle at his left that was the same size as his
9

truck, or larger, that could have put him in serious
danger.)

Third and finally, there is no evidence that

the fact Williams was driving a large truck played any
role in the accident.

Cf. Fike v. Peace, 964 So. 2d

651, 662 (Ala. 2007) (rejecting argument that hauling
an oversized load constitutes an “inherently dangerous”
activity

“because

the

major

oversized

load

could

risk

have

of

been

harm

from

the

alleviated

if

[defendants] had used reasonable care.”).
To conclude otherwise would mean that any collision
between a car and a large truck, resulting from mere
negligence or inattention of the driver of the larger
vehicle, always would constitute wantonness.
there

must

be

circumstance.

some

exacerbating

or

Instead,

differentiating

See, e.g., Griffin v. Modular Transp.

Co., 2014 WL 896627, at *4 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (Acker, J.)
(finding evidence of wantonness in case where only the
flatbed portion of tractor-trailer truck was blocking
the

highway,

not

the

cabin

with

the

driver’s

seat,

because “[a] collision between a car and the flatbed
10

portion of a tractor trailer does not carry the same
risk of injury to the trailer driver as it does to the
car driver”) (emphasis in original).
However, the presumption that a defendant did not
consciously
rebutted

engage

when

in

there

self-destructive

is

reason

to

behavior

believe

that

is
the

defendant was suffering from impaired judgment (such as
alcohol

consumption)

or

the

act

itself

is

“so

inherently reckless that it would signal the kind of
depravity

consistent

with

disregard

safety and self-preservation.”

of

instincts

of

Jinright, 607 F. Supp.

2d at 1276-77 (citing Ex Parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 16
(Ala.

2007)).

example,

might

“Inherently
be

driving

reckless”
in

reverse

behavior,
on

a

for

major

interstate, see Johnson v. Baldwin, 584 F. Supp. 2d
1322 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (Thompson, J.); driving through
an intersection “at a very fast speed” after ignoring a
stop sign, see Clark v. Black, 630 So. 2d 1012, 1016
(Ala. 1993); or abruptly moving from the right lane
into the left lane after seeing a video store on the
11

left and deciding to stop and get a movie.

Green v.

Leatherwood, 727 So. 2d 92 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
each

of

these

inattention,

instances,

that

is,

something

an

more

exacerbating

than

In
mere

circumstance,

contributed to the accident.
Here, there is no evidence that Williams suffered
from impaired judgment.
driver’s
vehicle.

license

and

He held a valid commercial

was

qualified

to

operate

his

There is no evidence that he had used drugs

or alcohol, or was talking on his phone or texting.
And he was not over his commercially allowed ‘service
hours’ at the time of the accident.
There is also no evidence that Williams’s conduct
was inherently reckless.

The failure to adjust one’s

driving to accommodate special dangers on the road,
such as bad weather or reduced visibility, may evidence
the

kind

of

recklessness

from

which

a

driver’s

consciousness or reckless disregard of probable harm
could be inferred.
v.

Meadows,

847

See, e.g., Hornady Truck Line, Inc.
So.

2d

908
12

(Ala.

2002)

(finding

evidence

of

wantonness

when

truck

driver

failed

to

check his mirrors and drifted or merged into the left
lane, where the truck was traveling at an unsafe speed
during

a

heavy

storm).

As

the

court

explained

in

Hornady, a factfinder could impute conscious disregard
to a truck driver operating his vehicle at an unsafe
speed during a bad storm because the driver “knew the
weather
“knew

conditions,”
the

traveling.”

speed

“knew
at

Id. at 915.

the

which

road

conditions”

their

vehicles

and
were

The plaintiffs in that case

brought negligence and wantonness claims, and, while
“inattention alone was sufficient to allow the case to
go to the jury on the negligence claim,” the court
found that the combination of the speed of the truck
and the weather conditions, coupled with the driver’s
inattention,

was

also

sufficient

wantonness claim to the jury.
In

this

case,

however,

to

submit

the

Id. at 915, 916.
the

plaintiffs

have

not

presented evidence of unsafe road conditions such that
Williams’s knowledge of those conditions, coupled with
13

his

inattentiveness,

wantonness.

could

support

an

inference

of

Nor is there is any evidence that Williams

was driving at an unsafe speed or engaging in any other
reckless conduct.
At best, Williams inattentively drifted into the
left lane; at worst, he deliberately merged into the
left lane without signaling or checking his mirrors.
But even “failing to look to one’s left before crossing
a lane, while imprudent and likely negligent, is not so
inherently reckless as to signal the kind of depravity
required by Essary.

It is also, quite simply, not

suggestive of the kind of knowledge of likely injury
required

by

the

consciousness

wantonness claims in Alabama.”

standard

applied

to

Jinright, 607 F. Supp.

2d at 1277.
Therefore, because the plaintiffs have not provided
any facts from which it could be inferred that Williams
consciously or recklessly caused the accident, their
submissions show “a total lack of evidence from which
the jury could reasonably infer wantonness.”
14

Cash, 603

So. 2d at 1003; see also Askew v. R & L Transfer, Inc.,
676 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (Thompson, J.).
Summary judgment will be granted in favor of Triumph
and Williams on the plaintiffs’ wantonness claim.

B. Negligent- and Wanton-Training
Claims Against Triumph
The plaintiffs also charge that, under Alabama law,
Triumph is liable for negligently or wantonly training
Williams.
training,

To support a claim of negligent or wanton
the

plaintiffs

must

demonstrate

that

(1)

Williams committed a tort recognized under Alabama law,
see Stevenson v. Precision Standard, Inc., 762 So. 2d
820, 824 (Ala. 1999); (2) Williams was incompetent to
drive his commercial vehicle, see Lane v. Central Bank
of Alabama, N.A., 425 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Ala. 1983);
(3)

Triumph

had

actual

notice

of

Williams’s

incompetence or would have known had it exercised due
diligence, see Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth
Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 682 (Ala. 2001); and (4) Triumph
either negligently or wantonly failed to respond to
15

this notice.
at 1304.

See id.; see also Askew, 676 F. Supp. 2d

Triumph argues that the plaintiffs cannot

satisfy these elements because there is no evidence
that Williams was an incompetent driver or that it knew
or

should

have

known

of

Williams’s

alleged

incompetence.
“Incompetence” is defined as the “state or fact of
being unable or unqualified to do something.”

Halford

v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, 921 So. 2d 409, 416 (Ala.
2005)

(quoting

2004)).
measured

Black’s

Law

Dictionary

780

(8th

ed.

In Alabama, “the incompetence of a driver is
by

the

driver’s

demonstrated

ability

(or

inability) to properly drive a vehicle,” Halford, 921
So.

2d

at

413-14,

characteristics

such

“habitual negligence.”

and
as

this

may

“general

be

measured

by

incompetence”

or

Edwards v. Valentine, 926 So.

2d 315 (Ala. 2005).
The plaintiffs make two arguments to support their
contention that Williams was incompetent.

First, they

argue that Triumph’s failure to train Williams properly
16

means

that

he

necessarily

was

incompetent;

in

the

alternative, they argue that Williams’s driving record
and history of violations establish incompetence.
The court rejects the first argument.

Williams was

a professional commercial driver with several years of
experience.

He earned his commercial driver’s license

after receiving training and education at a technical
college, and he passed the necessary tests to obtain
his commercial license.

He worked several different

commercial-truck-driving jobs prior to and between his
terms of employment at Triumph, and he passed a road
test when hired by Triumph.

Prior to the accident, he

was trained in defensive driving by another trucking
company.

His commercial driver’s license had

never

been suspended or revoked.
Moreover, the plaintiffs admitted at the pretrial
conference that Williams’s commercial-license training
included

instruction

on

safe

lane

changes.

Common

sense, too, dictates that drivers look before changing
lanes.

While

it

may

be
17

that

Williams

could

have

benefitted from additional training, there is simply no
evidence in the record that Triumph’s failure to train
Williams proximately caused this accident.
Under

the

plaintiffs’

line

of

reasoning,

any

employee--even with extensive experience or a spotless
record--would be considered “incompetent” unless fully
retrained by each successive employer.
not

the

standard

in

Alabama.

This is simply

Competence

is

not

measured solely by training; it is measured by one’s
ability to perform the task at hand.
So.

2d

at

414,

417

(explaining

See Halford, 921
that

a

driver’s

competence is measured by “actual ability to properly
operate
“evidence
physical

a

motor
relevant

abilities

vehicle,”
to

[the

and

his

experience and record.”).
Triumph itself

and

is

determined

driver’s]
or

her

mental

prior

by
and

driving

That he was not trained by

does not establish that Williams was

incompetent.
Turning to the plaintiffs’ second theory, the court
also

rejects

the

argument
18

that

Williams’s

driving

record

establishes

several

traffic

his

incompetence.

violations

on

his

Williams

personal

has

driving

record, including a ticket for speeding issued when he
was driving his pregnant girlfriend to the hospital to
deliver their child; an accident from age 17, before he
received

his

commercial

driver’s

license;

a

tag

violation; a seatbelt violation; and a failure to stop.
The only violation he has received while driving his
commercial vehicle is an overweight ticket.
An employee’s “mistake or single act of negligence”
does not establish incompetence, because even “the most
competent may be negligent.”

Southland Bank v. A & A

Drywall Supply Co., Inc., 21 So. 3d 1196, 1217 (Ala.
2008) (internal citations omitted).
habitually

negligent

incompetent.”
has

been

diverse
establish

on

that

Id. (emphasis removed).

cited

for

circumstances
the

may

But “one who is

kind

several
behind
of

amounts to incompetence.

moving
each

‘habitual

account

be

Though Williams
violations,
citation

do

negligence’

the
not
that

Cf. Pritchett v. ICN Medical
19

Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933 (Ala. 2006) (holding
that defendant’s use of an improper safety technique
during cosmetic surgery on 30 to 40 occasions evidenced
habitual negligence and established a jury question on
incompetence).
Williams

had

several

years

of

truck-driving

experience and a commercial driver’s license in good
standing, both demonstrating his “ability to properly
handle an automobile on the road.”
at 414.

Halford, 921 So. 2d

As this court explained in Askew, “blemishes

on an otherwise clean professional driving record do
not amount, under the law, to incompetence.

The law

requires that a driver have had a ‘demonstrated ability
to properly drive a vehicle’; it does not require that
he have a record completely free of mistake.”

Askew,

676 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 (citing Halford, 921 So. 2d at
413-14); see, e.g., id. (explaining that a driver’s
record

with

two

accidents did not

moving

violations

and

four

minor

amount to incompetence); Pryor v.

Brown & Root USA, Inc., 674 So. 2d 45, 52 (Ala. 1995)
20

(“[Defendant]'s

prior

driving

record--two

speeding

tickets and a suspended prosecution of a DUI charge
over a 10-year period--is not sufficient to support a
claim of negligent entrustment.”); Thompson v. Havard,
235 So. 2d 853, 857 (Ala. 1970) (“[P]roof of two moving
violations or accidents within a two year period prior
to

[the]

accident

...

is

probably

insufficient

[to

create a fact issue of the driver’s incompetence.]”)
(internal citations omitted).
Even

if

the

plaintiffs

had

established

that

Williams was incompetent, his employer could be liable
for negligent or wanton training only if it knew or
should have known about his incompetence and failed to
respond adequately to that notice.

But the plaintiffs

have not presented evidence that Triumph had or should
have

had

incident

either
for

notice

which

it

or

knowledge

might

have

of

any

prior

to

offer

needed

supplemental training.
The plaintiffs cite Big B, Inc., v. Cottingham to
support

their

argument

that
21

employers

may

be

held

liable for negligent training even when the employer is
not on notice of prior similar offenses.

634 So. 2d

999 (Ala. 1993), abrogated on other grounds,

Horton

Homes, Inc. v. Brooks, 832 So. 2d 44 (Ala. 2001).

In

Big B, a store manager was accused of making improper
sexual advances

toward a part-time employee, and he

later sexually assaulted a suspected shoplifter. The
employer
train,

was
and

remained
trained

sued
the

as

“reason

after
Id.

incompetence

incident

the

in

question

incident.

scenarios,

that

how

for

a

to

fact

employer
to

failure

question

had

properly

and

question

detain

As the court explained, the employer had

to

employment”

shoplifter

found

whether

manager

shoplifters.

the

court

to

the

by

the
was

it
at

arose

[the

manager’s]

received
1003.
in

two

in

of

Though

employer’s
based

notice

the

the

for

failure

for
first

manager’s

factually

liability
its

fitness

different
the
to

second
address

proactively a recurring problem: the mistreatment of
women in the workplace.

In Big B, therefore, the court
22

was already on notice of past similar conduct.

Here,

in contrast, Williams’s employer was not only not on
notice of past general incompetence, but was also not
on notice of past similar conduct.
Because the plaintiffs have failed to put forth
sufficient evidence of Williams’s incompetence or any
persuasive

reason

why

Triumph

should

have

been

on

notice of that alleged incompetence, summary judgment
in

favor

of

defendant

Triumph

on

the

plaintiffs’

training claims is appropriate.

* * *
An appropriate order will be entered.
DONE, this the 8th day of April, 2015.
_/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23