Neelley v. Walker, et al.
Filing
92
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: it is ORDERED that Plf's 79 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Dfts' 81 second motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 3/30/2018. (wcl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
JUDITH A. NEELLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLIFFORD WALKER, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 2:14-CV-269-WKW
[WO]
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Judith A. Neelley was originally sentenced to death, but Alabama
Governor Fob James commuted her sentence to life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole. A few years later, the Alabama Legislature made a class of its
inmates ineligible for parole. That class consists of exactly one inmate.
Ms. Neelley.
According to Ms. Neelley, that change in Alabama law violated both the ban
on bills of attainder and the ban on ex post facto laws in Article I, Section 10 of the
U.S. Constitution. She brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants
Clifford Walker, Lyn Head, and Terry G. Davis in their official capacities as
members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles. Her claims are now before
the court on cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. # 80, 81) based on
stipulated facts (Doc. # 77, at 2–11). Those motions have been fully briefed. (Docs.
# 81, 84, 85, 88, 89.)
The Alabama law at issue here retroactively enhanced the punishment of only
Ms. Neelley, so it is both an unconstitutional bill of attainder and an unconstitutional
ex post facto law. Therefore, Ms. Neelley’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
# 80) is due to be granted, and Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment
(Doc. # 81) is due to be denied.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Subject-matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343(a)(3). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must
demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court views
the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir.
2010).
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion . . . .” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the
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portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Id. Alternatively, a movant who does not have a trial burden of production can
assert, without citing the record, that the nonmoving party “cannot produce
admissible evidence to support” a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
establish — with evidence beyond the pleadings — that a genuine dispute material
to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine
dispute of material fact exists “if the nonmoving party has produced evidence such
that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Waddell v. Valley
Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).
“Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the
court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.” Bricklayers, Masons &
Plasterers Int’l Union of Am., Local Union No. 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d
1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1975).1 “Nonetheless, cross-motions may be probative of the
non-existence of a factual dispute when, as here, they demonstrate a basic agreement
concerning what legal theories and material facts are dispositive.” Id. “‘[W]hen
both parties proceed on the same legal theor[ies] and rely on the same material
1
The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
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facts[,] the court is signaled that the case is ripe for summary judgment.” Shook v.
United States, 713 F.2d 662, 665 (11th Cir. 1983). But “before the court can
consider the legal issues raised by the parties on cross-motions for summary
judgment, it must have no doubt as to the relevant facts that are beyond dispute.”
Griffis v. Delta Family-Care Disability, 723 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1984).
III. BACKGROUND
The parties have stipulated to all of the material facts in this case. (Doc. # 77,
at 2–11.)
Ms. Neelley was convicted of capital murder in 1983 for murdering Lisa Ann
Millican. The trial judge described Ms. Neelley’s crime in great detail in his
sentencing order:
The body of Lisa Ann Millican, age 13, was found in a gorge
known as Little River Canyon near Fort Payne on September 29, 1982.
Lisa was a resident of the Ethel Harpst Home, a Methodist home for
neglected children located in Cedartown, Georgia.
Lisa and five other girls from the home were taken by a house
parent on an outing to Riverbend Mall in Rome, Georgia on September
25, 1982. While at the mall, Lisa became separated from the others.
During this separation, she was abducted by [Ms. Neelley], who asked
Lisa to go “riding around.” Lisa hesitated at first, but then agreed. The
events which followed the abduction led to the death of Lisa when [Ms.
Neelley] shot her in the back on September 28, 1982, and threw her
body into the canyon.
The abduction of Lisa Ann Millican was part of a bizarre scheme
whereby [Ms. Neelley] attempted to lure girls and young women into
the car with her for the ultimate purpose of making them available to
her husband, Alvin Neelley, for sex with him. For several days
immediately prior to Lisa’s abduction, [Ms. Neelley] and Alvin drove
up and down Rome streets in separate automobiles looking for girls
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who would be suitable. When Alvin would see one who appealed to
him, he would communicate with [Ms. Neelley] by C–B radio, and [Ms.
Neelley] would invite the girl to go riding around with her. Numerous
girls refused [Ms. Neelley’s] invitation; her first successful pick-up was
Lisa Ann Millican.
[Ms. Neelley] took Lisa to a motel in Franklin, Georgia where
she tried to persuade Lisa to submit to sex with Alvin, but Lisa resisted.
Finally, Alvin told Lisa that if she did not submit to sex, [Ms. Neelley]
would kill her. Following this threat, Alvin engaged in sex with Lisa,
and later that night, Lisa was handcuffed to the bed to prevent her
escape.
The next day, [Ms. Neelley] and Alvin, traveling in two cars,
took Lisa with them to Cleveland, Tennessee where they picked up their
two-year-old twins who were being cared for by Alvin’s mother. Later
that day, they traveled to Scottsboro, Alabama where they rented a
motel room. Shortly after their arrival at the motel, [Ms. Neelley] hit
Lisa in the head several times with a slapjack in an attempt to render
her unconscious, but she was unsuccessful in achieving that result.
Alvin then had sex with Lisa, and afterward Lisa slept overnight on the
floor, unclothed, and handcuffed to the bed.
The following day, Alvin had sex with Lisa twice more despite
her cries and pleas that he stop. [Ms. Neelley] was present during these
sexual encounters and at one point during the day, she handcuffed Lisa
to the plumbing in the bathroom and interrogated her about a man she
had appeared to know at a dairy bar near the motel.
The next morning, Lisa was taken to Little River Canyon by [Ms.
Neelley] where [Ms. Neelley] instructed Lisa to lie face down and place
her hands around a tree. [Ms. Neelley] then handcuffed Lisa’s hands.
She explained to Lisa that she was going to give her a shot that would
make her fall asleep and that when she waked up, Lisa would be free to
go. Using a needle and syringe, [Ms. Neelley] injected Lisa in the neck
with liquid drain cleaner. When Lisa did not die in five minutes, [Ms.
Neelley] injected her again in the neck. She injected Lisa four
additional times, twice in the arms and twice in the buttocks, waiting
about five minutes after each injection for Lisa to die. Twice during
the infliction of these injections, Lisa requested to get up and “use the
bathroom” in the woods. She was allowed to do so, and each time she
returned and resumed her position on the ground with her hands around
the tree.
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Following the last injection, [Ms. Neelley] instructed Lisa to
walk around for awhile to hasten the work of the poison in her body.
When it finally appeared that Lisa was not going to die from the drain
cleaner, [Ms. Neelley] marched Lisa to the rim of the canyon to shoot
her in the back in a manner that would cause her body to fall into the
canyon. Lisa begged to go back to the Harpst Home and promised not
to tell what had happened. [Ms. Neelley] told Lisa to be quiet and then
shot her in the back. Lisa fell backward toward [Ms. Neelley] instead
of falling into the canyon. [Ms. Neelley] picked up the body and, using
her knee, propelled it into the canyon.
During [Ms. Neelley’s] trial testimony, she testified that Alvin
was present at the canyon directing her every action. However, in an
out-of-court statement made shortly after her arrest, [Ms. Neelley]
stated that Alvin was not present at the canyon.
Five days after the death of Lisa Ann Millican, [Ms. Neelley]
picked up a young woman named Janice Chapman and her commonlaw husband, John Hancock, from a street in Rome. Later that night,
[Ms. Neelley] shot John Hancock in the back and left him for dead. He
survived, however, and was present at the trial to testify to the incident.
[Ms. Neelley] and Alvin took Janice Chapman to a motel in
Rome where Alvin engaged in sex with Janice. The next day, [Ms.
Neelley] killed Janice Chapman, shooting her once in the back and
twice in the chest. During [Ms. Neelley’s] trial testimony, she testified
that Alvin was present during the shooting of John Hancock and Janice
Chapman and that he directed her to shoot them; however, in her outof-court statement given shortly after her arrest, she stated that Alvin
was present when she shot John Hancock but that he was not present
when she killed Janice Chapman.
On October 9, 1982, the day before [Ms. Neelley’s] arrest, she
picked up another young woman in Nashville, Tennessee who was
present with [Ms. Neelley] and Alvin in a motel room in Murfreesboro,
Tennessee on October 10, 1982 when [Ms. Neelley] was arrested on a
bad check charge. Later, this woman was released by Alvin unharmed.
Alvin was arrested in Murfreesboro on October 13, 1982, also on
a bad check charge. While [Ms. Neelley] and Alvin were in custody on
the bad check charges, additional charges were placed against them
arising from the murders of Lisa Ann Millican and Janice Chapman,
and the shooting of John Hancock.
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Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669 app. III 690–91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (including
the trial judge’s sentencing order in an appendix).
Although the jury recommended (by a margin of ten to two) that she be
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, the trial judge sentenced Ms.
Neelley to death. She exhausted all of her state and federal judicial means of
challenging her sentence to no avail.
On January 15, 1999, his last day in office, Governor James commuted Ms.
Neelley’s death sentence to “life imprisonment.” (Doc. # 77, at 7.) The Alabama
Board of Pardons and Paroles requested an official opinion from Alabama Attorney
General Bill Pryor clarifying the effect of that commutation. His opinion advised
the Board that Governor James had effectively commuted Ms. Neelley’s death
sentence to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Even though a death
sentence and a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility for parole were
the only sentences a court could impose for capital murder under Alabama law at the
time of Ms. Neelley’s crime, conviction, and sentencing, the Alabama Constitution
gave the governor the authority to commute a death sentence to a sentence less than
life without the possibility of parole. And per statute at the time Governor James
commuted Ms. Neelley’s death sentence, “[a]ny person whose sentence to death has
been commuted by the Governor to life imprisonment” would be eligible for parole
consideration after serving “at least [fifteen] years of such life sentence.” Ala. Code
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§ 15-22-27(b) (1975). The net effect of the commutation, Attorney General Pryor
concluded, was that Ms. Neelley would be eligible for parole consideration fifteen
years after Governor James commuted her sentence.
Pursuant to that opinion, the Board notified Ms. Neelley on March 8, 1999,
that she would be eligible for parole consideration in January of 2014. She requested
a parole hearing in October of 2001, but the Board denied that request and reiterated
its position that she would not be eligible for parole consideration until January of
2014. Shortly after that denial, Ms. Neelley filed an action in state court seeking a
judicial declaration that she was eligible for parole consideration because she had
already served over sixteen years on death row. The court denied her the relief she
sought, finding that she would be eligible for parole consideration only after serving
fifteen years of her commuted sentence.
In 2003, just over four years after Governor James commuted Ms. Neelley’s
death sentence, the Alabama legislature passed and Governor Bob Riley signed Act
2003-300. The Act amended Alabama Code Section 15-22-27(b) to read as follows,
in relevant part: “Any person whose sentence to death has been commuted by the
Governor shall not be eligible for a parole.” That change was made retroactive to
September 1, 1998 — four months before Governor James commuted Ms. Neelley’s
sentence.
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Ms. Neelley is the only person whose death sentence was commuted between
September 1, 1998, and the Act’s passage in 2004. In fact, “[a]s of July 10, 2015,
Judith Ann Neelley is the first and only inmate to have had a death sentence
commuted by an Alabama Governor since July 24, 1962.” (Doc. # 77, at 10 (quoting
Doc. # 42-2).)
In January of 2014, the Board requested a formal opinion from Alabama
Attorney General Luther Strange on whether Ms. Neelley was eligible for parole
consideration in light of Act 2003-300. Attorney General Strange concluded that
she was not. On April 1, 2014, just over fifteen years after Governor James had
commuted Ms. Neelley’s sentence, the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles
informed Ms. Neelley that she was not eligible for parole consideration.
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.
Plaintiff files and subsequently amends her complaint.
Plaintiff initiated this action on April 10, 2014, claiming that Act 2003-300
violated both the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses of Article I, Section
10 of the U.S. Constitution, as well as certain provisions of the Alabama
Constitution. (Doc. # 1.) The original complaint named the Board, as opposed to
its individual members, as the defendant. The Board moved to dismiss the complaint
(Doc. # 11), and Ms. Neelley filed an amended complaint replacing the Board with
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the Board’s members as Defendants (Doc. # 13).2 The court later denied the motion
to dismiss the original complaint as moot. (Doc. # 16.)
B.
The court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in part and denies it in
part.
The current Defendants, Clifford Walker, Lyn Head, and Terry G. Davis,
moved to dismiss Ms. Neelley’s amended complaint. (Doc. # 18.) The court granted
the motion with respect to Ms. Neelley’s state-law claims but denied it with respect
to her federal claims. (Doc. # 22.) For the former, the court held that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to order state agents to follow state law. For the latter,
the court rejected Defendants’ statute-of-limitations defenses because the allegations
in Ms. Neelley’s amended complaint did not indicate that she had the requisite
knowledge of the constitutional violations she alleges early enough for the statute of
limitations to have run.
The court further found that Ms. Neelley sufficiently alleged that Act 2003300 violated the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses of Article I, Section 10
of the U.S. Constitution to state claims upon which relief could be granted.
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint named Clifford Walker, William W. Wynne, Jr., and
Robert P. Longshore as defendants in their official capacities as members of the Alabama Board
of Pardons and Paroles. Lyn Head and Terry G. Davis succeeded Messrs. Wynn and Longshore
in those positions and, therefore, are each “automatically substituted as a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
25(d).
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1.
By alleging that Act 2003-300 retroactively eliminated her eligibility
for parole consideration, Ms. Neelley stated a valid Ex Post Facto
Clause claim.
The court noted that Defendants did not contest that the Act was retroactive
for ex post facto purposes.
Instead, Defendants argued that the Act did not
impermissibly increase Ms. Neelley’s punishment because it was not punitive, nor
did the Act increase the punishment annexed to capital murder at the time Ms.
Neelley murdered Ms. Millican. The court rejected Defendants’ first argument
because they failed to provide any authority to support it. The court rejected their
second argument because it was based on an overly restrictive reading of Justice
Chase’s non-exhaustive list of ex post facto laws in his opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), and failed to account for the “truly extraordinary situation
of a legislative branch retroactively increasing a punishment declared by the
executive branch in a commuted sentence.” (Doc. # 22, at 18.) Moreover, the
potential sentences for capital murder when Ms. Neelley committed that heinous
crime were not legally relevant to the ex post facto analysis because Ms. Neelley “is
serving a commuted sentence, and her commuted sentence is now the only legal
sentence in the universe of possible, legal sentences for her crime.” (Doc. # 22, at
18.)
“[T]he pertinent question,” then, was “what terms of parole eligibility were
annexed by Alabama law to a state defendant’s commuted capital murder sentence.”
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(Doc. # 22, at 18–19.) It was clear that under Alabama law at the time of Ms.
Neelley’s crime, conviction, sentencing, and commutation, individuals whose death
sentences had been commuted to life imprisonment by the governor would be
eligible for parole consideration after serving fifteen years of their commuted life
sentences. By eliminating this eligibility for parole consideration, Act 2003-300
retroactively imposed on Ms. Neelley the unquestionably harsher punishment of life
without the possibility of parole. Ms. Neelley’s allegations to that effect thus stated
a valid claim for relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
2.
By alleging that Act 2003-300 singled her out to retroactively increase
the punishment for her crime, Ms. Neelley stated a valid Bill of
Attainder Clause claim.
The court found that Ms. Neelley’s allegations sufficiently attributed each of
the three hallmarks of a bill of attainder to Act 2003-300: (1) the infliction of
punishment; (2) “a specific designation of persons or groups as subjects of the
legislation” and (3) an “arbitrary deprivation” of individual rights “without notice,
trial, or other hearing.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 538–39 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The court rejected Defendants’ conclusory argument that
the Act was not punitive as applied to Ms. Neelley, noting that the argument was
likely baseless. Defendants’ arguments that the Act did not specifically designate
Ms. Neelley fared no better, both because she alleged that the Act’s sponsors made
it clear that their intent was to increase her sentence and because the Legislature
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suspiciously made the Act retroactive to four months prior to her January 1999
commutation. And the court found that Ms. Neelley sufficiently alleged that she
was arbitrarily deprived of her right to seek parole consideration in 2014 without any
opportunity to contest the deprivation to establish the third hallmark of a bill of
attainder. In sum, Ms. Neelley had sufficiently stated a claim under the Bill of
Attainder Clause, even if her case is unique.
The court thus allowed Ms. Neelley’s federal constitutional claims to proceed.
C.
The court grants Defendants’ First Motion for Summary Judgment, but
the Eleventh Circuit reverses.
Defendants later filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 41), which the
court granted on statute-of-limitations grounds without addressing the merits of Ms.
Neelley’s ex post facto and bill of attainder claims (Doc. # 64). The court found that
the relevant statute of limitations was two years and that Ms. Neelley had sufficient
notice of the possibility that Act 2003-300 eliminated her eligibility for parole
consideration — at which point her federal claims accrued — more than two years
before she filed this action. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in an unpublished
opinion. Neelley v. Walker, 677 F. App’x 532 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Because the Board told Ms. Neelley more than once after the Act’s passage that she
would be eligible for parole consideration in January of 2014, the panel held that
Ms. Neelley’s claims did not accrue until the Board told her in April of 2014 that
she was ineligible for parole consideration under the Act.
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D.
The parties file cross-motions for summary judgment.
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s reversal, the parties “agree[d] that this matter
should be able to be resolved without the need for a trial and that this matter can
potentially be resolved on cross motions for summary judgment and stipulated
facts.” (Doc. # 77, at 11.) Those motions (Docs. # 80, 81) and stipulated facts (Doc.
# 77, at 2–11) are currently before the court.
V. DISCUSSION
Per Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution, “No State shall . . . pass any
Bill of Attainder . . . [or] ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The
court has already found that Ms. Neelley has stated viable claims that Act 2003-300,
as applied to her, is an unconstitutional bill of attainder and ex post facto law. The
court’s analysis at that stage in the proceedings applies with similar force to the
pending cross-motions for summary judgment. The main difference is that while
the material facts had only been alleged at that earlier stage, the parties have since
stipulated to them. Additionally, Defendants’ briefing on the cross-motions for
summary judgment has matured since their briefing in support of their motion to
dismiss (see Doc. # 22, at 17 n.5). But though their present briefing may be more
thorough this time around, it is no more persuasive. Defendants’ second motion for
summary judgment (Doc. # 81) is therefore due to be denied, and Ms. Neelley’s
motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 79) is due to be granted.
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A.
At least as applied to Ms. Neelley, Act 2003-300 is an unconstitutional ex
post facto law.
“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective —
that is, ‘it must apply to events occurring before its enactment’ — and it ‘must
disadvantage the offender affected by it’ by altering the definition of criminal
conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,
441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). The parties do not
dispute that Act 2003-300 is retrospective as applied to Ms. Neelley, as the Act was
passed after Ms. Neelley committed her crime, was convicted, sentenced to death,
and had her death sentence commuted to life with the possibility of parole.
But Defendants argue that the Act does not punish Ms. Neelley and that, even
if it is punitive, the act does not increase the punishment for Ms. Neelley’s crime.
Both arguments fail.
1.
Regardless of whether Act 2003-300 was intended to fix a mistake on
Governor James’s part, the Act is punitive as applied to Ms. Neelley.
Defendants first argue that the legislature lacked the requisite punitive intent
to pass an ex post facto law when it passed Act 2003-300 because “it merely
corrected the clerical mistake Governor James reportedly made when commuting
Neelley’s death sentence.” (Doc. # 81, at 10.) Defendants suggest that Governor
James meant to commute Ms. Neelley’s sentence to life without the possibility of
parole but inadvertently commuted her sentence to life with the possibility of parole.
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It is unclear from the record whether Governor James in fact intended to commute
Ms. Neelley’s death sentence to life without the possibility of parole, but Defendants
do not hang their argument on the truth of that proposition. What matters, they
argue, is that “the Legislature at least could have believed it to be true . . . when it
passed Act 2003-300.” (Doc. # 81, at 10.) From there, Defendants jump to the
conclusion that the legislature passed the Act to fix Governor James’s presumed
mistake, which Defendants call a “clerical mistake” (Doc. # 81, at 10, 13, 16, 26), a
“clerical error” (Doc. # 81, at 11, 13, 15), and “scrivener’s error” (Doc. # 81, at 15).
And because the legislature intended only to correct what they perceived to be an
error, Defendants conclude, the legislature did not intend to punish Ms. Neelley.
Governor James did indeed make a clerical or scrivener’s error when he
commuted Ms. Neelley’s death sentence: He misspelled her name. (Doc. # 77, at 7
(“I hereby commute the sentence of Judith Ann Neeley [sic] to life imprisonment.”
(emphasis added)).) Of course, that is not the error on which Defendants focus, but
it is the only clerical or scrivener’s error in Governor James’s commutation letter.
Justice Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 439 (“defining a scrivener’s error as “[a] drafter’s or typist’s technical
error — such as transposing characters or omitting an obviously needed word — that
can be rectified without serious doubt about the correct reading”).
16
Even if Governor James’s commutation of Ms. Neelley’s death sentence to
life with the possibility of parole instead of life without the possibility of parole was
the result of some transcriptional error in his commutation letter (there is no
admissible evidence in the record that it was), Defendant has failed to show that the
legislature could subsequently correct such an error. The only authority Defendants
have provided on the issue of correcting a clerical mistake is the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion in United States v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990). There, the Ninth
Circuit held that the district court did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment when it corrected a verdict form to reflect the verdict the jury
intended. Defendants cite Stauffer for a rather general proposition: “If correcting
clerical mistakes was embedded in our history and traditions as punishment, then the
Ninth Circuit would have decided Stauffer differently.” (Doc. # 81, at 16.)
To paraphrase Defendants’ brief only slightly, Stauffer shows that correcting
clerical errors does not necessarily violate the Constitution. True enough, but that
does not prove that a legislature has the power to correct a governor’s alleged clerical
error in such a way as to retroactively increase an individual’s punishment. Indeed,
Stauffer did not raise the separation-of-powers concerns at issue here. The clerical
error in Stauffer was made and corrected by the same branch of government. In this
case, on the other hand, the alleged clerical error was made by the executive branch
and corrected by the legislative branch. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits such
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legislative overreach.
See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n.10 (“The ex post facto
prohibition also upholds the separation of powers by confining the legislature to
penal decisions with prospective effect and the judiciary and executive to
applications of existing penal law.”). Moreover, the correction in Stauffer was
authorized by Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Stauffer, 922
F.3d at 514. That rule empowers U.S. district courts in the context of federal
criminal proceedings to “correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part
of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.
Defendants have pointed to no analogous authority that
empowers a state legislature to correct an alleged clerical error in a commutation
letter, a letter containing a constitutionally authorized commutation of sentence that
is not subject to legislative meddling.
But focusing on the legislature’s purported intent to correct Governor James’s
alleged clerical error ignores the fact that correcting such an error would inherently
impose greater punishment on Ms. Neelley. It is undisputed that the effect of
Governor James’s commutation letter was to commute Ms. Neelley’s death sentence
to life with the possibility of parole. It is also undisputed that the Act increased her
punishment to life without the possibility of parole. Defendants do not argue that
life without the possibility of parole is not a greater punishment than life with the
possibility of parole. Nor could they. See Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v.
18
Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 662–63 (1974) (dictum) (“[O]nly an unusual prisoner could
be expected to think that he was not suffering a penalty when he was denied
eligibility for parole. . . . ‘It may be “legislative grace” for Congress to provide
parole but when it expressly removes all hope of parole upon conviction and
sentence for certain offences, . . . this is in the nature of an additional penalty.’”
(second omission in original) (citations omitted)).
There are certainly cases in which an in-depth analysis of legislative intent is
necessary to determine whether a legislative action is punitive. E.g., Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). This is
not one of those cases. Act 2003-300 punishes Ms. Neelley for the purposes of the
Ex Post Facto Clause.
2.
Act 2003-300 increased Ms. Neelley’s punishment in violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause even though her resulting punishment was one
of the punishments Alabama law annexed to capital murder at the
time of Ms. Neelley’s crime.
Although they concede that the Act imposed a harsher punishment on Ms.
Neelley than the punishment that resulted from Governor James’s commutation,
Defendants argue that the Act did not increase her punishment in the relevant sense.
That argument rests on Defendants’ reading of Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Justice Chase famously listed the four main
categories into which most ex post facto laws fall, the third of which is relevant here:
“Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the
19
law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Id. at 390 (opinion of Chase, J.)
(emphasis added). Defendants draw a distinction between the punishment available
for a crime and the punishment imposed on a particular individual convicted of that
crime. Only the former, they argue, is covered by the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Defendants contend that the Act did not change the former because the only
punishments by Alabama law annexed to capital murder at the time of Ms. Neelley’s
crime, conviction, and sentence were death and life without the possibility of parole.
Therefore, they conclude, the Act did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Defendants’ arguments prove too much.
Under Defendants’ logic, the
Alabama legislature would arguably have the power to impose a death sentence
retroactively on anyone convicted of capital murder in Alabama sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole. After all, death is one of the possible sentences
Alabama law provides for capital murder, so such a law would merely inflict a
punishment the law already annexed to capital murder. Defendants do not take their
logic to that conclusion, instead contenting themselves with an assertion of the
authority to enhance Ms. Neelley’s punishment to life without the possibility of
parole retroactively.
Not only is the logical conclusion of Defendants’ argument problematic, but
Defendants’ argument also rests on a faulty premise: that a punishment less than life
20
without the possibility of parole was not annexed to the crime of capital murder
under Alabama law.
Before Act 2003-300 was passed, the Alabama Constitution allowed the
governor to commute a death sentence to life with the possibility of parole. Alabama
law explicitly contemplated this contingency, as it provided that an inmate whose
death sentence had been commuted to life with the possibility for parole would be
eligible for parole consideration after serving fifteen years of that lesser sentence.
So while Alabama law provided two potential sentences for capital murder at the
time Ms. Neelley committed her crime, Alabama law provided at least three potential
punishments for capital murder. The potential sentences were (1) a death sentence
and (2) a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The potential punishments
were (1) death; and (2) life without the possibility of parole; or (3) a punishment less
than life without the possibility of parole — including, as relevant here, life with the
possibility of parole — as a result of a commutation by the governor. Act 2003-300
deliberately attempted to eliminate the third of these options, the one embedded in
the Alabama Constitution, and it did so retroactively.3 Admittedly, the possibility
that someone convicted of capital murder in Alabama would have a resulting death
Act 2003-300 may very well violate the Alabama Constitution in that it tries to limit —
by statute — the governor’s constitutional authority to commute death sentences to any sentence
less than death, a limitation that would seem to require a constitutional amendment. But that
question is not before the court.
3
21
sentence commuted by an Alabama governor — let alone that a death sentence
would be commuted to something less than life without the possibility of parole —
seems remote at best. But Ms. Neelley is living proof that it was still a possibility
before the Act.
The Third Circuit found an ex post facto violation in similar circumstances
when it decided Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 321 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2003). Louis
Mickens-Thomas had been sentenced to life imprisonment, a sentence that
“presumptively exclude[d] any possibility of parole” under Pennsylvania law. Id. at
377. That presumption could be overcome only by a commutation to a sentence that
included a possibility of parole, and Mr. Thomas’s sentence was so commuted. Id.
Pennsylvania law provided that, “[f]ollowing a commutation, a prisoner seeking to
be released must still submit to the same parole procedures applicable to all other
prisoners.”
Id.
Those procedures changed after Mr. Thomas’s sentence was
commuted but before he was first eligible for parole consideration. See id. When
he was denied parole under the new procedures, he challenged their application to
him as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the U.S.
Constitution. Mickens-Thomas, 321 F.3d at 380–83.
The Third Circuit held that applying the new procedures did in fact violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause. The court explained its conclusion as follows:
[T]he parole change substantially impacted Thomas in violation of the
Ex Post Facto clause. Moreover, Thomas is entitled to the benefits of
22
his good behavior in prison; the opportunity to reduce his sentence
through commutation, no matter how speculative, existed at the time of
Thomas’s crime. Thomas successfully attained a commutation of his
sentence; he was entitled to corresponding reduction in sentence. We,
therefore, hold that to retroactively apply changes in the parole laws
made after conviction for a life sentence in Pennsylvania that adversely
affect the release of prisoners whose sentences have been commuted,
violates the Ex Post Facto clause.
Id. at 393. Admittedly, Mr. Thomas’s chances of being able to reduce his sentence
through commutation were much greater than Ms. Neelley’s chances of reducing her
sentence. Indeed, Thomas was one of hundreds of prisoners whose sentences of life
without the possibility of parole had been commuted to a sentence that allowed for
the possibility of parole, id. at 383, whereas Ms. Neelley is the only person whose
death sentence was commuted to life with the possibility of parole from 1962 until
at least 2015 (probably until this day, although the parties have not stipulated to that).
But Act 2003-300’s negative impact on Ms. Neelley’s chances for parole was
much greater than the impact Pennsylvania’s changes to its parole procedures had
on Mr. Thomas’s chances for parole. While Mr. Thomas’s chances of being paroled
decreased to some degree, Ms. Neelley’s chances of being paroled were eliminated
entirely.
Consequently, the Third Circuit’s reasoning still applies to Ms. Neelley. Act
2003-300 substantially impacted Ms. Neelley.
The opportunity to reduce her
sentence through commutation, no matter how speculative, existed at the time of Ms.
Neelley’s crime. Ms. Neelley successfully attained a commutation of her sentence;
23
she was entitled to a corresponding reduction in sentence. Therefore, to retroactively
apply Act 2003-300’s changes in the parole laws — changes made after Ms.
Neelley’s crime, conviction, sentencing, and commutation — that terminate her
prospects for release on parole after her sentence was commuted, violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause.
***
Defendants’ attempt to place Act 2003-300’s effect on Ms. Neelley’s sentence
outside the ambit of the Ex Post Facto Clause’s protection thus fails. Therefore,
with respect to her ex post facto claim, Ms. Neelley’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. # 79) is due to be granted and Defendants’ second motion for summary
judgment (Doc. # 81) is due to be denied.
B.
As applied to Ms. Neelley, Act 2003-300 is an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.
A law constitutes a bill of attainder if it “legislatively determines guilt and
inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the
protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468
(1967). A bill of attainder thus has three elements: (1) “specification of the affected
persons,” (2) “punishment,” and (3) “lack of a judicial trial.” Selective Serv. Sys. v.
Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984).
Act 2003-300 has all three of those elements. First, the Act unquestionably
identifies Ms. Neelley and designates her as the subject of its retroactive application.
24
Admittedly, the Act does not specifically name her, and its retroactive application
reaches before the date of her commutation. But the Act was not subtle in identifying
Ms. Neelley. The Legislature suspiciously made the Act retroactive to four months
before Ms. Neelley’s commutation. And the retroactivity provision ensured that the
Act would proximately affect one more person than it might have otherwise: Ms.
Neelley. Indeed, the Act demonstrates that a legislature does not need to specifically
name an individual to identify that person and designate that person as the subject
of a piece of legislation. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 324–25
(1866) (“The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was
levelled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the citizen should
be secure against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any
form, however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the
enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding.”
Id. at 325.).
Second, the Act constitutes punishment as applied to Ms. Neelley for the
purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has “recognized
three necessary inquiries” used to make this determination: “(1) whether the
challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2)
whether the statute, ‘viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed,
reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes’; and (3) whether
25
the legislative record ‘evinces a [legislative] intent to punish.’” Selective Serv. Sys.,
468 U.S. at 852 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475–476, 478) (citing Nixon, 433 U.S.
at 473). The first two inquiries lead to the conclusion that the Act is punitive for the
reasons discussed in the previous section with respect to the Ex Post Facto Clause.
See supra Section V.A.1. Defendants make no credible, reasonable argument that
the Act furthers a non-punitive legislative purpose when it is applied to reality. And
even assuming the third inquiry is still “necessary” in light of the judicial and
academic critiques of the use of legislative history, that inquiry does not change the
conclusion that the Act is punitive for the purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause.
Third, the Act arbitrarily deprives Ms. Neelley of her eligibility for parole
consideration without notice, trial, or any other procedure.
Defendants have
identified no legal process that may have existed to do properly what the Legislature
apparently intended to do — revoke the legal possibility of Ms. Neelley’s eligibility
for parole consideration. Consequently, the Act is an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.
Defendants offer three arguments to the contrary, but each is unavailing. First,
they incorporate their arguments that the Act does not punish Ms. Neelley for the
purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause to argue that the Act does not punish Ms.
Neelley for the purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Those arguments are no
26
more persuasive in the bill-of-attainder context than they are in the ex-post-facto
context.
Next, Defendants argue that the Act does not have the third element of a bill
of attainder because it did not deprive Ms. Neelley of a judicial trial to determine her
guilt, which was determined at her capital-murder trial. This argument rests on an
overly literal reading of some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s bill-of-attainder
definitions, one of which describes a bill of attainder as “the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.” (Doc. # 81, at 22 (quoting De Veau
v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (plurality opinion)).) Although Ms. Neelley’s
guilt was determined at her criminal trial, she did not receive any comparable form
of process before her punishment was legislatively enhanced decades after her
conviction. Indeed, the court is unaware of any lawful process to revoke a prisoner’s
eligibility for parole consideration in the absence of some intervening bad act on the
part of the prisoner.
Because of the extraordinary and possibly unique nature of Act 2003-300, the
separation-of-powers principles underlying the Bill of Attainder Clause are more
instructive than existing definitions of bills of attainder that were crafted in more
conventional claims brought under the clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court has
observed that “the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical
(and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of
27
the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the
judicial function,” United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965). The Bill of
Attainder Clause “also reflected the Framers’ belief that the Legislative Branch is
not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task
of . . . levying appropriate punishment upon . . . specific persons.” Id. at 445.
Act 2003-300 raises obvious separation-of-powers concerns. As applied to
Ms. Neelley, the Act represents a legislative infringement upon the executive’s
commutation power. And by doing so, the Legislature assumed the task of “levying
appropriate punishment upon” Ms. Neelley, a task primarily assigned to the judicial
branch subject to modification by the executive branch.
Furthermore, Defendants’ argument on this point would also support an
absurd result. Say, for example, Ms. Neelley had been sentenced initially to life
without the possibility of parole. Following Defendants’ logic, the Legislature could
later pass a law that enhanced Ms. Neelley’s sentence to death that read: “Ms. Judith
Ann Neelley, having been duly convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole, is hereby sentenced to death.” Such an act would
not determine Ms. Neelley’s guilt any more than Act 2003-300 does and would thus
be legal under Defendants’ bill-of-attainder definition.
Lastly, Defendants argue that the Act does not “impermissibly target Neelley
in the relevant sense” (Doc. # 81, at 22), although they do not deny that Act 200328
300 targets Ms. Neelley (probably because their clerical-error argument on the Ex
Post Facto Clause issue necessarily admits that the Act targeted her). This argument
relies entirely on Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a law that named President Richard Nixon and
arguably deprived him of his property rights in his presidential papers did not
necessarily violate the Bill of Attainder Clause because he “constituted a legitimate
class of one.” Id. at 472.
But Nixon is distinguishable, most obviously because Ms. Neelley is not
President Nixon. Indeed, multiple Justices in Nixon wrote that the Court’s holding
would have no precedential value. Id. at 486 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]n my
view, this case will not be a precedent for future legislation which relates, not to the
Office of President, but just to one of its occupants.”); id. at 543 (Burger, C.J.) (“The
concurring opinions make explicit what is implicit throughout the Court’s opinion,
i.e., . . . that the Court’s holding ‘will not be a precedent.’ (quoting id. at 486
(Stevens, J., concurring))); id. at 544 (“The immediate consequences of the Court’s
holding may be discounted by some on the ground it is justified by the uniqueness
of the circumstances — in short, that the end justifies the means — and that, after
all, the Court’s holding is really not to be regarded as precedent.”).
Defendants also have offered no compelling reason why Ms. Neelley
constitutes a legitimate class of one. She of course can be described as a class of
29
one because she is the only person in Alabama between 1962 and at least 2015 whose
death sentence was later commuted to life with the possibility of parole. Defendants
suggest that happened because of what the Alabama Legislature may have viewed
as “a loophole in Alabama’s parole laws that would allow the State’s most dangerous
convicted murderers out of prison,” a loophole that the legislature sought to close
via Act 2003-300. (Doc. # 81, at 26.) That amounts to an acknowledgement that
the legislature simply thought Ms. Neelley deserved more punishment than a
sentence of life with the possibility of parole. Nixon certainly does not stand for the
proposition that the legislature can single out an individual for punishment because
she really deserves it.
Furthermore, the Nixon Court’s bill-of-attainder holding did not hinge on its
description of President Nixon as a legitimate class of one. Rather, the Nixon court
devoted the vast majority of its bill-of-attainder discussion to its holding that the law
before it did not punish President Nixon. Id. at 472–84. As the D.C. Circuit put it,
“the statute at issue in Nixon created a ‘legitimate class of one’ and served significant
public purposes beyond the burdens inflicted on former President Nixon.” Foretich
v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at
472). Act 2003-300, on the other hand, “creates a vilified class of one with no
attendant nonpunitive purposes.” Id.
30
In short, Act 2003-300 is an unconstitutional bill of attainder, Defendants
arguments notwithstanding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion is not meant to suggest that Ms. Neelley’s particular
crime does not deserve a punishment greater than life with the possibility of parole.
That question does not have this court’s name on it.
Nor is it a question for the Alabama Legislature to answer. The Alabama
Legislature may have disagreed with Governor James’s decision to commute Ms.
Neelley’s sentence to life with the possibility of parole, or perhaps it thought
Governor James meant to commute her sentence to life without the possibility of
parole. But the Alabama Legislature could not increase her punishment after her
death sentence was commuted. The Alabama Legislature’s attempt to do so in Act
2003-300 violates the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses of Article I,
Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. # 79) is GRANTED and Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment
(Doc. # 81) is DENIED.
A final judgment will issue separately.
DONE this 30th day of March, 2018.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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