Youngblood v. City of Troy Alabama
Filing
46
OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/3/15. (djy, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER JASON
YOUNGBLOOD,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF TROY, ALABAMA,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14cv299-MHT
(WO)
OPINION
Plaintiff
Christopher
officer
employed
by
Alabama,
brought
this
Jason
the
Youngblood,
defendant
lawsuit
City
against
his
a
police
of
Troy,
employer
claiming that he was denied promotions on account of
his race, in violation of
the Civil Rights Act of
1866, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 1981), and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17). Jurisdiction is proper
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and
§ 1343(a)(4)
(civil
rights),
§ 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII).
and
42
U.S.C.
This cause is now before
the court on the city’s motion for summary judgment in
its favor.
For the reasons that follow, the motion
will be granted.
I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD
“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or
defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The court must view the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
If no reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, there
is
no
genuine
issue
of
material
judgment will be granted.
fact
and
summary
Beal v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994).
2
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Youngblood, who is Caucasian, began his career in
police work in 1996, and, since that year, has worked
in a number of different roles: as a police officer in
four different police departments; as a member of the
National Guard; as an investigator in a non-uniformed
law-enforcement role; and as a train engineer for CSX.
He first joined the Troy Police Department in 2002,
left in 2004, returned in 2007, and has remained an
officer there since then.
He was promoted to the rank
of
has
sergeant
in
2010
and
been
employed
in
department’s Patrol Division throughout his tenure.
the
At
the time he applied for a promotion in 2012, he had
about
14
years
of
combined
experience
in
law
enforcement, including seven years with the Troy Police
Department.
In 2012, the Troy Police Department had available
promotions for three lieutenant positions in various
divisions.
Under the department’s promotion-procedure
3
policy, all applicants must submit to an evaluation,
which has several components, including a score on a
written exam and an interview before an oral-promotion
board.
They must also meet other eligibility criteria.1
After the scores on the evaluation have been compiled,
the department creates a ranked list of applicants by
scores.2
The Chief of Police is sent a list of the top
three eligible applicants. Under the policy, he
has
discretion to decide which of those three applicants
should be awarded the promotion.
1. The components are weighted in the following
way: written exam (40 %), oral interview (40 %), job
experience (10 %), formal education (5 %), and job
evaluation (5 %).
To be eligible for promotion, applicants also
must have held the rank of sergeant for at least a
year,
been
in
good
standing
with
satisfactory
evaluations over the prior 24 months, and not have been
disciplined with a suspension during the prior 12
months.
If any of the applicants is ineligible under
these additional criteria, they are crossed off the
list and the next highest ranked person on the list
moves up.
2.
4
In 2012, Youngblood had the highest score on the
evaluation for promotion to lieutenant.3
the
other
qualification
criteria
However, he was not promoted.
for
He also met
a
promotion.
Although Chief of Police
Jimmy Ennis repeatedly considered him for a promotion,
on
each
occasion
individual.
Barnes.
Ennis
he
first
selected
another
promoted
qualified
a
man,
white
Lee
Ennis’s second and third selections were both
black men: Greg Wright and John Jerkins, respectively.
In addition, in a prior year, Ennis had selected Bryan
Weed, a white man, for lieutenant over Youngblood.
Around the same time that Police Chief Ennis was
considering
opening
whom
for
department
who
a
to
promote
lieutenant,
is
black
into
a
filed
the
second
lieutenant
an
Equal
in
2012
the
Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge claiming that he
had been denied promotions due to race.4
Youngblood
3. The range of applicant scores were all within
less than 10 points on a 100-point scale.
4. There has been considerable debate between the
parties as to when, exactly, Ennis knew of this EEOC
(continued ...)
5
argues that Ennis promoted the two black individuals to
lieutenant in response to the EEOC complaint, and in an
effort to disprove the charge of discrimination.
Believing that he had been discriminated against on
the
basis
of
race,
Youngblood
filed
an
EEOC
charge
alleging racial discrimination in failing to promote
him.
He then filed this suit.
III. ANALYSIS
Youngblood
under
Title
brings
VII5
and
his
42
race-discrimination
U.S.C.
§
1981.6
As
claim
these
charge and whether he found out before or after he
promoted Wright. For the purposes of summary judgment,
the court assumes that Ennis knew of the EEOC charge
before he promoted Wright.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) provides, in part, as
follows: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to ... discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race....”
6. Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in
the making and enforcing of contracts and is a
statutory remedy available in both the public and
private sectors. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
(continued ...)
6
statutes have the same standards of proof and use the
same analytical framework, Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d
1281,
1296
“explicitly
n.20
(11th
address
Cir.
the
2009),
Title
VII
the
court
claim
will
with
the
understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1981
claim as well.”
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161
F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).
When, as Youngblood does here, a plaintiff presents
circumstantial evidence of intent to prove a Title VII
claim,
the
court
uses
the
analytical
framework
established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp.
v.
framework,
Green,
the
411
U.S.
792
plaintiff
must
(1973).7
first
Under
this
establish
a
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975).
Section 1981
permits claims for intentional racial discrimination in
“the making, performance, modification, and termination
of [employment] contracts,” as well as “the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of
the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
In his complaint, Youngblood sought to bring a
discrimination claim under a “disparate impact” theory.
However, as he has presented no statistical evidence or
otherwise argued that he has shown a disparate-impact
claim, the court concludes that he has abandoned that
theory.
7.
7
prima-facie case of discrimination.
the
plaintiff
discriminatory
has
presented
failure
discrimination arises.
then
offer
to
a
prima-facie
promote,
Id. at 802.
legitimate,
Id. at 802.
a
case
of
presumption
of
“The employer must
nondiscriminatory
reasons
the employment action to rebut the presumption.
employer
successfully
rebuts
the
Once
for
If the
presumption,
the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to discredit the
proffered
nondiscriminatory
they
pretextual.”
are
reasons
Standard,
by
161
showing
F.3d
that
at
1331
(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04).
And
the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient for a
reasonable factfinder to discredit all of the proffered
reasons to succeed.
See Chapman v. AI Transport, 229
F.3d 1012, 1037 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (“In order to
avoid
summary
sufficient
conclude
judgment,
evidence
that
each
for
a
a
of
plaintiff
reasonable
the
must
produce
factfinder
employer's
to
proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons is pretextual.”); Crawford v.
City of Fairburn, 482 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007).
8
(“If the employer proffers more than one legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must rebut each
of
the
reasons
judgment.”);
to
Combs
survive
v.
a
Plantation
motion
for
Patterns,
summary
106
F.3d
1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997) (where plaintiff failed to
rebut one of the three reasons, defendant was entitled
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law
on
charge
of
impermissible discrimination).
Youngblood
may
establish
a
prima-facie
case
of
discriminatory failure to promote by showing that “(1)
he was in a protected group; (2) he was not given the
promotion; (3) he was qualified for the position; and
(4) someone outside of the protected group was given
the position.”
Standard, 161 F.3d at 1333.
has met this burden.
Youngblood
It is undisputed that Youngblood
is a member of a protected group, see McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976); he
was not promoted to lieutenant; he was qualified for
the position; and, as to the promotions of Wright and
Jerkins, someone outside Youngblood’s protected group
9
was
given
shifts
the
to
promotion.
the
city
Accordingly,
produce
to
the
legitimate,
a
burden
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
The city clearly has met this burden.
The city put
forth the explanations of Chief Ennis, who explained
his
general
approach
and
his
specific
reasons
promoting Wright and Jerkins over Youngblood.
explained
that,
when
considering
for
Ennis
applicants
for
promotions, he considers many factors, including “the
division
wherein
the
candidate
will
be
assigned,
evaluations, past work performance in other areas of
the police department, and years of service: a totality
of the circumstances based on the personality and fit
for a specific position.”
Ennis Declaration (doc. no.
18-2), ¶ 14.
Ennis promoted Wright to lieutenant in the Patrol
Division.
police
Ennis explained that Wright is a veteran
officer
Department
who
since
has
1990.
worked
Wright
in
the
had
Troy
been
a
Police
police
officer about seven years longer than Youngblood, and,
10
unlike Youngblood, had been continuously employed with
the Troy Police Department.
Ennis noted that Wright
had been a successful narcotics officer and supervisor
in
the
Patrol
Division,
and
had
served
investigator in the Detective Division.
as
an
Wright also
was a member of “the ERT Team and [was] an Active
Shooter Instructor.”
to
be
the
eligible
most
for
Id., ¶ 12.
qualified
promotion
to
Ennis judged Wright
candidate
lieutenant
amongst
in
the
those
Patrol
Division.
Wright’s greater overall years of experience
with
department,
the
supervisory
experience
in
the
relevant division, experience in a number of divisions,
clearly
constitute
reason”
for
a
promoting
“legitimate,
Wright
nondiscriminatory
instead
of
Youngblood.
See Bradford v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
2d 1203, 1211 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.).
The
city
has
non-discriminatory
Jerkins
over
¶Jerkins
won
also
reason
provided
for
Youngblood.
was
in
Ennis’s
The
the
11
Public
a
legitimate,
promotion
lieutenant
Housing
of
position
Division.
Jerkins began his law enforcement career a year before
Youngblood began his, and, unlike Youngblood, had spent
his
entire
career
Department.
working
for
the
Troy
Police
Also in contrast with Youngblood, Jerkins
had experience not only in the Patrol Division, but
also in the Public Housing Division, which Ennis deemed
highly relevant to the promotion decision.
Jerkins
also had served in a leadership role in both the Patrol
and Public Housing Divisions at the same time.
stated
that
Jerkins’s
diversified
critical to the promotion decision.
experience
was
much
comparatively.”
more
Ennis
experience
was
“Youngblood’s work
limited
Declaration
Ennis
and
short-lived,
(doc.
no.
18-2),
¶ 13.
As
the
city
nondiscriminatory
decisions,
the
has
put
forth
explanations
burden
returns
for
to
legitimate,
the
promotion
Youngblood
to
put
forward sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact
finder
city’s
to
conclude
proffered
that
each
reasons
12
and
was
every
not
one
of
actually
the
the
motivation for the promotions.
Youngblood may do so
“(1) by showing that the legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons should not be believed; or (2) by showing that,
in light of all of the evidence, discriminatory reasons
more likely motivated the decision than the proffered
reasons.”
In
an
Standard, 161 F.3d at 1332.
effort
to
show
pretext,
Youngblood
makes
several arguments: that he was better qualified than
either candidate; that the promotion a year earlier of
a less-experienced white officer demonstrates that the
city’s proffered reasons for the promotions are false;
and that the timing of the promotions, soon after a
black
lieutenant
filed
an
EEOC
charge
discrimination, establishes pretext.
of
race
The court will
address each argument in turn.
Youngblood contends that he was better qualified
than the selected candidates for both positions.
“A
plaintiff seeking to use comparative qualifications to
rebut a defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
for
promoting
another
employee
13
‘must
show
that
the
disparities between the successful applicant's and her
own qualifications were of such weight and significance
that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial
judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over
the plaintiff.’”
Gray v. City of Montgomery, 756 F.
Supp. 2d 1339, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (Thompson, J.)
(quoting Brooks v. County Com'n of Jefferson County,
Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).
has
not
shown
qualifications
any
disparities
Youngblood
between
his
and those of Wright and Jerkins that
would meet that lofty standard.8
Indeed, the promoted
officers had more experience as police officers overall
and in the department.
the
better
candidate
Youngblood feels that he was
because
he
has
more
diverse
experience in the National Guard and working in larger
8. To the extent Youngblood relies on his score on
the evaluation as a disparity, it is worth noting that
Youngblood outscored the other applicants by less than
10 points on a 100-point scale; all of the applicants
scored in the 80s. Therefore, there is nothing in the
record to support the conclusion that the score
differential, in and of itself, is of such weight and
significance that no reasonable person would choose one
of the other applicants over him.
14
police departments outside of Troy than the promoted
individuals did.
that
he
Jerkins
was
Although Youngblood may well believe
more
based
on
qualified
that
than
either
experience,
Wright
“‘a
or
plaintiff
employee may not establish that an employer's proffered
reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom
of the employer's reason’ as long as ‘the reason is one
that
might
motivate
a
reasonable
employer.’”
Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267
(11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns,
106
F.3d
1519,
1543
(11th
Bradford, 346 F. Supp. 2d
Cir.
1997));
at 1211.
see
also
A reasonable
employer might, as did Chief Ennis, prefer to promote
otherwise qualified individuals based upon a record of
successful
rather
experience
than
employer
on
would
candidate’s
within
experience
have
success
in
more
and
his
own
prior
employment;
difficulty
experience
employer than in his own workplace.
15
organization
gauging
with
the
a
another
Youngblood
also
argues
that
Ennis’s
proffered
reasons for promoting Wright and Jerkins are not to be
believed
because,
in
the
previous
year,
Ennis
had
promoted Bryan Weed, a white officer, to the rank of
lieutenant,
despite
the
fact
that
he
had
less
experience than Youngblood did.
Youngblood contends
that
experience
Weed
had
eight
years
of
in
law
enforcement overall, and six years of experience in the
Troy Police Department, less than Youngblood’s seven
years of experience in the department and 14 years of
combined law-enforcement experience.9
Because Ennis
once promoted an individual with less experience than
him, Youngblood argues, Ennis must be lying now when he
9. The
court
calculates
Youngblood’s
total
experience slightly differently from the way it was
done by him, who contends he had “approximately 15
years of combined law enforcement experience with seven
of those years coming from employment with Defendant.”
Pl’s Response (doc. no. 25), at 11.
Also, the Weed
promotion came the year prior to the 2012 promotions
Youngblood now challenges; accordingly, Youngblood at
the time of the Weed promotion would have had only
about six years of experience in the department and 13
years of police experience combined. In any case, the
exact amount of experience he had makes no difference
to the outcome.
16
now explains that he promoted Wright and Jerkins based
on their experience.
Arguably, if Youngblood could show with admissible
evidence
regarding
the
Weed
promotion
that
Ennis’s
current explanation of how and why he makes promotions
is
untrue,
pretext.
that
evidence
could
help
See Standard, 161 F.3d at 1332.
Youngblood has presented is argument.
present
to
any
admissible
evidence
establish
However, all
He has failed to
regarding
the
Weed
promotion decision, such as what division the position
was in, what kind of experience Weed had, what kind of
evaluations he had received, or Ennis’s explanation for
the promotion.
parties
stated
Indeed, at the pretrial conference, the
that
they
had
not
discovery as to the promotion of Weed.
conducted
any
Simply put, the
court knows nothing about how or why Weed was selected
for
promotion
and
accordingly
cannot
draw
any
conclusions from it.
Moreover, Ennis’s decision to promote an individual
with less experience does not contradict his earlier
17
explanation.
As Ennis explained it, experience is only
one of several factors that he considers when making
promotion
decisions:
ultimately
he
makes
decisions
“based on totality of the circumstances based on the
personality and fit for a specific position.”10
Declaration (doc. no. 18-2), ¶ 14.
explained
that
he
does
not
Ennis
In addition, Ennis
value
a
candidate’s
experience outside the department as much as experience
in the department, because he cannot assess the value
of a candidate’s outside experience as well.
Viewed in
this lens, Youngblood did not have significantly more
experience than Weed supposedly did.
Thus, the Weed
promotion does not contradict Ennis’s explanation of
the approach he takes to promotions and falls far short
of
establishing
that
Ennis’s
explanations
for
the
promotions of Wright and Jerkins are pretextual.
10. While “personality” is a subjective criterion,
that does not alone render it suspect. See Chapman v.
AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (“subjective reasons are not the red-headed
stepchildren
of
proffered
nondiscriminatory
explanations for employment decisions”).
18
Finally, Youngblood relies on the timing of the
challenged promotions--the first of which he contends
came shortly after a black lieutenant filed an EEOC
race-discrimination
charge--to
establish
pretext.
Youngblood argues that Ennis was or could have been
motivated by pressure to promote a black person after
he
got
word
officer
of
within
an
the
EEOC
complaint
department.
filed
While
by
another
the
parties
dispute whether Ennis knew of this EEOC charge before
he
made
the
decision
to
promote
Wright,
the
court
assumes for the purposes of argument that Ennis was
aware
of
it
before
making
both
contested
promotion
decisions.
As a general
matter, timing, of course,
can be
probative of discriminatory intent, but it does not
always establish a triable issue of material fact.
See
Wu v. Se.-Atl. Beverage Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1317,
1337 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (Pannell, J.) (citing retaliation
cases
where
establish
a
temporal
triable
proximity
issue
of
19
was
fact
on
sufficient
to
causation
and
cases where temporal proximity, though close, did not
establish a triable issue).
promotions
is
not
alone
Here, the timing of the
sufficient
to
establish
a
triable issue of fact as to pretext, as the evidence
that the promotions were appropriate is overwhelming.
The employer promoted two highly qualified individuals
with more relevant experience than Youngblood had, and
the record contains no other evidence that the decision
was motivated by race.
Indeed, Chief Ennis four times
chose both white and black candidates for promotion
over
Youngblood.
reasonable
jury
Under
could
these
conclude
circumstances,
that
Ennis
no
promoted
Wright and Jerkins over Youngblood due to race, and
there
is
no
dispute
of
material
fact.
Beal
v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir.
1994).
At
his
deposition,
Youngblood
admirably
conceded
that, if one accepted at face value the qualities Ennis
said he preferred in the candidates for lieutenant, the
decisions
to
promote
Wright
20
and
Jerkins
were
reasonable.
77:6-78:9.
See Youngblood Deposition (doc. no. 18-1),
Youngblood has failed to present sufficient
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude
that Ennis’s explanations for his promotion decisions
were untrue or that they were motivated by race.
In
the
of
absence
Ennis’s
of
such
admittedly
evidence,
reasonable
and
in
the
face
justification
for
promoting others over him, Youngblood’s discrimination
claims
cannot
succeed.
Where,
as
here,
“the
defendant's justification evidence completely overcomes
any inference to be drawn from the evidence submitted
by
the
plaintiff,
the
district
court
may
properly
acknowledge that fact and award summary judgment to the
employer.”
Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals, Co., 821 F.2d
590, 597 (11th Cir. 1987).
Accordingly, the court will
enter summary judgment in favor of the City of Troy.
21
An appropriate judgment will be entered.
DONE, this the 3rd day of August, 2015.
_ /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?