Youngblood v. City of Troy Alabama

Filing 46

OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/3/15. (djy, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER JASON
YOUNGBLOOD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF TROY, ALABAMA,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14cv299-MHT
(WO)

OPINION
Plaintiff

Christopher

officer

employed

by

Alabama,

brought

this

Jason

the

Youngblood,

defendant

lawsuit

City

against

his

a

police

of

Troy,

employer

claiming that he was denied promotions on account of
his race, in violation of

the Civil Rights Act of

1866, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 1981), and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17). Jurisdiction is proper
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and
§ 1343(a)(4)

(civil

rights),

§ 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII).

and

42

U.S.C.

This cause is now before

the court on the city’s motion for summary judgment in
its favor.

For the reasons that follow, the motion

will be granted.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD
“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying
each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or
defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The court must view the facts

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

If no reasonable jury could

return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, there
is

no

genuine

issue

of

material

judgment will be granted.

fact

and

summary

Beal v. Paramount Pictures

Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994).
2

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Youngblood, who is Caucasian, began his career in
police work in 1996, and, since that year, has worked
in a number of different roles: as a police officer in
four different police departments; as a member of the
National Guard; as an investigator in a non-uniformed
law-enforcement role; and as a train engineer for CSX.
He first joined the Troy Police Department in 2002,
left in 2004, returned in 2007, and has remained an
officer there since then.

He was promoted to the rank

of

has

sergeant

in

2010

and

been

employed

in

department’s Patrol Division throughout his tenure.

the
At

the time he applied for a promotion in 2012, he had
about

14

years

of

combined

experience

in

law

enforcement, including seven years with the Troy Police
Department.
In 2012, the Troy Police Department had available
promotions for three lieutenant positions in various
divisions.

Under the department’s promotion-procedure
3

policy, all applicants must submit to an evaluation,
which has several components, including a score on a
written exam and an interview before an oral-promotion
board.

They must also meet other eligibility criteria.1

After the scores on the evaluation have been compiled,
the department creates a ranked list of applicants by
scores.2

The Chief of Police is sent a list of the top

three eligible applicants. Under the policy, he

has

discretion to decide which of those three applicants
should be awarded the promotion.

1. The components are weighted in the following
way: written exam (40 %), oral interview (40 %), job
experience (10 %), formal education (5 %), and job
evaluation (5 %).
To be eligible for promotion, applicants also
must have held the rank of sergeant for at least a
year,
been
in
good
standing
with
satisfactory
evaluations over the prior 24 months, and not have been
disciplined with a suspension during the prior 12
months.
If any of the applicants is ineligible under
these additional criteria, they are crossed off the
list and the next highest ranked person on the list
moves up.
2.

4

In 2012, Youngblood had the highest score on the
evaluation for promotion to lieutenant.3
the

other

qualification

criteria

However, he was not promoted.

for

He also met
a

promotion.

Although Chief of Police

Jimmy Ennis repeatedly considered him for a promotion,
on

each

occasion

individual.
Barnes.

Ennis

he
first

selected

another

promoted

qualified

a

man,

white

Lee

Ennis’s second and third selections were both

black men: Greg Wright and John Jerkins, respectively.
In addition, in a prior year, Ennis had selected Bryan
Weed, a white man, for lieutenant over Youngblood.
Around the same time that Police Chief Ennis was
considering
opening

whom

for

department

who

a

to

promote

lieutenant,
is

black

into
a

filed

the

second

lieutenant
an

Equal

in

2012
the

Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge claiming that he
had been denied promotions due to race.4

Youngblood

3. The range of applicant scores were all within
less than 10 points on a 100-point scale.
4. There has been considerable debate between the
parties as to when, exactly, Ennis knew of this EEOC
(continued ...)
5

argues that Ennis promoted the two black individuals to
lieutenant in response to the EEOC complaint, and in an
effort to disprove the charge of discrimination.
Believing that he had been discriminated against on
the

basis

of

race,

Youngblood

filed

an

EEOC

charge

alleging racial discrimination in failing to promote
him.

He then filed this suit.

III. ANALYSIS
Youngblood
under

Title

brings

VII5

and

his
42

race-discrimination

U.S.C.

§

1981.6

As

claim
these

charge and whether he found out before or after he
promoted Wright. For the purposes of summary judgment,
the court assumes that Ennis knew of the EEOC charge
before he promoted Wright.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) provides, in part, as
follows: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to ... discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race....”
6. Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in
the making and enforcing of contracts and is a
statutory remedy available in both the public and
private sectors. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
(continued ...)
6

statutes have the same standards of proof and use the
same analytical framework, Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d
1281,

1296

“explicitly

n.20

(11th

address

Cir.

the

2009),

Title

VII

the

court

claim

will

with

the

understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1981
claim as well.”

Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161

F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).
When, as Youngblood does here, a plaintiff presents
circumstantial evidence of intent to prove a Title VII
claim,

the

court

uses

the

analytical

framework

established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp.

v.

framework,

Green,
the

411

U.S.

792

plaintiff

must

(1973).7
first

Under

this

establish

a

Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975).
Section 1981
permits claims for intentional racial discrimination in
“the making, performance, modification, and termination
of [employment] contracts,” as well as “the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of
the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
In his complaint, Youngblood sought to bring a
discrimination claim under a “disparate impact” theory.
However, as he has presented no statistical evidence or
otherwise argued that he has shown a disparate-impact
claim, the court concludes that he has abandoned that
theory.
7.

7

prima-facie case of discrimination.
the

plaintiff

discriminatory

has

presented

failure

discrimination arises.
then

offer

to

a

prima-facie

promote,

Id. at 802.

legitimate,

Id. at 802.

a

case

of

presumption

of

“The employer must

nondiscriminatory

reasons

the employment action to rebut the presumption.
employer

successfully

rebuts

the

Once

for

If the

presumption,

the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to discredit the
proffered

nondiscriminatory

they

pretextual.”

are

reasons

Standard,

by
161

showing
F.3d

that

at

1331

(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04).

And

the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient for a
reasonable factfinder to discredit all of the proffered
reasons to succeed.

See Chapman v. AI Transport, 229

F.3d 1012, 1037 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (“In order to
avoid

summary

sufficient
conclude

judgment,

evidence
that

each

for

a
a

of

plaintiff
reasonable

the

must

produce

factfinder

employer's

to

proffered

nondiscriminatory reasons is pretextual.”); Crawford v.
City of Fairburn, 482 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007).
8

(“If the employer proffers more than one legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must rebut each
of

the

reasons

judgment.”);

to

Combs

survive

v.

a

Plantation

motion

for

Patterns,

summary
106

F.3d

1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997) (where plaintiff failed to
rebut one of the three reasons, defendant was entitled
to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law

on

charge

of

impermissible discrimination).
Youngblood

may

establish

a

prima-facie

case

of

discriminatory failure to promote by showing that “(1)
he was in a protected group; (2) he was not given the
promotion; (3) he was qualified for the position; and
(4) someone outside of the protected group was given
the position.”

Standard, 161 F.3d at 1333.

has met this burden.

Youngblood

It is undisputed that Youngblood

is a member of a protected group, see McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976); he
was not promoted to lieutenant; he was qualified for
the position; and, as to the promotions of Wright and
Jerkins, someone outside Youngblood’s protected group
9

was

given

shifts

the

to

promotion.

the

city

Accordingly,
produce

to

the

legitimate,

a

burden

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
The city clearly has met this burden.

The city put

forth the explanations of Chief Ennis, who explained
his

general

approach

and

his

specific

reasons

promoting Wright and Jerkins over Youngblood.
explained

that,

when

considering

for

Ennis

applicants

for

promotions, he considers many factors, including “the
division

wherein

the

candidate

will

be

assigned,

evaluations, past work performance in other areas of
the police department, and years of service: a totality
of the circumstances based on the personality and fit
for a specific position.”

Ennis Declaration (doc. no.

18-2), ¶ 14.
Ennis promoted Wright to lieutenant in the Patrol
Division.
police

Ennis explained that Wright is a veteran

officer

Department

who

since

has

1990.

worked
Wright

in

the

had

Troy

been

a

Police
police

officer about seven years longer than Youngblood, and,
10

unlike Youngblood, had been continuously employed with
the Troy Police Department.

Ennis noted that Wright

had been a successful narcotics officer and supervisor
in

the

Patrol

Division,

and

had

served

investigator in the Detective Division.

as

an

Wright also

was a member of “the ERT Team and [was] an Active
Shooter Instructor.”
to

be

the

eligible

most

for

Id., ¶ 12.

qualified

promotion

to

Ennis judged Wright

candidate
lieutenant

amongst
in

the

those
Patrol

Division.

Wright’s greater overall years of experience

with

department,

the

supervisory

experience

in

the

relevant division, experience in a number of divisions,
clearly

constitute

reason”

for

a

promoting

“legitimate,
Wright

nondiscriminatory

instead

of

Youngblood.

See Bradford v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
2d 1203, 1211 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.).
The

city

has

non-discriminatory
Jerkins

over

¶Jerkins

won

also
reason

provided
for

Youngblood.
was

in

Ennis’s

The

the
11

Public

a

legitimate,
promotion

lieutenant
Housing

of

position
Division.

Jerkins began his law enforcement career a year before
Youngblood began his, and, unlike Youngblood, had spent
his

entire

career

Department.

working

for

the

Troy

Police

Also in contrast with Youngblood, Jerkins

had experience not only in the Patrol Division, but
also in the Public Housing Division, which Ennis deemed
highly relevant to the promotion decision.

Jerkins

also had served in a leadership role in both the Patrol
and Public Housing Divisions at the same time.
stated

that

Jerkins’s

diversified

critical to the promotion decision.
experience

was

much

comparatively.”

more

Ennis

experience

was

“Youngblood’s work

limited

Declaration

Ennis

and

short-lived,

(doc.

no.

18-2),

¶ 13.
As

the

city

nondiscriminatory
decisions,

the

has

put

forth

explanations

burden

returns

for
to

legitimate,

the

promotion

Youngblood

to

put

forward sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact
finder
city’s

to

conclude

proffered

that

each

reasons
12

and

was

every
not

one

of

actually

the
the

motivation for the promotions.

Youngblood may do so

“(1) by showing that the legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons should not be believed; or (2) by showing that,
in light of all of the evidence, discriminatory reasons
more likely motivated the decision than the proffered
reasons.”
In

an

Standard, 161 F.3d at 1332.
effort

to

show

pretext,

Youngblood

makes

several arguments: that he was better qualified than
either candidate; that the promotion a year earlier of
a less-experienced white officer demonstrates that the
city’s proffered reasons for the promotions are false;
and that the timing of the promotions, soon after a
black

lieutenant

filed

an

EEOC

charge

discrimination, establishes pretext.

of

race

The court will

address each argument in turn.
Youngblood contends that he was better qualified
than the selected candidates for both positions.

“A

plaintiff seeking to use comparative qualifications to
rebut a defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
for

promoting

another

employee
13

‘must

show

that

the

disparities between the successful applicant's and her
own qualifications were of such weight and significance
that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial
judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over
the plaintiff.’”

Gray v. City of Montgomery, 756 F.

Supp. 2d 1339, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (Thompson, J.)
(quoting Brooks v. County Com'n of Jefferson County,
Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).
has

not

shown

qualifications

any

disparities

Youngblood

between

his

and those of Wright and Jerkins that

would meet that lofty standard.8

Indeed, the promoted

officers had more experience as police officers overall
and in the department.
the

better

candidate

Youngblood feels that he was
because

he

has

more

diverse

experience in the National Guard and working in larger
8. To the extent Youngblood relies on his score on
the evaluation as a disparity, it is worth noting that
Youngblood outscored the other applicants by less than
10 points on a 100-point scale; all of the applicants
scored in the 80s. Therefore, there is nothing in the
record to support the conclusion that the score
differential, in and of itself, is of such weight and
significance that no reasonable person would choose one
of the other applicants over him.
14

police departments outside of Troy than the promoted
individuals did.
that

he

Jerkins

was

Although Youngblood may well believe

more

based

on

qualified
that

than

either

experience,

Wright

“‘a

or

plaintiff

employee may not establish that an employer's proffered
reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom
of the employer's reason’ as long as ‘the reason is one
that

might

motivate

a

reasonable

employer.’”

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267
(11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns,
106

F.3d

1519,

1543

(11th

Bradford, 346 F. Supp. 2d

Cir.

1997));

at 1211.

see

also

A reasonable

employer might, as did Chief Ennis, prefer to promote
otherwise qualified individuals based upon a record of
successful
rather

experience

than

employer

on

would

candidate’s

within

experience
have

success

in

more
and

his

own

prior

employment;

difficulty

experience

employer than in his own workplace.

15

organization

gauging

with

the
a

another

Youngblood

also

argues

that

Ennis’s

proffered

reasons for promoting Wright and Jerkins are not to be
believed

because,

in

the

previous

year,

Ennis

had

promoted Bryan Weed, a white officer, to the rank of
lieutenant,

despite

the

fact

that

he

had

less

experience than Youngblood did.

Youngblood contends

that

experience

Weed

had

eight

years

of

in

law

enforcement overall, and six years of experience in the
Troy Police Department, less than Youngblood’s seven
years of experience in the department and 14 years of
combined law-enforcement experience.9

Because Ennis

once promoted an individual with less experience than
him, Youngblood argues, Ennis must be lying now when he
9. The
court
calculates
Youngblood’s
total
experience slightly differently from the way it was
done by him, who contends he had “approximately 15
years of combined law enforcement experience with seven
of those years coming from employment with Defendant.”
Pl’s Response (doc. no. 25), at 11.
Also, the Weed
promotion came the year prior to the 2012 promotions
Youngblood now challenges; accordingly, Youngblood at
the time of the Weed promotion would have had only
about six years of experience in the department and 13
years of police experience combined. In any case, the
exact amount of experience he had makes no difference
to the outcome.
16

now explains that he promoted Wright and Jerkins based
on their experience.
Arguably, if Youngblood could show with admissible
evidence

regarding

the

Weed

promotion

that

Ennis’s

current explanation of how and why he makes promotions
is

untrue,

pretext.

that

evidence

could

help

See Standard, 161 F.3d at 1332.

Youngblood has presented is argument.
present

to

any

admissible

evidence

establish

However, all

He has failed to

regarding

the

Weed

promotion decision, such as what division the position
was in, what kind of experience Weed had, what kind of
evaluations he had received, or Ennis’s explanation for
the promotion.
parties

stated

Indeed, at the pretrial conference, the
that

they

had

not

discovery as to the promotion of Weed.

conducted

any

Simply put, the

court knows nothing about how or why Weed was selected
for

promotion

and

accordingly

cannot

draw

any

conclusions from it.
Moreover, Ennis’s decision to promote an individual
with less experience does not contradict his earlier
17

explanation.

As Ennis explained it, experience is only

one of several factors that he considers when making
promotion

decisions:

ultimately

he

makes

decisions

“based on totality of the circumstances based on the
personality and fit for a specific position.”10
Declaration (doc. no. 18-2), ¶ 14.
explained

that

he

does

not

Ennis

In addition, Ennis

value

a

candidate’s

experience outside the department as much as experience
in the department, because he cannot assess the value
of a candidate’s outside experience as well.

Viewed in

this lens, Youngblood did not have significantly more
experience than Weed supposedly did.

Thus, the Weed

promotion does not contradict Ennis’s explanation of
the approach he takes to promotions and falls far short
of

establishing

that

Ennis’s

explanations

for

the

promotions of Wright and Jerkins are pretextual.

10. While “personality” is a subjective criterion,

that does not alone render it suspect. See Chapman v.
AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (“subjective reasons are not the red-headed
stepchildren
of
proffered
nondiscriminatory
explanations for employment decisions”).
18

Finally, Youngblood relies on the timing of the
challenged promotions--the first of which he contends
came shortly after a black lieutenant filed an EEOC
race-discrimination

charge--to

establish

pretext.

Youngblood argues that Ennis was or could have been
motivated by pressure to promote a black person after
he

got

word

officer

of

within

an
the

EEOC

complaint

department.

filed
While

by

another

the

parties

dispute whether Ennis knew of this EEOC charge before
he

made

the

decision

to

promote

Wright,

the

court

assumes for the purposes of argument that Ennis was
aware

of

it

before

making

both

contested

promotion

decisions.
As a general

matter, timing, of course,

can be

probative of discriminatory intent, but it does not
always establish a triable issue of material fact.

See

Wu v. Se.-Atl. Beverage Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1317,
1337 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (Pannell, J.) (citing retaliation
cases

where

establish

a

temporal
triable

proximity

issue

of

19

was

fact

on

sufficient

to

causation

and

cases where temporal proximity, though close, did not
establish a triable issue).
promotions

is

not

alone

Here, the timing of the

sufficient

to

establish

a

triable issue of fact as to pretext, as the evidence
that the promotions were appropriate is overwhelming.
The employer promoted two highly qualified individuals
with more relevant experience than Youngblood had, and
the record contains no other evidence that the decision
was motivated by race.

Indeed, Chief Ennis four times

chose both white and black candidates for promotion
over

Youngblood.

reasonable

jury

Under
could

these

conclude

circumstances,

that

Ennis

no

promoted

Wright and Jerkins over Youngblood due to race, and
there

is

no

dispute

of

material

fact.

Beal

v.

Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir.
1994).
At

his

deposition,

Youngblood

admirably

conceded

that, if one accepted at face value the qualities Ennis
said he preferred in the candidates for lieutenant, the
decisions

to

promote

Wright
20

and

Jerkins

were

reasonable.
77:6-78:9.

See Youngblood Deposition (doc. no. 18-1),
Youngblood has failed to present sufficient

evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude
that Ennis’s explanations for his promotion decisions
were untrue or that they were motivated by race.

In

the

of

absence

Ennis’s

of

such

admittedly

evidence,
reasonable

and

in

the

face

justification

for

promoting others over him, Youngblood’s discrimination
claims

cannot

succeed.

Where,

as

here,

“the

defendant's justification evidence completely overcomes
any inference to be drawn from the evidence submitted
by

the

plaintiff,

the

district

court

may

properly

acknowledge that fact and award summary judgment to the
employer.”

Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals, Co., 821 F.2d

590, 597 (11th Cir. 1987).

Accordingly, the court will

enter summary judgment in favor of the City of Troy.

21

An appropriate judgment will be entered.
DONE, this the 3rd day of August, 2015.
_ /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE