Dennis v. Colvin (CONSENT)

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Wallace Capel, Jr on April 27, 2015. (scn, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
CRYSTEL ANN DENNIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:14cv339-WC

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

INTRODUCTION
Crystel Ann Dennis (“Plaintiff”) protectively filed an application for supplemental

security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Her application
was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ
issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled from the date she filed her application,
October 6, 2011, through the date of the decision. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals
Council, which rejected her request for review of the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ’s decision
consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”).1 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case

1

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to
Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry of a final
judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.

Pl.’s Consent to

Jurisdiction (Doc. 7); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 8). Based on the court’s
review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to benefits when the person is

unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2
To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011).
(1) Is the person presently unemployed?
(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?
(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific
impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of
Impairments]?
(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?
(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?
2

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.

2

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next
question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative
answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of
“not disabled.”
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step Four. See Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie
case of qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step One
through Step Four. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then
show there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can
perform. Id.
To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Id. at 1238-39. The RFC is what the claimant is
still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical
and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id.
at 1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and
work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the
claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical
Vocational Guidelines3 (“grids”) or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40.
The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary
or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job

3

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available
to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a
statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id.
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court
must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial
evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the
decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look
only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must
view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the
evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).
[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the
reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No
similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal
conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied
in evaluating claims.
Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

3

See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2.

4

III.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff was thirty-three years old at the time she filed her application, and had a

ninth-grade education. Tr. 21, 31. Following the administrative hearing, and employing
the five-step process, the ALJ found at Step One that Plaintiff “has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since October 6, 2011, the application date[.]” Tr. 15. At
Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments:
“major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, [and] panic disorder[.]” Id. At Step Three,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments[.]” Id. at 16.
Next, the ALJ articulated Plaintiff’s RFC, in pertinent part, as follows:
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of
work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations: the claimant can perform simple, routine repetitive tasks, can
occasionally interact with the general public, can work in close proximity
with coworkers and supervisors but needs to work independently, can work
in a goal oriented job as opposed to a production pace job, can occasionally
adapt to changes in the work setting, however, the changes need to be
introduced gradually over the course of 1 to 2 days, can maintain attention
and concentration for up to 2 hours at a time.
Id. at 18. Having consulted with a VE at the hearing, the ALJ concluded at Step Four
that Plaintiff “is unable to perform any past relevant work[.]” Id. at 21. Finally, at Step
Five, and relying upon the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that “[c]onsidering
the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
5

perform[.]” Id. at 21. The ALJ identified several representative occupations, including
“janitor,” “automobile detailer,” and “kitchen helper.” Id. at 22. Accordingly, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, since October 6, 2011, the date the application was filed[.]” Id.
IV.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM
Plaintiff presents as her “Statement Of Issue” whether “[t]he Comissioner’s

decision should be reversed because the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence.”

Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 3.

In her “Discussion” section she clarifies her

contention that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the
“ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of examining and treating physicians without
providing adequate reasons for this rejection[,]” and, furthermore, that “the medical
evidence of record contains no contradicting evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC filing
[sic].” Id.
V.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff first appears to argue that the ALJ erred in her consideration and

treatment of the opinion offered by the consultative psychological examiner, Dr. Randall
Jordan. Dr. Jordan evaluated Plaintiff on January 11, 2012. Tr. 217. Doctor Jordan
reviewed the medical evidence provided by the Disability Determination Service and, in
relevant part, noted the following conditions: “depression, anxiety, crying, sleep
problems, [and] paranoia[.]” Id. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Jordan that “she is always
6

upset, cries al lot [sic], cannot be by herself, is fearful, and gets paranoid thinking
someone is out to get her or her children. This has been ongoing for 1-2 years.” Id.
Based upon his evaluation of the evidence and examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Jordan’s
diagnostic impression was “Major Depressive Disorder, recurrent, moderate to severe,”
and he assigned her a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 45.4 Tr. 218.
He opined that Plaintiff cannot manage her finances “in a manner consistent with same
age peers and allows her husband to as she states she gets mixed up.” Tr. 219. He
further opined that Plaintiff “can function independently,” and that, “[i]n terms of
vocation,” Plaintiff’s “ability to carry out and remember instructions of a simple, one-step
nature is not compromised. The claimant cannot do multi-step tasks without some degree
of supervision.” Id. Nevertheless, Dr. Jordan further opined that, also as a matter of
vocation, Plaintiff’s “ability to respond well to coworkers, supervision, and everyday
work pressures is compromised to a moderate to severe degree due to psychiatric issues.
4

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently elaborated upon the meaning of a
GAF score as follows:
GAF is a standard measurement of an individual’s overall functioning level “with respect
only to psychological, social and occupational functioning.” American Psychiatric
Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at 32 (4th ed.1994)
(DSM–IV). A GAF of 31–40 indicates some impairment in reality testing or
communication or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, familiar
relations, judgment, thinking, or mood. Id. A score between 41 and 50 indicates serious
symptoms, such as suicidal ideation, serious impairment in social, occupational or school
functioning. Id. A score between 51 and 60 indicates moderate symptoms, such as
occasional panic attacks or moderate difficulty in social, occupational or school
functioning. Id.

Lacina v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
2015).

F. App’x

,

7

, 2015 WL 1453364, *2 n.2 (11th Cir. April 1,

Physical issues seem to be the primary limiting factor.

Continued psychiatric and

medical care is needed.” Id.
In her opinion, the ALJ reviewed in detail Dr. Jordan’s consultative examination
report. Tr. 19-20. Ultimately, she found Dr. Jordan’s report “persuasive[,]” noting Dr.
Jordan’s opinion that “while the claimant’s ability to respond well to coworkers,
supervision, and everyday work pressures is compromised to a moderate to severe degree
due to psychiatric issues, physical issues seem to be the primary limiting factor.” Id. at
20-21 (citing Tr. 219). The ALJ further found that Dr. Jordan’s assessment of a GAF
score of 45 “is inconsistent with his opinion that the claimant can function independently,
and that, in terms of vocation, the claimant’s ability to carry out and remember
instructions of a simple, one-step nature is not compromised.” Id. at 21. Accordingly,
the ALJ concluded that the RFC she assigned to Plaintiff “fully accommodates” Dr.
Jordan’s specific findings about Plaintiff’s vocational aptitudes. Id.
Citing Dr. Jordan’s finding that Plaintiff’s “ability to respond well to coworkers,
supervision, and everyday work pressures is compromised to a moderate to severe degree
due to psychiatric issues,” Tr. 219, as well as Dr. Jordan’s assessment of a GAF score of
45, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Jordan’s report “documents [Plaintiff’s] inability to
perform the mental demands of any level of work activity.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 6. She
asserts that the “ALJ’s reasoning for her rejection of part of Dr. Jordan’s opinion is
inconsistent and inadequate.” Id. at 7. In essence, she contends that the ALJ erred in
8

qualifying Dr. Jordan’s more severe findings and limitations by relying upon his separate
conclusions that Plaintiff “can function independently” and that her “ability to carry out
and remember instructions of a simple, one-step nature is not compromised.” Id. (“The
ALJ assumes Dr. Jordan’s statement that Ms. Dennis ‘can function independently’
somehow negates his assignment of a GAF score of 45[, but that such statement does not
do so and, moreover, does not negate] his statement regarding moderate to severe
limitations with coworkers, supervisors and every day work pressures.”).
Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ committed reversible error in her treatment of
Dr. Jordan’s consultative opinion is without merit. As a preliminary matter, if the ALJ
may somehow be faulted for utilizing certain of Dr. Jordan’s findings to distinguish other
of his findings in the same report, Plaintiff is plainly guilty of the converse of the same
transgression.

See Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 7 (“Additionally, Dr. Jordan’s statement

regarding Ms. Dennis’ ability to carry out instructions of a simple, one-step nature (Tr.
219) is compromised by his GAF score of 45 and additional limitations, including her
moderate to severe degree of limitation in responding well to coworkers, supervision and
everyday work pressures[.]”). That is, Dr. Jordan’s findings, to the extent they actually
can be construed as conflicting, plainly cut both ways. If Dr. Jordan’s findings that
Plaintiff can “function independently” and “carry out and remember instructions of a
simple, one-step nature” are indeed somehow “compromised” by the GAF score he
assigned Plaintiff or his separate conclusion that her ability to respond to coworkers,
9

supervisors, and work pressures is moderately to severely compromised, then it must be
said that the latter findings are in turn “compromised” by the former to the extent all of
those factors figure in assessing Plaintiff’s ability to function at the level set by the ALJ.
In any event, it is evident that the ALJ’s decision in this regard is supported by
substantial evidence. Plaintiff stakes too much significance in the GAF score articulated
by Dr. Jordan. As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, “a [GAF] score is not dispositive
when determining disability.” Williams v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 580 F. App’x 732,
734 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished decision). Thus, while “GAF scores may be helpful in
formulating a claimant’s RFC, [they] . . . are not essential to the RFC’s accuracy, and an
ALJ’s failure to describe GAF scores does not render the ALJ’s RFC assessment
inaccurate.” Thornton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,

F. App’x

,

, 2015 WL

542323, *7 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2015) (citing Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d
235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, even if a GAF score of 45 broadly, and vaguely,
indicates some “serious symptoms,” id., the ALJ was warranted in concluding that, as a
matter of Plaintiff’s discrete identifiable vocational abilities, Dr. Jordan’s more specific
findings that Plaintiff “can function independently” and can “carry out and remember
instructions of a simple, one-step nature” provides substantial support for the ALJ’s
decision to discredit the GAF score to the extent it would conflict with Plaintiff’s RFC.
Likewise, the ALJ was justified in noting that, while Dr. Jordan opined that
Plaintiff’s “ability to respond well to coworkers, supervision, and everyday work
10

pressures is compromised to a moderate to severe degree,” Dr. Jordan clearly indicated
his belief that “[p]hysical issues seem to be the primary limiting factor” causing such
restrictions. Tr. 219. Of course, none of the “physical issues” described by Plaintiff at
the hearing, including back pain and medication side effects, see Tr. 31, 35, were found
by the ALJ to constitute severe impairments and Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s
conclusions in that regard. As such, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to
distinguish Dr. Jordan’s opinion to the extent he opined that Plaintiff’s vocational
abilities are limited by her non-severe physical impairments.
Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ reversibly erred in rejecting the opinion of her
treating physician, Dr. Yongkuma. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 7-8. The opinion evidence
which Plaintiff identifies as having been erroneously rejected is a form completed by Dr.
Yongkuma on January 14, 2013, just over a week prior to the evidentiary hearing before
the ALJ, in which he was asked to rate the degree of impairment or constriction of
Plaintiff’s abilities in a number of mental activities.

Tr. 240-42.

Apart from Dr.

Yongkuma’s less troubling findings, he opined that Plaintiff would experience “Marked”
limitations or restrictions in a number of such activities, including the following: “ability
to interact appropriately with the general public”; ability to carry out “daily activities”
like attending meetings, performing housework, an socializing with friends and
neighbors; “ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance
and be punctual with customary tolerances”; “ability to complete a normal workday and
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workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at
a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods”; and
“ability to respond to customary work pressures.” Id. Alongside these more restrictive
findings regarding a few of Plaintiff’s mental activities, Dr. Yongkuma found that
Plaintiff is only mildly or moderately impaired or limited in a number of mental activities
which are vocationally significant and which, furthermore, appear consistent with the
RFC articulated by the ALJ. For example, despite his opinion regarding Plaintiff’s
ability to interact with the general public, Dr. Yongkuma opined that Plaintiff is only
mildly impaired in her “ability to get along with co-workers or peers.” Tr. 240. Similar
to Dr. Jordan, Dr. Yongkuma opined that Plaintiff has only mild impairment in her
“ability to understand, remember and carry out simple [and complex] instructions.” Tr.
240-41. He further opined that Plaintiff has only mild impairment in both her “ability to
understand, remember and carry out repetitive tasks” and in her “ability to respond
appropriately to supervision.” Tr. 241. Likewise, Dr. Yongkuma opined that Plaintiff is
moderately impaired in her “ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods,” “to sustain a routine without special supervision,” “to make simple work-related
decisions,” and “to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.” Tr. 241.
The ALJ reviewed the medical evidence of Dr. Yongkuma’s treatment of Plaintiff.
Tr. 19-20. She rejected Dr. Yongkuma’s opinion that Plaintiff suffers marked restrictions
in her daily activities because “this finding is inconsistent with the claimant’s daily
12

activities and Dr. Yongkuma’s treatment notes.”

Tr. 16.

As for Dr. Yongkuma’s

assertion that Plaintiff suffers from “marked” limitations in certain mental activities, the
ALJ found such opinion “not persuasive as Dr. Yongkuma is not a mental health
specialist, unlike Dr. Jordan[,]” whose opinion the ALJ found more credible on matters
related to Plaintiff’s mental health. Tr. 21.
Plaintiff contends that, “[a]s a treating physician, the ALJ should have assigned
Dr. Yongkuma’s opinion substantial weight or clearly articulated reasons for failing to
give his opinion less weight.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 8. She maintains that the ALJ
“failed to adequately articulate reasons for her dismissal of Dr. Yongkuma’s opinion.”
Id. In Lacina, the Eleventh Circuit explained the deference Social Security regulations
ordinarily accord treating source opinion like that of a treating physician:
[T]he opinion of a treating source (i.e., a medical professional who is able
to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] medical
impairment(s)) is usually entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a
medical professional who sees the claimant only once or for a brief period
of time. An ALJ will also consider: the length, frequency, and nature of the
provider-patient relationship, the extent to which a provider or other source
presents relevant medical evidence to support his opinion, and the
consistency of an opinion with the record as a whole.
2015 WL 1453364, *5 n.6 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Where medical
source opinion is credited as a treating source opinion, it is ordinarily entitled to
deference. “Absent ‘good cause,’ an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating
physicians substantial or considerable weight.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631
F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
13

Good cause exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not
bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3)
treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the
doctor’s own medical records. With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a
treating physician’s opinion, but he must clearly articulate [the] reasons for
doing so.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
To the extent the ALJ indeed rejected Dr. Yongkuma’s opinion as asserted by
Plaintiff, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ is
correct that Dr. Yongkuma’s assessment that Plaintiff suffers a marked degree of
restriction on her daily activities is not supported by Plaintiff’s own description of her
daily activities or Dr. Yongkuma’s treatment notes. In pertinent part, Dr. Yongkuma
opined that Plaintiff’s ability to function with respect to her daily activities, such as
working around the house, is seriously affected. Tr. 240. However, Plaintiff testified
that she does household laundry (Tr. 34) and washes dishes (Tr. 35), and she also
indicated in her Function Report that she prepares her own meals (Tr. 150), does
housework for two hours at a time, three times per week (Tr. 150), and goes grocery
shopping (Tr. 151). Because nothing in Dr. Yongkuma’s treatment notes reflects the
serious impairment to Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities which he indicates on
the form highlighted by Plaintiff,5 and her own testimony and self-reporting does not
5

In general, the treatment notes of Dr. Yongkuma’s brief treatment relationship with Plaintiff
indicate that Plaintiff responded well to prescribed medications for her depression and anxiety
issues when she was compliant with the regimen prescribed by Dr. Yongkuma. See, e.g., Tr. 228
(Plaintiff reports feeling “much better” and Dr. Yongkuma remarks that Plaintiff “seems to be
doing very well” with 1mg dose of Xanax), 227 (Plaintiff reports “feeling much better” and that
14

otherwise substantiate the severity of Dr. Yongkuma’s opinion, the ALJ’s decision to
reject that portion of Dr. Yongkuma’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ was further justified in favoring the opinion of Dr. Jordan over that of
Dr. Yongkuma regarding the several “marked” limitations the latter source indicated with
respect to the mental activities of Plaintiff. In general, the Commissioner gives the
opinions of “specialists on issues within their areas of expertise more weight than nonspecialists.” Davis v. Barnhart, 186 F. App’x 965, 967 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished
decision). Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Yongkuma is not a
“mental health specialist.” As such, the ALJ was justified in affording Dr. Jordan’s
opinion greater weight to the extent which it found Plaintiff less restricted or limited in
her ability to function in the areas where Dr. Yongkuma found “marked” impairments.
Finally, the ALJ was justified in affording Dr. Yongkuma’s opinion less than
substantial weight because it is conclusory. As noted above, the ALJ carefully reviewed
Dr. Yongkuma’s treatment notes from his brief history treating Plaintiff. Tr. 19-20.
Apart from Plaintiff’s generalized complaints of depression or anxiety issues reflected in
the notes, none of Dr. Yongkuma’s treatment notes appear to provide a clear objective
basis for the several “marked” limitations which he attributes to Plaintiff.

This is

especially salient in view of the fact that the form opinion completed by Dr. Yongkuma
clearly anticipates that Dr. Yongkuma would complete a “narrative report” providing

“she has dealt with her social issues and is actually doing much better from that perspective”).
15

information regarding his opinion. See Tr. 240. However, no such “narrative report” has
been made a part of the record in this case. Indeed, Dr. Yongkuma even left blank the
“Comments” section at the end of the form where, presumably, he might have provided at
least a brief statement establishing the basis for some of his more limiting findings and
how those findings might be reconciled with the numerous other mental activities which
plainly touch on Plaintiff’s ability to work and in which Dr. Yongkuma opined that
Plaintiff suffers only “Mild” or “Moderate” restrictions or limitations. Accordingly, the
ALJ was justified in failing to fully credit Dr. Yongkuma’s opinion because it was
conclusory.
The court finds that Plaintiff’s claims that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to
sufficiently articulate her rejection of portions of the opinions of Drs. Jordan and
Yongkuma are without merit, and that the ALJ’s decision finding Plaintiff not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence.
VI.

CONCLUSION
The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that,

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
separate judgment will issue.
Done this 27th day of April, 2015.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.
WALLACE CAPEL, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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A