Dunn et al v. Thomas et al
Filing
1299
DAUBERT OPINION AS TO PHASE 2A EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 7/13/2017. (kh, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
EDWARD BRAGGS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his
official capacity as
Commissioner of
the Alabama Department of
Corrections, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
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)
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)
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14cv601-MHT
(WO)
DAUBERT OPINION
AS TO PHASE 2A EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
The plaintiffs in this phase of this class-action
lawsuit are seriously mentally ill state prisoners and
the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP).
The
defendants are officials of the Alabama Department of
Corrections
Associate
(ADOC)--Commissioner
Commissioner
Naglich--who
capacities.
are
sued
of
in
Jefferson
Health
only
Dunn
Services
their
and
Ruth
official
In Phase 2A of the case, the plaintiffs claim that
the defendants have failed to provide constitutionally
adequate
mental-health
care
to
ADOC
prisoners
with
serious mental-health needs, in violation of the Eighth
and
Fourteenth
Amendments
U.S.C. § 1983).1
(as
enforced
through
42
The court has jurisdiction of the
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question)
and § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights).
Beginning in December 2016, the court presided over
a
two-month
bench
trial
concerning
this
claim.
At
trial, the parties presented evidence from five expert
1. This case has been divided into three parts for
administrative convenience.
The claims in Phase 1,
which the parties settled with a consent decree
approved by the court, are under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, alleging
discrimination on the basis of physical disabilities
and failure to accommodate those disabilities.
See
Dunn v. Dunn, 318 F.R.D. 652 (M.D. Ala. 2016)
(Thompson, J.).
Phase 2A involves mental-health care.
The
parties
settled
claims
regarding
involuntary
medication
and
violations
of
the
ADA
and
the
Rehabilitation Act pending approval by this court, and
the trial proceeded on only the Eighth Amendment claim.
The claims in Phase 2B challenge the adequacy of
medical and dental care under the Eighth Amendment and
will be addressed later in the litigation.
2
witnesses, some of whom the parties had objected to
prior to trial.
the
experts’
asserted
The parties did not object to any of
qualifications,
objections
under
but
Daubert
the
v.
plaintiffs
Merrell
Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to portions of Dr.
Raymond Patterson’s testimony and to the methodology
underlying Robert Ayers’s opinion, and the defendants
asserted Daubert objections against Dr. Kathryn Burns’s
and
Eldon
Vail’s
methodologies.
The
court
recently
issued an opinion finding that the plaintiffs prevailed
on their Eighth Amendment claim in the Phase 2A trial.
Braggs v. Dunn, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 2773833,
2:14cv601-MHT (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2017) (Thompson, J.).
In tandem with that opinion, the court entered an order
overruling all Daubert objections and promised that an
opinion explaining why would follow later.
promised Daubert opinion.
3
This is the
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Well before the trial, the court entered a Phase 2
scheduling order setting forth its requirements for the
parties should they wish to bring Daubert challenges.
The court made clear that, if the parties wished the
court
to
consider
any
Daubert
challenges
at
trial,
“including any unresolved challenges previously raised
by either party in litigation on dispositive and class
certification
Daubert
motions,”
challenges
in
they
had
their
trial
to
address
briefs
those
detailing
proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, and
that,
“[a]bsent
Daubert
motions
exceptional
would
not
circumstances,”
be
entertained.
separate
Phase
2
Pretrial and Motion Deadlines Order (doc. no. 529) at
4-5; see also New Phase 2A Scheduling Order (doc. no.
748) at 4 (affirming deadlines in doc. no. 529).
Both
Daubert.
sides
challenged
expert
testimony
under
In their opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion
for class certification, the defendants challenged Dr.
Burns’s methodology under Daubert and stated that Vail
4
was not qualified under Daubert and Federal Rule of
Evidence
702
facility.
because
he
did
not
visit
every
ADOC
The plaintiffs asserted Daubert challenges
to the testimony of Ayers and the methodology of Dr.
Patterson’s audits in their summary judgment briefing.2
The
court
objection
overruled
against
Burns
the
in
defendants’
the
Daubert
class-certification
opinion, but did not find it necessary to resolve the
remaining Daubert objections before trial.
Dunn,
317
F.R.D.
634,
645-49
(M.D.
Braggs v.
Ala.
2016)
(Thompson, J.).
The plaintiffs reasserted their Daubert challenges
in their pre-trial brief, as required by the court in
order
to
raise
their
objections
at
trial.
The
defendants stated in their pre-trial brief: “The State
believes
that
restating
its
position
on
the
admissibility of the expert witnesses is unnecessary
2. The plaintiffs also challenged the testimony of
Dr. Robert Morgan on Daubert grounds. Pls.’ Pre-Trial
Brief (doc. no. at 966) at 269.
However, because the
defendants did not call Morgan to testify at trial, the
5
here
and
relies
upon
the
submitted on these issues.”
extensive
briefing
already
Defs.’ Pre-Trial Br. (doc.
no. 992) at 196 n.893.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The
Federal
admissibility
of
Rules
expert
of
Evidence
testimony.
See
govern
Daubert
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
the
v.
Rule
702 provides:
“A witness who is qualified as an
expert
by
knowledge,
skill,
experience, training, or education may
testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if:
a. The
expert’s
scientific,
technical,
or
other
specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
b. The
testimony
is
sufficient facts or data;
based
on
c. The testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods; and
plaintiffs’ Daubert challenge to his opinion is due to
be denied as moot.
6
d. The expert has reliably
the principles and methods
facts of this case.”
Fed.
R.
Evid.
“gatekeeping
Daubert,
702.
role”
509
The
trial
for
U.S.
at
court
expert
597,
applied
to the
must
witness
by
serve
a
testimony,
considering
three
requirements: “First, the expert must be qualified to
testify
competently
regarding
the
matter
he
or
she
intends to address; second, the expert’s methodology
...
must
be
reliable
...;
and
third,
the
expert’s
testimony must assist the trier of fact through the
application of expertise to understand the evidence or
determine a fact in issue.”
of
America,
(internal
requires
760
F.3d
quotation
the
“reliability”
and
court
Adams v. Laboratory Corp.
1322,
1328
citation
to
make
(11th
omitted).
both
determinations,
Cir.
2014)
Doing
“relevance”
disallowing
so
and
expert
testimony that is either unreliable or unhelpful to the
trier
burden
of
is
fact.
on
Daubert,
the
509
proponent
U.S.
of
at
expert
587-90.
testimony
The
to
establish the admissibility by a preponderance of the
7
evidence.
McCorvey
v.
Baxter
Healthcare
Corp.,
298
Court
provided
F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002).
In
Daubert,
non-exclusive
the
list
Supreme
of
factors
to
consider
a
when
examining a challenge to the methodology underlying an
expert’s
testimony,
including:
whether
a
theory
or
technique can be or has been tested; whether a theory
or
technique
has
been
subjected
to
peer
review
or
publication; whether a theory or technique has gained
widespread acceptance within the relevant community of
experts, or, rather, has been unable to garner more
than minimal support; and the known or potential rate
of error of a technique.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
These factors are not a “definitive checklist,” but are
considerations
that
may
shape
flexible inquiry under Rule 702.
the
trial
judge’s
Id. at 593-94. “[T]he
question of whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or
are
not,
reasonable
measures
of
reliability
in
a
particular case is a matter that the law grants the
trial
judge
broad
latitude
8
to
determine.”
United
States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation omitted).
Two
additional
considerations
Daubert inquiry are relevant here.
in
conducting
a
First, Daubert’s
reliability and relevance inquiry is not supposed to
“supplant
the
adversarial
system,”
meaning
that
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence,
proof
are
and
the
careful
instruction
traditional
and
on
the
burden
appropriate
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”
of
means
of
Quiet Tech.
DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
Second, the Daubert barriers to admissibility are more
relaxed in a bench trial, “where the judge is serving
as factfinder,” and the court need not be “concerned
about
dumping
a
barrage
evidence on a jury.”
of
questionable
scientific
Brown, 415 F.3d at 1268 (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
9
III. DISCUSSION
A. Dr. Kathryn Burns
While the defendants did not object to Dr. Burns’s
qualification as a correctional mental-health expert,
they objected to the methodology she employed to assess
the adequacy of mental-health care within ADOC.3
court
previously
addressed
Burns
defendants’
the
Daubert
objection
regarding
opinion.
Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634 (M.D. Ala.
2016) (Thompson, J.).
in
the
The
class-certification
In that opinion, the court found
that Burns’s methodology of evaluating the adequacy of
mental-health
care
within
ADOC
facilities
was
sufficiently reliable to overcome a Daubert challenge,
dismissing the defendants’ contentions that her sample
size was too small and that her non-random sampling
rendered her analysis unreliable.
court
also
found
that
her
Id. at 645-49.
expert
analysis
of
The
the
3. As a procedural matter, the plaintiffs argue
that the defendants have waived their objection to
Burns’s testimony by failing to address it in their
pre-trial brief.
The court does not reach this issue
10
mental-health care system was helpful to the trier of
fact.
Id. at 649-51.
With its previously entered
Daubert order, the court reached the same findings on
the
defendants’
objections
at
trial--that
Burns’s
testimony was admissible because her methodology was
reliable and conclusions helpful to the trier of fact.
In their post-trial brief, the defendants raised
two
additional
grounds
for
objecting
to
Burns’s
testimony under Daubert.
First, the defendants argued
that
identify
Burns
failed
to
during
her
trial
testimony specific prisoners whose experience supported
her
conclusions
and
extrapolated.”
1283) at 14.
iteration
of
that
Defs.’
she
therefore
Post-Trial
Filing
“improperly
(doc.
no.
This objection is simply a different
the
defendants’
previous
argument
that
Burns’s methodology was unreliable because it did not
include
a
sufficient
number
of
conclusions on a systemic level.
argument
unconvincing.
As
data
points
to
make
The court finds this
noted
in
the
because the defendants’ objection is overruled on the
11
class-certification
extensive
report
observations
prisoners
and
and
opinion,
that
Burns
identified
conclusions,
specific
provided
sources
including
documents
based
of
her
names
of
which
on
evaluated ADOC policies and practices.
an
she
See Joint Ex.
460, Burns Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1044); see also
Jama
v.
Esmor
Corr.
Servs.,
Inc.,
2007
WL
1847385,
97-3909, at *26-27 (D.N.J. June 25, 2007) (Debevoise,
J.)
(finding
health-care
a
limited
case
sampling
reliable,
method
especially
in
a
prison
because
the
analysis incorporated reviews of other documents that
enabled the expert to “draw general conclusions”).
Furthermore,
the
court
has
already
found
that
Burns’s conclusions are based on a sufficient quantity
of data and range of sources to be admissible under
Daubert.
See Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. at 645-49
(finding that non-random sampling was an accepted and
reliable
sample
merits.
method
size
was
among
prison
sufficient,
12
experts,
and
that
that
she
Burns’s
had
other
sources of information, such as internal documents).
Once a court has found that the expert testimony is
based
on
sufficient
data
and
that
the
underlying
methodology is sound, the strength of conclusions drawn
from the expert’s analysis and the weight due to those
conclusions is for the finder of fact to decide through
the adversarial system.
(“The
focus
solely
on
[of
the
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95
Rule
principles
702
and
inquiry]
...
must
methodology,
not
on
conclusions that they generate.”).
be
the
To the extent Burns
during her trial testimony did not identify a specific
prisoner
or
example
for
every
single
observation
or
conclusion drawn from her interviews, document reviews,
and site visits, the court considered those factors in
considering the weight of her testimony, rather than
its admissibility.
The defendants’ second contention is that Burns’s
opinion as to the adequacy of individual care does not
establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
This is not a
Daubert objection at all: establishing legal liability
13
is not a requirement under the Daubert analysis.
the
factfinder’s
opinions,
in
job
to
evaluate
conjunction
with
all
It is
competing
other
expert
admissible
evidence, to decide whether there has been a violation.
In sum, Burns’s testimony was sufficiently reliable to
survive a Daubert challenge.
B. Eldon Vail
The
defendants
testimony
and
plaintiffs’
objected
expert
under
report
correctional
Daubert
offered
by
to
the
Vail,
the
administration
expert,
asserting that he is not “qualified” to testify under
Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to offer an
opinion as to facilities that he did not visit.
Defs.’
Opp. to Pls.’ Motion to Certify a Class (doc. no. 810)
at 8 n.3.
Vail’s expert testimony is admissible. First, as
explained
in
the
class-certification
opinion
with
regards to Burns’s testimony, the case law indicates
that
an
expert
on
prison
14
conditions
is
not
categorically required to visit every single facility
in
order
Braggs
to
v.
offer
Dunn,
an
opinion
317
F.R.D.
on
at
systemic
645-49.
issues.
How
many
facilities an expert should visit in order to offer a
reliable
opinion
depends
circumstances presented.
that
he
public
did
not
documents
analyses,
operating
meeting
monthly
Vail
ADOC,
reviewed
including
statistical
procedures,
minutes,
the
care
to
facilities.4
internal
and
vulnerability
institutional
local
transcripts
standard
policies,
of
ADOC
officials’
Vail Testimony at
As with Burns’s analysis of mental-health
delivery
evidence
and
reports,
depositions, and incident reports.
1-24, 1-65.
issues
Second, for the facilities
visit,
of
on
within
support
ADOC,
his
Vail
cites
conclusions
documentary
about
ADOC
In fact, Vail’s overall conclusion--that
4. For
that
reason,
Vail’s
testimony
is
distinguishable from cases the defendants cite where
experts connected existing data to the opinion by only
the
“ipse
dixit
of
the
expert,”
without
other
supporting evidence. Hendrix v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609
F. 3d 1183, 1201 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
Similarly, Vail’s testimony is
15
ADOC
facilities
are
overall
overcrowded
and
understaffed, with some variances across facilities--is
essentially undisputed: ADOC Commissioner Dunn himself
called the two problems a “two-headed monster” facing
the Department.
Dunn Testimony at 2-45.
that
not
Vail
was
familiar
with
To the extent
the
minutiae
of
everyday operations of the facilities that he did not
visit, or the exact magnitude of understaffing at each
facility,
testimony,
such
shortfalls
rather
than
go
to
the
admissibility.
weight
See
of
his
United
States v. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th
Cir. 2013) (holding that the availability of a “more
distinguishable from another case that the defendants
cite, Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc.,
387 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
In that case,
the trial court excluded an expert’s damages estimate
because it was based on the financial performance of a
corporation that was not comparable to the plaintiff
corporation. Also, there was no evidence derived from
the plaintiff corporation or any connection between the
comparator corporation and the plaintiff corporation.
In contrast, here, Vail based his overall conclusion on
his site visits of select facilities, as well as
voluminous documentary evidence from the facilities
that he did not visit, all of which are operated by the
defendants. In other words, these cases are simply not
comparable.
16
thorough,
more
necessarily
complex”
render
a
less
inadmissible under Daubert).
in
the
Daubert
order
methodology
does
precise
not
methodology
The court therefore found
that
Vail’s
testimony
was
admissible.
C. Dr. Raymond Patterson’s Audit Results
The plaintiffs challenged as unreliable Patterson’s
testimony and his report about an ADOC medical-records
audit that he and other defense experts performed.
particular,
the
methodology
plaintiffs
was
argued
unreliable,
that
and,
the
even
In
audit
if
the
methodology were sound, the defense experts carried out
the
audit
in
an
unreliable
manner.
Based
on
Patterson’s testimony regarding the methodology and the
audit process, the court, with the previously entered
Daubert
order,
found
that
the
audit
results
were
admissible.
According
to
Patterson,
he
and
other
defense
experts designed the audit tools in May 2016 to measure
17
patients’ access to an appropriate level of care in
high-risk and high-volume areas of mental-health care.
The resulting audit tools targeted timeliness of care
in six areas: mental-health evaluation at intake and
after
referrals;
suicide
risk
assessments;
treatment
planning; and three types of side-effect monitoring for
psychotropic
medications.
The
spent
days
facilities
three
in
six
defense
experts
going
medical records along with ADOC employees.
included
the
findings
in
his
expert
then
through
Patterson
report
and
testified during the trial regarding the methodology
and conclusions that he drew from the audit.
Patterson’s
established
Daubert
testimony
sufficient
challenge.
regarding
reliability
Patterson
the
to
testified
methodology
overcome
that
he
a
has
done hundreds of similar audits to evaluate a prison
mental-health
care
system,
non-litigation purposes.
for
both
litigation
and
He explained that, although
the audit measured only six high-impact and high-volume
areas, it was a part of his systemic evaluation of
18
mental-health
care
document reviews.
within
ADOC,
complementing
his
Furthermore, he testified that the
audit results are replicable, because another team can
verify
the
data--the
audit
medical
conduct the audit.
the
audit
results
if
given
records--that
the
his
underlying
team
used
to
In other words, he attested that
methodology
is
generally
accepted
in
evaluating a health-care system and can be tested and
replicated, both of which are indicia of reliability
under Daubert.
The plaintiffs, during their cross examination of
Patterson,
appropriately
raised
issues
regarding
the
limited nature of the audits and what the results do
not show.
For example, the audit results, as Patterson
conceded, do not show what providers did in response to
side-effect monitoring test results.
Furthermore, in
some cases, the audit results were inconclusive because
of
the
limited
certain
facility.
type
number
of
of
patients
side-effect
who
monitoring
required
in
a
that
However, these shortfalls of a study are
19
“more appropriately considered an objection going to
the
weight
of
the
evidence
rather
than
its
admissibility.”
Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc.,
654
1190,
1193-94
and
citation
F.3d
quotation
(11th
Cir.
omitted)
2011)
(internal
(allowing
expert
testimony based on methods that the opponent challenged
as “imprecise and unspecific,” because the criticisms
of
the
study
admissibility).
go
to
the
weight,
rather
than
In other words, these inadequacies in
the audit methodology were appropriately addressed by
the
adversarial
presentation
precluding
of
the
system
of
contrary
related
cross-examination
evidence,
expert
rather
testimony
and
than
from
by
being
presented during the trial.
As
for
plaintiffs
the
implementation
contended
that
the
of
the
audit
audit,
tools
the
changed
throughout the process, and that the audit process did
not
sufficiently
safeguard
against
irregularities
in
pulling audit samples or ensure that the audit data
entries
accurately
reflected
20
the
underlying
data.
However, as with the limitations of the audit results
discussed above, these limitations or shortfalls in the
audit process go to the weight of the audit results,
rather than admissibility, since Daubert requires the
methodology to be only “sufficiently reliable” and “not
without
foundation,”
persuasive.
rather
than
faultless
or
even
Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 665-66 (11th
Cir. 2001); see also Quiet Tech. DC–8, Inc., 326 F.3d
at 1341 (“[I]t is not the role of the district court to
make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of
the proffered evidence” under Daubert).
Indeed, the
plaintiffs were able to point out errors on the audit
forms
and
results
raise
during
doubts
the
about
cross
the
accuracy
examination
of
of
audit
Patterson.
Therefore, with the previously entered Daubert order,
the court found that the audit-implementation issues
raised
by
through
excluding
the
the
the
plaintiffs
adversarial
results
were
system,
from
21
properly
rather
consideration
addressed
than
by
by
the
factfinder,
and
that
Patterson’s
testimony
regarding
the audit results was admissible.
D. Robert Ayers
The plaintiffs initially challenged defense expert
Ayers’s methodology under Daubert, arguing that relying
primarily
opinion
on
interviews
about
unreliable.
the
with
quality
of
staff
to
formulate
mental-health
care
an
is
See Pls.’ Opposition to Defs.’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (doc. no. 888) at 250-64.
In their
post-trial brief, however, the plaintiffs conceded that
their
objection
should
be
overruled.
Given
that
Ayers’s methodology--site visits, document review, and
staff
interviews--did
not
deviate
significantly
from
the methodology employed by other experts in this case
whose methodology was found reliable, the court, with
the
previously
Ayers’s
court
entered
methodology
further
found
was
that
Daubert
order,
sufficiently
the
limited
found
that
reliable.
The
nature
his
of
supporting data and his testimony that he did not have
22
sufficient time to investigate certain issues bore on
only
the
weight
admissibility.
of
his
expert
Therefore,
opinion,
the
rather
plaintiffs’
than
initial
objection against Ayers’s methodology was overruled in
the Daubert order.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the court in its order
of June 27, 2017 (doc. no. 1284) denied the plaintiffs’
motion
to
Patterson’s
defendants’
exclude
Ayers’s
testimony
motions
to
testimony
(doc.
no.
exclude
and
888)
Burns
portions
and
and
of
the
Vail’s
testimony (doc. nos. 807 & 810).
DONE, this the 13th day of July, 2017.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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