Dunn et al v. Thomas et al

Filing 610

PHASE 2 OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT: it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The motion for leave to amend plaintiffs' complaint (doc. no. 549 ) filed by plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) is granted. (2) If defenda nts conclude that additional discovery--limited to the question whether ADAP is entitled to assert associational standing--is necessary, they are to file a request that discovery be reopened, specifying what discovery they seek, within five days of the date this order is issued. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/5/2016. (kh, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his
official capacity as
Commissioner of
the Alabama Department of
Corrections, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:14cv601-MHT
(WO)

PHASE 2 OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
The

plaintiffs

in

this

putative

class-action

lawsuit are dozens of state prisoners and the Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP).
are

the

Alabama

Department

of

The defendants

Corrections,

its

Commissioner, and its Associate Commissioner of Health
Services.

In Phase 2 of this case, with which this

opinion is concerned, plaintiffs assert the following
claims:

constitutionally

inadequate

medical

and

mental-health treatment in Alabama prison facilities,
involuntary

medication

without

due

process,

and

discrimination

against

disabilities.

prisoners

with

mental

They rely with respect to these claims

on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (as enforced
through

42

U.S.C.

§ 1983),

the

Americans

with

Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134), and § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794).
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question) and § 1343 (civil rights).
This case is currently before the court on ADAP’s
motion

for

leave

associational

to

amend

standing.

the
This

complaint

to

amendment

assert

will

be

permitted for the reasons discussed below.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that
after a party has amended its pleading once as a matter
of

course,

consent

of

subsequent
the

amendments

opposing

parties

require
or

leave

either
of

the

court.

Here, plaintiffs’ complaint has already been amended,
and defendants oppose the motion for leave to amend it
further.

Leave of court is therefore required.

2

Rule 15(a) states that leave to amend “shall be
freely given when justice so requires.”

However, “the

liberal amendment policy prescribed by Rule 15 does not
mean that leave will be granted in all cases.

Indeed,

in determining whether ‘justice [] requires’ that leave
to amend be granted, district courts may consider such
factors

[]

as

‘undue

delay,

bad

faith

or

dilatory

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure

deficiencies

undue

prejudice

by

to

amendments

the

opposing

previously
party

by

allowed,
virtue

of

allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment,
etc.’”

Jeter v. Montgomery Cty., 480 F. Supp. 2d 1293,

1297 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Thompson, J.) (quoting Foman v.
Davis,

371

U.S.

178,

182

(1962),

and

citing

Andrx

Pharms., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2005)).
Defendants identify two grounds for denying ADAP
leave to amend: (1) ADAP’s delay in seeking to amend,
and (2) their related contention that “[a]llowing the
amendment after the fact discovery deadline has passed

3

places the State at a disadvantage.”
no. 583) at 2.

Defs.’ Obj. (doc.

However, defendants have not shown that

they will suffer significant (indeed, any) prejudice on
either account.
Although this litigation was commenced two years
ago, and the complaint has thrice been amended, the
timing

of

ADAP’s

motion

seeking

amendment is not unreasonable.

leave

for

a

fourth

The motion was filed

prior to the deadline this court set for amendments to
pleadings; defendants were therefore on notice that a
further amendment might still occur.

In addition, the

motion was filed over a month prior to the deadline for
dispositive and class-certification motions, and more
than three months prior to the trial of the phase of
this case that remains in active litigation. *

*

The first phase of this case has preliminarily
been settled; assuming the settlement is finally
approved, this amendment to the complaint will have no
effect with respect to the claims resolved in that
settlement.
Were the court to reject the settlement
and reinstate the litigation of the first phase,
defendants would of course be afforded an opportunity
to contest ADAP’s associational standing with respect
to the revived claims.
4

Additionally,

the

amendment

represents

merely

a

clarification of the legal basis for ADAP’s standing,
and involves no substantive change to the allegations
in the complaint.

Defendants have long been on notice

that ADAP intended to assert third-party standing; this
amendment

clarifies

only

that

in

addition

to

“organizational standing,” based on the contention that
“the ADOC policies and practices challenged ... serve
to

frustrate

and

perceptibly

impair

ADAP’s

advocacy

efforts and its ability to accomplish the statutory
purposes for which it was created,” Second Am. Compl.
(doc. no. 89-1) at 25 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)) (filed on Feb. 2,
2015), ADAP also asserts “associational standing ... on
behalf of its constituents who include any current or
future prisoner in the physical custody of ADOC who has
a disability [including mental illness],” Fourth Am.
Compl. (doc. no. 549-1) at 24 (citing Doe v. Stincer,
175 F.3d 879, 886 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also id. at
131-32

(describing

ADAP’s

statutory

5

authority,

and

stating

that

conducted

ADAP

an

Defendant

“maintains

advisory

administrative

ADOC’s

practices

councils,

investigation

with

respect

to

has
into

ADAP’s

constituents, and has received communications from its
constituents

incarcerated

in

Defendant

ADOC’s

facilities regarding Defendant ADOC’s practices”).
The

only

potential

prejudice

resulting

from

the

timing of ADAP’s motion that defendants identified in
their opposition brief was the inability to conduct
discovery

“on

the

issues

for

which

ADAP

amend.”

Defs.’ Obj. (doc. no. 583) at 2.

amended

complaint

asserting

expressly

associational

“coextensive[]”
members.

with

states

standing

those

of

to
the

seeks

to

However, the

that

ADAP

is

pursue

claims

putative

class

Fourth Am. Compl. (doc. no. 549-1) at 131.

There is, therefore, no need for additional discovery
on

the

substantive

claims

raised

by

ADAP

as

a

plaintiff.
To the extent that defendants wish to challenge
whether ADAP functions like the protection and advocacy

6

organization

that

the

Eleventh

Circuit

held

had

associational standing in Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879
(11th Cir. 1999), the parties agreed during a telephone
conference held on the record on August 2, 2016, that
minimal if any additional discovery would be needed to
do

so.

Defendants

have

corporate representative

already

deposed

regarding its

ADAP’s

organizational

structure and processes, and ADAP agreed during this
telephone

conference

that

it

could

additional discovery very rapidly.
will

reopen

allowing

discovery

defendants

production--if,

in

it--defendants

will

for
to

the

they

suffer

no

any

Because the court
limited

obtain

fact,

produce

this
decide

prejudice

purpose

of

additional
to

request
from

the

amendment.
Moreover,

allowing

this

amendment

will

have

significant value to the court and to the parties in
adjudicating this case.
explained,

ADAP

is

As the court has previously

authorized

under

federal

law

to

“‘protect and advocate the rights of [] individuals

7

[with mental illness and other disabilities] through
activities

to

ensure

the

enforcement

Constitution and Federal and State statutes.’”

of

the

Dunn v.

Dunn, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2016 WL 324990, at *12 (M.D.
Ala. Jan. 27, 2016) (Thompson, J.) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 10801(b)(2)).

ADAP’s

participation

is

therefore

important to the fair and efficient adjudication of a
case of this scope and complexity, allegedly involving
many

of

the

mentally

ill

Alabamians ADAP serves.

and

otherwise

disabled

This amendment will ensure

that the basis for ADAP’s standing as a plaintiff is
asserted (and--to the extent defendants challenge it-contested) squarely.
In light of the absence of any significant reason
not to grant ADAP leave to amend, and the benefits of
allowing

the

amendment,

the

court

concludes

justice requires that leave be granted.

* * *
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

8

that

(1) The

motion

complaint

for

(doc.

leave
no.

to

549)

amend
filed

plaintiffs’
by

plaintiff

Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) is
granted.
(2) If

defendants

conclude

that

additional

discovery--limited to the question whether ADAP
is

entitled

standing--is

to

assert

necessary,

they

associational
are

to

file

a

request that discovery be reopened, specifying
what discovery they seek, within five days of
the date this order is issued.
The

clerk

of

the

court

is

DIRECTED

to

docket

plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint (doc. no. 549-1).
DONE, this the 5th day of August, 2016.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE