Martin v. Houston et al (JOINT ASSIGN)

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: construing 41 reply as containing a renewed motion to dismiss Plf's RLUIPA claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); it is ORDERED that Dft's 41 renewed motion to dismiss Plf's RLUIPA claim is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 7/25/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist) (wcl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
RICKY MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RANDALL V. HOUSTON,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 2:14-CV-905-WKW
[WO]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the Order to Show Cause (Doc. # 38), which
addressed the issue of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claim. Plaintiff
filed a response to the show cause order (Doc. # 40). Defendant then filed a reply
(Doc. # 41), which is construed as containing a renewed motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Upon careful consideration, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claim, and the renewed motion to dismiss is due to be denied.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
At issue is whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. The parties do not contest personal
jurisdiction or venue.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They must only exercise
jurisdiction in cases within their authority as defined by Article III of the
Constitution and the relevant Congressional mandates. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999). Before taking action in a case,
the court must first determine that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over all the
claims raised therein. See id. at 410 (recognizing the court’s duty to raise the issue
of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte wherever it may be lacking). Where the
issue of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is raised in connection with a motion
to dismiss, the relevant inquiry is whether the complaint sufficiently alleges a factual
basis of subject-matter jurisdiction. Cf. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733
F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013).
To exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over an RLUIPA claim, the court must
satisfy itself that one of three prerequisites is met: (1) the land use regulation causing
the alleged substantial burden on the exercise of religion is part of a plan or activity
that receives federal funding; (2) the substantial burden on religious exercise affects
interstate commerce; or (3) the substantial burden arises from the state or local
government’s procedures for making individualized assessments of proposed
property use. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2); Midrash Shepardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,
366 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004).
2

When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as
true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed,
Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2012). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The claim is
facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III. BACKGROUND
This action comprises statutory and constitutional challenges to an act of the
Alabama legislature. The relevant facts and procedural history were addressed in
detail in the Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Defendant’s previous motion
to dismiss. (Doc. # 37.) For the sake of convenience, they will be briefly discussed
below.
A.

Facts
Plaintiff Ricky Martin (“Martin”) is the pastor of Triumph Church in Clanton,

Alabama. For several years, Martin carried on a Christian ministry through which
he offered transitional housing to registered sex offenders who were recently
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released from incarceration. He housed these men in mobile homes, which he placed
on a parcel of property adjacent to Triumph Church. The ministry carried on for
several years until the state passed a law disrupting its operation.
The statutory measure at issue, which originated as House Bill 556, and is
codified at Alabama Code § 45-11-82 (the “Act”), provides that multiple unrelated
adult sex offenders may not establish residency in the same home. It also provides
that an adult sex offender may not establish a residence on the same lot or property
as another adult sex offender unless the homes are at least 300 feet apart. Any
violation of these provisions constitutes a public nuisance and is punishable by fine.
The Act empowers the Chilton County District Attorney, Defendant Randall V.
Houston (“Houston”), to bring civil enforcement actions against owners or lessors
of non-compliant properties.
Martin alleges that the Act only applies to his property. All of the mobile
homes on his property were within 300 feet of each other, and all of the men living
in his settlement were adult sex offenders. By its terms, the Act only reaches
property within the confines of Chilton County, Alabama. Ala. Code § 45-11-82(a).
Martin alleges that the bill’s sponsors supported its passage with the intent of forcing
him to dismantle his ministry. In his Answer, Houston admits that Martin is the only
person on whom he served a notice of enforcement of the Act. (Doc. # 39, at 3.)

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Upon receiving notice that his property constituted a public nuisance under
the Act, Martin discontinued his settlement ministry. He evicted all settlement
residents to avoid being fined under the Act’s civil enforcement provision and has
not since taken in any residents. If not for Houston’s threat to bring an enforcement
action against him, Martin would have continued operating his settlement ministry.
He brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
B.

Procedural History
In the operative amended complaint (Doc. # 22), Martin raises four claims:

(1) that the Act violates RLUIPA; (2) that the Act infringes upon his First
Amendment rights; (3) that the Act constitutes an unlawful bill of attainder; and (4)
that the Act violates his rights to procedural due process.

Houston initially

responded to the Amended Complaint with a motion to dismiss (Doc. # 25).
That motion was denied in its entirety, but with the caveat that Martin must
show cause why his RLUIPA claim should not be dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction (Docs. # 37 and 38). Martin filed a response to the order to show
cause (Doc. # 40), and Houston filed a reply (Doc. # 41). In his reply, Houston
reanimates his argument that Martin’s RLUIPA claim should be dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The reply is thus construed
as containing a renewed motion to dismiss, which will be addressed in conjunction
with the issue of RLUIPA jurisdiction.
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IV. DISCUSSION
In his First Cause of Action, Martin alleges that the Act constitutes a land use
regulation that imposes a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion in
violation of RLUIPA.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).

RLUIPA’s jurisdictional

prerequisites will first be generally discussed. Those principles will be applied to
determine whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Martin’s RLUIPA
claim. The issues raised in Houston’s renewed motion to dismiss will then be
addressed.
A.

RLUIPA’s Jurisdictional Prerequisites
Congress enacted RLUIPA with the intention of ensuring broad religious

protections. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). RLUIPA provides, in
relevant part,1 that “no government shall impose or implement a land use regulation
in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). If the land use regulation does impose a substantial
burden on religious exercise, the government must demonstrate that the regulation
furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
doing so. Id.

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RLUIPA also reaches governmental action that imposes a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of persons institutionalized in government facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1; see
42 U.S.C. § 1997 (defining “institution”). Martin’s claim relies only on RLUIPA’s land use
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
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RLUIPA’s land use regulation provision only applies, however, where one of
three jurisdictional prerequisites is met. Martin relies solely on the “individualized
assessments” prerequisite, arguing that the substantial burden on his free exercise of
religion arises from the government’s procedures for making individualized
assessments of proposed property use. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). Because
these prerequisites have been characterized as jurisdictional, Midrash Shepardi, 366
F.3d at 1225, the court must first satisfy itself that the circumstances at bar fit this
statutory paradigm.
The Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. # 37) denying Houston’s motion
to dismiss raised sua sponte the issue of RLUIPA jurisdiction. It questioned whether
the allegations in the amended complaint were sufficient to state a basis of subjectmatter jurisdiction in light of the fact that the Act involves no system of granting
permits or variances for specific types of property use. Because the Act determined
conclusively that the existing settlement on Martin’s property constituted a public
nuisance, it was unclear whether the substantial burden at issue arose from the
government’s implementation of a land use regulation under which the government
makes individualized assessments of the proposed use of property.

See §

2000cc(a)(2)(C).
The parties’ supplemental briefing on this issue has clarified the nature of
Martin’s allegations with respect to his RLUIPA claim. Upon consideration of these
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new arguments, the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to support
the finding that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Martin’s RLUIPA
claim. This finding will be addressed in detail below.
B.

Whether the Court Has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Martin’s
RLUIPA Claim
As noted above, in support of his argument that the court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over his RLUIPA claim, Martin relies solely on the individualized
assessments prerequisite. Under that prerequisite, RLUIPA applies, and the court
has subject-matter jurisdiction over the relevant claim, where
the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use
regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government
makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that
permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the
proposed uses for the property involved.
§ 2000cc(a)(2)(C). See Midrash Shepardi, 366 F.3d at 1225. This provision can be
parsed into three individual elements. To adequately plead a basis of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the allegations in the amended complaint must be sufficient to plausibly
support the findings (1) that the Act constitutes a land use regulation, (2) that the Act
is a regulation under which the government makes individualized assessments, and
(3) that the Act permits the government to assess the proposed use of property. See
§ 2000cc(a)(2)(C). These elements will be addressed in turn.

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1.

Whether the Act Constitutes a Land Use Regulation

The allegations in the amended complaint must first support the finding that
the Act constitutes a land use regulation. RLUIPA defines “land use regulation” as
“a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts
a claimant’s use or development of land.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). Martin
adequately alleges that he owns the property at issue and that the Act restricts his
use or development of that land. Whether the Act constitutes a land use regulation
within the meaning of RLUIPA turns on whether the Act qualifies as a zoning or
landmarking law.
Martin’s allegations do not suggest that the Act qualifies as a landmarking
law. Such laws, as their name suggests, generally relate to measures that restrict
land use for the purpose of protecting buildings, sites, works of art, or other objects
that have special historic, aesthetic, or other value. See Congregation Adas Yereim
v. City of New York, 673 F. Supp. 2d 94, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). The amended
complaint includes no allegations supporting the finding that the Act is designed to
protect landmarks of this sort.
Martin’s allegations are sufficient, however, to support the finding that the
Act qualifies as a zoning law.

It first bears noting that the precise definition of

“zoning” is difficult to delineate. Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208,
216 (2d Cir. 2012). In general terms, zoning refers to the “legislative division of a
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region, esp[ecially] a municipality, into separate districts with different regulations
within the districts for land use, building size, and the like.” Zoning, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); cf. Ala. Code § 11-52-70 (authorizing municipal
corporations within Alabama to divide territory for different uses).
The Act makes territorial divisions in the same way. It divides the state of
Alabama into two districts: one where adult sex offenders may not live within 300
feet of each other, and one where they may. The former includes the entirety of
Chilton County, and the latter comprises all other counties within the state. Rather
than imposing in personam restrictions on adult sex offenders themselves, the
legislature opted to limit the acceptable uses of property within the Chilton County
zone.

In this sense, for purposes of applying the individualized assessments

prerequisite, the Act qualifies as a zoning law, and thus constitutes a land use
regulation. The allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to support this
element of the individualized assessments inquiry.
Houston urges the court to find otherwise by operation of certain canons of
statutory construction. He mentions first that courts should narrowly read statutes
“purporting to preempt traditional state prerogatives: ‘if Congress intends to alter
the usual constitutional balance between the States and Federal Government, it must
make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” (Doc.
# 26, at 39; Doc. # 41, at 5–6 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
10

58, 65 (1989)).) Beyond offering this quotation from Will, Houston makes no effort
to explain how this principle of statutory construction applies to the circumstances
at bar.

He fails to explicate, for example, how RLUIPA alters the usual

constitutional balance between states and the federal government. Nor does he
elaborate on the way in which a narrower reading of the individualized assessment
provision would avoid preemption of a traditional state prerogative. To the extent
that RLUIPA upsets the ability of the states to enforce their own zoning regulations,
the text of the statute makes Congress’s intent to do so unmistakably clear.
In similarly cursory fashion, Houston makes reference to the principle that
courts should construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional questions. Aside from
noting that Congress passed RLUIPA in the wake of constitutional challenges to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Houston fails to explain which particular
constitutional question the court should avoid in this instance. (See Doc. # 26, at 39
(citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)); Doc. # 41, at 5 (citing
Edward J. Bartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).) He briefly mentions concerns about Congressional authority
to enact legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment, but fails to identify the way
that this question arises in the context of Martin’s RLUIPA claim. The court cannot
divine his meaning from isolated reference to these canons and their supporting case

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law. Without meaningful argument, these principles cannot overcome the finding
that the Act qualifies as a zoning law within the traditional meaning of that phrase.
Houston also argues that RLUIPA’s legislative history counsels in favor of a
narrower reading of the phrase “land use regulation.” It is true, as Houston notes,
that Congress chose to enact a version of RLUIPA that only applies to zoning or
landmarking laws as opposed to a version that would have applied to all laws or
decisions restricting land use. But the Act fits squarely within the general definition
of “zoning law,” and thus falls within the category of laws intended to be subject to
RLUIPA’s land use provision.
To the extent Houston references statements added to the Congressional
record associated with RLUIPA’s passage, those statements have no bearing on the
application of RLUIPA to the Act. The particular statement to which Houston refers,
which came from Senator Dewine of Massachusetts, expressed concern with the
ability of municipalities to enforce building codes, fire codes, and other health and
safety codes without running afoul of RLUIPA. See 146 Cong. Rec. S10992-01
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 2000). The Act, however, is not akin to a building or fire code
intended to prevent hazardous conditions inside of buildings. Instead of ensuring
that the structures themselves are safely maintained, the Act regulates which persons
are allowed to occupy certain structures within Chilton County.

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With respect to Houston’s argument that treating the Act as a land use
regulation is inconsistent with the history of RLUIPA’s land-use provision, he again
fails to explain how this history comes to bear in the context of the Act and Martin’s
settlement. Houston merely provided copies of cases outlining that history, offering
no explanation as to how it should inform the resolution of the issues now before the
court. To the extent that RLUIPA’s history confirms that Congress intended that it
apply only to land use and the activities of institutionalized persons, that history is
unremarkable.

This is because the allegations in the amended complaint are

sufficient to support the finding that the Act qualifies as a land use regulation and
thus fits within the limited parameters under which RLUIPA applies. Because the
allegations support the reasonable inference that the Act divides the state of Alabama
into territories and prescribes permissible uses of land within those territories, Martin
has adequately pleaded that the Act is a land use regulation.
2.

Whether the Act is a Land Use Regulation Under Which the
Government Makes Individualized Assessments

The allegations in the amended complaint must also plausibly support the
finding that the Act is a land use regulation under which the government makes
individualized assessments of the use of land. Martin’s allegations suggest that the
government made two individualized assessments relating to the Act. First, the
allegations suggest that the Alabama legislature designed the Act after making an
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individualized assessment of the way that Martin was using his property. Second,
the allegations suggest that Houston, implementing the Act’s terms, individually
assessed Martin’s property use and determined that it constituted a public nuisance.
These allegations are sufficient to plausibly support the finding that the Act is a land
use regulation under which the government makes individualized assessments
regarding the use of land.
One potential individualized assessment of Martin’s property use occurred
when the Alabama legislature passed the Act. Martin alleges that the Act applies to
no property other than his, and Houston admitted that Martin is the only person on
whom he served a notice of enforcement of the Act. Martin further alleges that
Alabama House Representative Kurt Wallace (“Wallace”) and the Chilton County
District Attorney’s office explained to news media outlets that their purpose in
supporting the bill was specifically to force Martin to disband his settlement. These
allegations are sufficient to support the inference that the Act’s passage involved an
individualized assessment of Martin’s property use.
Houston is correct to note, however, that RLUIPA requires something more
than a mere legislative assessment of an individual’s property use. RLUIPA is
designed to reach the implementation of a land use regulation in a manner that
burdens the exercise of religion. § 2000cc(a)(1). And the individualized assessment
prerequisite is only satisfied where the burden is imposed in the implementation of
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a land use regulation under which the government makes individualized assessments
of the proposed use of property. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). As noted in Part IV.B.1, supra,
the allegations are sufficient to support the finding that the Act is a land use
regulation. But the legislature’s action in passing this land use regulation is not the
same as implementing it. Martin must sufficiently allege that the Act is a regulation
under which the state makes, by implementing the terms of the Act after its passage,
individualized assessments of the proposed use of property.
Because Martin alleged that Houston applied the Act, after its passage, to
prevent him from maintaining his settlement operations in the future, the amended
complaint is sufficient to satisfy this element of the individualized assessments
prerequisite. After the Act’s passage, and just before its effective date, Houston
warned Martin that his settlement arrangement would constitute a public nuisance
under the Act. He later ordered Martin to evict all settlement residents or face
enforcement action, which would include a fine. In taking these actions, Houston
had to apply the terms of the Act to the settlement as it existed on Martin’s property.
That is, Houston had to confirm that Martin’s property was located within the
confines of Chilton County, that the residents living in the settlement were adult sex
offenders, and that the mobile homes on the property were located within 300 feet
of each other. Houston also had to determine, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion,
whether expending his resources on the enforcement of the Act as against Martin’s
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property was a game worth the candle. Whether it was a formal or informal
assessment is immaterial—the individualized assessments prerequisite contemplates
both. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). If the legislature truly designed the Act with the intention
of forcing Martin to dismantle his settlement, this determination likely was not
difficult for Houston to make. But it was an individual assessment nonetheless.
Anticipating this line of reasoning, Houston contends that he did not make an
individualized assessment of the use of Martin’s property under the Act because the
Act conclusively determines that living arrangements violating the 300-foot rule
constitute a public nuisance. The Act does provide, in no uncertain terms, that any
property arrangement in which adult sex offenders live within 300 feet of each other
constitutes a public nuisance. Ala. Code § 45-11-82(c). The court found as much
in denying Houston’s initial motion to dismiss, noting that Martin’s as-applied
challenges to the Act were ripe for judicial review. (Doc. # 37, at 15.)
This finding responded directly to Houston’s ripeness arguments, rebutting
his contention that Martin might have been allowed to argue, in enforcement
proceedings, that his settlement in fact does not constitute a public nuisance. Under
the unmistakable language of the Act, the arrangement existing at Martin’s property
did constitute a public nuisance. To suggest that Martin could appear in court to
successfully argue otherwise is a fanciful suggestion of a futile argument.

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But the fact that the Act allows no room for argument as to what constitutes a
public nuisance does not mean that Houston did not make an individualized
assessment of Martin’s property use thereunder. Houston still had to assess, in an
individualized fashion, whether the circumstances warranted enforcement action.
After assessing the settlement as it existed on Martin’s property, Houston decided
that the arrangement ran afoul of the 300-foot rule and that it was appropriate to
serve Martin with an enforcement notice. This is sufficient, at least for purposes of
determining whether the amended complaint sufficiently alleges a basis of subjectmatter jurisdiction, to support the finding that the Act is a land use regulation under
which the government makes individualized assessments of property use.
3.

Whether the Assessment Was of a Proposed Use of Property

The allegations in the amended complaint thirdly must support the finding that
the Act allowed Houston to make an individualized assessment of the proposed use
of Martin’s property. Upon consideration of Martin’s response to the show cause
order, it is clear that the allegations are adequate to support this element of the
individualized assessments prerequisite.
In the amended complaint, Martin alleges that he would have continued
housing adult sex offenders on his property if not for Houston’s threat to bring an
enforcement action under the Act. Martin signaled his intention to continue using
his property for the settlement when he wrote to Wallace and urged him not to
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support the Act’s passage. The nature of Houston’s enforcement notice made it clear
that he understood that Martin intended to continue his settlement ministry for an
indefinite future period. Houston ordered Martin to evict the settlement residents
and warned Martin that his continuation of the settlement after the Act’s effective
date would result in substantial fines.

Houston thus made an individualized

assessment of Martin’s intended future use of the property.
In light of the foregoing, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over
Martin’s RLUIPA claim.

Examining the amended complaint in light of the

individualized assessments prerequisite, it is clear that Martin’s allegations support
the finding that the burden on his religious exercise resulted from the implementation
of a land use regulation under which the government made an individualized
assessment of his proposed use of property. See § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). Because the
amended complaint adequately pleads this basis of subject-matter jurisdiction, the
discussion now turns to the substance of Houston’s renewed motion to dismiss.
C.

Whether Martin Adequately Pleaded an RLUIPA Claim
In his reply to Martin’s response to the show cause order, Houston again

argues that Martin’s RLUIPA claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). He contends, in
support of this renewed motion, that the Act is not a land use regulation within the

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meaning of RLUIPA and that the Act does not impose a substantial burden on
Martin’s free exercise of religion.2 These grounds will be addressed in that order.
First, based on the analysis in Part IV.B.1, supra, the allegations are sufficient
to support the finding that the Act constitutes a land use regulation. Because it
divides the state of Alabama into districts and prescribes permissible uses of land
within those districts, it fits the conventional definition of “zoning law.”
Accordingly, to the extent that Houston argues that the Act is not a land use
regulation, his renewed motion to dismiss is due to be denied.
Second, Martin’s allegations are sufficient to support the finding that the Act
imposes a substantial burden on Martin’s free exercise of religion. Under RLUIPA,
a government action imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion
where it places “significant pressure” on the exercise of religion such that it “directly
coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.” Midrash
Shepardi, 366 F.3d at 1227. The Act, as alleged in the amended complaint, applied
sufficient pressure on Martin such that it coerced him to cease his settlement
ministry, which he maintained in furtherance of his religious beliefs.
Houston argues, in support of his renewed motion to dismiss, that the Act does
not impose a substantial burden because Martin is free to establish a settlement

2

Houston acknowledged, in his briefing on the original motion to dismiss, that these are
the only grounds on which he seeks dismissal. (Doc. # 34, at 14.)
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ministry on any property located outside of Chilton County. As with Houston’s
effort to dismiss Martin’s First Amendment claim, this “anywhere but here”
possibility is insufficient to warrant dismissal of Martin’s RLUIPA claim. At this
stage of the litigation, there has been no discovery with respect to Martin’s ability to
establish a settlement ministry outside of Chilton County. It thus cannot be said that
Martin could re-establish his settlement elsewhere without having to overcome
substantial personal or financial burdens.
The allegations, which are taken as true and construed in the light most
favorable to Martin, indicate that Martin carries out his ministry in furtherance of
his Christian beliefs, and that the Act effectively forced him to cease this ministry.
If not for Houston’s threat to bring an enforcement action against him, Martin would
have continued to carry out what he believes is his religious duty by providing a
Christian housing environment to adult sex offenders.

These allegations are

sufficient to plausibly allege that the Act imposes a substantial burden on Martin’s
exercise of religion within the meaning of RLUIPA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Accordingly, to the extent Houston argues that the Act does not impose a substantial
burden, his renewed motion will be denied.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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(See Am. Compl., Doc. # 22, at 13–14.) It is ORDERED that Defendant’s renewed
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim (Doc. # 41) is DENIED.
DONE this 25th day of July, 2016.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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