Taylor v. Blue et al.
Filing
223
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion to Renew #214 their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court grants Defendants' request for the Court to address the question of whether their alleged actions violated clearly established law. But the Court denies the renewed motion for summary judgment as to whether Defendants' alleged actions violated clearly established law, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Keith Starrett on 11/4/2019. (kr, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
BONNY EDWARD TAYLOR
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-1163-KS-WC
HENRY P. HUGHES, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion to Renew
[214] their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The
Court grants Defendants’ request for the Court to address the question of whether
their alleged actions violated clearly established law. But the Court denies the
renewed motion for summary judgment as to whether Defendants’ alleged actions
violated clearly established law.
A.
Background
Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have discussed the factual
background of this case. See Taylor v. Hughes, 920 F.3d 729, 731-32 (11th Cir.
2019); Taylor v. Hughes, No. 2:14-CV-1163-KS-WC, 2017 WL 3836680, at *1-*2
(M.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2017). On March 6, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment [108] on the basis of qualified immunity. Among other things,
Defendants argued that Plaintiff could not meet his burden of showing that they
had violated clearly established law. The Court granted Defendants’ motion but did
not address the question of whether Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to
show that Defendants violated clearly established law. On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the Court’s judgment, but it likewise did not address the question
of whether Defendants’ alleged actions violated clearly established law.
Defendants filed a Motion to Renew [214] their motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity so that the Court can address the issue
of whether their alleged actions violated clearly established law. Defendants
incorporated and reasserted their previous arguments on the issue. Plaintiff
opposes the motion. He argues that this Court is prohibited from addressing the
issue by the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate rule.
B.
Law-of-the-Case Doctrine
First, Plaintiff argues that the Court may not address Defendants’ argument
because it is barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The “doctrine of the law of the
case precludes courts from revisiting issues that were already decided,” Cambridge
Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290, 1299 (11th Cir. 2018), either “expressly or by
necessary implication.” Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 881 F.3d 835,
843 (11th Cir. 2018). “In particular, findings of fact and conclusions of law by an
appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same
case in the trial court or on a later appeal.” Albert, 906 F.3d at 1299.
Here, the Court of Appeals did not address the question of whether
Defendants’ alleged actions violated clearly established law, despite Defendants’
raising it in their briefing on appeal. Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not address
2
the issue when it summarily denied Defendants’ amended petition for rehearing,
despite Defendants’ specifically raising the issue. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
did not decide the issue by necessary implication. It simply found that the Court
erred in its determination that Plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to
create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants violated Taylor’s
constitutional rights, not whether the facts of this case brought it within the
contours of previous Eleventh Circuit case law such that “a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Washington v. Rivera,
939 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2019). Therefore, the law-of-the-case doctrine is not
applicable.
C.
Mandate Rule
Plaintiff also argues that the mandate rule prohibits the Court’s
consideration of this issue. The mandate rule “is nothing more than a specific
application of the ‘law of the case’ doctrine.” Albert, 906 F.3d at 1299. “[A] district
court, when acting under an appellate court’s mandate, cannot vary it, or examine it
for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; . . . or
intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.” Id.
(punctuation omitted). “The trial court must implement both the letter and the
spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s opinion and the
circumstances it embraces.” Id.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals merely remanded the case “for further
3
proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Taylor, 920 F.3d at 735. There’s nothing
in the opinion or the mandate prohibiting this Court from addressing the question
of whether Defendants’ alleged actions violated clearly established law.
D.
Clearly Established Law
Defendants argue that Plaintiff can not cite clearly established law holding
that their alleged actions violated Taylor’s constitutional rights. “The defense of
qualified
immunity
completely
protects
government
officials
performing
discretionary functions from suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct
violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir.
2019) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003)). “A right is
clearly established when the right is ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Washington, 939 F.3d
at 1245 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 523 (1987)).
Qualified immunity cases are “highly fact-specific and involve an array of
circumstances pertinent to just what kind of notice is imputed to a government
official and to the constitutional adequacy of the official’s acts and omissions.”
Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007). “This is not to say that
an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has been previously held unlawful, but it is to say that in light of
4
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Washington, 939 F.3d at
1245. “[O]fficials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in drawing
analogies from previously decided cases,” and “awareness of the existence of an
abstract right . . . does not equate to knowledge that a defendant’s conduct infringes
that right.” Id. (quoting Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1015 (11th Cir. 2011))
(punctuation omitted). The question is “whether the state of the law gave the
defendants fair warning that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.” Id.
(quoting Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating that the constitutional right in question was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1232.
In November 2013, it was clearly established that “[u]nder the Eighth
Amendment, prisoners have a right to receive medical treatment for their illnesses
and injuries.” Taylor, 920 F.3d at 732-33 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104,
97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)). Likewise, it was clearly established that
pretrial detainees – like Taylor – are “protected to the same extent as prisoners by
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.” Id. at 733 (citing Cook ex rel.
Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Finally, it was “clear that an official acts with deliberate indifference when he
knows that an inmate is in serious need of medical care, but he fails or refuses to
obtain medical treatment for the inmate.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116
F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, LeFrere v. Quezada,
5
588 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants knew that Taylor was
in serious need of medical care, and whether they were deliberately indifferent to
that need. The law of this Circuit provides fair warning that actions and omissions
like those alleged here violate the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff must cite a case holding that an official
violated an inmate’s constitutional rights by delaying medical treatment after the
arresting officer represented that the inmate had been medically cleared. This is
clever framing of the issue, but Defendants would have the Court “add an
unwarranted degree of rigidity to the law of qualified immunity.” Greason v. Kemp,
891 F.2d 829, 834 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff is not required to cite cases with
facts “materially similar” to this one. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S. Ct.
2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002). Rather, the question is whether Defendants had fair
warning that failing or refusing to provide medical care to a detainee they allegedly
knew was in serious need of medical care violates that detainee’s constitutional
rights. It is beyond dispute that they did.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that there was a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Taylor’s
serious medical needs. “A finding of deliberate indifference necessarily precludes a
finding of qualified immunity; prison officials who deliberately ignore the serious
medical needs of inmates cannot claim that it was not apparent to a reasonable
6
person that such actions violated the law.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Detention Ctr.,
40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Hope, 536 U.S. at
739 n. 9. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants’ alleged actions violated clearly
established law requiring prison officials to provide medical treatment for a
detainee’s serious medical needs.
The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion to Renew
[214] their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The
Court grants Defendants’ request for the Court to address the question of whether
their alleged actions violated clearly established law. But the Court denies the
renewed motion for summary judgment as to whether Defendants’ alleged actions
violated clearly established law.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 4th day of November, 2019.
/s/
Keith Starrett
KEITH STARRETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?