Varden v. The City of Clanton

Filing 76

OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 9/14/2015. (wcl, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
PEGGY JONES, as
Administrator of the
Estate and Personal
Representative of Christy
Dawn Varden,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF CLANTON,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:15cv34-MHT
(WO)

OPINION
Plaintiff Peggy Jones brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
case

as

administrator

of

the

estate

of

Christy

Dawn

Varden, the original plaintiff in this case, who is now
deceased.

Administrator Jones claims that, in violation

of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Varden
was jailed because she was too poor to pay a small amount
of bail money, which she was required to pay under the
terms

of

defendant

City

of

Clanton’s

bail

schedule.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal
question) and 1343 (civil rights).

The

litigation

is

now

before

the

court

on

the

parties’ joint motion for entry of final judgment as to
all matters excluding attorney’s

fees.

Based on the

representations made on the record on July 1, 2015, and
after a review of the entire record, the motion will be
granted.

I.
Administrator

BACKGROUND

Jones

claims

that

Varden

was

unconstitutionally jailed because she could not afford to
pay the amount of money set by the Clanton Municipal
Court’s generic bail schedule.

Although the facts remain

disputed, the court will briefly review them--as alleged
by Jones--to give background for the court’s decision to
approve the settlement.
Administrator Jones alleges that Varden was arrested
and jailed for four misdemeanor offenses: shoplifting,
resisting arrest, failure to obey a police officer, and
possession

of

drug

paraphernalia.

At

the

time

of

Varden’s arrest, the Clanton Municipal Court utilized a
2

generic

bail

schedule

for

new

misdemeanor

arrests,

a

schedule from which it did not deviate: $ 500 per charge
(and $ 1,000 per DUI charge).

Those able to pay the

amount of the bond always obtained immediate release.
Those unable to pay were required to wait in jail until
the

next

afternoons.

court

date,

typically

held

on

Tuesday

The bail schedule required payment upfront

and provided no option to secure release on recognizance
or by an unsecured bond (that is, a promise to pay the
amount only if one did not appear for the scheduled court
date).1
Administrator Jones alleges that under the terms of
the

bail

schedule,

Varden

could

have

been

released

immediately had she paid a bond of $ 500 per charge, or
$ 2,000 in total.

Varden was indigent, however, and too

1. Some people who cannot make this payment seek the
assistance of third-party commercial bail agents, who
typically charge an upfront fee of 10 %. Thus, a bonding
agent would charge $ 50 for each $ 500 cash bond.
However, the availability of third-party agents is not
guaranteed, and agents are free to refuse to pay for the
release of any arrestee. Further, some arrestees cannot
afford even the 10 % fee.
3

poor to pay this amount.
Tuesday,

after

the

Because she was arrested on a

weekly

court

hearings

had

already

occurred, she would have been forced to remain in jail
for seven days, until the next week’s hearings, before
any judge reviewed her imprisonment or determined that
the required bail was appropriate and reasonable in the
context of her individualized circumstances.

However,

upon learning of the lawsuit, the city released her from
jail a day after her arrest.
Jones
arrested,

also

alleges

the

that

municipal

at

court

the

time

enforced

a

Varden

was

policy

of

barring the public from its courtroom.
The

parties

agree

that,

in

the

time

since

this

lawsuit was filed, the city’s municipal-court policies as
to

both

bail

Specifically,

and

while

public
the

access

standard

have

bail

changed.

schedule

for

secured bonds remains the same, any person arrested on a
misdemeanor violation is now released on an unsecured
appearance bond as long as she has no outstanding warrant
for

failure

to

appear.

Thus,
4

the

arrestee

can

be

released

without

any

upfront

payment,

but

will

be

required to pay the bond if she does not appear for her
scheduled court date.
failure-to-appear

An arrestee who has an outstanding

warrant

is

required

to

post

a

cash

bond, commercial surety bond, or signatory bond (backed
by real property) in the amount established by the bail
schedule.

The current policy also allows city officials

to deny the release of anyone who poses a danger to
herself

or

others

or

whose

release

is

precluded

by

statute.
For a person who does not obtain immediate release
under this policy, the municipal court will now hold a
hearing

within

48

hours

of

arrest

to

make

an

individualized determination as to whether the person may
be released, and if so, under what conditions.

The court

understands the requirement in the city’s current policy
guaranteeing “the arrestee ... the opportunity to object
to the bail amount set for him or her” to mean that the
municipal
ability

court
to

pay

will
in

consider
determining
5

objections
the

regarding

necessity

and

appropriate

amount

of

alternative to bail.

bail

and

whether

to

use

an

A new policy also allows the public

access to the courtroom during court sessions.

II. DISCUSSION
With the now pending joint motion for entry of final
judgment and the settlement agreement in support of it,
the parties seek a judgment that, among other things, (1)
resolves all disputes in this matter with the exception
of

attorney’s

fees;

(2)

declares

that

the

Clanton

Municipal Court’s current bail practices, as they are
reflected

in

the

settlement

agreement,

are

facially

constitutional; (3) requires that the parties comply with
the

settlement

litigation

with

agreement;
the

and

exception

(4)

that

dismisses

the

court

this

retains

jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and to
resolve the matter of attorney’s fees.
Because a court’s declaration reflects its own views,
this court has an independent obligation to make sure
that the declaration is accurate and appropriate.
6

Having

reviewed

the

Clanton

Municipal

Court’s

current

bail

practices, the court, as explained below, agrees with the
parties

that,

facially,

they

are

consistent

with

applicable law and, as result, the court will enter the
requested declaration.
The

Fourteenth

Amendment

prohibits

“punishing

a

person for his poverty,” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.
660,

671

(1983),

liberty based
amounts.

on

and

this

includes

deprivations

the inability to pay

of

fixed-sum bail

Indeed, this principle applies with special

force to criminal defendants awaiting trial, who have not
been found guilty of any crime.
Salerno,

481

U.S.

739,

750

See United States v.

(1987)

(recognizing

the

fundamental nature of the right to pretrial liberty).
While the “[u]tilization of a master bond schedule
provides speedy and convenient release for those who have
no

difficulty

in

meeting

its

requirements,”

“[t]he

incarceration of those who cannot [meet them], without
meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives,
infringes

on

both

due

process
7

and

equal

protection

requirements.”

Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057

(5th Cir. 1978)2.
Thus, the use of a secured bail schedule to detain a
person after arrest, without an individualized hearing
regarding the person’s indigence and the need for bail or
alternatives to bail, violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1056-57

(“[I]imprisonment solely because of indigent status is
invidious

discrimination

permissible. ...

and

not

constitutionally

Such requirement as is necessary to

provide reasonable assurance of the accused’s presence at
trial is constitutionally permissible.

Any requirement

in excess of that amount would be inherently punitive and
run afoul of due process requirements.”); Bearden, 461
U.S. at 673-74 (explaining, in the context of probation,
that to deprive a person

“of his conditional freedom

simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot
2. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions
of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the
close of business on September 30, 1981.
8

pay the fine ... would be contrary to the fundamental
fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); State
v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959, 968 (Ala. 1994) (“Under Alabama
law a defendant has an absolute right to bail in all
noncapital cases.

A system of bail based totally on some

form of monetary bail, and not providing for release on a
defendant’s

own

recognizance

circumstances,

would

be

in

appropriate

unconstitutional.”)

(internal

citations omitted).
Under this precedent, the court finds that, facially,
the

Clanton

Municipal

Court’s

new

bail

policy,

as

reflected in the municipal court’s new standing order,
see joint motion for entry of final judgment (doc. no.
72-2) at 8-9, and the court’s above explanation of its
understanding of that policy, see supra at 5-6, meets
constitutional due-process standards.

This court need

not--and

the

merely

will

not--determine

constitutes

the

whether

constitutional

new

minimum

policy
or

goes

beyond what is required.

But it does commend the city

and

for

the

municipal

court

9

taking

swift

action

to

rectify the former policies.

Bail schemes such as the

one formerly enforced in the municipal court result in
the unnecessary pretrial detention of people whom our
system of justice presumes to be innocent.

This period

of detention “has a detrimental impact on the individual.
It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life;
and it enforces idleness.”
514, 532 (1972).
one’s

defense,

detention
evidence,
defense”);

It can also impede the preparation of
see

hinders
contact
it

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.

can

id.
a

at

533

(noting

defendant’s

witnesses,
induce

or

even

that

“ability
otherwise

the

pretrial

to

gather

prepare

innocent

to

his

plead

guilty so that they may secure a quicker release, see
Andrew D. Leipold, “How the Pretrial Process Contributes
to Wrongful Convictions,” 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1123, 1154
(2005); and it may result in a period of detention that
exceeds the expected sentence, see Stephanos Bibas, “Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,” 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 2463, 2492 (2004).

Moreover, unnecessary pretrial

detention burdens States, localities, and taxpayers, and
10

its use appears widespread: nationwide, about 60 % of
jail inmates are pretrial detainees, and the majority of
those people are charged with nonviolent offenses.

See

Todd D. Minton and Zhen Zeng, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at Midyear
2014, at 4, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf
(PDF

replication

in

this

litigation

(doc.

no.

75));

Richard Williams, Bail or Jail, State Legislatures, May
2012,

http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-

justice/

bail-or-jail.aspx

(PDF

replication

in

this

litigation (doc. no. 75)).
Criminal defendants, presumed innocent, must not be
confined in jail merely because they are poor.
that

is

blind

defendants

to

to
pay

justice at all.

poverty
for

and

their

indiscriminately
physical

liberty

Justice
forces
is

no

By enacting a new policy that takes

account of the circumstances of those who come before its
courts,

the

Clanton

strides

in

improving

delivers.

Cf.

Municipal
the

Griffin

Court

quality

v.

of

Illinois,

11

has
the
351

made

marked

justice
U.S.

12,

it
16

(1956) (“Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak
and powerful alike is an age-old problem.

People have

never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that
goal.”).

***
The

court

will,

therefore,

enter

an

appropriate

judgment granting the parties’ joint motion for entry of
final judgment and, in accordance with that motion, (1)
declaring that the Clanton Municipal Court’s current bail
policies are facially constitutional, (2) requiring that
the parties comply with their settlement agreement, and
(3)

dismissing

administrator

Jones’s

claims

with

prejudice albeit with the exception that the court will

12

retain

jurisdiction

settlement

agreement

over
and

the

case

adjudicate

to
the

enforce
matter

the
of

attorney’s fees.
DONE, this the 14th day of September, 2015.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson___
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE